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Reflections on the Quarter

Anti-Missile Defense and Strategic Superiority

ON June 18 the Johnson Administration gave public recognition to the potential seriousness of developments in Soviet strategic capabilities. The United States, it was announced, has developed a new weapon known as the ICM (Improved Capability Missile), designed to assure for U.S. strategic forces the penetrability of Soviet defenses. The Administration views this weapon as "the long-range answer to the most pessimistic appraisal of what the Russians may be capable of installing in the way of sophisticated anti-missile missiles several years hence." It will probably not become operational in less than five years. Meanwhile, a Soviet ABM system may be deployed prior to the end of this decade. The Soviets have also pressed the development of an ICBM with improved accuracy which can carry several times the payload of existing U.S. missiles.

At a dinner meeting in Washington on June 20, Dr. Finn Larson, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, suggested that Soviet ICBM capabilities approached the U.S. level. Any gap, he declared, was "modest." This statement was subsequently disputed by Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, who stated that reports about Soviet strength as being "close to the U.S. level" were without foundation.

According to recent official estimates, the Soviet Union possesses approximately 300 land-based missiles capable of striking targets in the United States, about half of which have been emplaced in hardened missile sites. Many of the Soviet missiles have warheads far heavier than their U.S. counterparts. Some reputable experts have concluded that the ICBM capabilities of the Soviet Union are in excess of the official U.S. figures.

The United States, it is generally agreed, presently retains strategic superiority. Reportedly, the United States possesses some 800 Minuteman I missiles, together with at least 54 Titan II, and about 80 Minuteman II missiles. By 1967 there may be approximately 1,050 land-based missiles capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union from hardened sites. Some increases in U.S. strategic forces are planned, including the development of improved penetration capabilities, missiles and guidance systems.

Yet the Soviets appear to have embarked upon a major program to narrow and perhaps close the strategic gap. By 1968 they are expected to deploy more than 600 ICBM's. Moreover, it has been estimated that they have doubled their nuclear stockpile during the

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past year to about 12,000 megatons, while the United States has not increased substantially its nuclear stockpile of 25,000 megatons. Thus the Soviet Union, by 1968, may have reduced significantly the strategic margin that the United States enjoys today. A U.S. edge of approximately 3-1, calculated at figures for 1966, may have diminished to well under 2-1. By the end of the decade, the Soviets may have achieved, at the very least, strategic parity.

In their strategic program the Soviets have stressed the development of warheads larger than those of the United States, despite the fact that targets in the United States and Western Europe are less dispersed than in the USSR. Thus, even with fewer missiles, the Soviets might gain a strategic advantage. Given the larger warheads, together with the relative concentration of targets in the United States and Western Europe, they may be able to pose a more credible threat to the West by 1970. Moreover, the Soviets, it appears, are engaged in an effort to reduce the vulnerability of key regions to attack by missiles. They are reported to have begun to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system in the western regions of the Soviet Union.

For the past five years the question of whether or not the United States should deploy an ABM system has been a topic of major concern in U.S. strategic thought. Thus far, the Administration has avoided a decision. The United States has developed an ABM system, based upon the NIKE-X, but has stopped short of deploying ABM's to protect major urban centers or the U.S. strategic capability.

In delaying deployment of the NIKE-X, the Administration has been swayed by several considerations. The cost of an ABM system would be considerable. It has been estimated that, with an expenditure of $30-40 billion over a five-year period, at least thirty U.S. cities could be given ABM protection.

Factors other than cost, however, appear to have caused the delay. Some strategists have argued that the United States, in deploying an ABM system, might accelerate the arms race. Conceivably, the Kremlin might view such U.S. action as provocative. The Soviet Union might respond by raising its own defense budget. The Soviets might make a major effort to build missiles in sufficient numbers to enable them to penetrate even the most sophisticated U.S. anti-missile system. The deployment of an ABM system by the United States might also have a destabilizing effect upon international politics.

Whatever might be the inwardness of their reasoning, U.S. policymakers have refrained from the deployment of NIKE-X. At most, it appears, they are prepared to deploy an anti-missile defense against a potential Chinese communist missile threat. By the 1970's, it is feared, the Chinese will have at least a "primitive" nuclear capability sufficient to inflict damage upon the United States. Yet the Soviet Union will remain the power

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most capable of launching a devastating attack against us.

There exists in Soviet strategic thought a bias in favor of defense. During the last generation the Soviets have devoted a considerable proportion of their military expenditures to air defense. But in their decisions about such expenditures, the Soviets place less emphasis on the issue that has preoccupied U.S. strategists, namely, the extent to which opponents will perceive a given military measure as provocative. Instead, Soviet leaders appear to have assumed the obligation to take all technologically feasible steps to ensure the defense of the homeland. In keeping with this resolution, they have begun to protect some of their major cities.

In response to a Soviet decision to deploy an ABM system, the United States might select one of several options. One would be a minimal, or thin, ABM system on its own territory and perhaps in Western Europe. Such a system would be designed to protect ten major U.S. urban population centers and an equivalent number in Western Europe at a cost of approximately $20 billion. Alternatively, the United States could deploy an ABM system costing substantially more than $20 billion, affording protection to a wider region. Still other options are open. Production of missiles might be increased greatly in an effort to assure a strategic force capable of saturating an enemy ABM system; in this conjunction, the United States might give increased emphasis to the development of penetration aids. Thus far, the Administration, while not foreclosing the first or second alternatives, appears to have chosen to emphasize the development of improved missile capabilities.

The precise implications of respective U.S. and Soviet defense policies are not easily assessed. Yet a decision by the Soviets to press forward with the deployment of an ABM system, while also greatly increasing their missile capabilities, could lead to a deterioration of the U.S. strategic position. In the absence of a significant U.S. antimissile capability or an assured penetration capability, the Soviets might wrest global strategic superiority from the United States. At the very least, they might find themselves with a strategic force that would enable them to push for major political concessions from the West. To an extent greater than in the period following the Soviet development of the ICBM, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to allies might be cast in doubt.

In the development of defensive systems, and in other areas of military technology, the Soviets continue to search for scientific breakthroughs. Their educational system and their allocation of research and military expenditures gives evidence of the priority they attach to research and development. Over the last generation the Soviets have made major advances in those sectors of technology that have military application. Communist theory postulates a fundamental relationship between control of economic-

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technological resources and political power. The Soviets' conviction that technological breakthroughs will be of crucial importance over the next generation seems not to have been shaken. To that power which excels in technology may be given the political potential to affect greatly, and perhaps decisively, the course of events shaping the international system. If this fundamental concept of communist doctrine still guides Soviet policymakers, projected Soviet technological and military developments bode ill for the United States and for international stability.

It is highly probable that Soviet policy has been restrained by the strategic superiority possessed by the United States. The steady erosion of that superiority, or its passing to the Soviet Union, might lead the Soviets once again to step up their pressures against the West.

De Gaulle's Mission to Moscow

IN June President de Gaulle paid a state visit to the Soviet Union. De Gaulle had clearly earned the warm welcome accorded him when he arrived in Moscow on June 20. In preceding months he had taken steps designed to withdraw French forces from NATO, to remove NATO military installations from France, and to assert French independence within the Atlantic Alliance. By such actions, De Gaulle had unilaterally achieved changes in NATO that Soviet efforts had failed to effect. Yet Soviet enthusiasm for De Gaulle must have been tempered when the French President, speaking to members of the Politburo, declared that France would "not cease to be, essentially, a country of freedom, and a Western nation" and referred to "the essential role the U.S. has played and will continue to play in the pacification and transformation of the world." He was not prepared to sign agreements that might compromise West European security. When Brezhnev suggested that the West should "accept a framework that guarantees European security" and grant diplomatic recognition to East Germany, De Gaulle replied that East Germany was but an "artificial creation" of the Soviet Union.

However, during his visit De Gaulle gave further evidence of his belief that the United States and the Soviet Union had reached a *détente*. Apparently he had also concluded that, in a period of decreased tension, France might assume a role of growing importance in international politics. No longer needing the protection afforded by the integrated command structure of NATO, France might cast off the "American hegemony" which De Gaulle saw in the alliance as presently constituted and, while remaining as a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty under the protection of U.S. nuclear power, might nevertheless play a role of greater independence. In fact, in a conversation with Brezhnev on June 24, President de Gaulle expressed his satisfaction that the Soviet Union existed as a check upon American "hegemony."

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The most important talks of the visit, held on June 23 and 24, related to the future of Europe and German reunification. In De Gaulle's estimation the time had come for reconciliation between Eastern and Western Europe. Therefore, France's primary objective must be to encourage the development of "new relations" among European nations. In the declaration issued at the end of the visit, the French and Soviet leaders declared: "For France, as for the Soviet Union, the first goal is, in this spirit, normalizing then gradually developing relations between all European countries, with respect for the independence of each and non-intervention in its internal affairs. This action should be pursued in all domains, whether in economics, culture, technology and, naturally, politics." The declaration did not go so far as to suggest that all European countries might be joined eventually in a European confederation. Yet French and Soviet leaders appeared to agree upon the need to expand contacts among European states as the first step toward the creation of a "European Europe."

In welcoming De Gaulle to Moscow, the Soviets evidently had two hopes. First, they saw the visit as a means of encouraging De Gaulle to reiterate his call for a European settlement without the United States and, second, they hoped to interest him in granting diplomatic recognition to East Germany. Brezhnev proposed an all-European security conference as the first step toward the creation of a "European Europe." Such a step would be consistent with Soviet security interests since it might mark a reduction of U.S. influence in Europe.

Yet De Gaulle, however anxious he may be to restrict U.S. influence in Europe and to proceed with the building of a "European Europe," did not fully endorse the Soviet proposal. Instead, the French and Soviet leaders, in their declaration at the close of De Gaulle's visit, announced: "Both governments agree in thinking that the problems of Europe should be considered first of all in a European framework." Thus the declaration fell short of calling for a European settlement without the participation of the United States.

As for Germany, Brezhnev simply reaffirmed the long-standing Soviet objective, namely, recognition of East Germany as the prerequisite of any German settlement. In the declaration, it was merely noted that "European problems" are of "major importance to France and the Soviet Union, for it is on their solution that depends the establishment of a normal situation throughout the Continent and, consequently, of a real and stable peace. For them it is above all a matter of European security and of the German question on which the two parties exchanged their views." The discussion of the German question brought no change in the position of either power. In sum, neither the French nor the Soviets were prepared to subscribe to changes in Europe which might be detrimental to their security interests.

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The much-heralded visit produced but few agreements. France and the Soviet Union concluded an agreement for scientific and cultural collaboration, an achievement which, because of the Soviets' propensity to secrecy in scientific matters, might not redound to France's benefit. A considerable portion of the Franco-Soviet declaration was devoted to a survey of the parties' interest in such collaboration. "Both parties paid great attention to the development of exchanges in the areas of culture, science and technology, considering that such exchanges contribute to strengthening relations of friendship at the same time that they usefully serve mutual interests."

It was agreed that the two countries would consult with each other regularly on questions of common concern. "These consultations will deal with European problems and with other international problems of mutual interest. The two governments will attempt to concert their efforts in the interest of peace and security in Europe and in the world." Moreover, it was announced that they would establish "between the Kremlin and the Elysée a direct communication line, which it will be possible to use for exchanges of views and for sending messages."

Apparently, France and the Soviet Union will attempt to expand East-West trade. According to the declaration, "the problems concerning gradual development of economic cooperation between the two countries were subjected to a broad examination." In order to increase commercial, cultural and scientific contacts, it was decided in principle to set up a "joint standing committee, comprised of high-ranking representatives." This committee would be charged with the task of "examining regularly the practical problems raised by the implementation of the existing commercial, economic, and technical-scientific agreements." It would be given the task also of investigating the "possibilities of developing trade and cooperation in these domains with a view to assuring them of broader and more stable prospects." In all likelihood, this committee will have to deal with those thorny problems which have arisen from the Franco-Soviet trade agreement of 1964 and, in particular, with French disappointments at Soviet performance. Beyond the few specific accords that emerged from it, the visit was symbolic of a growing French interest in the development of new relationships with the Soviet Union and other communist countries.

It is appropriate to inquire as to the implications, both for France and for Western security, of De Gaulle's policy toward his Western allies and the Soviet Union. Clearly, by his conduct in the Soviet Union, De Gaulle indicated that, whatever his vision of Europe's future, he was not prepared to collaborate with the Soviets in the further dismantling of Western security arrangements. In fact, by his actions in the first six months of 1966, De Gaulle had already taken the most important steps toward

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restructuring NATO according to his own specifications. Beyond his initiatives of early 1966, he could not revise further the French commitment to NATO without placing in jeopardy France's essential security interests.

So far as the Soviets were concerned, De Gaulle had already played the most important card he held. By ending French participation in NATO commands and calling for the removal of NATO installations from French soil, he had reduced France's military and political ties to her Western allies. De Gaulle may have reasoned that he had thus placed France in a position in which she might eventually find common cause with the Soviets in the reduction of U.S. influence in Western Europe. He journeyed to Moscow as the head-of-state of a nation which was freeing itself from the obligations of full membership in NATO.

Yet the French halfway secession from NATO could hardly have strengthened France's bargaining position in Moscow. Even before his visit, the French President had taken steps which, in other circumstances, might have been his *quid pro quo* for concessions from the Soviet Union. De Gaulle had conceded in advance to the Soviets, without them having to make any concession to him, perhaps the most important bargaining advantage available to him: the integrity of the French commitment to NATO.

As a result of De Gaulle's actions, the position of Germany in the Atlantic Alliance, and in East-West relations, has been enhanced considerably. More than ever, the Federal Republic can be expected to become the primary Continental member of NATO. The withdrawal of French military units, together with the departure of French officials from NATO commands, creates vacancies that Germans will be called upon to fill. Now the Germans, not the French, possess the most important bargaining lever of any continental West European country vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In return, the Soviets hold the prize which increasingly the Germans covet: reunification. Hence, the Soviets may now show greater interest in cultivating relations with Bonn than with Paris. Having given reduced emphasis in recent years to the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, and to the strengthening of West European integration, France's influence in the Federal Republic has declined.

De Gaulle's actions toward his Western allies have weakened the prospects for the achievement of European integration — and the ultimate strengthening of Europe's place in world affairs. Paradoxically, his policies, designed presumably to achieve greater maneuverability for France, may serve to restrict French influence both in the West and in relation to the Soviet Union.

French Policy toward NATO and the Common Market

IT no longer strikes us as surprising that President de Gaulle should carry out a simultaneous

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campaign against the institutions of NATO and the institutions of the European Community. Historically, the Atlantic Alliance and the European integration movement have been closely associated. The former not only rendered the latter possible, but also benefited from its success, and the staunchest friends of the one have been the most ardent proponents of the other. According to the General's logic, both NATO and EEC have diminished what he cherishes most — the national sovereignty of France.

The French President professes himself loyal to the Atlantic Alliance and to the European Community. His quarrel, he says, is less with the Treaties than with the organizations as they have developed and the treaty distortions as they have occurred. During the second quarter of 1966, he virtually completed his country's withdrawal from the integrated military command of NATO. Thus, he created a most anomalous situation with respect to the continued presence of French forces in West Germany. The Germans will not accept a return to a quasi-occupation status, and the French will not give an automatic-response defense guarantee. In the EEC, by way of contrast, De Gaulle has not been able to reverse the process of integration. Undoubtedly he has succeeded in slowing down the pace of the movement toward European unification and in diluting the political implications of the Rome Treaty.

De Gaulle seems to believe that he can safely withdraw from the NATO structure without weakening French security, not because he deems the *force de dissuasion* adequate for the defense of Central Europe, but because he premises his freedom of maneuver on the dependability of U.S. deterrent power and commitment to West Germany. He is playing what could prove to be a highly dangerous game. His diplomatic assault upon NATO might enhance his own prestige; it risks the alienation of his European allies. His overtures—over the heads of the nervous Germans—jeopardize some of his major political objectives on the Continent. His more ardent followers are wont to assert that De Gaulle discerns international trends which no ordinary statesman can see. Clairvoyant or not, De Gaulle has been uncommonly perceptive of political realities, and this astuteness has enabled him to play a modest hand for more than his cards are really worth.

De Gaulle cannot fail to realize that he cannot destroy NATO even if he wishes to do so; his European allies will not allow it, for they—even less than he—do not think that French nuclear power might be substituted for the U.S. guarantee. The June NATO Ministers' meeting in Brussels demonstrated that he cannot induce any of his allies to follow his lead. They are determined to preserve NATO—without France if need be. His suggestion that the German question ought to be settled by Germany's European neighbors does not commend itself to the United

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States and Britain, not to speak of Germany. It is difficult to see why the Soviets would seriously negotiate with De Gaulle a settlement which is not his to deliver. This, too, he must know. In fact, De Gaulle has carefully hedged his position: While he purports to rid France and Europe of American "dominance," he does not cease to be what he called himself in Moscow—"a man of the West."

De Gaulle's diplomatic task in the EEC is, in several respects, more subtle and more complex than the one he faces in NATO. French policy in the Community is intimately related to the kind of unity that De Gaulle envisions for Europe. De Gaulle does want European political integration, if it can be achieved on his own terms —a united Europe administered by the Chief Executives in the six capitals, but not the technocratic managers in Brussels or the European parliamentarians in Strasbourg who, as he says, represent nobody (and whom he does not wish to see elected on a Community-wide representative basis).

He disdains the technocrats in Brussels and the parliamentary delegates in Strasbourg. In his view, they are interested in little more than a *Europe des marchands.* He is willing to let them fix the price of commodities, or debate anti-cartel policies. These matters do not concern a head-of-state, except insofar as they may have political implications. De Gaulle is primarily interested in political issues—war and peace, East-West relations, the future of China and Southeast Asia, the question of Germany, and the relations of Europe with the other continents of the world. These things, he says, must be handled, not by technical experts or by amorphous legislative bodies, but by a small number of experienced political executives. It is these considerations which define his disagreement with Monnet, Hallstein and Spaak.

There can be no question of trying to take France out of the EEC. The French economy depends too heavily upon the Common Market, and derives too many gains from it to make withdrawal a realistic choice for any government in Paris. The commercial losses would be so great as to cause grave internal political repercussions. France cannot undo the economic integration which has already occurred, nor is there solid evidence that De Gaulle wishes to do so. In those areas where France stood to benefit, especially in agriculture, De Gaulle has pushed for the achievement of a common market more rapidly than some of his partners meant to go. Hence it is incorrect to say that he is opposed to economic integration—although now that he has obtained what he wanted in the agricultural sector he might very well drag his feet on the effort to harmonize social policies and to create a common transport policy among the Six.

The present French government's principal quarrel with the Commission in Brussels has been over the method of making decisions which are patently fraught with political implications, and

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over the related question of financing the EEC's common agricultural policy. France's seven-month boycott of the Council of Ministers' meetings ended last January when it was agreed that on all questions involving the vital interests of one of the partners, the Six, instead of proceeding immediately to a decision by weighted majority, would instead make every effort "within a reasonable period of time" to arrive at a unanimously acceptable solution. The meaning of that compromise is far from clear: there is still no common view within the Council of Ministers as to what will happen if agreement cannot be reached within the undefined "reasonable period." This means that France retains the option to cause recurring crises in the future development of EEC policy.

Having received from her partners a grudging acknowledgment of her right to pull the "emergency brake," France approved, in May 1966, the plan for agricultural financing. The EEC policy aims at creating a single market for farm products, increasing the efficiency of European agriculture, improving farm incomes, stabilizing markets, guaranteeing supplies, and ensuring reasonable prices for consumers. All barriers to the free circulation of farm products among the Six will gradually be removed. In place of the existing national tariff systems, a common system of protection will be erected at the Community's frontiers to control outside competition. Common prices will prevail throughout the market area. For each item there will be established a target price, a support price (somewhat lower than the target price), and a variable import levy to prevent the entrance of foreign products at less than the target price. The task of maintaining the price structure falls to the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, which can intervene on the domestic market and start buying a given product when the price begins to fall below the target price. The price will not be allowed to fall below the support level, for the Fund must purchase all surpluses offered once the price declines to that level. When the price rises above the support level, the Fund can begin to sell its accumulated stocks. Presumably, imports would not enter until the target price level is reached.

The major impasse had been over the way in which the Community would assume full responsibility for agricultural financing, and that has now been settled, at least for the time being. Until July 1, 1967, the Fund will only partially finance the farm policy, and all of its resources will come from member states' contributions. From that date until the end of the transition period two and a half years later, the Fund will obtain its resources in two ways: about 45 per cent from the variable levies on agricultural imports and the rest from member states' contributions. After December 31, 1969, the Fund will cover all agricultural expenditures and will receive all the revenues from Community levies

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on farm goods. By 1970 this might very well amount to a total of some four billion dollars.

The prospect of such a massive budget in the hands of the Brussels technocrats has always caused serious misgivings in De Gaulle's mind. It looks so much like a roundabout approach to that supranational sovereignty which he abhors. Five of the Six are on record as favoring an examination of increased powers (including budget review) for the European Parliament after 1969. The Netherlands has called for the direct election of the Community Parliament. De Gaulle rejects both suggestions. He would undoubtedly prefer to bring the Commission and the Fund increasingly under the arm of the six executives, the Council of Ministers. But the deadline for that crisis is more than three years away.

The EEC, Britain and the Kennedy Round

THE progress of the Common Market is significant for the prospects of British entry and the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round talks in Geneva. With the pound in so much trouble that even France has had no choice but to join the "Group of Ten" in the decision to support it, and with national productivity showing only a one per cent increase in 1965, more and more British businessmen are becoming convinced that the only way for their country to improve the efficiency of its economic performance is to plunge into the "cold bracing shower" of the Common Market and meet Continental competition head-on. The trade unions are not happy about so strenuous a test, and the Labour Party is deeply divided on the question of membership.

The Germans have always favored British entry. Recently they have urged their partners among the Six to prepare a "readiness plan" for negotiations. Italy and the Benelux countries would also welcome British membership. Even De Gaulle had a few kind words to say on the subject earlier this year. He might like to have Britain come in to help him slow down the pace toward the federalist brand of political integration. During the question period in the Commons on May 19, Prime Minister Wilson said: "There is no question of Her Majesty's Government in such negotiations entering into any arrangements which would involve a supranational government or a Parliamentary Assembly to which this House would be subordinated . . . . or to see this country deprived of its independent foreign and defense policy." While De Gaulle rules in Paris there is little ground for such fears.

From the British standpoint, it may be advisable to arrange entry before the De Gaulle era comes to an end. The Wilson Government has agreed to undertake technical cooperation with France in aircraft and computers and to build a Channel tube. But De Gaulle remains cool to Britain's decision to maintain a defense role "east of Suez" in partnership with the United States, and he probably still

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wants the kind of Anglo-French nuclear partnership which the Labour Government would be reluctant to enter. Moreover, as Premier Georges Pompidou emphasized during his visit to London early in July, Britain must take some very hard decisions in the realm of fiscal policy—he hinted at devaluation, wage freezes and other unpopular measures—before France would deem her ready to assume the full responsibilities and burdens of EEC membership. There also remains the task of working out special arrangements for British agriculture and New Zealand's trade with the United Kingdom. It is likely that these problems, especially that of restoring Britain's competitive position, will require herculean efforts—and time.

Along the Geneva trade front, the barometer kept rising and falling between optimism and pessimism on the chances of bringing the Kennedy Round to a successful issue before President Johnson's authority under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 expires on July 1, 1967. The Six have been allowed to negotiate within GATT as a single unit, and they have proved to be tough bargainers. Their inability to reach agreement on EEC agricultural policy, however, delayed the negotiations for approximately two years. The U.S. delegation has argued that if the EEC sets its wheat and feed grain prices too high, grain production in France and other European countries will be artificially stimulated, leading to economic inefficiencies, the loss of markets by more efficient U.S. producers, and an inflationary effect on the Europeans' cost of living. The EEC negotiators argue that, even with a system of Community protection, an expanding economy among the Six will require the inflow of U.S. farm products. In respect to tariff cuts on industrial items, most of the arguments about "disparities" have now been fully aired and the various offers for tariff cuts have been placed on the bargaining table, although a snag has been struck on the "American selling price" as the basis for valuing chemical imports into the United States.

Everyone involved in the U.S.-EEC negotiations recognizes the importance of the Kennedy Round for the future economic development of the Atlantic Community and for the trade position of the less privileged countries. Most of the delegates profess a determination to bring a final settlement into view, it is hoped, before the end of this year, so that President Johnson can obtain Congressional ratification of the agreement before mid-1967, thus precluding the need to request an extension of the negotiating authority.

The XXIII CPSU Congress

AT the end of March, the XXIII Congress of the CPSU convened in Moscow amid widespread speculation that this congress would mark the resurrection of Stalin and at least a partial return to the Stalinist system. Rather than marking a return to Stalinism, however, the resolutions, rubber-stamped by the congress,

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conformed to the pattern of de-Khrushchevization which had been in progress over the past sixteen months. Indeed, the sense of the proceedings was to consolidate the victory of diverse bureaucratic groups over Khrushchev's potentially radical reforms of Soviet policies and institutions.

The central theme of the congress was the legitimacy of reasserting the conventional principle of division of labor between political and economic leaders that had been violated by Khrushchev's functionalist reform of the party structure from 1962 to 1964. The name-change of the "Presidium" to the "Politburo" and of "First Secretary" to "General Secretary" symbolizes the effort of the current leadership to disentangle and streamline the operations of the state administration. Henceforth the ruling body of the country presumably will discuss high policy and not economic detail, and the General Secretary will perform the function of high-level coordination of the various bureaucracies, operating in the broad categories of policy and strategy rather than in the area of practical economics.

In further action to destroy the system Khrushchev had been trying to build in the Soviet Union, the Party Congress approved the abolition of the Bureau of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic), created by Khrushchev in 1956. Among the functions of this bureau had been the supervision of all party, governmental and economic activity. As such, it had been an instrument of direct control over the largest and most populous of the Soviet socialist republics. Khrushchev had derived considerable power from his position as chairman of this bureau, as had Brezhnev who succeeded to the position after Khrushchev's fall. The abolition of the Bureau of the RSFSR, undoubtedly representing a loss of Brezhnev's political power, is an indication of ferment and uneasy compromise between various sections of the top caucus of the CPSU.

The Soviet Party Congress, at Brezhnev's behest, also abolished Khrushchev's rule of periodic rotation of party *apparatchiks* in leadership positions, in force since 1961. By severely restricting the tenure of party leaders in important posts, excepting only those deemed indispensable, this rule had provided Khrushchev with statutory means to eliminate all opposition to his policies. Needless to say, this system, generating personal insecurity at all levels of party leadership, was extremely unpopular.

The proceedings of the congress suggested that the orientation of the transitional regime headed by Brezhnev is one of semi-benevolent paternalism in domestic affairs. On substantive issues of internal policy, the congress indicated that moderate economic concession is to be combined with halfway measures of political repression. The major concessions to economic interests that have long been neglected include the granting of some autonomy to industrial managers and more state investment and

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labor incentives in agriculture. At the same time, the development of economic forces remains impeded by bureaucratic centralism, and the pattern of resource allocation is still designed primarily to enhance industrial-military power.

While the gap between the advance of heavy industry and consumer goods is to be narrowed considerably during the coming Five Year Plan, the former still has priority (scheduled to rise by 49-52 per cent) over the latter (with a projected growth of 43-46 per cent). Nevertheless, in Brezhnev's speech, the satisfaction of consumer needs received some emphasis: "What we need is to ensure full satisfaction of the mounting consumer demand within the coming five years. In doing so, special attention will have to be paid to improving the quality and appearance of commodities."

Brezhnev acknowledged the present inability of the Soviet economy to supply all that is being demanded by Soviet consumers. Moreover, he projected that "real per capita income will rise something like 30 per cent in five years." This is to be accomplished by raising the minimum wage level of all workers in the Soviet Union to 60 rubles per month ($66 at the official exchange rate of $1.10 to the ruble).

Though he had high praise for the economic growth achieved during the period of the Seven Year Plan (1959-1966), Brezhnev admitted that many of the more important targets had not been reached. The performance of agriculture had been particularly poor, with a total increase of only 14 per cent against a scheduled growth of 70 per cent. The Seven Year Plan for agriculture, announced by Khrushchev at the XXI Party Congress (on the basis of which he had boasted to the West, "We shall bury you!"), had been unrealistic indeed. The present Five Year Plan projects a far more moderate growth schedule of only 25 per cent. This is to be achieved by better management, vastly increased application of fertilizer, and more pay incentives to farmers.

The Kremlin's international policy, as stated by Brezhnev, seemed to represent a temporary agreement between those who wish above all to restore Soviet prestige in foreign revolutionary circles and others concerned mostly with attaining economic efficiency through stabilizing the arms race and promoting trade with the West. Brezhnev's report left an impression that the consensus was to try to harness world revolutionary fervor under Soviet auspices—without putting in jeopardy the physical security of the USSR, *but* at the risk of intensifying the arms race. The General Secretary reiterated a half-century-old theme, saying that "the capitalist system as a whole is in the grip of a general crisis." His evaluation of the present disarray of NATO, however, was not devoid of truth: "The United States is no longer able to direct policy as sweepingly as before. It is a long time now since any serious politician, let alone the peoples,

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have given credence to the fiction about the 'threat of Soviet aggression' which once helped to forge these blocs." The Soviet Union, he said, is conducting its foreign policy accordingly.

At the same time, according to Brezhnev, the aggression by "imperialist forces," headed by the United States, had necessitated the strengthening of the Soviet-bloc military alliance. Amidst vigorous denunciations of U.S. policy toward Vietnam, Brezhnev told the congress that "The armies of the Warsaw Pact countries are equipped with the most up-to-date weapons. In field training, in the air, and at sea, a cooperative practice between the armies and arms of the service of the allied states is developed, the power of modern weapons is tested, and the combat fraternity of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries is strengthened."

In Brezhnev's opinion, Soviet relations with communist countries had become more cordial than ever before. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was developing satisfactorily and its role in shaping the economies of the member countries was steadily increasing. He named in alphabetical order the communist countries with which the Soviet Union was having satisfactory relations, but left out China and Albania. Brezhnev's remarks about the dispute with the Chinese were mild indeed, and implied an admission of failure on the part of the Soviets. He reaffirmed the intention of the CPSU to promote unity in the communist camp; but throughout his report to the congress there was no indication that the Soviet Union was prepared to depart from its position on any major issue in dispute.

Within the party, Brezhnev emerged as a relatively strong leader of policy whose power is based on an unadventurous majority of the Central Committee. The exclusion of Anastas I. Mikoyan from the Politburo could be attributed to his age, yet it reflected a decline in the fortunes of those advocating greater adaptiveness in economic, social and foreign policy. Conversely, the recruitment of A. Ya. Pelshe into the Politburo increased the prestige of the functionaries specializing in indoctrination and control of the population as well as of those who take a conservative stand on economic priorities. Judging by the failure of certain leaders, like A. N. Shelepin, to take part in the open discussions at the congress, it would seem that orthodox elements in the party command are unreconciled to the prevailing moderation on certain issues and will continue to struggle for a more authoritarian and isolationist line.

Change and Reality in Eastern Europe

THE Warsaw Treaty Organization was created in 1955, when the German Federal Republic was admitted to membership in NATO and the Western European Union. The alleged purpose of WTO was to defend the Soviet bloc against the threat of NATO, reinforced by

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the admission of the Federal Republic. The signing of the Warsaw Pact also coincided with the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, which eliminated the legal justification for keeping Soviet troops on satellite territories in order to maintain supply lines to their army in Austria. The Warsaw Pact provided a new legal basis for the continued stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. Today, Poland, Hungary and East Germany are still hosts to units of the Soviet Army.

After the upheavals in Hungary and Poland, Soviet leaders made a concerted effort to replace the ruthless Stalinist methods of coercion with institutions that hopefully would bind the satellites to the Soviet Union. These efforts materialized slowly in the two bloc-wide organizations, COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. In both organizations, the measured pace toward complete integration of satellite economies and armed forces into a common system dominated by Moscow is probably due in large part to satellite opposition to the master plan. Rumania has been the most outspoken of the dissenters.

In his four-hour speech to the XXIII Party Congress on March 29, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev cited U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam, among other things, as making necessary the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact. What he had in mind, apparently, was the consolidation of the control structure that binds the armed forces of the satellites to those of the Soviet Union.

On May 7, a month after the conclusion of the Soviet Congress, Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the Rumanian Communist Party, made a speech in which he advocated the abolition of all military blocs, maintaining that these are an "anachronism incompatible with the independence and national sovereignty of the peoples and normal relations among states." Several times during the last two years, leaders of the Rumanian Communist Party had called for the abolition of military blocs, but their call had never before been regarded as newsworthy because it had never appeared in such stark contrast to articulated Soviet aims. The Soviets had, in fact, often expressed their willingness to trade the Warsaw Pact for the elimination of NATO.

One event, interpreted in the West as evidence of Soviet displeasure with Ceausescu's speech, was the sudden arrival of Brezhnev in Bucharest three days afterward. What Brezhnev and the Rumanian leaders discussed has not become public knowledge, but the Warsaw Treaty Organization was assumed to be the major topic of their conversations. It was evident from the communiqué that complete unanimity of views was not achieved.

The meeting of the Soviet and Rumanian party chiefs preceded a conference of Warsaw Pact defense ministers by about two weeks. Prior to this conference, the Rumanians were reported to have circulated a note to their allies in which they stipulated their demands for modifications of the existing WTO

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structure. These included demands that Soviet bloc allies be consulted before the Soviets reached decisions on major issues; that changes be made in the financial contributions of member states; and that a periodic rotation of the top military command in the Warsaw Pact be undertaken. In addition the Rumanians reportedly declared that it was no longer necessary for Soviet forces to be maintained in other communist countries. Two days after these reports were circulated in the West, the Rumanian Foreign Office stated that they were "in the realm of pure fantasy and . . . devoid of foundation."

However, when the Warsaw Pact Council met in Bucharest in the beginning of July, there was further evidence of friction between Rumania and the Soviet Union. After a preliminary joint session, most delegates left the conference hall, but the Soviet and Rumanian leaders remained to discuss their problems behind closed doors. Their meeting appears to have been no more satisfactory than their discussion in COMECON two years ago when the Soviets pressured the Rumanians to limit their industrial development plans primarily to petroleum and a few selected manufacturing industries.

Another development in this dispute is of interest. When Chinese Premier Chou En-lai visited Bucharest in May, it became apparent that Chinese-Rumanian friendship was not as strong as might have been supposed. At a rally for the Chinese leader, thousands of Rumanians had to wait for over an hour while Chou and Ceausescu met, presumably to resolve differences over a speech the Chinese Premier wanted to deliver.

Since communist councils are held in secret and the West is not privy to their debates, it is difficult to know what occurred in Rumanian - Soviet and Rumanian-Chinese deliberations. At present it can only be surmised, for instance, from the timing of Brezhnev's visit, that the Soviet leader might have had two matters foremost in mind. One was the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact; the other was the forthcoming visit of the Chinese delegation to Rumania. With respect to the former, the Soviet leader may be credited with at least a minor victory, for all subsequent Rumanian pronouncements on the subject of military blocs explicitly made the dismantling of NATO an unconditional prerequisite for their abolition, thus bringing Rumania's views in harmony with those of the Soviets. If Brezhnev's mission was to defend Soviet interests before Ceausescu saw Chou En-lai, his success might be discerned in the fact that the Rumanian leaders apparently did not permit Chou to use their country as a forum for Peking's currently venomous anti-Soviet invective.

Not a few commentators credit Rumania with courageous defiance and independence of the Soviet Union, and therefore, with "good" communism. In the process, those forces that continue to unite the Rumanians and Soviets have been

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subordinated to Western perceptions of changes in relationships among communist countries. For instance, only passing mention has been made in the West of Rumania's repeated promise to send volunteers to fight at the side of the North Vietnamese, should Hanoi request such aid. This promise comes at a time when Rumania is seeking most-favored-nation treatment from the United States.

Whether by design or coincidence, Rumania's opposition to Soviet plans regarding the Warsaw Pact, so much publicized in the West, appears to have reinforced the Soviet policy offensive to weaken NATO. Since 1962 the Soviets, in their diplomacy and propaganda, have striven to dispel Western fears of the Soviet Union. An effort has been made to convince Europeans that NATO is no longer necessary. Apparently with tacit Soviet approval, if not with Soviet encouragement, the communist regimes of Eastern and Central Europe have attempted to change their image from that of obedient satellites to troublesome allies whose policies and interests are not always consonant with those of Moscow.

Moreover, the West European communist parties have displayed moderation and a growing emphasis on identification with noncommunist groups, thus increasing their eligibility for inclusion in coalition governments. The Vienna meeting of fifteen West European communist parties, which coincided with the events related to Ceausescu's May speech, may have been designed to reinforce views in the West that these parties had cast off old loyalties to the Soviet Union. Whatever the relationship between these events, or the extent to which they are related to Soviet foreign policy, they have had significant implications for the West. They have given rise to Western hopes for change in Eastern Europe. The loosening up, real or perceived, within the communist sphere has been paced by disintegration within the Atlantic Alliance. This correlation may be accidental; then again, it may be the fruits of a conscious, long-term strategy pursued by the communists.

It remains a Soviet objective to remove U.S. power and influence from Europe. Initially at least, one French and Soviet objective, namely, the creation of a "European Europe," coincides. Hence Rumania might play a pivotal role in Soviet policy. A Latin nation, Rumania boasts many historic ties with France. Surrounded by other communist states, Rumania would appear to offer important advantages to the Soviets if Moscow, since the Cuban missile crisis, has indeed adopted new tactics in its campaign to break down Western unity.

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PLANNING FOR PEACE

by Edward Teller

NUCLEAR explosives and intercontinental missiles have deprived the United States of the protection of its ocean barriers. Today our country is open to a more sudden attack than Poland was in 1939. Our ability to retaliate has so far ensured peace and the nation's survival. The fact remains that the security of America has become just as precarious as the security of the powers of Europe has been for hundreds of years.

On an emotional basis one can easily understand the attractive nature of the most straightforward solution to this problem of security. The present state of instability and danger is due to nuclear explosives and other modern armaments: the solution, therefore, should be disarmament. If we could get rid of the new dangerous instruments, we would free ourselves of the danger itself.

When the argument for disarmament is put into such a simple and direct form almost everyone will recognize inherent fallacies. The emotional driving force remains powerful, however, even though the counterarguments are obvious.

Actually disarmament will contribute to stability only if it applies to everyone, if it is controlled, and if it is rigorously enforced. The very first requirement, that of adequate knowledge of the state of armament in the communist countries, is not fulfilled and will not be fulfilled in the foreseeable future. All of these matters are closely related to the paramount question of national sovereignty. The right of self-defense will not be relinquished unless credible defense is established by a trusted agency. The difficulties are widely recognized; most will agree that no one has yet presented a complete and feasible plan for disarmament or arms limitation.

In the meantime continued development of powerful weapons renders the international situation more unstable with every passing year. The name by which this danger is designated today is proliferation. The explosion of nuclear devices by the Chinese has demonstrated that modern weapons of mass destruction are within the reach of less developed countries. Recognition of this

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fact has furnished persuasive arguments, if not for disarmament, then at least for arms control.

What we really want, however, is not arms control or disarmament for its own sake. We want peace and stability. The purpose of this article is to discuss to what extent disarmament or arms control will in fact contribute to stability, to what extent the proposed arms control agreements might give rise to additional dangers, and what other measures could be taken to approach a more stable situation in the present troubled state of the world.

The Consequences of Banning Nuclear Tests

It has been accepted by the majority of U.S. policymakers that some form of a test ban is in our interest because it slows down the further development of nuclear explosives and impedes proliferation. The history of test limitations must be discussed not to criticize past actions or to suggest radical changes, but rather to find out the validity of the claim that a test ban is the first step toward lasting peace. The relevant arguments fill many volumes and no one can expect to draw a complete balance between the advantages and disadvantages of a test ban.

The present test ban hinders to some extent the development of Soviet nuclear explosives. On the other hand, a study of the 1957-1961 moratorium shows the limited nature of such an advantage. During that period of nearly four years the Soviets made thorough preparations for a new test series and have claimed great progress as a result of that test series. Since they had ample time for the preparation, this claim is probably valid. It is likely that without a moratorium their overall progress would have been greater. Yet, one can hardly doubt that due to the moratorium the Soviet Union gained an advantage over us. Following the moratorium they executed two well-prepared atmospheric test series while we had only one similar series for which the preparation was, of necessity, less thorough.

It has been claimed that the present limited test ban discourages the development of nuclear explosives by additional nations. Secretary McNamara has stated in public testimony that underground tests are too expensive and that this fact will limit the spread of nuclear weapons, although in a subsequent discussion he said that an underground test is too expensive only in a political and psychological sense. Indeed the money expended in the actual operations of an underground test is quite negligible

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as compared with the money needed to develop the nuclear explosive itself. Therefore the present limited test ban impedes the spread of nuclear weapons at best in an indirect manner. If proliferation is to be avoided, much more effective measures must be employed.

A comprehensive test ban has been suggested as the remedy. However, the examples of France and China show that a test ban is not a fully sufficient answer to the problem. Further worries arise because small tests can be carried out in secrecy and a country may develop nuclear weapons and refrain from testing them except at a time immediately preceding their intended use.

The present limited test ban has the obvious advantage of eliminating further contamination of the atmosphere. Without repeating the numerous arguments concerning this important question, one may mention three simple facts:

(1) Worldwide contamination due to nuclear tests has never exceeded 10 per cent of the natural background.

(2) Agreement to limit the activity released to the atmosphere can be policed satisfactorily and would be consistent with reducing radioactive contamination well below 10 per cent of the natural radiation. Such limitation would not interfere with technological progress needed for defense.

(3) In some parts of Brazil and in the province of Kerala on the east Indian coast, natural radioactivity exceeds the worldwide average background by more than 1000 per cent and makes a contribution to the relevant parts of the human body more than a hundred times greater than fallout. There is no clear-cut indication that this high level of activity has had harmful consequences for the population that has lived in these neighborhoods for many centuries, though it must be conceded that to prove the absence of such consequences is exceedingly difficult and cannot be done in a rigorous sense.

One very important worry connected with present and projected test bans is the unpredictable behavior of the Soviet Union. Radioactivity released in Siberia on January 15, 1965 shows that the Soviets are not observing the limited test ban in as scrupulous a manner as we are. It is not clear to what extent secret violations may occur in case a comprehensive test ban is signed at a future date. The extensive preparations that the Soviets must have made prior to their test series in the early fall of 1961 had remained secret and the breaking of the test moratorium actually took us

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by surprise. All of this indicates in a clear fashion that a test ban puts a stronger limitation on developments in the United States than on developments in the Soviet Union.

The most important argument against the test ban is the fact that the Soviet Union seems to have proceeded farther along with the development of a missile defense than has the United States. To catch up in this crucial field and to introduce a system that is experimentally verified and therefore reasonably reliable requires testing. More specifically, it requires testing in the atmosphere. By accepting a limited test ban we have probably accepted a position inferior to that of the Soviets in the important field of missile defense. The disadvantage might possibly be overcome by a great effort, which we continue to postpone. A comprehensive test ban would make such an effort all but impossible. It should be understood that if the Soviets possess a sufficiently good missile defense while we do not, then our present posture of deterrence will have ceased to be effective.

Arms Control and Enforcement

It is obvious that to set up rules without providing a method of enforcement and the means for carrying out such enforcement will have harmful consequences. The best known historical example, taken from a situation very different from arms control, is the story of prohibition in the United States. In this instance the establishment of a law to operate within the United States, although made part of the Constitution of our country, failed to accomplish its purpose and led to the proliferation of organized crime. This was due to the fact that neither the citizenry nor the police were prepared to enforce prohibition in a consistent manner.

If the enforcement of national laws is in some cases difficult, one might expect that enforcement would be much more of a problem with respect to international law where foundations of tradition, respect and stability do not exist as in individual nations. Introduction of international regulations which are not enforced is likely to result in a continuing lack of respect for international legality. At the present time international order based upon international law seems to be the only alternative to increasing danger and eventual chaos. Therefore it would be particularly unfortunate if we initiated a treaty or a structure of

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treaties which we have no means and perhaps no intention of enforcing.

The problem becomes much clearer if we try to connect it to a situation existing at the present time: the question of our response to Chinese nuclear explosions.

From a logical point of view there are four possible ways in which the Chinese nuclear explosions and agreement concerning nonproliferation can be related to each other. The first is to abolish the Chinese nuclear production capacity and to establish an international nonproliferation agreement. The second is to abolish the Chinese plant and not to introduce a nonproliferation agreement. The third is to allow the Chinese to continue the production of nuclear weapons and to establish an international agreement. And the last is to do nothing, that is, to allow the Chinese to build up their nuclear arsenal and not to undertake steps for the prevention of the spread of nuclear arms. The discussion of each of these possibilities will give us some needed insight.

The first alternative has been advocated by many people of differing political views. The proposal possesses elements of realism. If the Chinese facilities for the production of nuclear weapons are wiped out by American action, this will lessen immediate dangers of Chinese aggression and will at the same time put teeth into any prospective nonproliferation agreement. Such a course of action would be a clear signal that a law of nonproliferation will not be handled in the same ineffective and disastrous manner as prohibition.

At the same time this energetic course of action seems to me dangerous, of doubtful eventual utility, and questionable from the moral point of view. It is true that the Chinese have engaged several times in aggressive action; this may serve to justify the bombing of Chinese plants. Such bombing may be preceded by an appropriate warning in order to free us of the reproach of having killed unsuspecting Chinese workers. But to my mind the basis of morality is to act according to principles which can be properly applied in all essentially similar cases. If we abolish Chinese production facilities, we shall have no effective reason to protest if the Soviets do the same thing to French facilities. Violent reprisal against proliferation may indeed make a nonproliferation treaty effective, but only at the price of applying force even

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before a new and beneficial law has been firmly established in the minds and feelings of the people throughout the world.

The bombing of the Chinese plants would be a harsh measure and its ultimate utility may not be great. The Chinese could and probably would replace their facilities in utmost secrecy, and we might not be able to wipe out these facilities a second time. The danger therefore would be merely delayed and the period of delay could be less than five years. Thus the establishment of nuclear power by additional nations would be firmly linked to the requirement of secrecy and would give additional stimulus to secrecy measures not only in China but in other countries as well. Enforcement of nonproliferation would have to extend to the breaking of any secrecy, and we would therefore be forced to interfere with the detailed internal operation of each country suspected of developing nuclear explosives.

Thus the first alternative, though apparently realistic, would be in the end useless unless it is the first step of comprehensive international control, perhaps even amounting to international tyranny. This type of operation could be exercised by the Kremlin. It could not be undertaken by the United States as long as we are to adhere to the basic principles on which our society is built.

The second alternative is to abolish the Chinese production units but not to establish treaties or controls prohibiting proliferation. This exceedingly hard line may be advocated by those who want to consider the interests of the United States without making concessions to liberal views or to world opinion. The argument adduced in favor of such action may be that in order to exercise control we must use our power where it counts and need not be concerned about public opinion at home or abroad. I feel that this course has most of the disadvantages enumerated above and at the same time can be defended less effectively on the basis of general principles. I certainly would not want to argue for this alternative.

The third possibility is most popular among the planners of arms control and disarmament: We should not interfere with present Chinese plants but rather we should press for an international agreement prohibiting further proliferation. The great weakness of this approach lies in the fact that it imposes no plausible penalties on the breaking of the arms control agreement. In fact, by permitting the Chinese to arm, we increase the prob-

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ability that development of nuclear explosives by any additional nation will meet with no meaningful reprisal. Since the increase of Chinese power exposes additional nations to uncertainty and danger, it is quite probable that an anti-proliferation treaty will not carry sufficient authority.

A further danger of the anti-proliferation treaty lies in the weakening of the NATO alliance. Soviet leaders are apt to agree to this treaty for precisely this reason. Our unwillingness to share atomic information and atomic technology with the French has already produced serious disagreement within the Western alliance. A rigorous interpretation of an anti-proliferation treaty may deprive other NATO members of effective or plausible support by the United States. If laxity of enforcement should lead to the development of atomic explosives by other and possibly less advanced countries, West Germany and other NATO allies might indeed become restless.

Because of all of these circumstances, I consider the alternative of not halting Chinese nuclear development while concluding an essentially unpoliced nonproliferation treaty as the choice of greatest danger. Unfortunately, the forces driving us toward this alternative are strong, and indeed this possibility of maximum treaty obligations combined with minimum action and enforcement may become a reality in the near future.

There remains only one alternative: This is not to interfere with Chinese development and not to enter into a nonproliferation treaty. This appears to be the most probable course of action, or more precisely the likely outcome, because it consists in taking no action whatsoever. If one considers only the alternatives that we have so far discussed, the situation is most unsatisfactory. However, the inaction of the last alternative leaves the door open for action in other respects. I believe that strong arguments can be adduced for not bombing the Chinese and for not concluding treaties that are apt to remain ineffective, but for seeking increased safety by other means. We shall turn now to other methods that are apt to make peace more secure and the survival of our country more probable.

The Need for an Ample Retaliatory Force

The first step toward increased security has already been accomplished by the United States. It consists of the establishment of a reasonably secure retaliatory force, designed as a second-strike

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force to be directed against the Soviet Union in case the United States should be attacked. A portion of the same force may have to be used if an attack is inflicted upon us by another power, for instance by Communist China.

It has been frequently asserted that our second-strike force must be considered a danger and a liability because it might be triggered by a false alarm and in this way might give rise to war by accident. Some "scientific" arguments have even claimed that such an accident will become a certainty in the course of time for the simple reason that the probability of malfunction is cumulative. Such an assertion disregards the fact that the safeguards introduced against malfunction have been steadily increased, and the sum of an ever-decreasing number of small probabilities can be held to a level which still is of negligible size. Because of the necessary safeguards of security, it is unfortunately impossible to give explicit proof of this statement.

There is one method by which the probability of accidental war can be decreased to a considerable and decisive extent. This is to delay the retaliatory strike. An important advantage of such a proposal lies in the fact that it could rule out not only war by accident but also war by the provocation of a third party. If we are attacked we need not assume blindly that the attack must have come from the Soviet Union. It is possible to wait and check before we strike back.

On the other hand, a delayed second strike has disadvantages which may appear to have overwhelming importance. It has been argued with considerable plausibility that after a large-scale attack the devastation in our country would be so great that any further decisions would be meaningless and that delay of the counterattack might merely serve to give the enemy time to complete his destructive action.

This brings us to a most important point. Retaliation, and most particularly delayed retaliation, is meaningful only if two additional conditions are satisfied. The predominant one is that eventual retaliation must be certain. This requires ample and well protected retaliatory power. The second is a considerable amount of passive or civil defense which could guarantee the survival of the major portion of our citizenry and also ensure the rebuilding of our country and economy within a relatively short time. All of this could be carried out with remarkable effectiveness if we should also establish an active missile defense so as to blunt any attack on our country.

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These considerations give us a clear picture. If we believe in a second-strike force—and indeed our policy for the preservation of peace has been based on assured retaliation—then this second-strike force must be ample to ensure against surprising technological progress in the Soviet Union. The closed Soviet state is particularly apt to bring forth such surprises without previous warning. Therefore our second-strike force, if it is to be reliable, must be invulnerable to technological surprise.

One must always keep in mind that though deterrence is designed to prevent a nuclear attack and should indeed prevent it, our plan can work only if we continue to consider the possibility of such an attack as an ever-present danger. The insurance against technological surprise must consist mainly in our own excellent scientific work, but in addition it is necessary to have several alternatives for retaliation, such as land-based and submarine-launched missiles. At the same time it is necessary to ensure the survival of the retaliatory force by appropriate means such as mobility or active defense. In this way we can prevent its destruction by a pre-emptive strike from the Soviet Union.

All of this contrasts sharply with the present trend of buying defense for a minimum amount of money. Such economy leads to risks which are avoidable: there can be little doubt that the United States can afford to spend what is needed for safety.

It has been suggested that our retaliatory force should be limited so as not to make it appear unnecessarily provocative. It is, however, the nature of a reliable retaliatory force that it must be abundant. He who plans to deliver the first strike and possesses reasonably accurate information about his opponent may plan his attack using a moderately sized safety factor. If one assumes that the USSR does plan a first strike in case a favorable opportunity develops, then the conditions for economic planning may be fulfilled in the Soviet Union. For the forces planned by the United States, strict economy is dangerous because we are building a second-strike force to be effective at an unknown date and because we do not and cannot obtain detailed information about the Soviet Union, particularly about the technological surprises that the Soviets may have in store for us.

An overwhelming second-strike force is indeed not characterized by its provocative nature but rather by its safe and reliable character. If the retaliatory force is barely sufficient, the men responsible for the defense of our country may be exposed to most terrible psychological stresses. They may be tempted to retaliate

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prematurely so as to be able to retaliate at all. If, on the other hand, the force is ample, time is gained for deliberate action and thus mistakes can be avoided.

It is equally important that though our response may be delayed, it should be absolutely assured. In particular, our retaliatory system should be so organized that if all centers of higher command are put out of action by an attack, then the officer of more limited responsibility should automatically have the right and in fact the duty to release the retaliatory forces under his command. This system of organization should be not only known but in fact advertised, so that it should not be in the interest of the attacker to destroy our centers of political decisions. The attacker should know that destruction of the centers would even more surely and speedily bring about retaliation. In the same measure in which we are determined not to strike first, we should make absolutely sure that the second strike will be launched. Otherwise deterrence will not be credible and will fail to accomplish its purpose.

Civil Defense

A realistic policy based on deterrence is not possible if we consider nuclear war as the end of our civilization. Such a war would indeed be more terrible than anything we can remember. Nevertheless effective measures are possible which give us a good chance to survive as a nation.

This statement will not be easily accepted. It hinges on the effectiveness of civil defense and the possibility of reconstruction after an enemy attack. We have done next to nothing in these important respects. Yet it is true that civil defense can be effective, particularly when combined with missile defense. That the latter measure is within the realm of possibility is made plausible by the Soviet effort and can be borne out by detailed technological arguments. While it is not possible to prevent the penetration of some missiles to an altitude low enough so that great damage will be done, it has been recognized for quite a few years that one can hope to prevent almost all surface bursts in thickly populated areas. If one can force the enemy missiles to explode at a reasonable distance from the most heavily populated regions, then well-designed shelters which protect against fallout, fire and blast will save the great majority of our people. Since construction of such shelters requires a great amount of unskilled labor and since we have at the present time an abundance of such

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labor, the building of the shelters can be carried out without upsetting the economy.

In his effort to save lives, a civil defense planner faces the difficult problem that, in a surprise attack, warning time may be short. This requires a wide distribution of shelters; it also requires sufficient preparation not very different from the lifeboat drills that are always undertaken at the beginning of an ocean voyage.

The reconstruction of the country after a nuclear attack is a less difficult job than most people imagine. It is relevant to remind ourselves that we can easily produce and stockpile the prime necessity for such reconstruction: extensive, well protected and carefully distributed food reserves. Furthermore, it is possible in our abundant economy to mothball and safely store equipment before it is completely worn out and thus make it available for emergency purposes. We must remember that in the scarce economy of the USSR, civil defense and proper preparation for reconstruction are much more difficult to undertake than in the highly advanced economy of the United States. As long as we are forced to participate in a Cold War, there is every reason why we should emphasize those aspects of the Cold War where natural advantage is on our side, and this is the case for civil defense.

There is perhaps one additional point which bears mentioning. The total goods in the United States have a value roughly equivalent to three times the annual national product. Most people do not realize that this figure is so low, although the fact is well known to economists. Thus, reconstruction should not be an impossible task, however widespread the destruction, as long as the majority of the population is saved, food and sanitation are available, some emergency organization is maintained, and the necessary tools have been stockpiled.

The two problems, to prevent a war and to survive it, are of course intertwined. The more probable our survival, the less will be the temptation for a powerful enemy to attack us. If, on the other hand, we give up hope of surviving a nuclear attack, the attack itself becomes more probable. Thus civil defense becomes an integral part of the policy aimed at stability and peace.

The Role of a Delayed Response

The planning of a delayed response needs particularly careful discussion. It is often assumed that delaying the response will

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lead to greatly reduced effectiveness both because of aggressive action against our second-strike force by the enemy and because more time is available to the enemy for precautionary measures such as evacuation of his population. The first of these points is fully valid only if we have not prepared the type of overwhelming retaliatory force which we are considering here.

The second point is most significant. I would like to argue that the enemy should be given every chance to save his people. If we are attacked by the Soviets, it should not be and it need not be our aim to kill the Russian people. What we must do is to annihilate the power base of the communists, that is, we must flatten their cities, destroy their factories, interrupt their communications, and render the organized functioning of the country impossible. Under these conditions the Soviets will have lost the means by which to dominate the world and, therefore, the very things for which they are fighting. This prospect, more than any other, is likely to deter communist aggression.

The more Russian people we can save under these conditions, the better it will be. After communist power is demonstrably broken, the Russian people will regard their communist masters—and us—in a very different light. This is particularly true if we warn the Russian population to leave the target areas, if we use clean explosives, if we demonstrate our respect for life, and if we do everything in our power to save lives by supplying food and medicine in any area where organized aggression is at an end. All this is in the best tradition of our own history, although this fact may have been obscured by the horror stories concerning the cataclysmic course of a thermonuclear war. It cannot and must not be forgotten that such a war is dreadful beyond imagination. But its dangers and terrors do not justify unnecessary killing, nor should they permit any negligence with respect to the saving of human lives under all realizable conditions.

The greatest limitation of our defense effort at present is not lack of money or other means. I believe our weakness lies in internal disunity which has its obvious roots in the feeling that nuclear war can never be justified. While indeed nuclear war should be avoided under all possible circumstances, it happens to be true that we can avoid war only by proper preparedness. In turn this preparedness is much more justified and will be more efficacious if we do everything we can to maintain the effective power of our ideas and of our society without causing unneces-

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sary suffering. This principle has guided us in the past. The dangers of the present situation increase our responsibility to adhere to the same principle in the future.

Thus a delayed response could lead to better preparedness based on more justified procedures. At the same time it may also pay off in laying the foundations of a lasting peace should the horrible disaster of a nuclear war actually be inflicted upon us. An object lesson of the most repulsive lucidity is furnished by the experience of the Nazi armies: they were first welcomed in parts of the conquered Eastern regions, such as the Baltic countries, but soon their inhumanity turned the population against the invaders. This had more to do with the eventual defeat of Hitler than most people realize. While I am certain that no one in our country could plan destruction for its own sake, we may commit a serious mistake by not limiting the damage to human life in every possible way.

For all these reasons delayed responses may emerge as the safest, most practical, morally justifiable alternative open to us if we are ever forced to respond in a nuclear exchange.

Proliferation and Missile Defense

The last question to be discussed in connection with our retaliatory posture is how our plans have to be adjusted to the problem of proliferation. It is rightly stated that no defense is sufficient to rule out the possibility of a nuclear explosive being sneaked into our country. Such an explosive may indeed be set off with terrifying effect. I hope to show, however, that such action would serve the advantage of none of our enemies. The real danger lies in a surprise attack of a sufficiently massive character, and this danger will have to be discussed separately.

The detonation of one nuclear device could be particularly dangerous in case it triggers a nuclear exchange between the major opponents. Our recommended procedure of appropriate delay would effectively eliminate this danger. A major blow against the United States, which, however, falls far short of having a crippling effect, would in all likelihood be followed by proper retaliation against the government that had perpetrated such a crime.

Actually a single nuclear explosion will put our country into a state of alert in which no effort will be spared to prevent further damage. The resulting complications and the toughening

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of the attitude of the United States would be a setback to our competitors, including the Soviet Union. There is no reason to believe that anyone will find sufficient inducement to perpetrate mischief on such an inordinate scale.

There remains the possibility of nuclear blackmail. This is a dangerous course for any country and it is not likely to be undertaken unless the probability of success is great. This probability need not be great if the threat is a single terrible explosion rather than a credible danger to our national survival. The leaders of our country will have to be tough-minded and not give in to threats of nuclear attack. There is no substitute for determined leadership, and only determined leadership can face up to blackmail in the nuclear age. If great but limited damage is inflicted on the United States, this will in the end bring disastrous results to the aggressor—not to ourselves. No matter how difficult the situation, it should still be possible to remain firm and to find the right course of action in the face of nuclear threats. That such threats may come from more quarters as proliferation proceeds is a most unfortunate circumstance which, however, might prove to be unavoidable.

There is another and bigger danger which we should and indeed can avoid. One of the newcomers to the "nuclear club" may threaten an annihilating blow against the United States. For the reasons mentioned above, I believe it most unlikely that such a threat would be followed by action; but a threat of a massive attack may put intolerable pressure upon our Administration. Let us assume, for instance (and this assumption is by no means implausible), that within the next five or ten years the Chinese acquire a sizeable arsenal of thermonuclear explosives together with fairly accurate medium-range rockets which can be delivered from shipboard. Let us further assume that China will want to conquer Taiwan. The Chinese may threaten to deliver a simultaneous annihilating blow against all the major cities of the United States if we should interfere with their aggressive plans. For our President to take the required risk if the stakes are as high as the continued national existence of the United States will be an incredibly hard decision. It is necessary to find a way to counter threats of such dimensions. Fortunately appropriate defensive action is possible.

There has been extensive discussion of the question whether

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an active missile defense can be carried out in an effective manner. Valid arguments can be adduced on both sides as long as we are faced with a massive and sophisticated attack, such as the Soviets might launch against us. But there can be little doubt that we could establish within a few years an active missile defense which could blunt a Chinese attack. It is not claimed that our defense will be completely airtight and that not a single Chinese hydrogen bomb will get through. However, we can destroy most of the missiles in a less massive Chinese attack so that the results, while dreadful, will not seriously disrupt our national life or permanently reduce our industrial or military strength. All of this does not mean that missile defense will cause the dangers of the nuclear age to disappear. It means only that the size of the danger will be reduced to dimensions which can be managed by men of wisdom and fortitude.

The cost of the needed missile defense will run into billions of dollars. But we should be glad to pay this cost for the country's safety. Although such a missile defense will fall short of adequate insurance against a Soviet attack, the uncertainties introduced by its existence may cause the rulers of the Kremlin to hesitate before launching an attack. While we install a missile defense sufficient to stop the Chinese we will obtain more experience and will be in a better position to judge the cost of a massive defense system which can turn back an attack launched by the Soviet Union. It may turn out that the cost for the defender is not much greater than the cost for the aggressor. In that case defense on a large scale would indeed be justified.

What is recommended here is obviously a difficult and expensive procedure. I am asking for a bigger, stronger and more assured retaliatory force, and I am furthermore asking for passive and active defense measures. All of these forces must be kept up to date. One must expect that a proposal of this magnitude will be met with the statement that such defense will bankrupt the country. To this one might answer that during the period from 1952 to 1965 our defense expenditures have fallen from approximately 16 per cent to 8 per cent of the national product. In the same period the risks to our national survival have risen in a dramatic manner. We did not face bankruptcy in 1952. There is no reason to doubt that our country is strong enough and wealthy enough to do what must be done in order to survive.

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Thus the solution proposed is to replace disarmament or arms control by a buildup of national strength and by a policy of patience that can be coupled with such strength. But strength is not enough. The greatest immediate danger we now face may not lie in Vietnam but in France. It is a remarkable fact that the danger of NATO's disintegration can be traced directly to questions connected with nuclear weapons. It was the U.S. nuclear shield that held NATO together during its first years. It was our unwillingness to share nuclear responsibility with our allies that has led to the present rift within NATO.

Greater strength in the hands of the United States will make our promise to protect NATO a more credible one. It might be remembered that the initial days of the Cuban missile crisis, when the determined posture of our Administration brought an immediate favorable reaction from President de Gaulle, marked the only period of cordial relations between France and our country within the last few years.

At the same time the proposals made here may have in part a damaging and disruptive effect upon the NATO alliance. Let us assume that we introduce an effective missile defense which will allow us to face up to Chinese blackmail. Let us also assume that no similiar defense is available to our European allies. The psychological effects of this situation will be damaging, perhaps sufficiently adverse to lead to a dissolution of the alliance. In the long run the unity of NATO and its development toward an even stronger instrument of cooperation among the Western nations is the best insurance we have had or can possibly have in the future against communist encroachment. One of the significant consequences of an anti-proliferation treaty might be the exclusion for the indefinite future of an effective missile defense from Western Europe. Missile defense cannot be established without defensive nuclear warheads. Furthermore, it requires a most advanced and sophisticated application of nuclear technology. England, France and other European countries may develop their own small retaliatory force: they cannot develop an effective missile defense without our full cooperation.

An offer to assist in providing our European allies with a missile defense could be the wisest move the United States can make to strengthen the NATO alliance. French military theorists, in particular General Pierre M. Gallois, have asserted that in the

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nuclear age an alliance cannot be operational if it relies on the promise of one country to defend another at the risk of its own survival. Instead, they contend that even a small retaliatory force available to each of the cooperating Western nations will be sufficient to deter a Soviet attack. This claim is fallacious. The emerging fact of Soviet missile defense will render small retaliatory forces useless. At the same time, by offering large-scale assistance to establish a missile defense for Western Europe, the U.S. government could go far toward meeting the vital defense requirements of our NATO allies.

The objection obviously arises that such missile defense will amount to rapid proliferation by placing nuclear explosives in the hands of many participating nations. Surely, each of the Western nations should be given the full right to conduct its own defense, with the help of nuclear explosives if need be, in case a major portion of its population is threatened by approaching missiles. Yet one may fear that the defensive nuclear warheads may be used for the wrong purpose, namely, the initiation of a nuclear conflict.

Actually ample safeguards can be erected against misuse of the defensive explosives. Apparatus can be installed which will make the weapon promptly available for an appropriate aerial burst over the country to be defended. But if an attempt is made to use the nuclear bomb for any other purpose—for instance, if it is removed from its mounting to be used later in a tactical operation—then one can make sure that the warhead will completely ruin itself and at the same time automatically notify appropriate centers (such as NATO headquarters and Washington) that an unplanned use has been attempted. The technical means fortunately exist by which we can make certain that defensive weapons will be used for nothing except the proper kind of defense.

The establishment of an effective missile defense is a question of survival for ourselves and our allies. The problem is partly an economic one. To a very great extent, however, it is an extremely difficult scientific and technological undertaking. Cooperation between leading Europeans and Americans experienced in missilery and nuclear explosives, together with the full exploitation of the U.S. arsenal of fissionable materials and mass production facilities, would greatly accelerate our present effort to design and produce an effective missile defense system. It is not necessary

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and not desirable that the United States foot the whole bill. A large portion of the defense program would consist of local construction work as well as other special tasks in which some of our allies excel. This is a clear case where the whole can be much more than the sum of its parts.

Meaningful cooperation for defense is the mainstay of NATO unity. This cooperation must encompass much more than missile defense. In the sensitive and hazardous field of nuclear cooperation, however, the purely defensive measures should be in the forefront of our present plans. They are urgent and, furthermore, they are most obviously justified. In the long run we must share more responsibilities so that Western unity in international politics may be strengthened. This could serve as the fixed point from which we may move the world toward law and order.

The Question of Symmetry

In many arguments concerning disarmament and the hazards of war, the scientific fiction of symmetry has been introduced. It is assumed explicitly or implicitly that any measure serving the interest of peace is equally desired by the two great powers, that the actions and motivations of these powers are basically similar, and that the plans should be laid out in a manner equally affecting the two countries. This point of view appears to have the advantage of true justice in that it is certainly not influenced by prejudice or pride in one's own favor.

On the other hand, the assumption of symmetry flies in the face of a few obvious facts. Russian society is and has been organized for several centuries as a closed system. Our society is open. Communist leaders have inherited a doctrine that is not only purposeful but is in fact overabundant in missionary zeal. Our own attitude toward the rest of the world is more modest and more comfortable.

To interpret in a too literal and violent sense Khrushchev's repeated statement that the Soviets will bury capitalism is probably not fully justifiable. At the same time it is quite possible that Soviet leaders will consider it their duty to "liberate" the world if, due to our overcautious and parsimonious defense policy or due to mistaken attempts at arms control, we offer them an opportunity to carry out their grand design at the risk of only a limited amount of damage. All too frequently the power of modern weapons is equated to the certainty that American retali-

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ation will succeed. In a rapidly changing technological situation this may not be taken for granted. While clear aggressive designs may indeed be far from the thoughts of Soviet leaders, we do not know this with any degree of certainty; it is therefore incumbent upon us to provide for the real if not overwhelmingly great probability that such designs might be considered as possible alternatives by Kremlin policymakers.

Finally, one must clearly realize that tensions are apt to develop even without aggressive designs, and that these tensions may lead to acute situations in which only moderation or fear of retaliation will prevent war. Given the real differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, I believe that peace will be best preserved if we rely to some measure on the fear of retaliation in the minds of the communists. We have every reason to be confident that moderation will govern the policy of the United States.

The best guarantee of peace is appropriate force in the hands of those who want peace.

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DEBATE ON THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE*

by Edmond Combaux

LET us seek to identify the root causes of the many difficulties that have culminated in the crises of NATO. Perhaps we could thus find the paths leading to a reconciliation of the Western world. To present more clearly our analysis of so ardently controverted a topic, we will stage a debate in which the participants are a Moderator, an American, a Frenchman, a European, a NATO man, a Philosopher and a Military Engineer.

MODERATOR: The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949. How did it come about? Has it accomplished its purpose? Is it still serving a useful purpose? Do not the events which have taken place since 1949 suggest that we need to re-examine the reasons for the creation of the Atlantic Alliance and its present role and importance? Do not these events call for a reform of the organization to which the alliance has been committed? How should we structure our debate in order to answer these questions?

PHILOSOPHER: The polemics to which the NATO problem has given rise have shown the impossibility of conciliating the opinions of Western statesmen with those of the strategists. More often than not, the discussions are confused and incoherent. I fear that we shall not be able to avoid the same stumbling block if we do not first discover the real source of the disorder from which the alliance suffers. The alliance was formed in the midst of a world swept by two crosscurrents that differ fundamentally. On the one hand, the revolutionary tide presses upon all political and social structures, destroys empires, overthrows established powers and leaves in its wake disorder and anarchy everywhere. On the other hand, in the last twenty years, the impact of technology has been pushing humanity toward a new age, the nuclear age. Technological development imposes organizational con-

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ditions and demands the creation of vast political entities, strongly disciplined and firmly governed. Exposed to these two irresistible and intermingling forces, governments and peoples alike struggle alternatively against one or the other or abandon themselves to the flow of the tide without being able to see where it will take them.

To resolve the problems that face the Atlantic Alliance, we must first, by two separate analyses, place in perspective the alliance itself, face to face with these two powerful currents.

MODERATOR: I will gladly go along with the method suggested by the Philosopher. Thus, we will divide the debate into two parts: (1) the Atlantic Alliance and the Revolutionary Movements and (2) the Atlantic Alliance and the Nuclear Age. Our conclusions will be addressed to the reform of NATO.

The Atlantic Alliance and the Revolutionary Movements

Europe

NATO MAN: The revolutionary events with which the Atlantic world has had to cope for the last twenty years encompass the whole world. Let us start first with Europe.

The Atlantic Alliance was formed because of the pressing need to safeguard Western Europe against Soviet domination. After World War II the whole of Eastern and Central Europe had fallen into the hands of the Soviet Army. Following close on the heels of the Soviet Army, communist dictatorships were imposed upon East Germany (1945), Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria (1947), and Rumania and Czechoslovakia (1948). The free countries of Western Europe had to act immediately. The United States—fortunately holding an atomic monopoly—pledged itself to guarantee Europe's independence. The United States assisted in the rebuilding of Europe with the Marshall Plan in 1947 and cooperated in the defense of Europe. First, the Treaty of Brussels was signed in March 1948, providing for the mutual defense of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Low Countries. The Berlin blockade, which elicited the response of the airlift from June 1948 to May 1949, hastened the setting up of a joint military organization for common defense under this treaty. Washington followed this step by negotiating the establishment of a unique system of mutual defense which, encompassing the Brussels Organization, covered the whole of the

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North Atlantic. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949. Who could deny that this treaty preserved freedom in Europe?

EUROPEAN: In fact, the treaty saved Europe. It remains the guarantee of freedom in Europe today. Soviet expansion was brought to a halt by the signing of the treaty. This very achievement represents our first debt to NATO.

MODERATOR: There is a second. NATO has not only been a protective shield; it has been a source of confidence and security which has given an invigorating lift to prosperity, economic growth and political cooperation.

EUROPEAN: We have witnessed, moreover, the combined efforts of the United States, Great Britain and France to guide Germany toward a liberal democracy. The Federal Republic of Germany was formed on May 8, 1949. When Germany committed herself to the Free World, Stalin instantly responded by installing in Pankow in October 1949 a puppet government, the German Democratic Republic. It seemed as if, by the will of the Kremlin, the more Western Europe turned toward liberty, the more the East succumbed to tyranny.

Thanks to the initiative of two great Frenchmen, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, the European Coal and Steel Community was founded on April 18, 1951. The French government then launched the idea of the European Defense Community, but the EDC treaty, signed on May 27, 1952, was rejected by the French National Assembly in August 1954.

In 1952 Greece and Turkey, and in May 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany, were admitted into NATO. Finally, under the influence of powerful liberal forces, a great project saw the light of day: the progressive creation of a Europe freed of interior frontiers, sustained by a market of 160 million people, and rid of customs duties, import quotas and cartels. The Treaty of Rome, which instituted the Common Market and EURATOM, was signed on March 24, 1957. Would all this have been possible without NATO? Can one, in all fairness, pretend that the North Atlantic Treaty has plunged Europe into some subordinate role when it has, in fact, been the foremost catalyst of Europe's rebirth and the renewal of the European conscience?

MODERATOR: You have put forward the positive aspects of the alliance. Is there not also a negative side?

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FRENCHMAN: Since 1949 the Atlantic Alliance has mounted guard on the immense front which separates Free Europe from the Soviet world. The much-vaunted aggression from the East has not taken place. This fact, I agree, permits us to proclaim the efficacy of NATO. But the defense must not be limited to that alone. The Free World has been attacked by all sorts of direct and indirect strategies, not only in Europe, but also on all the other continents. NATO has been incapable of assuring the defense of its members on the globe-as-a-whole, which is where the battle is taking place.

NATO MAN: You are reproaching NATO for not having acted in territories which are not NATO's to cover. Article Three of the treaty limits assistance only to cases of armed attack. Article Five defines the geographic limits of this obligation. Thus, the domain of alliance solidarity was strictly defined. NATO has endowed the zone of which it had charge with a modern system for collective defense. Thus, NATO has accomplished its mission. I would like to know just what would have happened if NATO had stepped outside of its agreed framework.

EUROPEAN: Some people have reproached NATO for not having tried, after the death of Stalin, to save the rebels in East Berlin in June 1953 or to prevent Soviet tanks from crushing the risings in Poznan in June 1956 and in Hungary in October-November 1956. NATO did not respond to the raising of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.

But NATO would have overstepped its limits and would have risked failure if it had acted positively on such occasions. NATO would then have been divided by all the differences of opinion among allies which any foolhardy initiative would have brought into the open. Those Europeans who suffered most from the world wars would have been the first to refuse to participate in such a venture.

AMERICAN: Thus, after the terrible slaughter of the Second World War, our policy in Europe could not have been any different from what it actually was. We protected those countries that were not taken over by the Soviet Army—even the little island of West Berlin, isolated segment of the Free World in an ocean of dictatorships. With every means at our disposal, with all our heart, we have helped to bandage your sores and to build a new Europe which is regaining its prosperity and pride.

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Asia

MODERATOR: Let us now discuss Asia.

AMERICAN: Between the end of the Second World War and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, Soviet communism was not content to subjugate Eastern and Central Europe. The Soviets launched the conquest of Asia. With the help of Moscow, Mao Tse-tung's armies tore from our ally Chiang Kai-shek the whole of China in the period from 1945 to 1949.

What could we do to stabilize the Far East? First and foremost, we pursued in Japan the same generous policy that we applied to Germany. Under General MacArthur, Hirohito's empire was transformed into a constitutional monarchy along Western lines. Then we set out to protect those Asian countries threatened by revolutionary upheaval.

Did not England, France and Holland engage in this same struggle? Not long after the capitulation of Japan, Ho Chi Minh gave the signal for insurrection in Indochina. The British fought against communist guerrillas in Malaysia. The Dutch had to abandon Indonesia. In June 1950, North Korean troops invaded South Korea. For us, another murderous war had begun. We fought for three years until the North Koreans and Chinese were pressed back to their starting point.

FRENCHMAN: Checked in Korea, unable to dislodge the government of Chiang Kai-shek from Formosa, Red China concentrated on helping the forces of the Viet Minh that were harassing our troops in Tonkin. From there, we went on to the disaster of Dien Bien Phu in March 1954 and the Geneva Agreements of June 1954, which, for a short period of time, arrested the forces of Ho Chi Minh at the 17th Parallel. We had lost Indochina.

Is it not rather surprising, in view of the logic underlying America's fight against communism in Asia, that the United States did not intervene in our favor before the fall of Dien Bien Phu?

AMERICAN: Great Britain, whom we consulted at the time, was not in favor of our intervention. She feared dangerous consequences. In addition, we were troubled by the colonialist nature of your presence in Indochina.

FRENCHMAN: This is a beautiful example of Western confu-

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sion! Did a "liberated" South Vietnam, under your protection, find stability and peace?

AMERICAN: We had no guarantee of such an outcome, since, from 1957 on, the North Vietnamese took up the fight against South Vietnam. Could we abandon to its fate the South Vietnamese government which called on us for help and to which we had promised our assistance? Is not our present fight in the Mekong Delta and the hills of Annam more disinterested than the one in which you the French were engaged before us? If we now abandon the fight, will the neutralism of this or that oriental prince or the good intentions of the Quai d'Orsay suffice to preserve the Thais, the Laotians, the Malays, the Indonesians and the Australians from Chinese domination?

Africa

MODERATOR: Let us now turn our attention to the Middle East and Africa. The USSR has become very active in these areas. There are few places in the world where the absence of coordinated Western policies is so keenly felt.

AMERICAN: Do you believe that a coordinated policy of some kind might have been possible, one with which we could have associated ourselves? Our European allies followed differing colonial policies. They would have taken a dim view of any intervention on our part. In addition to this, we ourselves judged the ending of the colonial empires to be inevitable. Thus, we were virtually forced to abstain from intervening, to wait for the time when the colonial peoples attained independence, and to hold ourselves ready to help them—should this be necessary—to prevent their falling under communist influence.

FRENCHMAN: It is easy to see the last act of this play. On November 1, 1954, four months after the Geneva Armistice, fighting broke out in our departments in Algeria. This territory was under the NATO guarantee, which was to prove itself worthless. On July 26, 1956, there was the Suez affair for which you were, in part, responsible. It was your policies that, conflicting with those of Moscow, ended by pushing Nasser to nationalize the Canal Company, violating international law and defying vital European interests. To defend these interests, and while the Israeli forces were invading Sinai in October 1956, we decided to

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intervene, and England came in on our side. At this point, you suddenly placed yourself virtually in the enemy camp. Your pressure, added to that of Khrushchev, miraculously saved the Egyptian dictator from certain military defeat.

AMERICAN: We acted under dire duress. Do not forget that the first Soviet atomic bomb was exploded in April 1949. On August 12, 1953, the USSR exploded a hydrogen bomb. This factor modified the very foundations of our military policy. The Eisenhower Doctrine (officially announced in January 1957) based the maintenance of peace on limited conventional intervention subject to the most rigorous controls. Under these circumstances, how could we have approved your rash and poorly prepared action, an action which you kept secret from us and which jeopardized the peace of the whole world?

FRENCHMAN: We should here take due note of the fact that the Suez crisis is a remarkable date in the history of strategy. It also marked a decisive turning point in history. The whole Western world suffered a major diplomatic defeat. In addition, this episode revealed clearly the inferior position allocated to the European states by American predominance in NATO and the weight of Soviet power.

AMERICAN: While revolutionary fever gripped Africa, the Algerian war expanded. The war brought about the fall of the Fourth Republic and De Gaulle's accession to power on June 1, 1958. Can you explain his actions which seem to us to be undermining NATO?

FRENCHMAN: You remember the appeal De Gaulle made to you in 1958 to create—within the NATO framework—an American-French-British directorate charged with defining and carrying out Western policy on a worldwide basis. The United States did not grasp the real meaning of this appeal. De Gaulle wanted to save the achievement of France in Africa. The taste for conquest and glory that had led to the building of our empire was long forgotten. All that remained in our hearts was an almost fraternal feeling for these overseas populations which we were guiding toward civilization. Was all this to go down the drain because our desire to remain and to help conflicted with both the aggressive tendencies of the revolutionary East and your cold hostility?

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Deprived of the support he expected from you and pressured on all sides, General de Gaulle tried, in order to escape this predicament, to modify—by one single gesture—the interrelationship of France and her empire. It was a real poker player's ploy: first, national self-determination and then the linking of the newly independent peoples to a French community.

We know what happened to this project, a project undoubtedly generous in scope but too hastily conceived. Our empire was liquidated with a speed seldom equaled in history. First came the loss of French Black Africa. Independence had hardly been accorded before that land became a hotbed of intrigue. The unrest spread to the Belgian Congo, which the Belgian government was forced to abandon to its fate. What use could the hastily planned French Community have been with its Presidency, its Executive Committee and its Senate, since no agreement could be concluded which would give continuity and life to these institutions? In March 1961 the French Community's Senate was dissolved: the French Community was dead.

One year later the same fate awaited Algeria with the Evian Agreements of March. We now know the troubles that befell France in Algeria and how deep were the scars which this misfortune left on French society.

Premature decolonization launched Africa headlong into an era of anarchy, revolution and disorder, the end of which remains unknown.

AMERICAN: I presume the point you are trying to get across is that we should have accepted General de Gaulle's proposition of the "Directorate of Three." In 1958 this Directorate seemed inadequate to us for two reasons. With regard to Atlantic policy, its existence negated the principle of equality of the fifteen nations in the Council of the North Atlantic. As far as critical issues of world policy were concerned, nations other than France would have found themselves involved.

Undoubtedly, the rapid progress of revolutionary unrest in Africa threatened Western Europe with massive disturbances to the south. To contain them, the U.S. Sixth Fleet cruised the Mediterranean. Its presence, including a few interventions, such as the Lebanese landings of July 1958, sufficed to maintain general stability. But tell me, in the name of what agreement would we have been accorded the right to take part in quarrels from

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which, in view of your own great misgivings on internationalism, you wish to keep us separate?

Be it the Algerian rebellion, the Cyprus crisis, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the Suez crisis, we could not have used force without risking a major war.

South America

MODERATOR: While the African continent was throwing off European guidance, crises were breaking out in South America: Castro's accession to power in January 1959, the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961, the assassination of the Dominican dictator, Trujillo, in May 1961, the Cuban crisis of October 1962, and the Dominican revolt in April 1965. We could not sit silently by in the face of these events, for, in many of these instances, the signs of revolution pointed to the East.

AMERICAN: The Cuban crisis showed the momentous importance of the threat to world peace posed by Soviet-instigated revolutionary movements in South America. We witnessed the USSR helping Fidel Castro to install medium-range missiles with which he could threaten our most vital industrial centers. Never before has so massive a means of destruction been brandished by such a petty but impassioned politician. We soon put a stop to that.

In the midst of all this, our efforts in South America are no different from those we were making in other parts of the world. There is a certain symmetry between NATO, created in 1949, and the Organization of American States, founded in 1948 by the Act of Bogotá, which instituted political, economic and military cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. The same analogy can be drawn between what the Marshall Plan was to Europe and what the Alliance for Progress, launched in 1961 by President Kennedy, was to be to South America.

FRENCHMAN: The Punta del Este Charter, which gave the Alliance for Progress an inter-American character and called for collective commitment to specific economic and social goals, ran into some trouble because of the conservative bent of the ruling classes. These classes, people of European origins, seemed only able to keep up with the times by keeping in close contact with the Old Continent. However, the Old Continent kept to itself. Before 1914, Europe absorbed 60 per cent of Latin American exports and furnished in exchange 65 per cent of her imports. The

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two world wars forced Europe to withdraw its capital. A polarization took place in your favor—a polarization so strong that it seemed as if South America were a commercial satellite of the U.S.

A dangerous evolution! Wouldn't the South American political structures, cut off from European influences, dry out like plants whose roots have been cut? Let us hope that you North Americans do not take on too heavy a burden, cut off from Europe and faced with the complex problems of South America.

Consequences of Ideological Conflict

MODERATOR: The brief survey we have conducted has shown us the protective, purely defensive nature of NATO's role. It has also demonstrated the inability of the organization to play a positive role on either a European or global scale. In the last twenty years, Europe has suffered a tremendous loss of power and prestige. Its Eastern nations, now Soviet satellites, have been plunged into a kind of slavery that effectively removes them from history. Those of the West, although protected by the United States, have lost just about everything they possessed on other continents.

At the same time, the United States and the USSR have extended their quarrel to the Third World, that is, underdeveloped countries. Their struggle threatens to perpetuate the great schism of the Old Continent. Shouldn't the Atlantic Alliance seek a solution to this bipolar split which otherwise could only lead to a new world conflict in which European civilization would face ruin?

PHILOSOPHER: I do not believe in the idea that this civilization is doomed. I rather foresee the end of the schism that has divided Europe. We have been waiting for this for a long time, but it will issue, sooner or later, from the thinking of European, American and Soviet elites and their dealings with the events which we have just described.

MODERATOR: What solutions will these elites come up with? Let us begin with Europe, and by that I mean Western, Free Europe.

PHILOSOPHER: Listening to some official spokesmen, we hear anguished complaints and dire predictions about NATO. One of these days, a more accurate assessment will lead to self-exam-

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ination. Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Portugal, who were often rivals in building their empires, found themselves divided on decolonization. Each party had its own idea about the degree of political maturity of the populations in its charge, the relations each desired between itself and the future states formed from its colonies, and the best time to grant independence to them.

Should they have abandoned their empires in one fell swoop, recalled their troops and administrators, and betrayed their former colonial subjects by conforming to the rigid letter of democratic rules, or should they have protected the emerging peoples and met revolutionary violence with force in order to gain the time necessary for the gradual transfer of power, thus sparing the indigenous populations from anarchy and dictatorship?

These problems were so complex and so charged with passion that the European governments could not resolve them on their own. For a task of this magnitude, they should have organized a common political council with the authority to define, and direct, if need be, their common action.

Europe should take note of this. Europe should also understand that she needs to unite in order to solve future problems, that is, the making of peace and preparation for the nuclear age.

MODERATOR: Let us suppose that the European nations had been able to get together to manage the decolonization of their empires. Wouldn't the United States and the USSR have upset all their plans?

PHILOSOPHER: Undoubtedly. Stalinist Russia made no bones about its wish to destroy Western capitalism. The winds of change favored its policies. Revolutionary fervor was alive in the whole world, beginning with Asia. What was the result? Hardly had communist ideology triumphed in China when strong nationalist feelings started to assert themselves. China towered over Asia and threatened it with her demographic mass. She denied the claims of the USSR to Asian power, accused the Soviets of holding Siberian lands by colonial conquest and demanded them back. Finally, China set herself up as the rival to the Kremlin for the direction of global communism. Don't we see here a blow to Soviet foreign policies from which Soviet leaders are likely to learn some lessons?

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As for the internal situation, can the Soviet regime hang on indefinitely to its primitive ideology?

MODERATOR: The first signs of Soviet evolution which you would like to see were the beginning of de-Stalinization in June 1956 and the enunciation of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence in November 1960. We can only hope the resurgence of the humanities will help the Soviet intelligentsia to overthrow old idols.

You seem to foresee, too, a parallel evolutionary trend in the United States.

PHILOSOPHER: Remember the crusading ardor that suffused American policy. The United States wanted to supplant communism everywhere and contest with it every square foot of territory. In addition, Washington avowed its hostility to everything which smacked of colonialism. Beholding the confrontation of the European powers with the black or yellow nationalist leaders, the United States felt that it could not stand aside. Anticipating confidently the defeat of the colonial powers, Americans eagerly supported the nationalist leaders. They wanted to take charge of these freed, indigent and weak countries before communism took over what Europe was giving up.

In this fashion the opposing currents of communist ideology and American anti-colonialism rolled across the steppes, the deserts, the forests and the hills of Asia, Africa and South America, to do battle in every field of human endeavor.

Thus Europe, in withdrawing from the Third World, created a void with which neither the United States nor the USSR nor China could live at ease. Europe had furnished an intermediary class made up of soldiers, administrators, manufacturers, merchants and farmers. This class acted as a buffer between the indigenous elite, whose privileges to some extent it controlled, and the impoverished masses. Thus communism, with its appeal to the masses, touched off the latent tensions.

What would happen to the United States if every European influence were removed? Faced with an adversary appealing to all of the forces of disorder, Americans would be compelled to support all reactionary forces, even those whose only aim was to maintain the old regimes.

The Americans, now going through a painful experience in Vietnam, are beginning to realize some of their mistakes. They will come to undertand that Europe can play a role in formu-

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lating policies aimed at easing the revolutionary torment of the Third World.

FRENCHMAN: For my part, I subscribe to the Philosopher's analysis. I conclude that new movements will evolve to lessen the opposition between the two Great Powers. These movements will make themselves felt first in Europe—a Europe which we must unite. The North Atlantic Treaty will remain a necessary force for peace; but, under its flag, we must make a major effort to end the division of our continent.

Similar movements will evolve in the United States and the Soviet Union. The two Great Powers will come to realize, slowly but surely, that no good can come from their quarrel.

MODERATOR: Taking this conclusion as a springboard, how can the Atlantic Alliance proceed toward a solution of the European problem?

EUROPEAN: First and foremost, the members of NATO must keep in mind the importance of the U.S. guarantee for the protection of Europe, and the need for the American presence as well as the nuclear umbrella for as long as is necessary.

The Atlantic Alliance as a whole must acknowledge the need for according Europe the right to state her common cause in the NATO councils. The defense of Europe must spring from the will of the Europeans. Its conception should be based upon a carefully devised political plan. A consensus in every sphere of activity must first be established among Europeans, and then must flow down to influence those important decisions which Europeans and Americans have to make together in order to solve common problems and face common hazards. Once this has been accomplished, the new NATO can turn to the arduous search for a European peace.

AMERICAN: In his speech in Philadelphia, President John F. Kennedy appealed for an Atlantic Alliance based on two pillars, North America and Western Europe. Consequently, we are in no way opposed to your principles, but we feel that the European governments must act to make them operational. Are the European governments now ready to form a common and permanent policymaking executive committee to represent them in the chambers of the Council—one that will give an answer in the name of the whole group when NATO asks for its advice or de-

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cision? If no such agency can be called into existence, European statesmen should acknowledge their error, stop complaining about our predominance and cease to lament the fact that Europe—a Europe which they themselves have securely gagged—cannot make its voice heard in the Council.

MODERATOR: Let us assume that NATO wants to engage in a permanent political dialogue from which a true European policy and a European Executive would emerge. What would be the latter's role?

EUROPEAN: Its first mission would be to resolve amicably with our American friends the difficult political problems posed by the organization of defense; then it should seek to improve East-West European relations. This Western initiative might prompt the peoples of Central Europe to unite in order to balance the influence of the Kremlin and to turn their attention toward the problems of Europe as a whole. Finally, the European Executive would unite the efforts of its members in dealing with problems of world politics, particularly the economic development of the Third World.

This would not mean that Western Europe will become a third force interposed between the USSR and the United States. In fact, Europe would become a stronger ally, less dependent on American might. Closer relations between the two parts of the Continent would free all European peoples to seek the basis for a true peace, secured by the triple accord of the United States, the USSR and the European nations.

MODERATOR: Later we will look into the consequences of a European Executive for the organization of NATO. Now that we have reached the end of the first part of our debate, two kinds of conclusions seem to have come to the fore.

The first follows these general lines: (1) Despite the miracle accomplished in the last twenty years of rebuilding Europe from its ashes and restoring its prosperity, Europe has suffered a colossal loss of influence and prestige in every quarter of the globe. (2) This political weakening which perpetuates the split in the Old Continent has disastrous consequences for the stability of the whole world. One of the major problems of the Atlantic Alliance is to help to end this condition.

The second set of conclusions is concerned with the question of NATO reform: (1) A major effort must be made to intensify

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political consultation within NATO itself. (2) This consultation must seek to formulate a European policy. Such a European policy must be harmonized with American policy, but must have its individual stamp. It must be capable of rousing public opinion in the free lands of the Continent and evoke so strong a response from the whole of Europe that its message reaches behind the Iron Curtain. (3) The reorganized Atlantic Alliance must appear to the world as the nucleus for a union of two mighty gatherings of free peoples that will exert a powerful attraction on the peoples of the world and summon them to work for peace and progress. It should not appear as a vast empire, dominated by North America, whose nuclear power guarantees the safety of Western Europe. NATO must be an active force for good rather than a passive instrument of destructive power.

The Atlantic Alliance and the Nuclear Age

MODERATOR: Let us now consider nuclear and space problems. Angry voices have arisen in the midst of NATO concerning the nondissemination of atomic arms, the control of their use, and strategic conceptions of the alliance. Can we throw some light on these obscure problems and formulate some simple conclusions?

PHILOSOPHER: As I said at the beginning of our discussion, we now leave the revolutionary current to enter the technological current. Europe should stay at the center of our concerns. Let us ask if the current that turns us toward the nuclear age does not threaten Europe still more than does the revolutionary one?

FRENCHMAN: It does threaten Europe. That, in any event, is the opinion of France, and there are two facets to this threat. The one is scientific and the other industrial.

MODERATOR: Let us take the scientific first.

EUROPEAN: The Second World War has given an extraordinary impetus to scientific research. The conflict had scarcely ended when the United States and the Soviet Union began their unrestrained rivalry for the laurels of the nuclear-space race. As a result, swift progress has been made in science and technology. The momentum has been maintained only by the concentration and application of immense resources: vast numbers of research workers, advanced scientific-technological knowledge, giant indus-

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trial capacity, and the means for huge capital investments. The United States and the USSR had these resources more readily at their disposal than did any of the nations of a disunited Europe. Thus they progressed far beyond Europe. Our scientists found themselves more and more at a disadvantage in their attempt to keep up with the spectacular accomplishments of U.S. and Soviet science. I would not be a good European if I were not upset at such a state of affairs.

FRENCHMAN: I hope your reflections are pondered by those in France who do not understand the reasons for the effort that we are making in the nuclear and space fields. We were told this effort would be in vain; that, left to our own devices, we would fall farther and farther behind the superpowers. What would this time-lag have been if we had done nothing? Our decisions in this general area reflect our refusal to consent to being phased out of the space race.

MODERATOR: Let us now look at the military aspect.

FRENCHMAN: The defense of Europe is in jeopardy. Are we in a position to reject an atomic arsenal if it is within our grasp? The confidence we invest in our American friends—and in their colossal nuclear might standing behind their guarantee of West European defense—is unquestionable. But we want sovereignty over our own weapons because we want to make sure that the great issues, which will determine the future of France, Europe and perhaps the entire globe, will never be settled without us or to our disadvantage by Moscow and Washington.

MODERATOR: No one can deny that the French nuclear force presents NATO with difficult problems. We will understand them better if we review the recent history of nuclear weapons development and the strategic concepts for their use.

AMERICAN: History will show that the evolution of ideas in the field of nuclear warfare is not at all due to the malice of men, but rather to the pressure of reality. Since the inception of nuclear and space technology, each step forward has brought important modifications in the balance of forces, in the policies of governments, and in the doctrines of war.

As long as we had an atomic monopoly or were in possession of a crushing nuclear superiority, our strategy was one of "massive retaliation."

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FRENCHMAN: Agreed, but you never used it—neither in Korea, contrary to the wishes of General MacArthur, nor in Indochina when we were fighting the battle of Dien Bien Phu.

AMERICAN: The communists launched a campaign condemning the use of nuclear weapons against peoples who did not have any. This campaign created, even in the minds of our own leaders, a sort of psychological inhibition that restrained them from acting.

When, in turn, the Soviet Union found itself confronted with the problem of nuclear weapons and came to realize, just as we did, the immense destructiveness of a nuclear war, the risk of nuclear war began to weigh so heavily on them and us that almost no one thought the game was worth the risk. A new, more subtle strategy was born—the strategy of bilateral deterrence which brought forth the theory of "flexible response" and "controlled escalation."

France denounced the strategy of "flexible response." She professed to find in it a reason to doubt the U.S. will to defend Europe. Should France uphold a doctrine that, at the smallest incident along the Iron Curtain or at Berlin, prescribes only one response, namely, unleashing an atomic storm on the world? To me, this does not make sense. Furthermore, I would be willing to bet that French ideas will change when the Elysée has learned to control its nuclear infant, the *force de frappe,* which requires so much care at the moment. Our strategy, believe me, is not the reflection of our black souls; it has no other purpose than to defend our security and that of our allies, and to safeguard the peace of the world.

FRENCHMAN: In the dialectic of forces that you have just described, you recognize that a subtle tie now links you and the Soviet Union. That bond has been woven from your common and exclusive possession of new arms, the balance of forces, and the mutual awareness that both of you carry together the responsibility for atomic peace throughout the world.

Put yourself in our place and see how things look. We, who were without nuclear power, were forced to watch the two great colossi endowing themselves with a second-strike force capable of surviving the first enemy nuclear attack. Under the reign of reciprocal terror an ambiguous solidarity binds them one to the other, just as an object is bound to its reflection in a mirror.

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Washington and Moscow made sure that they could be in direct and instantaneous contact with one another. They tried to present to us the "hot line" as the guarantee of nuclear peace.

Thus, a bipolar division of the world came into being. In order to emphasize this bipolar division, the United States and the Soviet Union adopted common positions on problems such as the nonproliferation of nuclear arms and the control of those arms. They had the same desire to perpetuate their monopoly and to be assured that, within their respective coalitions, the command of nuclear arms would remain in their hands alone.

France judged that this evolution would sooner or later lead to the irreversible subjugation of Europe, divided between two atomic empires, the American and the Soviet. France refused to contemplate such a future. This is why she has decided to equip herself with nuclear armaments, and never fails to take advantage of any opportunity to affirm that membership in the Atlantic Alliance will never force her to renounce her independence.

MODERATOR: Let us see if we can clarify this. At the base of the nuclear controversy, three questions appear to be crucial. The first, on which we have elaborated in the course of our previous discussion, is the political question: Europe, which sees two powerful atomic giants growing in the East and in the West, wishes to determine her own future. The other two questions concern the nonproliferation of nuclear arms and the control of those arms.

PHILOSOPHER: These questions have defied analysis because of the multiple factors that are intermingled—political, economic and military—and because these factors change appearances according to whether one sees them in short-term or long-term perspective. Let us first examine them from the political point of view.

AMERICAN: As I see it, the two questions are so closely tied together that, in the last analysis, they are inseparable. Atomic weapons are no ordinary weapons, easy to hand over to small powers for resolving local problems. Rather, the colossal power of these weapons can be put to use only in major conflicts. Still, even in the case of major conflicts, it is appropriate to maintain a firm hand on them.

From this, two imperatives can be deduced: first, humanity would be in great danger if small nations, too often subjected to unstable regimes, were permitted to play with atomic arms as

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children play with matches; and second, the conduct of nuclear war—and for us this is technically a nonnegotiable principle—requires central control.

FRENCHMAN: Two unhappy consequences have issued from your last stated principle. You have condemned our nuclear effort and you have been forced to create, in the midst of NATO, a structure that inhibits your allies from acting independently.

As for the proliferation of nuclear arms, it is not France that brought it about. It began with the Soviet Union, without anyone's permission, and with Great Britain, with your aid. And it is pursued today by China. Tomorrow India, Israel, Egypt and many others will perhaps see their own nuclear programs succeed. To whom, then, will your principle of nonproliferation be applied? Will you discriminate between great and little nations or between good and wicked people? Such a Manichaean conception of the world will never be ours. Wisdom definitely counsels the nuclear powers to refrain from giving nuclear arms to states that lack them. The power to blow up the world with nuclear weapons should not be a marketable commodity. But what possible regret can you feel in seeing one of your allies such as France —whose political maturity I hope you do not dispute—attain by its own efforts the rank of a nuclear power which permits it to assume its own full share of risk and responsibility in the common struggle, side by side with the United States?

Now let us discuss the control of nuclear forces. The nations of Western Europe should, according to your wish, entrust that control completely to the United States. What, in that case, are you going to do about national sovereignty? If you insist on the central control of nuclear weapons, this control will, *ipso facto,* become the common instrument of NATO policy. It also presupposes that NATO policy has been formally defined, that it is known and accepted by everyone, and that, in consequence, it is not simply your policy. Do you not understand that, to the extent that your allies surrender their independence for the benefit of the alliance, they ought to exact from you a commensurate loss of independence? Yet you do not accept that corollary and you will not renounce any of your own political sovereignty.

How can you believe it possible to escape from this dilemma in proposing to NATO these extraneous systems—the Multilateral Nuclear Force or the Allied Nuclear Force—which would main-

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tain your absolute authority over nuclear arms? How do you propose simultaneously to organize nuclear sharing among allied nations, and to quiet the anxieties of those on the other side of the Iron Curtain who suspect you of condoning nuclear proliferation?

MODERATOR: Two essential points must be kept in mind: (1) The problems of nonproliferation and control arise as soon as the giant nuclear powers—who are at the focal point of the great coalitions—are confronted by medium-sized or weak states who hope to become nuclear powers or have attained that rank. Regarding those who have not yet "gone nuclear," how can we convince them not to do so? And for those who have, how can we control the use they might wish to make of their power? (2) Only a fairy, with a wave of the magic wand, could instantly resolve the two questions. This fairy would be whoever is capable of arousing in all members of the alliance a common political feeling, all-encompassing and miraculous.

AMERICAN: The French continue to be obsessed by the spirit of Carthage. The contradictions of the modern world irritate them. Our other European allies do not have the same attitude; they are not persuaded that the French nuclear force will fundamentally modify the problem of their defense. Perhaps some of them even fear that it will engender certain tensions harmful to European cohesion. However that may be, we wish to re-establish harmony in the Atlantic Alliance.

We do not insist on the MLF if it is going to be an instrument of discord. We would be happy if political discussions brought about an understanding with our allies, and succeeded in convincing them that we do not wish them to relinquish their sovereignty. Finally, let me state that the search for strategic coordination between our nuclear capacities and the French independent nuclear force does not appear to us to be impossible. It will not change the material fact that, disposing 97 per cent of the total nuclear force of the Free World, we will continue to carry almost singlehandedly the responsibility for deterrence and for maintaining the equilibrium between the two great power blocs.

MODERATOR: Does not the search for a common Atlantic policy risk being upset by other misunderstandings caused by certain trends in the development of military thought in France and the United States?

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PHILOSOPHER: Eminent strategists have recognized the existence of this problem.[1] The United States integrates every phase of nuclear strategy in its thinking: (1) the "phase of preparation," in the course of which forces are created, their deployment is determined, and the communication network necessary for their control is developed; (2) the "phase of deterrent maneuvers," put into operation in times of grave crisis, in the course of which instantaneous communications must be established between the heads of government and their operational commands in order to achieve maximum results with verbal threats, significant gestures, and material, moral and political pressures; and (3) the "phase of coordinated use of forces," for those unlikely cases where dissuasion has failed.

Extending this projection to its terminal point, namely, a nuclear apocalypse, it is clear why perfect discipline must be imposed on everyone. Thus, the United States finds it quite natural and essential to insist on the technical needs for a single command and central control.

For France, on the other hand, it is not a question of going that far. Her nuclear forces are not intended for waging war but for preventing it. Political sovereignty need not be sacrificed to the technological need for a nuclear strategy. Without doubt, if Paris found itself one day dramatically confronted with the risk of an imminent nuclear holocaust, it would become aware that its fate was bound up with that of its allies. Its complete freedom of decision would then appear rather fragile. But for the present, it has need of its independence to play its role on the international scene, and the demands of its sovereignty count at least as much as the technical realities of the nuclear age.

MODERATOR: Now that the politicians and the strategists have had their say, let us hear from the Military Engineer. Perhaps he has longer-range views since he is dedicated to the slow process of developing new conceptions of modern systems of defense.

MILITARY ENGINEER: The proliferation of nuclear weapons will stay limited. To make nuclear warheads and missiles requires an advanced scientific and industrial base. Only a few nations possess it and thus can become, like Great Britain and France, medium or small nuclear powers, dwarfed by the U.S. and the

[1]See General André Beaufre, *Deterrence and Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 187-188.

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USSR. What will then happen to them? I have no hesitation in saying that as long as the ideological split of the world between capitalism and communism lasts, these powers, with the exception perhaps of China, will have to reach amicable agreements on their relationships with the dominant nuclear power in their camp.

This evolution is resisted by certain politicians and strategists. Not all of these are American. They are, in NATO countries, "Atlantic maximalists." To them, the principle of the equality of sovereignties no longer applies in the face of the exigencies of the modern era. They think the small Western nuclear powers are ineffective, useless and dangerous, and can make no useful contribution to common defense unless they submit to the U.S. strategic command and the veto of the President of the United States.

Other experts, especially French, have different opinions. They think small nuclear powers would be able to maintain themselves quite well in isolation as a fixed symbol of local independence. A number of practical reasons sustain this opinion: The atomic arm is the ideal weapon of medium-sized nations. Nuclear weapons are the most economical. Just as a bulldozer does as much as an army of shovels, so a few pounds of uranium or plutonium, carried by a small number of airplanes or missiles, replaces thousands of cannons and hundreds of bombers. At the price of the initial costly industrial investment—stimulating for the economy in general—a small nuclear force is created. Then, as if by magic, military expenditures cease to rise. The number of men in uniform decreases, so does the period of military service.

MODERATOR: Do you reject both theses?

MILITARY ENGINEER: The first, the "integrationist" thesis, is contrary to all lessons of political history. No technical-functional imperative has ever persuaded a nation willingly to abandon its sovereignty in one fell swoop. The second thesis, namely that of the viability of independent nuclear forces, might for a while stand up to its critics, but the history of weapons suggests that it is unsound for the long term.

The appearance of a small nuclear power in one corner of the globe does not alter decisively the balance of military power. True, it has great political significance. The new nuclear power poses a threat to large portions of humanity. While it inspires

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terror, it also provokes the counterthreats of nations that are more populous and possessed of larger resources.

Thus an historical process—a "feedback"—begins, the duration of which is difficult to foresee. Its end, however, is foreseeable: To diminish the counterthreats it has provoked, a nuclear power has to expand its perimeter of security. Thus, it must form alliances with neighboring states; extend the margin of land and sea over which it exercises its control; and deploy in depth its batteries of anti-missile missiles. As danger may lurk in space, it must undertake the conquest of space, placing in orbit spy satellites and, later, space vessels for fighting the battles of attrition in a future war. Finally, the greater the potential of destruction, the more the nuclear power needs to strengthen its defenses. It must set up underground command centers, hospitals and food stores, protect communications, provide blast and fallout shelters, and create a vast transport system for evacuating cities.

MODERATOR: What you have just described is a cumulative development which you believe to be ineluctable, and which we could call "nuclear expansionism." According to you, this process will arise from the mechanism of terror.

MILITARY ENGINEER: I believe that other sociological factors will come into play. As I think about war, which is said to be a social phenomenon, I discern the secret laws that have governed its permutations. One of these laws that seems to have been most strikingly confirmed by the events of our age is the close and mysterious interrelationship between the political dimensions of countries and the destructive powers they possess.

The greater the destructive power of its weapons, the larger and more powerful a nation must become. There can be no war if the adversaries are not convinced of their ability to carry on the fight, contain the conflict and repair the damage. When weapons technology makes so huge a stride as it has in our day, a natural evolutionary force pushes humanity irresistibly toward superior forms of political organization compatible with the survival of society. This implies that the latter encompass huge spaces and large populations in order to right the balance between the forces of life and the forces of death.

PHILOSOPHER: Thus a twin conclusion is forced upon us: (1) Nuclear weaponry, and all its ramifications, is far and away

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more expensive than any weapons of the past. It is so costly that smaller nations cannot stay indefinitely in the nuclear race unless they can obtain the wholehearted support of their neighbors through binding political agreements. (2) By this very token, the nuclear explosive is the most powerful instrument ever invented to force men to unite their countries in huge political alliances.

Nuclear power centers are still being formed. Each will become the nucleus of a vast gathering of peoples. The appeals for nuclear discipline and self-control which the United States addresses to us anticipate this process of political concentration. The United States urges Western Europe to rally around the nuclear empire of North America. France has not yet heard the bell summoning her to this kind of integration. Her independent effort manifests her desire to see Europe constitute a powerful political and nuclear bridgehead and to remain arbiter of her destiny.

MODERATOR: Thus we have a conflict between two points of view. The first, mainly elaborated in the United States, envisages the accelerated organization of an Atlantic Community centered on Washington and attuned to the pace of technological progress; the other envisages a much slower development inspired by humanist culture which is rooted in the heart of Old Europe and the mind of France.

The problem is to reconcile these points of view. To do so, let us respond to those difficult questions the governments of NATO must ask themselves. The first concerns Article Thirteen of the North Atlantic Treaty which states that from 1969 onward any party can withdraw from the treaty for any reason. Some believe this is France's intention. Does the alliance then risk total dissolution, or will it be maintained?

FRENCHMAN: The alliance will be continued. That is the wish of all its members. In his press conference of September 1965, General de Gaulle said: "We will remain the ally of our allies, but in 1969, at the latest, we will reject the subordinate position defined as NATO integration."

These words do not question the treaty, for our security is based on it. They do not question even the principle of the organization itself, because to reject all organization would deprive the alliance of its force and effectiveness. It is the structure and func-

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tion of the organization that must be modified so that the organization can resolve real problems such as East-West relations, strategic doctrine, nuclear control, and relations with the Third World.

MODERATOR: The second question is this: Since the nuclear age requires large political communities, should the alliance aim at establishing a huge Atlantic Community, centered on Washington, or, as a necessary stage of development, a United Western Europe?

AMERICAN: There are those on our side of the fence who believe that our level of material power justifies the first solution, which would simply sanction our role as the prime defender of the Free World. There are others who insist that the responsibilities attached to this role are extremely heavy. We run the risk of finding ourselves more and more involved in the Far East, in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. The idea is gaining acceptance on our side that we should not hold on forever to the monopoly of Atlantic defense because our resources would not be adequate for this task.

Please take care that West European governments avoid gestures that could be interpreted as hostile and unfriendly toward us. They might lead us to detach ourselves from you, and this undoubtedly would be the end of your freedom.

EUROPEAN: I am in complete agreement. To plunge ourselves into an Atlantic Community would provoke dangerous reactions from the East. Thus Western Europe must unite and organize its own defense. However, the European union will not come to be without your encouragement. You have only to frown, and the fear of being abandoned by you throws our people into disunity and immobility. But, if you come to our assistance, don't you think 300 million Europeans, who stand second to you in industrial power, should be able to assume a greater share in Atlantic defense? Wouldn't this result in a tremendous growth of prestige and power for the West?

MODERATOR: Certainly, we must strive to make the voice of Western Europe heard in the Atlantic Alliance. Let us go on to the third question: If a permanent European organization of political command has to be constituted—separate from NATO—how should we go about setting up this organization?

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EUROPEAN: The permanent political European Executive, whose need we discussed earlier, must at least represent the Europe of the Common Market. Since the Common Market does not have a federal constitution, the Executive can only represent national sovereignties. Thus, nothing would prevent England or any other European nation connected with NATO from joining the Executive. Is it not essential that it should include at least the two nuclear powers, Great Britain and France, in addition to the Federal Republic of Germany?

NATO MAN: Wouldn't this Executive simply be a European branch of the North Atlantic Council, created by Article Nine and made up of foreign ministers?

EUROPEAN: No, it would differ in several respects. Given the permanent character of the body, the various foreign ministries must be represented in it, not by ordinary ambassadors, but by envoys with the rank of deputy foreign minister, capable of speaking and acting in the name of their governments.

If it is to be effective, the Executive should have only a few members. For example, a leading American strategist, Henry Kissinger, in proposing establishment of an Executive Committee of the NATO Council, suggests that this Committee should be composed of the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and a representative of other NATO governments seated by rotation. He goes on to suggest that in the Executive Committee a two-thirds majority vote should be binding, although each ally should have the right to appeal decisions to the North Atlantic Council and to refuse, for an interim period, to be bound by the Executive Committee's vote.[2] Such an arrangement might be applied to a European Executive. Keeping in mind the crucial role of America in European defense, the United States would sit in the Executive as a full member.

PHILOSOPHER: I would like to see placed at the disposal of the Executive Committee a group of experts, eminent persons designated by their governments yet able to act independently and on behalf of Europe only. National and European sentiments must learn to live with one another and to cooperate. Europe will never be united if its problems can be discussed only in the course of disputes among heads of state.

[2]*The Troubled Alliance* (New York: McGraw-Hill, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1965), pp. 245-246.

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MODERATOR: The fourth question is: Could the creation of a European political executive body put an end to the sterile debate on the integration and coordination of NATO forces, and would it permit us to resolve the problem of European command and control of nuclear weapons?

EUROPEAN: The two great commands of NATO, the Channel Command and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe, could operate much more effectively if they were supported by a permanent and authentic European political authority. A thorough re-examination by the Europeans of defense problems would ease the assignment of Europeans to a greater number of higher military posts carrying greater responsibility. Recommendations for the improvement of the organization of forces, logistical services and the choice of weapons would be more acceptable if they appeared to be the constructive suggestions of a European organization. Finally, the existence of a European Executive would undoubtedly warrant the establishment of a command center for nuclear decisions which would be subordinated to it. This center for nuclear decision would be assigned to the European theater and coordinated with the strategic nuclear command of the United States.

FRENCHMAN: Taking into account the fact that Great Britain and France claim the sovereign right—essentially a theoretical right—of employing their nuclear forces in defense of supreme national interests, it should not be impossible to create such a command center. It would be tripartite in nature, the United States, Great Britain and France being the only nuclear powers. In fact, it might be possible, as a start, to transfer the NATO Standing Group from Washington to Paris.

Thus the European nuclear decision center would exercise authority over both British and French forces and also over that part of U.S. nuclear forces concerned with the defense of Europe.

EUROPEAN: Wouldn't there also be integrated nuclear forces such as proposed under the MLF and the ANF projects?

FRENCHMAN: The MLF and the ANF no longer have any *raison d'être*. It is useless to disinter them to satisfy the legitimate complaints of nonnuclear allies in the matter of nuclear control. Let us take the case of Germany. Germany has pledged herself not to manufacture nuclear weapons. Having ranged herself on

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the side of NATO countries, she cannot risk a conflict without relying on firm mutual political understandings. This means that the Federal Republic of Germany must have information on the general conduct of nuclear operations and control over the deployment and the use of nuclear forces installed by her allies on German territory.

The political Executive, of which Germany would be a part, should provide Germany with the opportunity to participate in decisions for the use of nuclear weapons in the European theater, and should give her the right to participate in planning for the defense of Europe.

NATO MAN: The conclusions we have reached have dissipated many of the qualms that I had at the beginning of our discussion. The treaty is not really the topic of our symposium. The reforms proposed for NATO do not actually change those keystones of the alliance: the Council, the supreme political authority, the Military Committee of the fifteen heads of state, or the General Secretariat. But rather, these reforms suggest a European Political Executive and a European nuclear command. These innovations will establish a better balance within the alliance between Europe and America.

Finally, a continuing dialogue on Western policy will enliven the entire organization and will permit it to ponder the role the organization should play in the world as a whole.

MODERATOR: Our debate is now drawing to a close. What lessons can we derive from it?

AMERICAN: For my part, I have often been annoyed by the resistance we met in Europe for our suggestions and projects. I understand them now. My country is one of the pioneers of the great technological and scientific developments of this century. In our haste to create the material shapes of the future, we tend to neglect the present. I am now left with the conviction that nothing would be more useful to us than to share more equitably the leadership that we exert now in the Atlantic Alliance. European humanism, the European sense of the great historical perspective, will help us to discipline our impetuous forward movement. The improved psychological balance between America and Europe will lead us both to make a better use of our immense resources.

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EUROPEAN: What I have understood from this discussion is that Europe must unite. Not too quickly, because the countries that make up Europe have no wish to relinquish their national sovereignty. These countries would not accept—under the pretext of integration—the loss of the diversity of tongues, the traditions and the cultures that are the treasure of European civilization. Nor should we go too slowly, because Europe today looks like a collection of plants dying because they were planted in pots which are too small. An economic union has already been set on foot. A union for the defense of Europe is also necessary. Perhaps some kind of federalism à la carte will allow us to realize this union slowly but surely. Then 300 million West Europeans must abandon their lazy and laissez-faire attitude in which they are now encouraged by American protection. The Europe of the future, under these conditions, would be a powerful and wise partner on whom the United States could rely.

FRENCHMAN: Our debate has shown, I hope, that France is in the forefront of those who are agitating for a European renaissance. There are those who would interpret the French attitude as a sign of defiance and even hostility toward the United States. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our friendship for the Americans is engraved in history. Throughout the last two centuries, since the time of their war of independence up to the last world war, we have always fought on their side.

No one should doubt our allegiance to the Atlantic Alliance either. France is both European and Atlantic. She is absolutely committed to the geographic and strategic position in which she finds herself. In this region, she has no wish for hegemony. Hasn't France been on the political and military defensive for the last 150 years, fighting to retain her freedom of judgment and action and protecting herself from the nationalism of other powers? It is the deep-seated desire of France today to defend the continental rights of the Europe of tomorrow.

France also wants to safeguard the values of European civilization which Europe, in her colonial ventures, has extended to the four corners of the world. Situated as she is at the crossroads of the Anglo-Saxon world, the German world, the Latin world, and the African world, France, more than any other nation, believes that part of Europe's soul has remained among the overseas people who, with her consent, have gained their independence. In the course of the struggle France has waged against the revo-

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lutionary currents in her former empire, she has finally come to understand the deep meaning of this revolutionary tide.

MODERATOR: A debate such as ours gives a much clearer picture of the Alliance of the Free World. For this we have to thank philosophy. Philosophy enables us to examine closely the contradictions that are at the very root of the NATO crisis. Just as from an airplane, flying at high altitude, one can see the contours of the whole country, we have flown high enough to take in, at a glance, the Atlantic Alliance and the whole world. From this height, our disagreements are shown to be more imaginary than real. Our misunderstandings are dissipated. We have been able to discern the ties of friendship and common interest that bind our peoples to a common destiny.

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

by Robert C. Hill

SIGNIFICANT progress in Latin America since 1945 cannot conceal the fact that these twenty independent nations and Communist Cuba, with their 280 million people, remain in the midst of a fundamental social, economic and political transformation—a consequence of long-neglected and deeply-rooted conditions. Most of Latin America is caught up in a vicious cycle of low productivity and correspondingly low per capita income, excessive unemployment, rapid population growth, insufficient capital, harmful monetary and fiscal policies, inequitable and inefficient tax programs, restrictive and antiquated attitudes toward foreign investment, and often unreliable leadership.

These conditions by themselves would be enough to challenge the most capable of men and governments. But today they are persistently exploited and aggravated by the policies of international communism and selfish oligarchy interests. Castro's Cuba remains the communist springboard into the Western Hemisphere and constitutes, with or without missiles, a menace to the peace and security of North and South America.

The failure of U.S. leaders to prevent the rise of communism in Cuba may be the most disastrous foreign policy setback sustained by the United States since World War II. The responsibility rests with both political parties. The refusal to give first priority in U.S. policy to removing this communist fortress from the hemisphere is unaccountable, especially since we know that the communists use this base to obstruct progress and create disorder in neighboring countries. While Washington pours billions of dollars and thousands of lives into the defense of a country 12,000 miles away, Cuba is relegated to the status of an unavoidable nuisance.

In 1960 President Eisenhower, reporting to the American people on his Latin American tour, stated: "No other area of the world is of more vital significance to our own future." Nothing has transpired since to alter this assessment. Indeed, with communism entrenched in Cuba, and social and economic dis-

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content widespread in Latin America, the political and economic problems confronting the hemisphere appear today even more formidable and urgent.

There is a need to pause, the Alliance for Progress notwithstanding, to reappraise the fundamental economic and political problems straining relations between Latin America and the United States. And the first point to keep in mind is the inextricable nature of political security and economic development. Economic progress, no matter how essential, will be rendered worthless without adequate policies to combat internal and external forms of aggression.

The Political Realities of Latin America

The political instability of many Latin American countries, generated by socio-economic conditions from within as well as by subversion from without, compels the United States to adopt a realistic rather than an ideological approach to Latin American governments. Constitutional government remains the common ideal and goal of all the people of the hemisphere, but there is no hard and fast diplomatic formula to guarantee its attainment. We have recently witnessed instances where the military forces coming to power constituted the most practical and available, as well as stabilizing, influence capable of effecting social, political and economic reform in periods of crisis.

No one suggests that military seizures represent an acceptable permanent substitute for constitutional government. However, under the given realities a pragmatic rather than a doctrinal approach is the only feasible policy for our government. The United States has an obligation to judge each case on its merits while continuing to support counterinsurgency and military training programs to preclude revolutions which would jeopardize the security of all the American nations.

In the years I have lived abroad, I have come to the conclusion that there is something equally as dangerous as dictators to U.S. security in this communist-threatened world. That is our refusal to face the fact that apart from the United States, England and a few European and Commonwealth countries there are few countries governed by truly representative democracies, irrespective of what their written constitutions may say.

In Latin America the culture pattern has been widely built

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around the heroic figure of the Conquistadors, who were dictators among dictators. It will take many years before the "hero model" of success in government disappears from the political scene in all of these countries. We must simply recognize that other people choose to live by different patterns than ours, We should not be so intolerant as to refuse to believe that history may eventually prove to us that, over the centuries, they had better instincts for the kind of government suited to their needs.

The democratic way of life has been enjoyed by few fortunate nations. It is not necessarily transferable, at this particular time, to societies whose political and economic legacies are different from ours. Perhaps it is something that people must fight for and die for before they really appreciate it or want it.

This cannot be interpreted to mean that I do not cherish democracy. We must protect this democracy that we have won for ourselves, but we must not foolishly assume a condition contrary to fact in other countries. At this time, there are many lands in Latin America where we have—unless we are very careful and very skillful—no choice except between dictators of the right and dictators of the left. The Castro experience should be the final proof of that. If we do not temper our enthusiasm with this realism we may experience an endless drain on our resources in our pursuit of unattainable ends.

The Organization of American States

The problems of political upheaval, coups and counter-coups are the responsibility of all the members of the Organization of American States. Many hoped the Rio conference of November 1965 would create inter-American peacekeeping machinery, and thus remove the burden of leadership from the shoulders of the United States. But Washington cannot abdicate leadership in the Western Hemisphere any more than it could during the critical stages of the postwar European recovery. The strength and success of the OAS will be determined by United States leadership in cooperation with Latin America.

If the Rio conference did not meet all our expectations, Secretary of State Dean Rusk at least set the stage for understanding with his frank declaration that the United States will take action where necessary to protect our vital interests. Those who claim this represents a departure from the past would do well to recall the words of the late President Kennedy:

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Our restraint is not inexhaustible. Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction—if the nations of this Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration—then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation.[1]

Revolutionary unrest, nationalism, communist subversion and U.S. failures—the latter caused both by indecision and dissension—continue to plague the peace and security of the hemisphere. Until the OAS assumes responsibility and creates some kind of effective peacekeeping machinery, the United States is left with no feasible alternative but to retain the freedom to act in defense of our vital security interests.

Cuba. Communism exported from Cuba is an important element of the communist program for Latin America. At the height of the October 1962 missile crisis, the nations of the Western Hemisphere stood as one. This important development was a credit to the Kennedy Administration. But Castro's proven collusion with the USSR and formerly with Communist China failed to produce a sustained, united policy. With or without missiles, communism remained intact in Cuba. Since then the United States has had considerable difficulty in rallying OAS members to act in concert to isolate communism. The available evidence, documented in several recent Congressional hearings, refutes the notion that Castro communism is a mere "nuisance."[2] To recognize this danger is not to be obsessed with anti-communism. It is a simple recognition of the fact that communist control of Cuba offers our enemies unique opportunities to undermine the freedom of the hemisphere. The psychological as well as the political benefits derived from this communist outpost clearly outweigh the financial cost of maintaining it. If Castro and the communists so far have not overthrown any governments or installed local communist parties, they have instigated or supported, within the past three years, various forms of sublimited

[1]Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Statler-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., April 20, 1961.

[2]These documents include two produced by the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, *Hearings on Communism in Latin America* and *Communism and Latin America: Report No. 237,* both completed during the 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965; and another produced by the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, *Organization of American States, Combined Reports on Communist Subversion,* 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965.

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warfare in such countries as Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Bolivia, Peru and the Dominican Republic.

Dominican Republic. Few would challenge the President's duty to take whatever steps were required to protect lives and prevent a communist takeover in the Dominican Republic. The crisis, however, did not erupt overnight. President Johnson admitted in his press conference of June 1, 1965, that danger signals were evident for some time: "Many months ago we became aware of the increasing tensions there and the difficulties that would likely confront us." On the basis of this foreknowledge, the Administration should have been prepared to utilize the Organization of American States in anticipation of the crisis. This failure to formulate policies in cooperation with the OAS to forestall such events as the Dominican crisis of April 28, 1965 contributes to the reluctance of the other members to assume collective responsibility. As a result, United States intervention evoked considerable criticism throughout the hemisphere. The facts regarding the Dominican revolt are still shrouded in secrecy and the Administration's continued suppression of information is contrary to the best interests of the American people. The President apparently has not been able to justify his policy to his own Congressional leaders. As a result, our policy has been inconsistent and confusing.

In the final analysis, Latin America must be considered by those charged with responsibility for the national welfare as a vital zone of United States security. The loss of additional territory, even temporarily, to communism, or the spread of neutralism, would erode our joint measures to promote social, political and economic justice throughout the continent.

It is clear that the immediate communist objective in the hemisphere is political neutralization through terrorism, subversion, trade, aid, and political and cultural exchanges. These programs are still relatively new and too limited to indicate a clear trend, although a close surveillance of these developments should be maintained. The dimensions of the communist offensive demonstrate that this alien, totalitarian force is bent ultimately upon creating a series of communist or pro-communist regimes in Latin America. Confronted by the communist menace, our policymakers would be reckless indeed to sanctify, without discretion, every revolution called forth in the name of "social justice."

The Western Hemisphere cannot tolerate endless communist

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subversion and provocations without weakening the credibility of our will to remain free. For better or for worse, the United States is cast as the moral, political and economic leader of the free, and it is a position that should be better understood by friend and foe alike.

As leader, Washington should move forward more vigorously to strengthen the OAS and make it a truly regional organization. A serious collective security "gap" exists in the Western Hemisphere and the OAS nations have not yet developed concrete measures to close it. Adoption of the following policy recommendations would help to narrow this gap: (1) The Administration ought to continue efforts at forthcoming OAS meetings to explore the concept of peacekeeping machinery, so that the hemisphere can respond quickly and collectively to threats to peace and security. (2) Despite efforts to discourage trade between our friends and Cuba, there is ample evidence that such commerce continues. The Administration should work through the OAS, NATO, and the Free World community to restrict trade with Communist Cuba. (3) The Soviet Union and Communist China still support Cuba for the purpose of exporting communism throughout the hemisphere. The Rio and Caracas treaties should be utilized to return Cuba to the Free World. (4) The United States government should invite all independent countries in the Western Hemisphere, especially Canada, to accept membership in the OAS. The political and economic maturity of Canada would add prestige to the OAS.

The Economic Realities of Latin America

If the nations of the hemisphere are to succeed in building free, stable societies, cooperation in combating external and internal forms of subversion must be joined to assistance in creating economic, political and social justice based upon internal reforms.

In Latin America today, economic, political and social justice remains for the vast majority of people a dream and not a reality. The affluence of an outside nation, even the United States, is not unlimited and cannot in any event be transferred successfully to another. Only the people themselves can create a prosperous society. However, the less fortunate nations have experienced such extreme difficulty in economic, political and social development that anarchy in some instances would surely follow but for the

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marginal technological and capital assistance of the more advanced countries.

Four postwar administrations in Washington have worked through various foreign assistance programs to set the stage for real economic, political and social progress.

In 1959, for example, under President Eisenhower, the Congress enacted legislation creating a unique series of inter-American policies and institutions by which the United States could help Latin Americans help themselves. Later, under President Kennedy, the program became known as the Alliance for Progress. Since its inception, the Alliance has made significant contributions to the overall struggle for progress. Per capita income increased by about 2.5 per cent in 1964 and again in 1965 for Latin America as a whole, meeting the goal set forth under the Charter of Punta del Este. Important reforms have been achieved: nine countries have passed tax reforms; twelve, land reforms; and another nine, badly needed savings and loan legislation. However, while this kind of progress is impressive, it is only a beginning. Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Development Bank, has warned, in his study *Latin-American Economic Integration,* that "the positive efforts undertaken internally . . . have not yet substantially altered the current situation in Latin America. It is not surprising, therefore, that tensions of every sort are rising as a product of the interacting process of inflation, substandard social conditions, urban pressures created by the mass movements of the rural population to the cities, frustration in the middle class and unrest in the countryside."

The Alliance is a vital step toward finding long-range solutions to the region's common problems. But primary responsibility for achieving the noble purposes proclaimed in the Act of Bogotá of 1960 resides with Latin Americans themselves. Nearly everyone recognizes the need for political and social reform; few, however, are convinced that such needs can be attained more rapidly and efficiently by a free economic order. Historically, financially sound social and economic welfare programs have been achieved in those industrial societies which provide for private enterprise and a broadly based tax structure. It is this aspect—the role of private investment in the Alliance for Progress—that is in disrepair and the focal point around which other issues congregate. Member nations of the Alliance as well as the present U.S. Administration are guilty of downgrading and disregarding the vital

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role of local and foreign private investment in creating and sustaining broad social gains. While U.S. officials should appreciate this economic reality, there is genuine confusion and misunderstanding among Latin Americans, aggravated by the well-known problems of public hostility toward private ownership, the flight of local capital, tax evasion, graft and corruption.

To a considerable extent, political and economic attitudes toward private investment and public policies are manageable problems which can be met by education, communication and understanding. Some problems, however, are more difficult to cope with and require international cooperation. This is true with respect to economic integration and the weak trading posture of Latin American countries which create a vicious economic cycle, canceling out the positive effects of foreign assistance and private investment, reducing badly needed foreign exchange earnings, and undermining monetary and fiscal stabilization programs.

Equally unclear at this time are the policies of the respective governments of Latin America toward the population explosion that increasingly influences economic conditions. Leadership on this issue must come from the individual countries, for this is a question to be determined by each family and nation for itself.

The problems impeding acceleration of economic growth in Latin America which we will examine here concern private investment, education, economic integration, commodity stabilization and commercial trade policies, and population.

Private Investment

The problems of private enterprise in Latin America are rooted in the history of the early decades of the 1900's and in a semantic misundertsanding between Latin Americans and ourselves that has taken on emotional overtones. The first step the Johnson Administration could take to cut through this confusion would be to help private investment play its proper role under the Alliance for Progress. The evidence to date indicates a downgrading of the function of private investment, despite an awareness on the part of administration spokesmen that private rather than public investment is the key to fulfilling the objectives of the Alliance for Progress. The 1964 report of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress points out that "while the Charter of Punta del Este itself contains some 3,000 words on comprehensive national development programs, the nearest

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reference to the private sector in the document itself is a ten-word phrase buried in a statement of purpose." It is too often forgotten that while the U.S. government is expected to contribute substantial sums of foreign assistance through the Alliance, an additional $10 billion from private resources is considered essential.[3]

Few people at home and abroad appreciate how deeply private enterprise is involved in the economic development of Latin America. As of 1965 U.S. business investments in Latin America totaled almost $13 billion. We conduct trade worth almost $6 billion a year with these hemispheric neighbors. The 1964 Joint Economic Committee of the Congress reported that "70% of economic activity is in the hands of private owners, while 30% is controlled by government. Of the 70% of privately owned enterprises, some 90% is estimated to be owned by Latin Americans and only 10% by foreigners."

The beneficial effect of United States business on the economies of Latin America is best illustrated by a Department of Commerce survey prepared in 1957.

Our private investment grew from $3 billion in 1946 to $7.4 billion by the end of 1957, provided $2.8 billion worth of goods and services for use in Latin America and $2.1 billion of exports from the area, paid over $4 billion in local salaries, cost of materials and taxes, and generated employment for about 625,000 persons.[4]

The derivative effects created by these investments, such as the development of managerial skills and employee community services, are equally tangible but statistically impossible to calculate.

To assist private investment to meet its obligations under the

[3]The "Declaration to the Peoples of America" signed at Punta del Este in 1961, along with the Charter, reads in part: "The United States for its part pledges its efforts to supply financial and technical cooperation in order to achieve the aims of the Alliance for Progress. To this end, the United States will provide a major part of the minimum of twenty billion dollars, principally in public funds, which Latin America will require over the next 10 years from all external sources in order to supplement its own efforts.

"The United States will provide from public funds, as an immediate contribution to the economic and social progress of Latin America, more than $1 billion during the 12 months which began on March 13, 1961 when the Alliance for Progress was announced."

In effect, the United States promised $2 billion a year over the next ten years for a total of $20 billion from the following sources: (1) U.S. public funds, (2) private U.S., West European and Japanese investment, and (3) funds from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation.

[4]U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, *United States Economic Investments in Latin America, 1957.*

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Alliance for Progress, the Administration might consider the following policy recommendations.

The Investment Guaranty Program. By 1964 the Agency for International Development had the authority to guarantee U.S. business firms against losses due to the following risks: inconvertibility of earnings or of repayment of principal, expropriation or confiscation, war or revolution, loans made for housing mortgages, and 75 per cent of the loss on an investment arising out of any other kind of risk as the President may determine.

Investment guarantees cannot ultimately protect investors from irresponsible leaders who promote expropriation, inflation and chaos. Risks vary from country to country but under the present law no distinction is made in the insurance rates or fees charged. In short, responsible countries are penalized in effect by the actions of irresponsible nations.

The law should distinguish between good and bad risks, and the investment guaranty program under the Foreign Assistance Act should be reviewed for the purpose of adjusting insurance fees to relative risks, thereby encouraging private investment in responsible countries. To offset risks, the tax laws could be amended so that losses suffered by American-owned subsidiaries in developing countries can be offset against profits earned elsewhere. Such tax credit proposals, applied against United States tax liabilities on investments in underdeveloped countries, ought to be given thorough consideration by the U.S. government.

The United States-Honduras Income Tax Convention. This recently renewed treaty precludes double taxation by the United States and the foreign nation on the earnings of private investment abroad. In effect, the agreement provides an investment credit to United States-owned private investment in Honduras. In the view of the United States Chamber of Commerce, these arrangements "promote United States exports thus easing our balance of payments problem, stimulate economic growth at home, and foster the foreign policy of the United States by encouraging economy-building private American investment in the friendly less-developed nations." To date, the United States has entered into twenty-two double taxation treaties with foreign countries. The Administration should intensify efforts to sign similar conventions with all the free countries of this hemisphere.

International Institutions and West European Firms. The United States government should lend its support to a proposal

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to allow the International Finance Corporation (IFC), wholly owned by the World Bank, to borrow $400 million from the World Bank for private investment in underdeveloped areas. Similarly, there is a need to encourage more vigorously West European private investment corporations and multinational private capital corporations such as ADELA (Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America) to invest in Latin America.

Expropriation. Nothing discourages the inflow of private investment more than expropriation. The sovereignty of a government is complete with respect to the right to expropriate any property, provided it is for a public purpose and there is prompt, adequate compensation. There can be no objection to the acquisition, under fair conditions, of foreign-owned properties by the nationals of any country, but merely to put them under the control and operation of a government monopoly has proved to be economically advantageous to very few countries.

The United States government can help to protect U.S. private investment in Latin America against expropriation in two ways: (1) urge other governments to ratify the World Bank's International Treaty for Investment Disputes and to work for the adoption of an international code for the fair treatment of private foreign investors; and (2) utilize the Hickenlooper Amendment[5], whenever necessary, to protect United States investments in Latin America.

Inflation. Most Latin American economies have experienced chronic inflation and balance of payments problems. The principal engine of inflation has been governmental deficits that accentuate price instability, discourage savings, compound tax collections, and inhibit a sound allocation of investment capital throughout the economy. Indiscriminate balance of payments loans or grants by the United States are regrettable because they merely prolong improper policies, waste resources, encourage inflation and undermine political stability.

Economic Understanding and Development through Education

The problems confronting private enterprise in Latin America

[5]Section 620 (e) of the Foreign Assistance Act empowers the President to terminate aid to any country when the government of the recipient nation has nationalized, expropriated or seized ownership or control of property owned by any U.S. citizen or by any corporation, partnership or association in which U.S. citizens have a majority interest.

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are not the responsibility only of the people of the United States. Latin Americans have an obligation to help remove the confusion and misunderstanding. As David Rockefeller, President of Chase Manhattan Bank, has stated:

> The U.S. business community as a whole must identify itself as a creative and constructive force working for Latin American growth and progress. . . . One of the most formidable roadblocks to identification is the Latin American's habit of describing their own aspirations as "socialistic," and of verbally rejecting "capitalism." Once the semantic smog has lifted, however, we see that the "socialism" they are talking about is really a combination of "social security" and "social justice" both of which are unimpeachable orthodox concepts in our own country.
>
> The "capitalism" they are criticizing turns out to be the predatory system of tightly held power and privilege which they have read about in Karl Marx, and which has long since ceased to exist.

Developing a common basis of understanding in these matters is really an educational task that cannot be done overnight. Even if Latin America were suddenly to have enough teachers and schools, the impact could only be felt years ahead. Hence, the problems of responsible government are compounded, for without education there can be little of the general understanding required for the public to support unpopular, but necessary, reforms. In such a climate, it is not easy for democratic institutions to take root and perform efficiently; popular movements in support of good government are difficult to organize and sustain. Consequently, there has been little genuine appreciation of the benefits of an orderly transfer of power through free elections. The electorate, even when it gets a chance to participate in government, is ill-prepared for the job.

To attack this basic problem in conjunction with our Latin American neighbors, we must grant a higher priority to educational programs through the Alliance, the State Department's Cultural and Educational Exchange Program, and private groups with their counterparts in the other countries. The appropriate governmental agencies and private institutions should reappraise their educational programs in Latin America.

Under the Alliance for Progress the Agency for International Development spends an average of $33 million a year on educational development. In 1964 only $40 million out of the total $1.2 billion program for Latin America went to support education. These programs with the agreement of the recipient countries should be stressed and upgraded wherever possible.

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The United States Cultural and Educational Exchange Program, operated under the Department of State, costs an average of $1.5 million a year. The Administration should expand the educational exchange programs to Latin America to include more teachers, professors and professional leaders as well as students. In a continent where 40-50 per cent of the population is fifteen years old or younger, our national interest would be served by the return to Latin America of educated individuals who, understanding the United States better, may provide a more accurate image of our country to their own people.

Assistance from private organizations in the United States, such as that given by the American Institute of Free Labor Development of the AFL-CIO to free labor movements in Latin America, is important in establishing bonds of friendship and mutual understanding between our societies. Private organizations working through their respective nations under the "Partners of the Alliance" ought to be given further encouragement and support.

Another vital aspect of education is the provision of vocational training for skilled and semi-skilled workers. The Administration might explore the feasibility of granting to exporters of technical and professional *services* the same financing and guaranteeing facilities now available under AID and the Export-Import Bank to exporters of *goods and products.*

Integration

Cooperative efforts to create conditions conducive to private investment through intensified educational and exchange programs, while desirable, are at best a long-term solution. There is a need for a new approach to the basic causes of economic stagnation which continue to plague Latin America.

The key to material prosperity is the economies of scale that come with mass production stimulated by integrated markets. Progress toward integration under the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) has been substantial. The Latin American nations should be encouraged and assisted by the United States to set up additional integration programs, so long as these subunits do not become a mechanism to destroy the potential integration of all the nations of this hemisphere.

Real integration is a long-term development, not an immediate panacea for the ills that beset Latin America. Although provid-

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ing some funds for integration efforts through the Alliance for Progress, Washington has been generally content to stand aloof. But we cannot abdicate our responsibility on this issue: we have an obligation to point out that the real benefits of integration can come only with the ultimate inclusion—not exclusion—of the North American economies. As the Latin American nations integrate their economies, the United States should declare its readiness to enter into discussions looking toward a common market which is truly hemispheric.

Commodity Stabilization Agreements and Commercial Trade Policies

Critical to the overall problem of integration and economic development in Latin America is the trade posture of the various countries. Economic relations between ourselves and Latin America are of considerable significance to both parties. The United States today purchases more than one-third of all Latin American exports, and provides almost 45 per cent of Latin America's imports. The interdependence of the nations of the Western Hemisphere will grow in the years ahead. Larger populations, rising economic expectations and virulent nationalism make uncertain the future of U.S. trade and investment in the raw material producing areas of Asia, Africa and the Near East. For its part, Latin America is already feeling the impact of discriminatory trade preferences granted former African colonies by the European nations of the Common Market. In the course of time, the nations of the Western Hemisphere may find themselves even more dependent upon one another for supplies and markets. Given the existing and potential relationships among the nations of this hemisphere, the long-term security interests of the United States will be best advanced by economic policies that do not seriously conflict with those of Latin America.

Commodity Stabilization Agreements. The successful development of economically free, prosperous nations in Latin America is heavily dependent upon the adequate growth of their export markets. Yet their economies are predominantly agrarian and inadequately diversified; over half of the population depends upon agriculture for survival. Income from export commodities such as coffee, sugar and bananas is vital, constituting better than 80 per cent of the foreign trade revenues of certain nations. While most of these countries rely upon the sale of one or two crops

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for most of their export earnings, prices frequently fluctuate widely, skyrocketing or plummeting in response to various pressures, such as sudden changes in the volume of demand and supply brought on by bumper crops, droughts, substitute products, and the intrusion of unforeseen political events, e.g., the Korean, Suez and Vietnam crises. Moreover, the problem is compounded by the continuing disparity between the high prices paid for manufactured products imported by Latin America and the lower prices received for commodity crops exported by Latin America. Economic forces, beyond the normal control of governments, can and do upset the commodity market and place nations in vulnerable trade postures. It is much easier to explain this vicious economic cycle than it is to provide adequate solutions.

Over the years various schemes have been devised. It is currently suggested that the International Coffee Agreement provides the kind of model answer to such problems. But in the report of the eight-member Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) recommending such a solution, the key words are "effective, disciplined commodity agreements." Unfortunately, the Coffee Agreement has so far been no guarantee of stabilization. In fact, virtually nothing has been done to cut back production, and the world is now faced with a new bumper crop. According to João Oliverra Savitos, Executive Director of the International Coffee Agreement, "the high level of 1959-1960 is expected to be reached again in 1967-68 and surpassed in subsequent years." The Coffee Agreement to date has worked to spur rather than to stabilize world coffee production; it will be largely unworkable without self-discipline and may defeat rather than promote the purposes for which it is intended.

Too often the U.S. government has extended valuable concessions, obtainable nowhere else, to Latin American governments at the precise time when these same governments were taking actions in opposition to our legitimate interests. Thus, Washington has, on occasion, made large purchases of commodities without the slightest reference to the beneficiary's continued lack of cooperation on matters regarding our vital interests. One such case might well be the recent Sugar Bill sponsored by the Administration, under which several Latin American nations, who were the least cooperative in political security affairs, received similar or even larger quotas for the future. Our government has a duty to work for reciprocity and adequate *quid pro quos* in

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these matters. It is essential that the Administration, in working with Latin American governments, coordinate our economic actions with our political objectives.

Commercial Trade Policies. The United States has long committed itself to support the general principle of multilateral free trade and nondiscriminatory treatment toward all free nations. This policy is now being challenged by the Latin American nations. In their view, the slow pace of their economic development can be attributed in part to preferential trade treatment granted by European industrial nations to other competing underdeveloped countries. It is a fact that Africa is a competing supplier of practically all of Latin America's exports of tropical products, and that, outside the Western Hemisphere, the trend has been toward regional preferential trading. It may be that our traditional multilateral free trade policy does not actually correspond to the world in which we live and that a vast multilateral area free of discrimination no longer exists. Rather, a more fragmented world appears to be emerging in which developing nations attempt to maintain a high degree of protection and seek whatever advantage they can in special preferences.

Historically, most of Latin America's trade has been with industrial Western Europe, Japan, and North America, although burdensome surpluses and declining foreign exchange are now prompting an increasing number of Latin American countries to turn toward the communist bloc. Preferential treatment, some Latin Americans argue, would reduce the pressure for increased trade with communist countries. Others contend that preferential trading would not only generate greater self-esteem through increased trade and reduced aid but would also be a catalyst for economic integration. The speed and success of Latin American economic growth may depend upon effective hemispheric common market arrangements, and preferential trading would spur these efforts.

Opponents of trade preferences contend that such a system would require a reversal of our traditional multilateral trade policy, provoke retaliatory measures, and probably alienate our friends. Since almost all products from Latin America enter the U.S. market duty-free, we cannot show preference by reducing tariffs, but would have to raise tariffs on the products of competing nations in order to assist Latin American nations. Even if some system of preferential trade terms were worked out, would

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it provide significant additional income to Latin America? Preferential arrangements for manufactured goods raise the question of whether there are many enterprises, excluding textiles, which are competitive, that could break into the markets of the United States and garner more than marginal earnings. Unfortunately, there is no way to guarantee that even a substantial increase of earnings resulting from preferences would be channeled into economic development, diversification, and a reduction of excessive dependence upon single export products.

The critical problem we must solve is how to increase the foreign exchange earnings of Latin America. Without substantially increased foreign exchange reserves, these countries will be unable to pay for critically needed imports and will fail to achieve their legitimate aspirations through the Alliance for Progress.

The old solutions such as commodity agreements and the more recent suggestion for tariff preferences are not in themselves real answers to the need for additional income. Moreover, time and again, we have witnessed the failure of orthodox, sensible austerity programs in practically every Latin republic. We must recognize that governments have not yet devised ways to halt inflation without imposing undue hardship upon those people least able to endure it. To be competitive, developing nations which are investing huge sums of capital into manufacturing plants need the economies of mass production that only larger markets can bring. But, at least for now, markets within Latin America are neither big enough nor expanding rapidly enough to replace imported goods and to provide for the longer production runs needed for maximum efficiency. So long as marginal, uneconomic enterprises within individual countries are protected by high tariffs, many of them will tend to remain small and inefficient. Therefore, Latin American governments will have to use discretion, providing protection perhaps only for potential multinational or integrated markets.

For their part, the industrial nations will have to reconsider this basic cause of economic stagnation—the shortage of foreign exchange earnings—and pursue other alternatives. In the words of George Woods, President of the World Bank, "to go on doing what we are doing will, in the long run, amount on balance to doing nothing at all." As one alternative, the President might consider appointing a high level commission to review the price-cost gap and recommend policy solutions. Pending a correction of the

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U.S. balance of payments deficit, the Administration might consider taking the initiative in establishing a multilateral fund—drawn from public and private, and European and Western Hemisphere sources—to provide loans and other forms of assistance to help potential multinational or integrated industries meet their export potential, thereby stimulating the productive capacity of the private sector and improving the balance of payments positions of the Latin American countries.

Population

All aspirations and programs for the development of free economic and political institutions in Latin America will continue to be frustrated by the pace of population growth. The United States cannot take the lead in establishing population policy, for this is a matter for each family and country to determine for itself. However, the United States should make available, to those countries which request it, material and information contributing to a solution of this problem.

Conclusions

The critical nature of our relations with Latin America should not be overlooked as we become more deeply involved in Southeast Asia. Freedom from want and the blessings of political and social justice are just as much an aspiration of the people closest to our shores as they are of the people of the rest of the world.

The prospect for the rapid improvement of economic, political and social conditions in Latin America, and consequently the peace and prosperity of the Western Hemisphere, will be shaped by the decisions these governments take to meet the challenge of communism and the needs and aspirations of their own people. In Washington and the capitals of Latin America, leadership to attack the fundamental causes impeding progress is still awaited. The United States should cooperate with the governments of Latin America in promoting broad internal reform and improved educational opportunities, and in seeking solutions to the commodity and trade problems that afflict these pre-industrial societies. Above all, government leaders must realize that governmental assistance alone does not provide an adequate substitute for the dynamic contribution of private local and foreign capital.

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THE FUTURE OF ATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS*

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

FOUR-FIFTHS of the world's economic exchanges flow within the North Atlantic area. It is this circumstance which accounts largely for the gap in wealth and living standards that separates Atlantic countries from the rest of the world. The existence of this gap poses the most serious problem in relations between the West and the developing countries. The problem of these relations is also a factor in the West's confrontation with the communist states.

Close as are its economic ties, the West has not succeeded in devising an institutional framework or even a broad and formal consensus which could ensure the orderly development of international exchanges. Neither the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, GATT nor OECD is effective enough to guard, beyond a chance of doubt, against severe dislocations such as payments difficulties and unilateral trade restrictions, or to maximize the immense productivity of the West's national economies. In some respects regulatory mechanisms in the international economy operate less efficiently today than they did prior to 1914.

The economic policies that the United States and its allies adopted in the period following World War II contributed decisively to European recovery and the building of the "new Europe." But during the last decade economic problems have again arisen. Their solution in many cases will be best achieved by collaboration among the leading participants in the international economic system, most of whom are found in the North Atlantic area.

The major economic problems confronting the United States and its allies bear an important relationship to each other; the solution of one has significant implications for the others. More-

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over, the ability of leading Western nations to achieve their political objectives is related in no small measure to their ability to take appropriate steps to remove economic barriers, reduce payments imbalances, and provide adequate levels of international liquidity to sustain a rising volume of world trade. The questions of prime concern to the nations of the North Atlantic area are the lowering of barriers to international trade, the expansion of trade with less developed areas, the resolution of the American and British payments difficulties, and the reform of the international monetary system. In addition, while the flow of U.S. investment to Western Europe is likely to provide an impetus to European economic growth and modernization, it may also contribute to frictions between the United States and Europe. The problems posed by these issues will be at the forefront of transatlantic economic relationships for years to come.

Trade Relations within the North Atlantic Area

The expansion of Atlantic trade has been a principal objective of both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 represented the most tangible expression by the Kennedy Administration of its Grand Design. On the assumption that the United States would soon face an enlarged EEC including Britain and other countries formerly outside the Common Market, the Trade Expansion Act was conceived as the first of a series of steps designed to link an integrated Western Europe and North America in an Atlantic Partnership.

This act gave the President authority to make across-the-board reductions of as much as 50 per cent in U.S. tariffs if other trading partners agreed to make comparable concessions. It provided for the reduction and elimination of tariffs on tropical agriculture, on other imports for which the tariff was below 5 per cent, and on products in which the Common Market and the United States together accounted for 80 per cent or more of total world trade. The effectiveness of this latter provision, in particular, depended upon the entry of Britain into the Common Market. Finally, under the Trade Expansion Act, the United States could enter negotiations for the removal of other kinds of trade barriers, such as special taxes, so-called health regulations and laws on advertising that have the effect, and perhaps the intention, of hampering the flow of international commerce.

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Trade within the North Atlantic area accounts for a large proportion of the imports and exports of the United States and its European allies. For example, about one-fifth of U.S. exports find markets in the EEC.[1] The EEC conducts about 12 per cent of its trade with the United States. Together, the United States, Britain and the EEC constitute the major suppliers of goods to less developed countries as well as the principal markets for their exports. Hence, the future of trading relationships throughout the Free World depends to a considerable extent upon the outcome of negotiations on trade within the North Atlantic area.

After having first met in the spring of 1963, the representatives of the United States and other nations held protracted discussions in Geneva under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations. The United States, the EEC and Britain, the world's three largest trading units, have constituted the principal negotiators.

The Common Market members had as primary objectives to create a common external tariff to be applied against outside countries and to reach agreement among themselves on a common agricultural policy. Each of these objectives created problems for the negotiators in the Kennedy Round. The EEC common tariff was to be established by taking an arithmetical average of the national tariffs of its six members. Thus, if French and Italian tariffs were relatively high, and those of, say, Belgium and Germany low, the EEC tariff would fall between these levels. The result of this averaging process was to replace very high and low tariffs with a more moderate common external tariff.

This in turn gave rise to the question of "disparities" which provided a source of contention in trade negotiations between the United States and the Six. In item-by-item tariff negotiations parties have been guided by the principle of reciprocity. The negotiators have sought to ensure that they received reciprocity, or equivalent benefits, in whatever agreement they concluded. Presumably, gains and losses could be measured by expected increases or decreases in imports and exports on the particular item under negotiation; thus the overall structure of a country's tariff was not of great importance. The Kennedy Round, however, raised the question of tariff dispersion in a country's tariff structure.

The U.S. tariff structure differs from that of the EEC. The

[1]Canada provides markets for another fifth of U.S. exports.

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United States has more zero rates than does the Common Market. A greater proportion of American than European Community rates falls below 15 per cent. Nevertheless, a greater proportion of Common Market rates lies within the range of 15 to 20 per cent. Except for food products, the United States has more tariffs above 20 and 30 per cent than does the Common Market. Practically no EEC tariffs are higher than 25 per cent; some U.S. tariffs are as high as 80 per cent. EEC tariffs on temperate zone agricultural products are generally higher than comparable tariffs in the United States. The United States, in accordance with the Trade Expansion Act, pressed for linear tariff reductions of 50 per cent. That is, the United States sought to reduce as many tariffs as possible by the same percentage, namely, by 50 per cent, and held that tariff reductions by lower percentages should be restricted to exceptions to the linear principle.

The question of the dispersion of respective U.S.-European tariffs took on another meaning in the Kennedy Round negotiations with respect to tariff disparities between the United States and the Six. A "disparity" was said to exist as a result of substantial differences among negotiating parties on the same commodity. The Six objected to across-the-board tariff reductions that would reduce by 50 per cent the tariff on commodities already bearing a very low tariff in the EEC structure, but a substantial tariff in the U.S. structure. The Six insisted that if the U.S. tariff were 80 per cent and the EEC tariff 20 per cent, a 50 per cent reduction applied to a given category would still leave the United States with a protective barrier in the form of a duty of 40 per cent. Thus the issue of disparities, which related to differences in tariff dispersion within the respective tariff structures of the United States and the EEC, could exist even if these structures were similar.[2]

The United States sought the automatic application of tariff reductions to all items in an agreed category. The Six, however, asked for item-by-item bargaining in certain cases in order to take

[2]For a discussion of some of the theoretical implications of across-the-board tariff negotiations within the North Atlantic area, see Richard N. Cooper, "Tariff Dispersion and Trade Negotiations," *Journal of Political Economy*, December 1964, pp. 597-603. Cooper concludes that higher U.S. tariff dispersion, contrary to European contentions, does not necessarily place the Common Market at a disadvantage in across-the-board reductions. He suggests that there is no necessary correlation between tariff levels and demand elasticities of commodities under consideration. Depending upon the commodity, excessive protection can be related to any level of tariff, not merely high tariffs. Alternatively, tariff reductions, even where tariff levels are already low, may have little or no effect on imports.

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account of products where disparities were said to exist. In brief, the United States strove for across-the-board reductions, while the Six favored negotiations on specific items in order to allow for so-called disparities between European and American tariff levels. As a way out of this dilemma, both the United States and the Six prepared lists of products they wished to have exempted from full tariff cuts of 50 per cent. Each side presented its list of exemptions in November 1964 at a closed session of the negotiations.[3]

The North Atlantic nations faced other barriers to trade. Europeans, for instance, objected to the U.S. refusal to sign the Brussels Convention of 1950 which defined customs value and outlined uniform methods and principles for duty assessment. Europeans maintain that trade with the United States is restricted by a series of complicated headings ascribed to products, by varying rates of duty, and by differences in the assessment of customs values. They also point to U.S. anti-dumping legislation which, despite liberalization, restricts trade by placing on goods an additional duty, based on the difference between the original price and the import price at a time when the U.S. Treasury Department declares that "dumping" exists. Moreover, they claim that U.S. customs law is in violation of GATT provisions because it allows duties to be charged on products subsidized by private organizations in exporting nations, and on products that constitute no "serious" damage to U.S. industry.

There are also objections to the "buy American" policy of the U.S. government, which gives American firms preference over foreign competition for government purchases if the cost is no more than 6 to 12 per cent higher than for the same product made by a foreign company. The only condition U.S. firms must meet is the use of American raw materials equivalent to at least 50 per cent of the total cost. This policy, hitherto covering only purchases in the United States, was extended to governmental purchases abroad when President Kennedy ordered, as a means of reducing the balance of payments deficit, the purchase of U.S. goods for U.S. installations so long as they were available. The EEC has suggested that such a policy is equivalent, in some cases, to a duty on imported goods.[4]

[3]For a discussion of the disparities issue, see Miriam Camps, *What Kind of Europe?* (New York: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), pp. 16-34; and Committee for Economic Development, *Trade Negotiations for a Better Free World Economy* (New York, 1964).

[4]"Europeans Weigh Non-Tariff Obstacles to Trade," *European Community* (Washington), June 1965, pp. 8-10.

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The question of the "American selling price" is of concern in the case of certain imports. For the most part U.S. ad valorem tariffs on an import are calculated by reference to its value at the point of origin. Yet for some products the valuation is based on the American selling price. A tariff calculated on the American selling price may be considerably higher than one figured on the selling price at the import's point of origin. A tariff based upon American selling prices is said to give greater protection to U.S. competitors. In some cases—for example, imports of certain kinds of dyes—American selling price valuation is used because no dependable data on foreign selling prices are available.

Yet data may also be difficult to obtain for some U.S. selling prices, because of changes over time. American selling price valuation has encountered criticism as a violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which provides that "the value for customs purposes of imported merchandise should be based on the actual value of the imported merchandise. . . ." (Article VII, Section 2a.) Exporters in Europe and elsewhere have maintained that valuation of imports on the American selling price limits their opportunities for trade with the United States, although it is not applied for the vast majority of U.S. imports. The development within the North Atlantic area, and in other Free World countries, of uniform procedures for the valuation of goods subjected to tariffs might enhance the flow of international trade.[5]

On its part, the United States has called attention to certain European practices which, it is contended, restrict trade. U.S. exporters of numerous commodities (e.g., agricultural products, oil, coal, radio and telephone sets, electric lights) have sometimes found themselves faced with quota restrictions. Criticism has been raised against the general secrecy that shrouds the conclusion of many contracts—public and private—in Europe. European tax systems, particularly the turnover, value added, and automobile taxes, provide another issue of contention. For example, European taxes based upon cylinder capacity rather than price have restricted the market in Europe for U.S. exports in automobiles. Americans have found that the health regulations in some European countries provide formidable barriers to trade

[5]For an examination of the American selling price problem, see Jules Backman, *Foreign Competition in Chemicals and Allied Products,* published by Manufacturing Chemists' Association (Washington, 1965), pp. 21-23.

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in agricultural products such as chickens and citrus fruits.[6] Cumbersome customs procedures and restrictive practices in the granting of import licenses constitute other nontariff impediments to the flow of international trade.

The future of agricultural trade clouds transatlantic economic relationships. U.S. exports of farm products to the EEC totaled $1.4 billion in 1964. In that year the Common Market absorbed about 22 per cent of total U.S. agricultural exports, but has accounted for a declining share of U.S. dollar sales of farm goods abroad in the last decade. Because of the importance it attaches to agricultural exports, the United States asked for progress toward the liberalization of trade in farm goods before negotiations on industrial products were completed. The Six, however, have established an agricultural policy whose objective is to "organize" rather than liberalize trade in farm products with third countries. The French, with rising farm productivity, have been anxious to reach agreement within the Common Market on a pricing policy for agricultural commodities in order to assure greater markets in Europe for their agriculture. France, not without justification, insisted that the Common Market was not indeed the Common Market unless it provided for the freeing of trade in agriculture, as well as industrial products, among the Six.[7]

The Six have undertaken to set prices for agricultural commodities within the Common Market at levels calculated to eliminate its least efficient agricultural producers. Nevertheless, the EEC price for most farm products can be expected to remain above levels prevailing in the world market. Imports to the EEC from outside countries will face a levy, computed at approximately the difference between world prices and the Common Market price. The so-called variable import levy will bring the price of imports of farm goods to the level prevailing within the Community. Proceeds from this levy are to be paid to a fund

[6] "European Non-Tariff Obstacles to Trade Criticized," *European Community*, August 1965, pp. 7-9.

[7] On May 11, 1966, the EEC Council of Ministers reached agreement in principle on financial regulations for the Community agricultural policy and set a date, July 1, 1968, for the completion of the transition to an agricultural and industrial customs union. The Council, it was agreed, would seek by July 1, 1966 to reach agreement on remaining regulations and common prices for major commodities. By July 1, the EEC had resolved major problems related to the establishment of financial regulations for fats and oils. Problems remained to be resolved regarding Community prices for other commodities, including milk, fruits and vegetables, sugar, beef, veal, and rice. See *European Community*, May and July 1966.

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for the modernization of farming in Europe, and perhaps for the subsidization of exports of agricultural surpluses from the EEC.

The Six have offered to discuss with participants in the trade negotiations the possibility of concluding an agreement whereby each nation would consent to limitations upon the amount of support it would provide for farm production. Under such an agreement, it might be possible to place limitations on the EEC levy system and thus reduce, although not eliminate, the tendency for agricultural output to expand in the Common Market at the expense of imports from traditional agricultural producers elsewhere in the world. In the Kennedy Round the United States indicated its willingness to discuss and even to open for negotiation any feature of the U.S. agricultural support system if to do so would enhance the prospects for trade liberalization.

As a result of population growth and higher incomes, food consumption in Western Europe has risen steadily in recent years. Since 1950 the EEC's net imports of agricultural commodities have increased, but on a lower scale than the growth of consumption. European farmers, spurred by modernization, are increasing output so rapidly that in some commodities the Common Market may have its own agricultural surpluses in the not too distant future. In particular, the EEC has moved toward self-sufficiency in the production of bread grains. The Six produce practically all their requirements of potatoes, butter, sugar, eggs and cheese, and a large percentage of other temperate zone agricultural products consumed in the Community. In all likelihood, the United States will face a shrinkage in its markets in the EEC for bread grains. Although two other important U.S. farm exports to Western Europe, coarse grains (animal feed) and high quality meats, will continue to enjoy substantial, and perhaps even expanding, markets, the markets for certain U.S. farm exports can be expected to decline as a result of rising levels of production in Western Europe as well as the farm policy of the EEC.

The bulk of U.S. industrial exports to the EEC consists of machinery, vehicles and chemicals. Growth in these categories of exports has been rapid; they more than doubled between 1958 and 1963. Because the United States is at the forefront in the development of advanced technologies, markets in Western Europe are assured for U.S. producers of a variety of new products. European efforts to acquire advanced technologies through the purchase of U.S. equipment could lead to a further expansion in

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overseas markets. Thus U.S. trade with Western Europe may consist increasingly of the sophisticated products of advanced technology. While the United States is naturally anxious to preserve European markets for agriculture, the prospects for the expansion of trade in industrial goods appear more promising. Hence the United States, over the long run, may have an even greater interest in achieving a substantial lowering of remaining barriers to trade in industrial goods than in pressing for the preservation of markets in agriculture, however difficult the process of adjustment may be for certain segments of the U.S. farming community.

The United States faces another obstacle in its efforts to achieve agreement with the EEC on the future of trade in the North Atlantic area. The United States for many years has enjoyed a trade surplus with the Common Market. U.S. exports to the EEC nearly doubled in the period between 1958 and 1965, rising from an annual average of $2.4 billion to $4.6 billion. During the same period U.S. imports from the EEC rose from $2.1 billion to $3.1 billion, an increase of about one-third.[8] Thus the United States has found in the EEC a market for a rising volume of its export trade—a greater increase in exports than the Common Market has gained in the United States. If the United States can continue to increase its markets in Western Europe, the pressures upon its balance of payments might be reduced. However, new U.S. inroads into European markets without corresponding increases in Western Europe's share of the U.S. market would undoubtedly be viewed with some concern. Hence the Six are unlikely to make major concessions on Atlantic trade, even in industrial goods, unless the gain they derive more than compensates for anticipated increases in U.S. exports to Western Europe.

Relations with the Less Developed Countries

Trade among Atlantic countries has increased at a faster rate than has trade between the more advanced and less developed areas of the world. The future development of many countries outside the North Atlantic area will depend to a considerable extent upon their ability to achieve higher levels of trade. Un-

[8]See *Trade Negotiations for a Better Free World Economy, op. cit.,* p. 35; Randall Hinshaw, *The European Community and American Trade: A Study in Atlantic Economies and Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1964), especially pp. 143-145; and United Nations, *Statistical Papers,* Series D, Vol. XV, No. 1-3, especially pp. 299, 350.

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less they can increase exports to industrialized countries, they may be unable to acquire the foreign exchange to finance imports needed for economic programs. Hence the policies which the North Atlantic countries adopt, separately or in collaboration, toward the less developed areas will affect the capacity of new states to undertake successfully the formidable tasks of economic and political development. Efforts of industrialized countries to reduce trade barriers are of considerable importance. If the industrialized countries are able to reach agreement on the major issues confronting them, they may find it possible to encourage the flow of trade from new states, or at least to halt an acceleration in existing trends.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), held in Geneva in 1964, addressed itself in detail to the question of trade between the industrialized and less developed countries. There was general agreement that "no new tariff or non-tariff barriers should be created (or existing barriers increased) by developed countries against imports of primary products of particular interest to developing countries." Moreover, it was suggested, the industrialized countries should "substantially reduce, and where possible eliminate, customs charges on primary products." In sum, the developed countries were requested not to take any action which might restrict imports from less developed countries.

Since 1950 changes in the patterns of demand, the growth of productivity in primary products, and the development of synthetics have affected adversely the terms of trade of many of the world's nonindustrialized states. Such countries must stabilize and increase their export earnings if they are to finance development programs. Yet they may face a further shrinkage in demand for their key exports for which the elasticity of demand is low. Rising income levels in the North Atlantic area are not likely to result in a substantial expansion of markets for many of their principal commodities. Advances in technology, as well as changing consumer preferences, may erode still further the industrialized markets for their primary products.

One of the most remarkable developments of the postwar period is the growing recognition by industrialized nations of a responsibility for assisting other countries in their economic advancement. A variety of programs of assistance have been placed in operation. It is difficult to measure the impact of these foreign

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aid programs because of important differences among them. Undoubtedly, their effectiveness varies as a result of many factors, including the sectors of the economy emphasized, the capabilities of recipients to utilize aid, and the quality of the donor country's administrative facilities. Moreover, the amount of aid has not been adequate in many cases to the growing needs of countries struggling to achieve economic and political modernization.

The aid programs of North Atlantic countries have remained but a small percentage of their GNP's. As Table I illustrates, the French overseas aid program, although it declined from 1.6 in 1955 to 1.1 per cent of France's GNP in 1963, remains the highest —as a percentage of GNP—of any North Atlantic country, with the exception of Portugal. The United States in 1963 allocated approximately 0.70 per cent of its GNP to foreign aid, followed by Belgium with 0.66 per cent. Using percentage of GNP as a standard for measurement, the foreign aid programs of other North Atlantic countries were even smaller.

It is not certain, however, that many North Atlantic countries will be prepared to continue to bear even their existing share of assistance to less developed areas. The reduction of European political influence outside the North Atlantic area may produce a diminution in European interest in maintaining aid programs. Dissatisfaction with aid programs has risen in Western Europe,

TABLE I

TOTAL AID AND GNP DURING 1963—
SELECTED ATLANTIC COUNTRIES

Country	*Aid in millions of dollars*	*GNP in millions of dollars*	*Aid as a percentage of GNP*
Belgium	90.2	13,610	0.66
Canada	99.1	39,781	0.25
Denmark	10.2	7,864	0.13
France	857.9	78,572	1.10
Germany	421.0	94,200	0.45
Italy	63.0	44,791	0.14
Netherlands	37.7	14,257	0.62
Norway	20.7	5,525	0.37
Portugal	47.1	2,905	1.62
United Kingdom	412.9	83,200	0.50
U. S. A.	3,843.6	586,445	0.70

Sources: 1. Development Assistance Efforts and Policies: 1964 Review, OECD, Statistical Tables, Table 5, pp. 108-109.

2. Bernard Mueller, *A Statistical Handbook of the North Atlantic Area* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1965), pp. 70-71.

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especially in France and Germany. Some European governments have drawn up plans for economic modernization in backward regions of their own countries. In the years ahead, foreign aid may compete with domestic economic programs, particularly if countries in Western Europe become increasingly "Europe-oriented."

The loss of European interest in foreign aid programs might contribute to doubts in the United States about the wisdom of bearing alone a major portion of the aid burden. Hence the future of aid programs may be related in no small measure to the ability of the industrialized nations, especially in the North Atlantic area, to concert their national aid policies or even to achieve a greater measure of multilateral collaboration in the granting of foreign assistance than they have manifested in the past. In the examination of problems of trade and development, the OECD has provided a forum of considerable importance to Atlantic countries. Under OECD auspices, studies of trade, aid and development have been undertaken. The Development Assistance Committee of OECD has furnished a device for coordination of national aid policies and for the study of long-term assistance needs. Given the magnitude of the problems facing less developed areas, the need for machinery such as that provided by OECD is likely to remain urgent.

U.S. Investment Patterns

Investment is yet another problem the Atlantic countries face in their relations with each other. In the last generation Western Europe's burgeoning markets have become increasingly important to U.S. investors, and, as a result, the United States has developed important new links with Western Europe. The formation of the Common Market, together with the high levels of economic growth attained by European countries, has attracted the interest of U.S. industry and, in many cases, given American businessmen impressive new opportunities.[9]

The factors that contribute to the decision of a firm to establish itself abroad in one form or another are numerous. One consideration is the level of protection—tariff and nontariff—which a country or a customs union affords its own industry. Hence the ability of the United States and the Six to reach accord on the

[9]For a comprehensive examination of U.S. investment trends in Western Europe, see Christopher Layton, *Trans-Atlantic Investments* (Paris: Atlantic Institute, 1966), and Anthony Edwards, *Investment in the European Economic Community* (New York: Praeger, 1964).

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freeing of transatlantic trade may be expected to influence U.S. businessmen in deciding whether to make a direct investment in Western Europe or to focus upon an expansion of exports to European markets from the United States. However, U.S. businessmen for other reasons as well have stepped up their investment in Western Europe. Possibilities for high margins of profits and European demands for capital, especially in the 1950's, provided considerable incentive to U.S. investors. In the 1960's, investment in many sectors of European industry remained profitable. U.S. companies, in many cases, saw in Western Europe the opportunity to invest profits accumulated from the long period of economic expansion which the United States has experienced over the last generation. As a result, U.S. companies, to an extent unparalleled in their history, have taken an interest in overseas markets, especially in Western Europe. American corporations are without counterpart in establishing "European" production facilities, whereas German and French firms have generally lagged behind their U.S. competitors in recognizing the need for, and the benefits which accrue from, the establishment of corporate activities across national frontiers within the Common Market. American firms, accustomed to production in the United States, with its differing state corporate regulations, and sales within the huge domestic American market, have often had a built-in advantage vis-à-vis their more tradition-bound European competitors, oriented toward sales and operation within a smaller domestic market.

There is a remarkable balance between U.S. investment in Western Europe and West European investment in the United States. At the end of 1964 European investment totaled $17.7 billion compared with U.S. long-term private investments of $17.5 billion in Western Europe.[10] However, U.S. and European investments differ in composition. For the most part Europeans have invested in American securities and bonds ($10.8 billion), rather than direct investments ($5.8 billion). But Americans have more sizeable direct investment in European industry ($12.1).

The growth of U.S. direct investment in Western Europe has given rise to charges of American economic "hegemony" as a result of the external influence that U.S. affiliates are sometimes alleged to have upon the economies of European countries. U.S. investment accounts for only 6 per cent of total investment in the

[10]Layton, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

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EEC, although it is by far the largest single component of foreign investment in Western Europe. U.S. investment is established in key fields such as petroleum, chemicals, electronics and automobiles.[11] It is heavily concentrated in many of Europe's new and rapidly growing industries. Fears have been expressed that Western Europe may become permanently dependent upon U.S.-developed technology, and, as a result, increasingly unable to take independent decisions about defense.

The financial strength of U.S. corporations, in comparison with their European competitors, also produces concern. Not only do American corporations often possess superior financial resources, they are able usually to borrow on terms more advantageous than those granted European firms. Banks in Western Europe, it is alleged, may lend to U.S. corporations operating in Europe more readily than to European enterprise because of the greater strength of the American firms, and hence, the lower risk. The United States, because of its voluntary program to reduce the U.S. payments deficit, has encouraged U.S. corporations operating in Europe to borrow abroad rather than in the United States. U.S. corporations have greater access to the U.S. capital market, with its generally lower interest rates than are available in Western Europe. European corporations, if they are able to borrow in the United States, are subject to an interest equalization tax. Moreover, the influx of U.S. managerial practices, marketing techniques, advertising methods and new products has sometimes had an unsettling effect upon European industries accustomed to older ways of conducting business. The ability of U.S.-owned enterprise to attract workers because of higher wages and improved management-labor relations is a source of irritation. Not unexpectedly, therefore, U.S. investors have become the object of criticism from some Europeans.

Many in Europe have recognized, however, the contribution that U.S. investment has made to European economic modernization. The presence of U.S. industry has provided a major source of

[11]See statement by Dr. Herman J. Abs, Senior Executive of Deutsche Bank, *Christian Science Monitor,* October 13, 1965. According to a business survey published in April 1965 by the Union des industries de la Communauté Européene, of the 500 largest companies in the world (classified by 1963 sales figures) 306 were American, 53 British, 33 German, 25 French, 7 Italian, 6 Swedish, 6 Swiss, 4 Dutch, 3 Belgian, 1 Luxembourgian. In this list the EEC accounted for only 74 companies, while EFTA provided 66. The report suggested the need for greater concentration in those industries in Western Europe where large-scale investment was necessary for technological advance. *European Community,* May 1965, pp. 12-13.

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technological innovation. Through direct investment as well as licensing agreements, industrial processes pioneered or perfected in the United States have been made available to Western Europe. U.S. firms have introduced new technologies as well as products and marketing methods previously confined to the United States. In short, industry provides an important avenue for transatlantic technological collaboration.

In many cases U.S. direct investment in Western Europe has led to marked increases in productivity, the growth of mass markets, and the jettisoning of restrictive practices in trade unions. U.S. capital has contributed to the development and growth of some of the most dynamic sectors of European industry. In Britain's vital export industries, for example, sales abroad of companies affiliated with U.S. firms rose by an estimated 65 per cent in 1964, while British exports as a whole increased by a modest 4 per cent.[12] To a considerable extent this startling contrast reflects the fact that U.S. investors in recent years have invested heavily in industries, such as automobiles, which have registered rising exports. But even without the influx of U.S. capital, such industries might have contributed to a rise in British exports. Hence some, but by no means all, of the stimulus to British export industries can be credited to U.S. investment.

The impact of investment overseas upon the U.S. balance of payments is not easily determined. Ultimately, the return flow of capital to the United States thus generated may be expected to exceed the outflow. In the short term, U.S. investment overseas may contribute to a payments deficit, while in the long run it may lead to a payments surplus.[13] The flow of funds from the United States to other countries has contributed to an increase in U.S. exports. U.S. investment abroad has led to increased exports, for example, to U.S. subsidiaries overseas. Almost one-fourth of U.S. exports in 1963 were shipped to U.S. subsidiaries in other countries.[14] Undoubtedly, overseas investment contributes to foreign demand for exports from U.S. industries which themselves have not placed capital abroad. U.S. companies, in

[12]*Wall Street Journal*, January 25, 1966.

[13]For a detailed discussion of the implications of overseas investment for a country's balance of payments, see Lawrence B. Krause and Kenneth W. Dan, *Federal Tax Treatment of Foreign Income* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964).

[14]Layton, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

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many cases, have received substantial licensing fees from foreign firms for products and processes produced abroad. Finally, profits generated from large-scale U.S. investment in Western Europe may be returned to the United States, if they are not reinvested abroad. U.S. tax policy, however, appears to encourage corporations to reinvest earnings abroad, since earnings are not taxed in the United States until they are returned to this country.

Trends in the U.S. Balance of Payments

Despite the impressive growth of U.S. foreign trade, the United States has incurred deficits in its balance of payments for many years. In 1958 the U.S. payments deficit increased sharply and thus became an object of official concern. The flow of gold from the United States which accompanied the increasing U.S. payments deficit represented a redressing of the abnormal wartime and early postwar flow of gold to this country. In 1958 the deficit was approximately $3.5 billion; in 1959 and 1960, nearly $4 billion; 1964, $3 billion; and in 1965 $1.3 billion.[15]

The U.S. payments imbalance occurred at a time when U.S. exports were rising. While imports during the period 1960-1964 grew by about $5 billion, exports fared even better, rising by approximately $7.5 billion. In fact, the payments deficit is related more to the responsibilities the United States has continued to bear in international affairs than to a lagging economy which might have placed U.S. industry in a less favorable competitive position vis-à-vis Western Europe. Economic growth in the United States during this period has been unparalleled, with the U.S. gross national product approaching $650 billion in 1965.

In fiscal year 1965, $1.4 billion of U.S. defense expenditures in Europe entered the U.S. balance of payments.[16] This figure represented a slight reduction from comparable figures in previous years, the result perhaps of the efforts taken by the U.S. government to achieve greater economies in overseas spending. If the United States were to curtail defense spending abroad and foreign aid, the balance of payments deficit might be reduced greatly. The United States should not permit payments problems to

[15]Robert Strausz-Hupé, *et al., Building the Atlantic World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 165; *New York Times,* February 11, 1965 and March 29, 1966.

[16]Figures furnished by the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense.

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govern strategic decisions;[17] yet the fact remains that, given the existing distribution of economic and military responsibilities among leading nations of the West, the United States bears the major burden of European defense.

Recognizing that defense expenditures have accounted for one important source of dollar outflow from the United States, the Kennedy Administration made an effort to tie foreign assistance, both military and nonmilitary, to purchases of U.S. goods wherever possible. The U.S. government has taken other steps, including: (1) reduction of Defense Department employment of foreign nationals by 15 per cent between June 30, 1963 and June 30, 1965; (2) reduction of the staffs at overseas military headquarters by 15 per cent; (3) channeling to the United States of $250 million in purchases of supplies and services for U.S. installations overseas; (4) limitation of purchases in foreign countries for U.S. military assistance programs to the fulfillment of prior commitments; (5) elimination or deferment of military projects not regarded as absolutely essential; and (6) phasing out of some U.S. forces in Western Europe in 1964-1965 and reduction of air defense forces in Spain and Japan due to growing local capabilities.

This program contributed to a reduction in the proportion of the payments deficit directly attributable to the Defense Department. Yet for the most part this reduction was the result of increases in the sale of U.S. military equipment abroad ($300 million in 1961 as against $1.3 billion in 1965). Thus the United States has improved its position in this sector, but in doing so may have contributed to an increase in European dissatisfaction because of U.S. efforts to sell U.S.-built weapons systems to NATO allies. Moreover, the Agency for International Development (AID), as a result of tying assistance to procurement of U.S. goods and services, has been able to reduce expenditures outside the

[17]Taking one component of the payments account and making that the marginal outlay to which the deficit is attributable may well lead to irrational treatment of that component. Moreover, it is not technically legitimate. The net balance of payments will presumably never change by an amount precisely equal to a reduction in a given outlay. Expenditures abroad generate return flows. The estimation of the ratios of these return flows during given time periods is complex and subject to great uncertainties. The singling out of a given sector, such as overseas military expenditures or foreign investment, said to be "about equal to the deficit" and therefore to account for the deficit, may create the risk that appropriate policies toward other components of the payments balance will be overlooked.

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United States under its programs from $1 billion in 1960 to $533 million in 1964.[18]

The achievements of governmental agencies in reducing overseas spending were offset by increases in capital outflow, particularly U.S. investment, to Europe. The impact of investment overseas upon the U.S. balance of payments, it has been suggested, is not easily determined. Certainly, in the long run, investments abroad may be expected to strengthen the international payments position of an investing country. Yet the U.S. government, in 1964, became concerned about the implications of U.S. foreign investment for the U.S. balance of payments.

In a message in February 1965 calling for "voluntary restraints" by Americans, President Johnson noted that capital outflow had reached $6.5 billion in 1964—a $2 billion increase over 1963. To reduce this dollar outflow, the Administration asked for "voluntary restraints" on investment and loans abroad. Under the "voluntary restraints" program, some 400 companies were asked to join in an effort to limit direct foreign investment. U.S. corporations were requested to step up their efforts to increase exports, income repatriation from abroad, repatriation of short-term financial assets, and utilization of funds abroad for investment purposes.[19] Moreover, the Administration requested an extension of the interest equalization tax, which previously had applied primarily to purchases of foreign securities, to include loans made abroad by banks, and had legislation enacted to reduce duty-free exemptions for Americans traveling abroad.

The commitment of the United States to regions outside Europe, together with the U.S. payments problem, may reduce the likelihood that the United States will increase its share of the burden of providing for the defense of Western Europe. For the most part, West European defense expenditures have declined as a percentage of GNP, at a time when Western Europe possesses economic resources of unprecedented dimensions. At the same time, European commitments outside Europe have been reduced. The United States has assumed many of the burdens of assisting newly independent peoples to build viable political and economic structures. In fact, the export of U.S. capital and other forms of

[18]Remarks by David E. Bell, Director, Agency for International Development, Press Release, December 6, 1965, AID Information Staff.

[19]*Extension of Voluntary Payments Program,* Press Release, U.S. Department of Commerce, December 6, 1965.

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aid to regions outside the North Atlantic area appears to have contributed to the U.S. payments deficit.

As a result of its transactions especially with countries other than the United States, Western Europe increased its gold and dollar holdings in the period 1961 to 1964. European countries, with trade surpluses with less developed countries, have received a major addition to their reserves from the Third World. They thus appear to have benefited economically from the major burdens the United States has assumed outside the North Atlantic area.[20] The heavy share of Free World defense and economic development borne by the United States, together with the economic strength manifested by Western Europe, point up the need for a redefinition of European responsibilities, as well as the voice to be accorded to Europeans within the Atlantic Alliance.

The British Economic Crisis

Britain, alone among major West European countries, retains international commitments that strain her national capabilities. She has striven to maintain a military presence in Asia, the Middle East and, until recently, Africa, in addition to her contribution to NATO. With meager gold and currency reserves, she has attempted to retain for the pound sterling a position as a major reserve currency. Yet Britain, since the Second World War, has faced formidable economic problems that have limited her maneuverability in international politics. Periodically, successive British governments have wrestled with balance of payments crises that undermined international confidence in the pound. In 1964, for example, Britain, confronted with a balance of payments deficit of $2 billion, was forced to take steps to reduce imports and to stimulate exports. Again, in July 1966, the British government found it necessary to adopt policies designed to strengthen Britain's economy. These included a freeze on wages and prices, reductions in public spending and investment, and restrictions on spending outside the sterling area by British subjects.

Beyond the considerable international responsibilities that Britain has borne since the Second World War, the weakness of the British economy lies at the root of the recurrent balance of payments problem. Although heavily dependent on imports and exports for her national livelihood, Britain has experienced a de-

[20]See Layton, *op. cit.*

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cline in her share of international trade, from 32 per cent in 1914 to 15 per cent in 1963.[21] Over the last generation her economic difficulties have forced her to rely heavily upon borrowings from other nations and financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund in order not only to bolster her economic position, but also to retain her position as banker for the sterling area. The future of the pound sterling as a reserve currency, as well as the political role Britain will play in NATO or a successor organization, is intimately related to Britain's ability to resolve her pressing economic problems.

The Labour Government which entered office in October 1964 took several steps to remedy Britain's payments problem. The government enacted an import surcharge of 15 per cent (subsequently reduced to 10 per cent) on all goods except raw materials and food.[22] (In recent years an increasing percentage of Britain's imports has consisted of manufactures.) Moreover, the British government revealed its intention to place in operation an incomes policy, with the cooperation of trade unions and industry, as part of an overall national plan to increase GNP by 25 per cent over the five-year period, 1965-1970. During 1965 specific measures were taken to aid British exporters. The government granted subsidies to export industries roughly equivalent to indirect taxes paid in the production of export goods. A Commonwealth Export Council and a number of industry export groups were established.[23] In the summer of 1966 the British government received parliamentary approval of its Prices and Incomes Bill. This bill was designed to make increases in wages in a given industry contingent upon increases in productivity in that industry. Nevertheless, Britain in 1966 had yet to achieve, through economic reform, the strengthened economic structure upon which her future position in world affairs is so heavily dependent.

Without a major change in her economic position Britain cannot be expected to maintain her existing role in international politics. The onset of yet another economic crisis may lead to increased calls in Britain for the abandonment of the British military presence "east of Suez" and, conceivably, for reductions in the British commitment to NATO. Not a few critics of Britain's

[21]"Britain's External Trade and Payments," London, Central Office of Information, July 1964, p. 1.

[22]In May 1966 it was announced that Britain would end, in November 1966, the surcharge on imports. *EFTA Reporter,* May 23, 1966.

[23]*British Record,* Political and Economic Notes by British Information Services, January 27 and February 3, 1965.

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military policy have noted that the British payments deficit has been roughly equivalent to the military expenditures "east of Suez." Yet the withdrawal of British forces, whether from Asia and the Middle East or from Germany, would place an added burden upon the United States at a time when the need for greater European support in the obligations of assuring Free World security has become apparent. Even though her defense expenditures, as a percentage of GNP, remain higher than those of other major West European NATO countries, Britain will be forced to reduce her contribution to the Atlantic Alliance unless she can find a solution to chronic economic problems.[24]

Britain, in a weakened economic position, might herself be unable to retain for the pound sterling a key role as a reserve currency in the international monetary system. Although the role of sterling as a reserve currency, in comparison with that of the dollar, has declined since the Second World War, a major proportion of Free World trade is still conducted with sterling. This in turn makes more complex the problem of ensuring sufficient international liquidity which confronts Free World countries.

Reforming the International Monetary System

The specter of an international monetary crisis precipitated by a shortage in international liquidity has been raised at the highest policymaking levels in the North Atlantic area.[25] Visions of an impending collapse of the international monetary system are uniformly dismissed as fanciful. Nevertheless, many thoughtful economic analysts have addressed themselves to the problems of reforming the international monetary system. These efforts, together with the work of the Group of Ten and the studies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), indicate the importance attached to this problem.[26]

[24]Britain's defense expenditures in 1964 were $6 billion or 7.1 per cent of her GNP. *Ibid.*, March 22, 1965.

[25]The international liquidity of a nation consists of all the resources that are available, directly or indirectly, to its monetary authorities to support its rate of exchange when its external payments are in deficit. The present international payments system calls for the free convertibility of currencies at specified exchange rates which can be adjusted only if a "fundamental disequilibrium" exists. Monetary authorities of a country experiencing "transitory disequilibrium" in its payments may stabilize its currency within the agreed limits by using reserve currencies to purchase needed currencies. If inadequate resources are available to support the currency within the IMF limits, a crisis of confidence may occur. A country with adequate resources or reserves can, in effect, purchase the time to restore payments equilibrium.

[26]Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten Countries participating in the

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The August 1964 report of the Deputies of the Group of Ten considered the problems of international liquidity as divisible into two broad categories: "reserves" and "credit facilities."[27] Credits that had not been utilized were generally available to potential deficit countries subject to individual credit arrangements. "Reserve assets" represented gold, currency assets of various types and claims on the IMF.

Gold held as international reserves by countries of the Free World trading system amounts to approximately $41 billion, with about one-third in the possession of the United States and about 50 per cent in Western Europe.[28] Currency assets are maintained as reserves under various arrangements including holdings of reserve currencies; these, consisting primarily of dollars and sterling, total about $22 billion, of which about three-fifths is held in dollars. "Swap" lines consist of agreements that the authorities of one country will make its currency available to other nations up to agreed amounts, usually for an initial period of ninety days. In recent years the United States and the major industrialized countries have built up a network of bilateral short-term credit arrangements, including the advancement of $3 billion in November 1964 to strengthen the pound. A substantial innovation in the management of international liquidity is represented by Roosa Bonds, nonmarketable short- and medium-term U.S. Treasury securities held by foreign monetary authorities. These are commonly denominated in the currency of the holder and are convertible on short notice into cash. Some nations regard these bonds as part of their reserves; others do not. The bonds now outstanding amount to $1.1 billion.[29]

The third type of reserve asset consists of claims upon the In-

General Arrangements to Borrow with the International Monetary Fund, *Report of the Study on the Creation of Reserve Assets* (Washington: GPO, May 1965), p. 13. (Hereafter cited as Group of Ten, *Report of the Study Group.*) Also, International Monetary Fund, *Annual Report,* Washington, 1964 and 1965. The Group of Ten includes the major industrial and trading nations of the Free World—Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States, with Switzerland as an observer.

[27]Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten Countries participating in the General Arrangements to Borrow with the International Monetary Fund, *Ministerial Statement of the Group of Ten and Annex prepared by the Deputies* (August 1964), p. 8. (Hereafter cited as Group of Ten, *Ministerial Statement.*)

[28]Frederick L. Deming, "Remarks at Annual Convention of Iowa Bankers Association," Des Moines, Iowa, October 18, 1965, U.S. Treasury Department Release, p. 4.

[29]Frederick L. Deming, "Remarks at Ohio State University," Columbus, Ohio, April 29, 1965, U.S. Treasury Department Release, p. 4.

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ternational Monetary Fund. Each member country has a borrowing quota based on payments of gold and its national currency which it has made to the Fund. One-quarter of its drawing rights are based on its contribution of gold. Access to this quarter of its quota, the gold tranche, is virtually automatic. The so-called super gold tranche represents claims totaling about $5 billion.[30] Moreover, in negotiations carried on during 1961 resulting in the General Arrangements to Borrow, the leading industrial countries comprising the Group of Ten agreed to provide loans to the Fund under specified conditions in amounts up to $6 billion. Swiss authorities set up a parallel arrangement to furnish up to $200 million in Swiss francs directly to the Fund.[31]

The other element of international liquidity, apart from "reserve assets," is credit availabilities. The nature of credit, relying as it does on judgment in particular circumstances, makes it difficult to speculate about its form and quantity in a period of payments disequilibrium. *Ad hoc* arrangements are difficult to forecast. Beyond the gold tranche, one particular form of credit is available in the IMF. Such credit, which constitutes "conditional liquidity," is provided on the condition that the drawing country agrees to maintain or adopt policies designed to correct its payments deficit.

The operation of the international monetary system in recent years has given rise to concern for the future. The overall growth of official reserves in the world apart from the United States in the period between 1958 and 1964 was about $17 billion. The U.S. payments deficit during those six consecutive years resulted in an increase of officially held foreign reserves totaling nearly $13 billion.[32] The U.S. and British payments deficits, however much they may have contributed to the increase in international liquidity, have led some monetary authorities to accelerate the conversion of reserve currencies in their possession, namely, holdings of dollars and pounds sterling, into gold. This in turn reduces the supply of liquidity. For example, at the beginning of 1964, France held about 1.3 billion dollars in its reserves. The French authorities announced that they intended to convert $300 million into gold before the end of March, and that in the future all current dollar surpluses would be immediately converted

[30]Frederick L. Deming, Speech of November 12, 1965, U.S. Treasury Department Release, pp. 9-10.
[31]*Ibid.*, p. 12.
[32]*Ibid.*, p. 10.

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into gold.[33] Between 1958 and 1964, the reserves of the United States fell from $22.5 billion ($20.6 billion in gold) to $16.7 billion ($15.5 billion in gold).[34] The decline continued in 1965 and 1966. By the end of 1965 the reserves of the United States totaled $14.6 billion ($13.8 billion in gold).[35]

The U.S. and British balance of payments deficits have diminished confidence in Western Europe and elsewhere in the dollar and pound. The adequacy of liquidity is dependent in large part upon the supply of the dollar and pound as reserve currencies. Unless the U.S. and British currencies enjoy the confidence of other trading nations, their value as reserve currencies may decline. Hence the strengthening of the dollar and pound sterling, by the correction of U.S. and British payments deficits, bears an important relationship to efforts designed to assure a level of liquidity adequate for the conduct of world trade.

Paradoxically, the efforts of the reserve countries to restore confidence in their currencies by eliminating payments imbalances, if successful, will result in a drying up or reduction in the major source of new liquidity over the last generation. The British and U.S. payments deficits, by placing large amounts of these key reserve currencies in the hands of foreigners, have led to an increase in international liquidity. New gold production flowing into monetary channels—about $500 to $700 million per year—has been and is likely to remain roughly constant.[36] Yet the world economy is expanding rapidly, and sooner or later, more reserves will be needed. As the Group of Ten statement, known as the Ossola Report after the Group's Chairman, Signor Rinaldo Ossola of Italy, has suggested:

> The problem arises from the considered expectation that the future flow of gold into reserves cannot be prudently relied upon to meet all needs for an expansion of reserves associated with a growing volume of world trade and payments and that the contribution of dollar holdings to the growth of reserves seems unlikely to continue as in the past.[37]

An evaluation of the present adequacy of liquidity is a difficult undertaking; the authors of the Ossola Report concluded that

[33]Torsten Carlsson, "The Discussion on the International Payments System," *Skandinaviska Banker Quarterly Review,* No. 2 (1965), p. 34.
[34]Deming, "Remarks at Annual Convention of Iowa Bankers Association," *op. cit.,* p. 6.
[35]*General Statistics 1966,* Statistical Office, European Community (Brussels).
[36]Frederick L. Deming, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the Washington State Bankers Association," Tacoma, Washington, June 22, 1965, U.S. Treasury Department Release, p. 9.
[37]Group of Ten, *Report of the Study Group,* p. 17.

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"the adequacy of aggregate reserves is not at present measurable by any quantitative formula. . . ."[38] Different national experiences give rise to different perspectives on the question of the adequacy of international liquidity. A surplus country may view with apprehension the expansionary effect of its balance of payments and conclude that liquidity is ample. A deficit country may regard the same amount of liquidity present in the system as inadequate because of the restrictionist stabilization policies required to restore its payments equilibrium.

Between 1954 and 1963, the eight major nonreserve countries of the Group of Ten and Switzerland acquired the equivalent of $18.5 billion in reserve assets.[39] Some countries consider that the growth in their reserves has been a contributing factor to inflationary pressures on the European continent. Dr. Karl Blessing of Germany expressed this view at the 1965 meeting of the IMF. He declared that "if the world were really in for a crisis, it would be because of persistent inflation." With respect to the liquidity problem, he suggested that "if all leading countries were to aim at balance of payments equilibrium, the need for reserves would be small."[40] Liquidity may be regarded as excessive if U.S. balance of payments deficits extend over protracted periods without effective corrective measures. M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, speaking for France at the same meeting, believed this to be the case since the reserve countries "are in a position to obtain implicit credit facilities over long periods of time through the holding of their own currencies by partner countries."[41] This practice is held to be a "dangerous usage, as these countries are tempted to

[38] *Ibid.* As the Senior Financial Adviser of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* has suggested: "Regarding international liquidity one might, on the one hand, lay down the same rule as is prescribed in the Bretton Woods statute for credit facilities: the rule that these ought to enable countries to make an adequate adaptation without imposing restrictions harmful both to their own and their partners' economies. On the other hand, however, liquidity should not be so considerable as to tempt the countries to relax their monetary discipline and slow down their adaptation." F. E. Aschinger, "Problems of an International Currency Reform," *Swiss Review of World Affairs,* March 1966, p. 6.

[39] Deming, "Remarks at Ohio State University," *op. cit.,* p. 5.

[40] International Monetary Fund, *Summary Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors,* Washington, 1965, p. 117. The Germans appear to have a phobia about inflation, resulting from a confusion in their minds between the traumatic experiences of hyper-inflation after two world wars and the phenomenon of gradual inflation persistent throughout most of history and related to periods of prosperity. The second type of inflation differs, both in its causes and effects, from the first. In the case of French official criticisms of the international monetary system, however, the question arises as to whether French concern with the U.S. payments deficit and French devotion to gold are related to Gaullist dissatisfaction with the U.S. position in NATO.

[41] *Ibid.*

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misuse such facilities by postponing as long as they can the implementation of appropriate adjustment policies."

The American response is that the United States has not misused its privileged position. U.S. authorities, it is maintained, have been diligent, if not fully successful, in their efforts to restore payments equilibrium. The purchasing power of the dollar, despite inflationary pressures, is said to have been better preserved than that of any other major currency.[42]

The most challenging problem confronting the United States and other leading Free World countries is not the assessment of the adequacy of present reserves but the question of growth for future liquidity. Both the Fund and the Group of Ten are in agreement that international liquidity is sufficient for the immediate future.[43] Forecasts of the probable need for liquidity are fraught with uncertainty. It is difficult to anticipate inflationary or contractionary tendencies in the world economy and to predict the patterns of distribution of reserves and surpluses among countries at any given time. Yet there is a consensus among most monetary authorities that the need for international liquidity is likely to increase in the decade ahead.[44]

To be sure, the development of uniformly sound national economies not subject to short-term or chronic payments disequilibrium would diminish the need for increased international liquidity. Such an ideal state of equilibrium is not likely to obtain in the real world of the foreseeable future. Increasing levels of international trade will make necessary a growth in the media of international exchange and their more efficient utilization.

The expansion of the world economy may lead to payments disequilibrium. For example, developing countries with large import needs relative to their export incomes and reserves will have a rising need for financial resources. Yet in the period between 1958 and 1964 their reserves fell by about 10 per cent.[45]

[42]Gottfried Haberler, "The International Payments System," in *International Payments Problems.* Symposium sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, September 23-24, 1965, pp. 4-7.

[43]International Monetary Fund, *Annual Report,* Washington, 1964, p. 29; Group of Ten, *Ministerial Statement,* p. 1.

[44]International Monetary Fund, *Annual Report,* 1964, p. 31.

[45]The underdeveloped nations are defined for this purpose to include all of Latin America, all of Africa except the Union of South Africa, and all of Asia except Japan. U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee, *Hearings, Guidelines for International Monetary Reform,* 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, Part 2, Supplement, p. 271. Statement of Edward M. Bernstein.

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Underdeveloped countries, for the most part, can ill afford to accumulate currency reserves at a time when they face a shortage of capital for development.

The amount of liquidity that will be available at a particular time is as difficult to predict as the demand for liquidity. The IMF has concluded that the growth rate of all forms of international liquidity has averaged 3.3 per cent annually between 1954 and 1964. In the same period the gold growth rate was 1.6 per annum; foreign exchange, 4.3 per annum; and gold tranche, 7.6 per annum.[46] The rapid expansion of foreign currency reserves was attributable to the fact that countries with payments surpluses vis-à-vis the United States obtained much of their surplus in dollars. This source of reserve formation will not continue as in the past if the United States succeeds in restoring payments equilibrium.[47] In an effort to ensure sufficient international liquidity, the IMF has expanded the resources available to member countries in payments difficulties. In 1958-1959 Fund quotas were increased by 50 per cent across the board, with additional selective increases. In 1964 a general 25 per cent increase, together with additional amounts for certain individual countries, was authorized.

There is growing sentiment among Free World nations that measures beyond the bolstering of existing reserve currencies must be taken in order to provide adequate liquidity. It is generally conceded that gold, at a fixed price, should be retained as the basic monetary reserve commodity and ultimate medium for the settlement of international accounts. Agreement exists on the necessity for maintaining the arrangements that have been developed since the Second World War to aid countries in balance-of-payments difficulties.[48] It is agreed, moreover, that Britain and the United States must reduce markedly their balance of payments deficits if confidence in the pound and dollar as reserve currencies is not to be diminished.

Despite the agreement of most governments that ways must be found to ensure adequate liquidity, there are fundamental differences of opinion about the appropriate solutions. The United States proposed a new monetary unit, to be backed by the currencies of the leading industrial nations, a so-called composite reserve unit (CRU). In addition to the new unit, the United States

[46]International Monetary Fund, *Annual Report,* 1964, p. 30.
[47]*Ibid.,* p. 31.
[48]See *International Payments Problems, op. cit.,* pp. 71-75.

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has favored the enlargement of automatic borrowing rights in the IMF for nations experiencing balance of payments difficulties.[49]

European countries appear to favor differing approaches to the international monetary problem. Britain, unable to redeem sterling liabilities to foreigners in gold or dollars, sought to strengthen its monetary position by obtaining the long-term credits needed to repay short-term loans for the defense of the pound sterling. Given its interest in retaining for the pound sterling a role as a reserve currency, the British government can be expected to support proposals, such as those favored by the United States, to increase monetary reserves and to ease the task of defending the pound in any future financial emergency.

France, however, appears to favor a proposal to replace the existing system of reserve currencies with one more closely tied to gold. Other European countries, including Germany and Italy, see no necessity for haste in effecting reform. German financial authorities have maintained that if all leading countries were able to approximate balance of payments equilibrium, the need for reserves would not be great. Temporary deficits could be financed either from nationally held reserves, or from the IMF or other financial institutions. Therefore, the strengthening of national economies resulting in the easing of chronic payments deficits would lessen the need for great increases in international liquidity.[50]

Whatever the solution chosen, the leading nations of the North Atlantic area, as the major world grouping of industrial states, will have an influential voice in decisions about the future of the international monetary system. In all likelihood, national currencies, namely the dollar and pound sterling, will continue to play a role of prime importance as reserve currencies. This factor may be expected to increase the pressure on the United States and Britain to take necessary steps to correct their payments imbalances, perhaps more drastic steps than they have taken thus far. The most pressing need may be to strengthen international confidence in the two reserve currencies. At the same time, the leading industrial powers, in collaboration with other states, will find it necessary to assure the availability of liquidity to finance in-

[49]*New York Times,* January 28, 1966, p. 1. For an elaboration of similar proposals, see Robert V. Roosa, *Monetary Reform for the World Economy* (New York: Harper & Row, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1965), pp. 73-129.

[50]See, for example, the statement by Dr. Blessing, Governor of the IMF for the Federal Republic of Germany, International Monetary Fund, *Summary Proceedings, Annual Meeting 1965, op. cit.,* pp. 115-119.

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creases in international trade and to assist governments in payments difficulties. The creation of additional borrowing rights in the IMF, as well as the creation of a new reserve unit, might serve to ease this problem.

Such proposals should be designed to permit continental European countries to make a greater contribution to the international monetary system in return for a greater voice in its operation, although the United States and Britain can be expected to retain what is perhaps an inordinate share of the burden of ensuring the smooth operation of the system. At the end of 1965 the gold and foreign exchange holdings of members of the EEC, taken together ($19.7 billion), exceeded those of the United States, ($14.6). As Table II reveals, in 1965 the gold holdings of each of the three major EEC countries exceeded those of Britain. The continental countries might be expected to make a major contribution to an augmented IMF, a new reserve unit, or other schemes for assuring sufficient international liquidity. In return, voting procedures in the IMF might be altered in order to give these contributors a greater voice. The international monetary system, like the defense of the West, has been dominated by the "Anglo-Saxon" powers, despite changes in the capabilities of continental West European states during the last generation. If Britain were to join the Common Market, the enlarged Community might eventually create a European currency which in turn might replace sterling as a reserve currency. Such a currency, backed by the economic potential of Western Europe, could make a major contribution to international liquidity.

TABLE II

GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS OF EEC COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM—1965

(Millions of dollars)

Countries	*First Quarter*		*Second Quarter*		*Third Quarter*		*November 1965*	
	Gold	*Foreign Exchange*	*Gold*	*Foreign Exchange*	*Gold*	*Foreign Exchange*	*Gold*	*Foreign Exchange*
EEC Members	13,740	5,990	14,514	4,848	14,646	4,738	14,762	4,751
France	4,197	1,119	4,433	917	4,556	825	4,638	811
Germany	4,243	2,617	4,378	2,015	4,390	1,913	4,406	1,948
Belgium	1,484	519	1,563	437	1,554	464	1,558	452
Italy	2,093	1,389	2,384	1,225	2,390	1,227	2,404	1,176
Netherlands	1,723	346	1,756	254	1,756	309	1,756	364
United Kingdom	2,111	219	2,226	566	2,139	616	Not Available	

Note: Data refer to holdings at the end of each quarter.
Source: *International Financial Statistics*, International Monetary Fund.

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However, only less far-reaching reforms, it appears, are likely for the immediate future to attract the support needed for their adoption in the international monetary system. As in the case of restructuring the Atlantic Alliance, proposals for restructuring the international monetary system should be designed so as to afford those countries able to do so the opportunity to contribute, and then to play a policy role commensurate with their national capabilities and contribution.

Conclusion

The increase of economic relationships within the North Atlantic area has produced a need for continuing collaboration between the United States and other Free World nations, especially those of Western Europe. The major economic problems facing the United States and nations in Western Europe and the less developed areas are, to varying degrees of importance, interrelated. The freeing of trade within the North Atlantic area is related to efforts to increase the flow of trade between the industrialized and nonindustrialized regions of the world. The growth of U.S. investment in Western Europe may affect transatlantic trade patterns and exert a considerable impact upon the growth of European economies. Changes in U.S. export and overseas investment patterns, as well as military and other expenditures abroad, will have implications for the U.S. balance of payments. Changes in the U.S. and British balance of payments positions may have important consequences for the dollar and pound sterling as reserve currencies and, thus, will influence decisions about international liquidity.

The economic problems facing the United States and other Free World countries are not only related to each other; they bear important relationships to political and military issues as well. The ability of the United States, in collaboration with other industrial nations, especially in Western Europe, to resolve major economic problems will affect the U.S. capacity to continue to bear a major part of the burden of Free World defense and economic development. Hence, the restructuring of economic relationships should be an issue of high priority on the agenda of North Atlantic nations. In some cases the resolution of economic problems by the North Atlantic countries calls for more systematic consultation about domestic economic policies, especially fiscal and monetary policies.

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REGIONALISM AND INSTABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

by Bernard K. Gordon

WILL some new organizational structure for Southeast Asia speed economic development, encourage Cambodians to get along better with Thais, contain Chinese ambitions, and maybe even bring lasting peace between Indonesia and Malaysia? At different times, many of Asia's leaders have asserted that all these noble goals—and others too—would be promoted by regionalism, or "regional cooperation."

A plethora of proposals on regionalism has afflicted Southeast Asia for almost twenty years, and little that is tangible or significant has come to pass. Despite that, new proposals for regional cooperation, and revisions of old ones, continue to be pressed at high levels: the Asian Development Bank, established early in 1966, and proposals to organize an Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), set forth at meetings held in South Korea in June 1966, are only the most recent illustrations. Two questions immediately arise: why has so little been achieved, and why, in the face of so little success, have so many continued to advocate regionalism?

The first question has two answers. Regionalism has not taken root in Southeast Asia, first, because of the many political conflicts among the nations there, and second, because there is so little agreement, even among its advocates, on what "cooperation" would mean in practice. That same imprecision also helps to answer the second question. In large part, regionalism continues to attract supporters because the concept, vaguely defined, seems to promise different benefits to different national leaders. To many, regionalism has meant a revival of cultural, and perhaps political, ties among Asian "brothers," long divided during the period of European colonialism. For many others regional cooperation has offered hope for a more efficient path to national economic development. To another group, regionalism has seemed to offer small nations a stronger guarantee of defense and security.

Conceivably, regional cooperation might serve all these pur-

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poses, and the result would be to make that part of the globe more cohesive, and less unstable, than it is today. But if we want to judge whether regionalism has a future we must first understand Southeast Asia's divisive elements, particularly the intra-regional conflicts that are so common.

The Major Divisive Forces

Aside from the war in Vietnam, which now involves forces whose interests go beyond those of the Southeast Asian nations, conflicts in Southeast Asia seem to fall roughly into two categories: those that have roots deep in Asia's history, before the period of European colonialism, and those that stem primarily from much more recent events. The disputes between Cambodia and her neighbors, Thailand and both Vietnams, illustrate the first type: old fears and animosities reinforced by modern events. The argument between the Philippines and Malaysia over the sovereignty of North Borneo is more clearly an illustration of the second type. It reflects no long-standing interest of Filipinos or Malaysians in the affairs of the other, nor is it accompanied by that centuries-old mutual dislike and distrust which exists between Cambodians and Vietnamese (or Thais). In contrast, the controversy between Indonesia and Malaysia is a combination of both types. It is modern, in terms of the sources of Indonesia's ideological attitude toward Malaysia, and very old too, because of some historical relationships among the territories that make up Indonesia and Malaysia today.

Indonesia and Malaysia: Temporary Quarrel?

One of the most promising recent developments in Southeast Asia is the decision of Indonesia's new leaders, which became apparent soon after the eclipse of President Sukarno, to call off the "confrontation" with Malaysia. By the early summer of 1966 the new government in Djakarta was seeking actively to terminate this conflict, which had led to small-scale guerrilla actions in Borneo and Malaya. Finally, after several months of searching for a mutually face-saving accommodation, the two parties brought confrontation to a close in August 1966.

Yet Indonesia's "crush [ganjang] Malaysia" policy, had, since late 1962, caused a serious disturbance in an unstable area. It is important to understand what led to the hostility toward Malaysia in the first place. Indonesia is, after all, the fifth most populous state in the world, the largest state in the region; any lasting

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effort at stability or regional cohesion in Southeast Asia must take Indonesia into account.

The view that the policy was essentially Sukarno's has been widely accepted. Thus it has been argued that Indonesia's hostility to Malaysia derived from Sukarno's need to provide circuses rather than bread, and from his "balancing" position between the army and the Indonesian communists. Confrontation, in this view, was a perfect issue on which nationalists, soldiers and communists could readily agree, and just another of Sukarno's "nation-building" methods.

While there are elements of truth in this view, it misses a vital point: Indonesia's attitude toward Malaysia goes much deeper than Sukarno's immediate requirements of the 1962-1965 period. Thus, while Sukarno's successors seek an end to the policy of confrontation, because it is tactically expedient to end it, the attitudes that generated the policy will continue. This is because Indonesian leaders share a number of ideas and attitudes about their nation's role in the region, most of which envisage some sort of Indonesian influence and dominance in Southeast Asia.

Among the most important ingredients of Indonesia's Southeast Asia policy is a body of thought which advocates a "Greater Indonesia." Evidence of this thesis is found as early as 1945 in the statements of Indonesia's nationalist leaders, including Sukarno. Over the objections of Mohammad Hatta[1] and others, two-thirds of the leaders who proclaimed an independent Indonesia in 1945 believed that their country's territory should include Malaya, all of Borneo, and parts of southern Thailand. Sukarno himself went further when he said:

> I have on one occasion in my life dreamt of a pan-Indonesia, which will include not only Malaya and Papua (New Guinea) but also the Philippines. . . . I myself am convinced that the people of Malaya feel themselves [to be] Indonesians, belonging to Indonesia and as one of us. . . . Indonesia will not become strong and secure unless the whole Straits of Malacca is in our hands.[2]

Clearly, this sort of thinking can support a crude territorial expansionism—which in Indonesia has been reinforced by other pre-Malaysia attitudes concerning Malaya.

[1]Hatta shared with Sukarno the leadership of Indonesia's independence movement, and served as Indonesia's Vice President until 1956.

[2]"The Territory of the Indonesian State," in *Background to Indonesia's Policy Towards Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, 1964), pp. 20-21. This consists of a translation of part of the records of the 1945 meetings which laid the foundations for Japan's grant of independence to Indonesia.

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First, Singapore, included in the Malaysia concept, represented to many leading Indonesians a host of negative symbols. To them, this Chinese-run entrepôt, with its banking and processing facilities, bore a large share of the responsibility for the historic and, in their mind, continuing economic "bleeding" of Indonesia. Add to this resentment the bitterness that many Indonesian leaders have felt toward the Malayan government of Tunku Abdul Rahman since 1958-1959, when, according to them, both Malaya and Singapore shielded and assisted Indonesian rebels during the insurrection against the central government. Indeed, events during that period strained Djakarta's diplomatic relations with Kuala Lumpur and reinforced Sukarno's conviction that control of the "whole Straits of Malacca" is a requirement of Indonesian security.

Then, too, there is the curious mixture of contempt and apprehension with which many Indonesians regard Malaya, and which has contributed to hostility. "Contempt" is perhaps too strong a term, but there is definitely an attitude in Djakarta that Malaysia is an "upstart" as a spokesman for Malay peoples; that Indonesia is culturally superior to Malaya; and that Indonesia is the natural leader of all ethnic Malays. The other side of the coin, a certain Indonesian apprehension about Malaya, derives from the latter's economic prosperity and its relative political stability. This has occasionally led Djakarta to fear that some Indonesians (particularly those on Sumatra) might attempt to emulate their neighbors' example, and apply in Indonesia the free-enterprise model so successful in Malaya's economic development. There has even been concern in Indonesia regarding Sumatran secessionist feelings, which tend toward either independence or association with Malaysia.

The final element that contributed to hostility toward Malaya derived from Indonesia's heavily ideologized politics. This was of course most apparent in the last years of Sukarno's "guided democracy." During that period the official Indonesian world view increasingly regarded all nations as divided into two camps: the old established forces and the new emerging forces. Indonesian leaders considered Malaysia to be one of the old established forces, or at least a product of those forces,[3] and frequently asserted that a fundamental tenet of Indonesia's ideology was to

[3]On this point see Donald E. Weatherbee, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Confrontation in Southeast Asia," ORBIS, Summer 1962, p. 339.

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work for the dissolution of those forces. Even General Jani, among the officers slain by communist activists during the night of the attempted coup on September 30, 1965, maintained that Indonesians have an obligation to aid national liberation movements—particularly those along their own borders.[4] As a result of this conviction, Indonesians of many political persuasions were perfectly willing to give both overt and covert support to measures designed to disrupt the government of Malaysia and replace it with one more inclined to the views of Indonesia's leaders. General Nasution, who barely escaped assassination that same night, and disagrees with Sukarno on many other matters, also spoke frequently of the need to destroy Malaysia. Before the confrontation was announced he issued orders that led (as he later disclosed) to the training of "more than 6,000 anti-British, anti-Malaysia rebels in the Northern Borneo territories."[5]

All these factors combined to form an anti-Malaya political base in Indonesia that could support the foreign policy goals of the "Greater Indonesia" thesis. Since "Greater Indonesia" implied Indonesian dominance over the territories slated for Malaysia, and since many Indonesians were already unfriendly to the Kuala Lumpur government that was spearheading the Federation idea, it was not difficult for Indonesian leaders to fashion a "ganjang Malaysia" policy. The opportunity came in December 1962, as a direct result of an abortive revolt in Brunei, which Indonesia may or may not have initiated but certainly supported. The Brunei revolt set back, at least temporarily, the plans for the Malaysian Federation, and Djakarta responded by dropping any restraint previously shown with regard to its ultimate goals concerning the Malaysia territories. At that point Sukarno launched the confrontation and declared his intention to "ganjang Malaysia."

The thesis that Indonesia's decision was mainly the product of internal forces operating on Sukarno—that "components of the Indonesian ruling group were eager to embrace some new foreign crisis"[6]—must be rejected. Had a "foreign crisis" indeed been

[4]See Jani's statement reported in the *Washington Post*, February 2, 1963, that his troops were "awaiting the order" to move in support of people in Borneo "struggling for independence."

[5]*New York Times*, September 3, 1963.

[6]Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives," *Asian Survey*, June 1964, p. 909.

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required—which some leading authorities doubt[7]—Indonesia had other targets from which to choose. Portuguese Timor, surrounded by Indonesia, would have been an ideal candidate for "liberation," particularly considering the negative image of Portugal in the United Nations and elsewhere. Certainly no important group inside Indonesia and no major foreign power would have strongly opposed a campaign to "liberate" Timor. Indeed, on every conceivable ground a confrontation over Timor, rather than against Malaysia, would have better served Indonesia's "need for a foreign crisis"—if that had been Indonesia's need. But that was not the case, for Timor can be seized at any time, while the instability surrounding the Malaysia proposal in 1962 presented an opportunity not to be missed. Indonesia's confrontation decision resulted, not from any alleged internal "need," but from a set of external goals reinforced by the conditions of its internal environment.

Indonesia's leaders expected their opposition to Malaysia would lead with relative ease to important changes in the nature of the proposed new state. Djakarta had two goals. The immediate one no doubt was at least to delay the formation of Malaysia. The second was probably to assure that Malaysia, if it had to come, would be more loosely constructed than the federation then planned. This was not an unreal goal, because the fear of Kuala Lumpur's domination, especially in Sarawak, Singapore and Brunei, was well known (Brunei never did join, while Singapore later left Malaysia). If such a looser Malaysia had been established, its separate parts might then have been attracted into some sort of *confederation* with Indonesia and the Philippines, and that in turn would have provided Indonesia with an opportunity eventually to incorporate all or parts of Malaysia. Singapore would have been the only difficult pill to swallow, but it could have been effectively "sugar-coated" by the other, more clearly "Malay," communities.

But Malaysia, as proposed by London and Kuala Lumpur, proved to be more difficult to undermine than President Sukarno anticipated. Confrontation did not achieve success in delaying

[7]Herbert Feith, weeks before confrontation was launched, wrote that Indonesia's territorial ambitions had been satisfied by the New Guinea settlement, and the army leaders "would almost certainly oppose an agitational campaign" for Timor or Borneo. Finally, he wrote, Indonesia's need for "functional equivalents" to the New Guinea campaign could be met by tackling internal problems. ("Indonesia's Military Hardware," mimeo., 1962, p. 4. A slightly shortened version of this article was published in *Nation* [Sydney], November 3, 1962.)

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significantly, altering the nature of, or "crushing" Malaysia. Indeed, Indonesia herself ran into difficulties during the second half of 1963 in her pursuit of these goals. Sukarno's several efforts to negotiate with Malaysia after mid-1963, as we will see below, strongly suggests that he realized the price of confrontation—the decidedly negative economic and political effects within Indonesia —might be too high. Therefore, he resolved, probably by June 1963, to attempt to end the confrontation.

By that time, however, the policy had developed a dynamism of its own within Indonesia, particularly among Indonesia's communists and their associates. To the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), confrontation combined many advantages. First it meant that economic stabilization could not be undertaken in Indonesia. Second, it provided a legitimate method for opposing Malaysia, and for fostering national liberation movements in Borneo. Finally, of course, confrontation had once again placed the PKI at the forefront of an Indonesian movement championed by Sukarno.

For these reasons, Sukarno's wish to modify the confrontation was obstructed by its very dynamism, and the efforts he and Subandrio exerted were faltering and in the end unsuccessful. Nevertheless, during 1963 and 1964, they tried on at least three occasions, in Manila, Bangkok and Tokyo, to extricate themselves, and each time Sukarno's dilemma became more clear: how to give in without appearing to. The records of the final effort, the Tokyo meetings with the Tunku and the Philippines President, show that Sukarno even seized upon a vague proposal for an Afro-Asian commission to end the conflict.[8] But on each occasion Indonesia insisted upon conditions—for example, prolonging Indonesian guerrilla activities while negotiations were in progress —that were intolerable to Malaysia.

When Sukarno lost power, the effort that he began, to reach a compromise settlement, was resumed, but under far better conditions. With the PKI demolished, and with men in office who are committed to more rational economic measures, the difficulties that Sukarno believed he faced no longer impede the process of ending confrontation. Indeed, the first moves to restore a measure of stability came on the heels of Singapore's separation from

[8]For a full discussion on this point and extracts from the Tokyo and other "summit" meetings, see Bernard K. Gordon, *Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 98-116, especially the section called "Hypothesis For Sukarno's Tactics."

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Malaysia in 1965, an event caused by reasons internal to Malaysia. Almost immediately, Indonesia offered to resume trade and other ties with Singapore. Soon afterward, Indonesia's new Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, made it clear that he would do more than simply normalize trade with Singapore. He wanted to find some way to hold talks with Malaysian leaders, end the embarrassing confrontation, and direct Indonesia's energies to economic development, which confrontation had helped to sabotage for three years.[9]

But it should be stressed that the end to confrontation at this time is not a "good guys, bad guys" proposition. Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy was not an invention of Sukarno and Subandrio, which automatically disappears as they leave the scene. Sukarno himself attempted to find an end to confrontation because it brought more liabilities than assets *at the time,* but he would have continued to pursue certain foreign policy goals even had he been able to terminate confrontation. Sukarno's successors are seeking to end confrontation, and will probably succeed because it is expedient, not because they like, more than Sukarno does, today's Malaysian regime. A distaste for and distrust of the whole Malaysia concept will continue, for the genesis of the "crush-Malaysia" campaign lay in Indonesia's objective goals and subjective attitudes. Those goals do not necessarily call for the extension of formal Indonesian sovereignty over adjoining territories. They do imply, however, a dominant Indonesian influence in Malaya, and, in the view of some leading Indonesians, Djakarta's dominance in all of insular Southeast Asia.

With the end of confrontation, those objectives and attitudes will not cease to exist. Should another opportunity arise under circumstances again susceptible to a catalyst (like the Brunei revolt), Indonesia may be expected to resume a foreign policy which seeks to establish regional dominance. At first glance, therefore, the policies of Indonesia would appear inconsistent with any hopes for greater regional cohesion; there are, however, certain circumstances in which Indonesian policies might reinforce or serve regional cohesion. That possibility will be discussed later in this article, for it still remains to examine certain of the other disruptive forces in the region.

[9]By May 1966, press stories from Kuala Lumpur confirmed what had been unofficially rumored for some time: that with the aid of Japanese and Thai officials, senior officials of the Indonesian and Malaysian governments had already been in direct contact in order to bring an end to confrontation. *Washington Post,* May 12, 1966.

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Filipino Adventurism: The Claim to North Borneo

The Philippines have also been involved in a dispute with Malaysia since 1962-1963. This controversy, too, seems now to be coming to an end. But the Philippines-Malaysia dispute differs from Indonesia's confrontation in two important respects. First, it is unlikely to be revived, and secondly, it does appear to have revolved heavily around a single person: former Philippines President Diosdado Macapagal.

The controversy arose because of a Philippine claim to North Borneo, now the Malaysian state of Sabah. While the claim derives from conflicting interpretations of a grant of land made by the Sultan of Sulu in 1878, it had to all intents and purposes lain dormant until the election of President Macapagal in 1961. At about the same time, a group of the Sultan's heirs gave notice that a formal claim to the territory would be presented to Great Britain, which still exercised sovereignty in North Borneo. A well-known Manila attorney, "Nick" Osmeña, represented them, and he reportedly let it be known that his clients would accept compensation in cash for their rights to Sabah. Estimates of the asking price run between $20 and $40 million.

Soon afterward, in early 1962, a series of colorful Manila press stories appeared demanding the "return" of North Borneo to the Philippines. Precisely at this time, when the proposals to establish Malaysia—which would incorporate North Borneo—were being discussed throughout Asia, President Macapagal made a famous declaration. He announced that the Philippines government had succeeded to the Sultan's claim, and was going to press for ownership of North Borneo, or Sabah, as a matter of sovereignty and national security. Ever since, relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila have been troubled.

The claim itself has met with no success, but there have been several important consequences for international politics in Southeast Asia. First, in order to weaken the proposal for formation of Malaysia, and Malaysia itself once it became a reality, the Philippines entered into a year-long embrace with Indonesia. This step aggravated many leading Filipinos, some of them leaders of Macapagal's own party. When Malaysia was established, Manila refused to recognize the new government and recalled the Philippines Ambassador; this led to a break in diplomatic relations with Kuala Lumpur. These strained relations in turn forced the cessation of all activities in the Association for Southeast Asia

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(ASA), the group which the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand had set up in 1961 as Southeast Asia's first indigenous effort at practical regional cooperation.

Since that time, there have been a number of efforts to improve Philippines-Malaysia relations,[10] including some while Macapagal was still President, for he must have realized that his anti-Malaysia posture had not received wide support at home. The new President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, even while he was a leader of Macapagal's party and President of the Senate, became increasingly bitter in his denunciations of Philippines policy during this period. Marcos, former Vice-President Pelaez, and many others felt that Manila's suddenly warm relationship with Indonesia was a particularly foolish move. As a result, it is very likely that with Marcos as President, the Philippines will attempt to restore the previously good relationship with Kuala Lumpur, and it is likely too that ASA activities will be resumed during 1966.[11]

Nevertheless, leading Malaysian officials feel that the Philippines government, during former President Macapagal's term of office, sacrificed those formerly good relations in favor of two charlatans: Sukarno and Osmeña. The Tunku and his associates regarded Manila's efforts to cooperate with Indonesia during 1963-1964 as a cynical attempt to bring pressure on the Borneo claim. This policy of transparent expedience sorely distressed the Tunku, and some Philippines officials were in turn irritated by Malaysia's attitude that the Borneo claim was simply not negotiable. Thus, while ties between the two countries will be resumed soon, it is clear that the dispute over North Borneo eroded a large portion of the mutual trust that had developed between the two governments. It may not be quickly rebuilt.

Thailand and Cambodia: Diplomacy by Recrimination

Unlike the Philippines and Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia have had relations with each other for centuries, and between them nothing like mutual trust has ever been present. While there are few material issues dividing them today, a legacy of historical

[10]Consular ties were resumed after a year.

[11]ASA completed its first meeting in three years in Kuala Lumpur on April 30, 1966 with recommendations for 29 economic and cultural projects to be undertaken by the revived three-nation association. On August 3, 1966, ASA convened its third meeting of Foreign Ministers, a strong indication that the group is no longer moribund.

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enmity embitters their every contact. Cambodia fears, for example, that Thailand still covets at least two Khmer provinces, lands which were in fact "returned" to Thailand by her Japanese allies in World War II.[12] On top of this, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia has long suspected Thai involvement in attempts to overthrow him. Almost daily he charges that Thailand harbors his enemies and permits an anti-Sihanouk radio station to broadcast from Thailand. This has led him to launch venomous attacks on all Thai leaders; when Thailand's former Premier, Marshal Sarit, died late in 1963, Sihanouk decreed that Cambodia should begin a period of "national rejoicing." These days the Prince's favorite target is Thailand's Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, who generally returns the barbs with the implication that the Prince is no longer sane.

In addition to this personal bitterness, Thai leaders, already anxious about communist gains in Laos and Vietnam, believe that Sihanouk will turn Cambodia over to the communists without a struggle. This is unlikely, for Sihanouk has made his distrust of Asia's communists very clear, yet the relations between the two countries are not improved by their mutual public recriminations and threats. For example, General Praphat, nominally second in command in Thailand, but in the view of many the real power in the country, has declared that "we must . . . put an end to the most vile acts of Sihanouk. . . ."[13]

Against this background it is difficult to envisage any significant improvement in Cambodian-Thai relations—especially under their present leaderships. It is true that Cambodia has participated, under UN auspices, in the Mekong River project, but it is also true that Cambodia has steadfastly declined to participate in other, perhaps more immediately important efforts at cooperation in the region. She did not, for example, join ASA, and her bitter relationship with Thailand may inhibit Sihanouk from participating in other practical cooperative undertakings. Part of his reason may indeed be his desire to avoid too close a connection with Western-associated states like the Philippines and Malaysia, for fear of alienating Peking, but some part of his

[12]On April 1, 1966 a new twist was added when Cambodia's official broadcasting station charged that "As everyone knows, the Bangkok leaders are not content with only coveting Khmer provinces and trying to nibble portions of our territory, they also look hungrily at Laos, Burma and Malaysia. These expansionists, the Thais of Southeast Asia, have always tried to expand their country at the expense of . . . all their neighboring countries."

[13]From a press conference statement of Praphat, reported by the Cambodian government on March 20, 1964.

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thinking will continue to derive from the historic Cambodian fears of Thailand.[14]

The Other Side of the Coin: Efforts at Cooperation

We have discussed up to this point some, but by no means all, of Southeast Asia's many conflicts; they suggest that the obstacles to cooperation are not negligible. But as we remarked at the beginning, Southeast Asia's leaders do nevertheless continue to devote a remarkable amount of time and energy to the concept of cooperation in their region. Even Prince Sihanouk has commented, almost wistfully, on the potentially major economic benefits that would be available if Laos, Cambodia and all of Vietnam came together again, as they had been joined economically under the French-inspired "Associated States of Indochina."

Once again we ask: why, in the face of so little success, has regionalism continued to be stressed? That it does continue to attract support is indicated by the establishment of two important —though faltering—steps toward cooperation, ASA and MAPHILINDO (Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia), created in 1961 and 1963, and by other measures such as the Asian Development Bank. In addition, the UN economic commission in the region, ECAFE, has for years promoted studies and plans which attempt to point the way toward cooperation in intraregional trade and coordinated development. Recently, the Japanese government sponsored meetings designed to foster some form of economic cooperation in Southeast Asia,[15] and this was followed by the Korean-sponsored conference for Asian and Pacific Cooperation (ASPAC).

The Essential Elements for Cooperation

None of these efforts has yet resulted in a durable entity, although both ASA and MAPHILINDO went further than earlier undertakings—especially in the sense that both were truly Asian and that ASA in particular promised certain practical economic advantages. But like all other efforts toward regionalism, since Aung San and Quirino gave voice to the concept soon after World War II, ASA and MAPHILINDO lacked one or more of the essential elements that might convert regionalism into reality.

Some of those early calls for regionalism were impressive at the

[14]For a full discussion see Bernard K. Gordon, "Cambodia: Where Foreign Policy Counts," *Asian Survey*, September 1965.

[15]See the statement of Aiichiro Fujiyama, Director of Japan's Economic Planning Agency, Tokyo Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast Asia, April 7, 1966.

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time; a few seemed quite farsighted. But often they were merely vague, as in the case of the "pan-Malay" idea which has long influenced a number of intellectuals in Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. President Sukarno has been attracted to that notion, but many others, too, have looked toward the day when all the peoples of the Malay race would be united, as ostensibly they had been in precolonial times. Rizal, the Philippines national hero, was among these, and Manuel Quezon also "dreamed of a larger federation embracing Burma, Thailand, and Indochina."[16]

It seems fair to say, however, that in the early postwar years, when some of these sentiments for Asian unity were expressed, the Asian governments themselves were not ready for the concept of regionalism. Some leaders may have spoken of Asian "brotherhood," but the notion of cooperation seemed unrelated to their more immediate domestic needs. Those were times when the struggle for independence and the first difficult steps that must follow the removal of colonialism's yoke had priority. And the big powers, the United States in particular, had their interests focused elsewhere; or, as in the case of Japan, were themselves emerging from the destruction of war. Thus, two elements—Asian interest in regionalism and great-power support for the idea—were out of phase with each other.

Later, when the big powers did turn their attention to the potential benefits that might lie in regional cooperation (as Britain did at Colombo in 1954 and the United States at the Simla Conference in 1955), the nations of Southeast Asia seemed to have lost even their early vague interest in cooperation. They were in the midst of meeting the pragmatic requirements of independence, when the first flush of freedom gave way to recognizing the hard facts of making statehood work. To most it meant "full steam ahead" with *national* economic development. In turn, this meant that prior attention had to be given to the capital and technical assistance that only big powers could provide. Thus in 1955 at Simla, few in Asia were ready to listen to American talk of multilateral planning and offers of "regional" assistance, if those offers implied any reduction in what each of the recipient Asian states might expect by acting alone.

Today, however, the Asian nations seem once again interested in regional cooperation, particularly in the economic sphere. In-

[16]Arnold C. Brackman, *Southeast Asia's Second Front* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 179.

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deed, officials in Washington who are involved, for example, in President Johnson's recent offer of $1 billion for Asian regional development, and who were also involved in U.S. plans for regional assistance in 1955, must wonder what has changed that might permit the idea of regionalism to work now when the same good idea could not get off the ground a decade earlier.

The answer is a simple one: Much has changed, in that the three "essential elements" for regional cooperation might now, for the first time, be in phase with one another. Those elements are the three groups of nations whose interest and support will be essential for the success of any effort toward regionalism: (1) the more developed and "efficient" states in the area, such as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, whose participation can provide a regional effort with practical experience in economic planning and a record of past accomplishment; (2) the "uncommitted," though important, nations in Asia (like Indonesia) whose support is vital if a future regional grouping is to be truly "regional" and a force for stability in the region, though initially they can add little in material terms; and (3) the world powers, such as the United States and Japan, whose material support is indispensable if regional economic development is to approach the take-off stage. In the next pages we will examine two of those elements in detail, namely, the interest of the Asian nations in regionalism.

ASA and MAPHILINDO

Among the most important manifestations of this interest was the formation of ASA in 1961. ASA's short but interesting history has been characterized by an increasing movement away from big, grandiose notions (like a regional airline) in favor of smaller but more practical efforts. Thailand, for example, stressed before entering ASA that the new group should be a "practical organization." And it should not be forgotten that one of the last measures accomplished by ASA before it went into suspended animation was the series of steps—taken by each of the three governments—to appropriate $1 million each to a joint "ASA Fund." This Fund was designed to support joint ventures, largely in research, that would aid the national goals of each member. Other ASA projects examined trade problems, and their studies indicated that certain cooperative measures—in the fields of joint marketing and industrial planning, for instance—could assist domestic economic goals. This is not to say that ASA was ready to ac-

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complish all the things its most fervent supporters hoped for, but only that ASA was beginning to come to grips with the pragmatic tasks of regional cooperation precisely when the Association's activities were suspended.

ASA foundered in 1963 on the shoals of the Philippines' claim to Sabah. The events which followed that claim, particularly Manila's sometime support for Djakarta, led directly to the establishment of MAPHILINDO. But MAPHILINDO was in no important way a successor to ASA, for they represent fundamentally different conceptions of regionalism. ASA was formed in 1961 partly because both the Tunku and President Garcia of the Philippines shared a deep aversion to communism, and concluded that regional cooperation could accelerate the economic progress they felt essential to counter the appeals of communism. MAPHILINDO, in contrast, developed out of the simply cynical and tactical motives of Presidents Macapagal and Sukarno (as well as Subandrio). President Macapagal sponsored MAPHILINDO because it provided hope for keeping alive the North Borneo claim; Indonesia joined because it supported confrontation, while at the same time recognizing that it was "good domestic politics for Macapagal";[17] and the Tunku acquiesced in it in order to buy time. With those beginnings, it is not surprising that nothing practical resulted.

Yet MAPHILINDO did bring one important accomplishment. It showed that President Sukarno was willing to submit the Malaysia dispute to a regional grouping and join a clearly regional organization. For Indonesia, this decision represented an important break from her past preference for the global level of diplomacy, particularly in the Afro-Asian framework. Indonesian membership in MAPHILINDO could signal the coming into phase of that second element—the participation of the uncommitted though important nations in Southeast Asia—for Indonesia is without question the most important of those states, both by virtue of her population and resources, and also because the direction of her policies thus far has been so destabilizing.

One Approach to Stability: "ASANEFOS"

One can make a strong case for the thesis that stability in the region would be enhanced if Indonesia became regularly asso-

[17]Based on interviews in Djakarta, including one with Dr. Subandrio of July 4, 1963.

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ciated with almost any sort of regional organization. Even without material benefits from such an association—and Indonesia's participation, with her economic and administrative weaknesses, could mean some initial net loss to the other states—the political gains could be major. Conversely, any effort toward regionalism that does not include Indonesia will be seen as unreal by Asian leaders, who also hope for Djakarta's involvement in region-wide efforts as one way to improve stability in the area.

For example, an organizational affiliation—such as ASA provided for Malaya and the Philippines when they were most at odds over North Borneo—might similarly provide Indonesia's leaders with a rationale for smoothing the roughest edges of her regionally destabilizing foreign policies. In the Philippines-Malaysia dispute, ASA served both as an organizational entity—a value—that each nation hoped to preserve, and as a communications link. Thailand, ASA's third member, performed this communications function, largely in the person of Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman.

Of course, to suggest that the "rough edges" of Indonesia's policies might be smoothed by participation in some regional organization implies that Indonesia's proclivity for expansionism can be moderated. Sukarno, we should recall, attempted to use MAPHILINDO to end the confrontation. He and Subandrio saw MAPHILINDO as a framework for influencing Malaysia and for claiming that Indonesia's "voice" had been listened to in Southeast Asian affairs. The new leadership in Indonesia is no more likely than Sukarno would have been to forget about the policy goals that gave rise to confrontation in the first place. Those goals derive from a perception of Indonesia's place in Southeast Asia which holds that Djakarta should exercise a major influence regarding the territories now part of Malaysia, and that Indonesia's views must be taken seriously within the region as a whole.

Recognizing this Indonesian outlook, there are several ways that other nations might attempt to deal with it. One was attempted in 1958-1959 when several countries encouraged the dissolution of Indonesia, at least as presently constituted. Another way may be to condemn Indonesia as a "trouble maker," and strive to build countervailing strength around her. But for a variety of reasons, among them the many weaknesses of Malaysia, such hopes would appear doomed to failure.

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A third approach is to *internalize* the role of Indonesia within the system of Southeast Asia's international relations. This approach would try to involve Indonesia in a new regional or subregional association. If such an association effectively combined the political-diplomatic character of MAPHILINDO with ASA's goals of practical economic cooperation, we might look for benefits in improved stability for the region as a whole, as well as improvements in Indonesia's internal well-being. What we are proposing, therefore, is a new MAPHILINDO-*cum*-ASA which would have two advantages: First, it would provide Indonesia with the framework for a grand foreign policy role in Asia, thus helping to satisfy her need for a major voice in world and regional affairs. Second, to the extent that such a body developed into an association for practical projects in technological and economic cooperation, it could contribute significantly to development and stability within Indonesia. That would itself add to the stability of the region.

Such a group might be called "ASANEFOS"—to designate the "Association of Southeast Asian New Emerging Forces." ASANEFOS would include Indonesia, the ASA members, and hopefully could attract even Cambodia and Burma. But the main feature of the group is that it would combine the membership of both ASA and MAPHILINDO, and could thereby secure Indonesia's participation in practical cooperative undertakings. Moreover, ASANEFOS would provide a rationale, for the first time, within which the development plans of Indonesia's "administrators" and "economists" could be legitimized.

Up to now, such a rationale has been missing. A central malaise of Indonesian politics has been that practical and moderate men, whose overriding concern is with economic development, have lacked a grand ideological design and symbol with which to attract internal support for their efforts. Without such a grand design, the dichotomy between "nation-building" and "economy-building" has not been bridged. Under Sukarno, with the nation-builders dominating, Indonesia's economy suffered and she undertook foreign policies frustrating both to herself and her neighbors. The new leadership, on the other hand, seems to have embarked on a more moderate program, emphasizing pragmatic steps to bring economic stabilization and a clearly less adventurous foreign policy. Nevertheless, a country as diverse and divided as Indonesia continues to need the cementing forces which

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Sukarno provided with his dramatic posturings and grand ideological symbols.

That requirement could be met, in part, by a new regional group in Southeast Asia in which Indonesia plays a leading, even unique role. By putting her energies to work in an organization which could bring economic benefits, Indonesia would have a stake in its success. If so, this would help to attenuate the forces that might again produce a disruptive Indonesian foreign policy in Southeast Asia. An organization such as the proposed ASANEFOS would also help to bridge the dichotomy not spanned in Sukarno's time, for it would give Indonesia's economy-builders a legitimate and attractive all-Asian symbol, to be invoked and cited as a reason for taking sound economic steps.

In sum, ASANEFOS should be seen as a potential stabilizing force for Southeast Asia as a whole and Indonesia specifically. If it carefully provided for Indonesian nuances (as in its name, its stated goals, and perhaps in headquarters location), it could satisfy certain of the foreign policy aspirations of many leading Indonesians. Simultaneously, it could provide a new incentive and rationale for domestic efforts in Indonesia toward economic development.[18]

Conclusions

A regional effort along these new lines will have to combine two quite different perspectives on "regionalism." Both outlooks already exist simultaneously in each of the ASA and MAPHILINDO countries. There are on the one hand many leaders, pragmatic about the requirements of economic and political development, who see regionalism in instrumental-economic terms: a means to help achieve developmental goals. On the other hand, a strident and sometimes flamboyant Asian nationalism sees regionalism as a format for asserting Asia's identity and recaptur-

[18]This would be especially true if practical aspects of the new group were modeled after ASA, and one would expect that if Thailand participated the ASA model would exercise a major influence. ASA, once its "shakedown" phase was completed, showed a marked change. It grew away from its early attachment to regional cooperation almost as an end in itself to a more practical instrument within which to press ahead with the economic development of each participating state—in ways that required multinational cooperation. Again, ASA's experience suggests that the model for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia will emphasize joint projects to improve commodity production, as in rubber and probably in rice; planning on industrial development, so as to avoid needless redundancies and duplication; educational exchanges, in order to utilize scarce skills more efficiently; and efforts that can help to bring greater levels of intraregional trade among Southeast Asian countries. These are some of the directions in which ASANEFOS might move.

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ing an "Asian unity" that ostensibly was upset by colonialism. Any new cooperative effort will have to combine the appeals and energies of both. It will have to reflect more of Asia's new nationalism than ASA, but will also have to be far more practical than MAPHILINDO.

The formation of a group like the proposed ASANEFOS would represent two of the three essential elements for regionalism. It would mean that the interest in regionalism of the colorful but less prosperous states (like Indonesia) had begun to converge with the interests of the more efficient small states (the ASA group). The third essential element, the interest and support of the great powers, is becoming more apparent. This was signaled in two ways: first, by President Johnson when he spoke in 1965 of a $1 billion contribution toward cooperative developmental efforts in Southeast Asia, and second, by the Japanese and American promises to subscribe $200 million each to the Asian Development Bank. As these three elements move into place—for the first time in history—they provide a practical basis for making regionalism work in Southeast Asia.

However, whether the dream will become reality will depend primarily on the actions of Southeast Asian states. Their policies will help to determine whether the material support of outside states—in the form of capital investment—will flow into Southeast Asia. That support will look for a greater measure of political stability in the region than has existed up to now. Stability requires that political sores, such as Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia and the Philippines' claim to North Borneo, be healed. While these goals are difficult, recent changes in Manila and Djakarta indicate that they can be achieved. If conflicts can be resolved and some measure of stability thereby restored, the climate for great-power support for regionalism in Southeast Asia will have been greatly enhanced. The states in the region have increasingly begun to feel a sense of regional consciousness and identity, in part because of their common condition and the common problems of development that they face. It is also because they recognize that they are impotent in world politics—except on a regional scale. As one scholar has noted, "the extremely limited international capacities of these countries is a major influence for regionalism."[19]

[19]Donald C. Hellmann, "East Asia: The Evolving Postwar International Order," Paper read at the 18th Annual Meeting, Association for Asian Studies, April 6, 1966, p. 5.

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The sense of common interest goes beyond the economic plight of the developing nations of Southeast Asia, and is today fostered, even in Japan, by the growing power of Communist China. Hellmann puts it this way: "actual and potential security threats . . . rather than common cultural heritage . . . have laid the foundation for a sense of regional identity."[20] We have in this circumstance a convergence of interests between Japan on the one hand and the weak and poor states of Southeast Asia on the other, which can develop into the most formidable of all incentives toward Asian regionalism. Japan has, of course, the resources to assist not only in the development but in the defense of Southeast Asia; yet until now China has been the "political king and Japan the passive, economic queen" in Asia's international politics.[21]

This pattern is changing, and Japan is again turning her attention to Southeast Asia. In April the Japanese government convened an economic conference of Southeast Asian states for the purpose of encouraging among them better industrial planning, sounder development programs and greater economic cooperation. Tokyo suggested that there are potential "concrete projects of economic cooperation," and promised to submit detailed proposals.[22] These steps represent a marked change in the direction of postwar Japanese behavior toward the region, and they are being undertaken now because Japan once again frankly recognizes its "special bond" to Southeast Asia.[23] As Prime Minister Sato remarked at the time, Tokyo would soon significantly expand its aid to the area, because Japan is "resolved to engage in positive cooperation for the development of Southeast Asian countries."[24]

Is Japan, with its reputation for circumspection and caution, likely to renew and expand this investment in Southeast Asia without at the same time concerning itself with the long-term security of the region? Probably not. Instead, Japan will probably intensify not only its economic interest, but also its emphasis on defense and security in Southeast Asia, and that is a very hopeful sign in the process of developing cohesion and stability in Southeast Asia.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[22] Joint Communiqué of the Tokyo Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast Asia, April 7, 1966.
[23] Statement of Aiichiro Fujiyama, the Tokyo Conference, April 6, 1966.
[24] Joint Communiqué, *op. cit.*

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"GESTAPU" IN INDONESIA

by Justus M. van der Kroef

ON September 13, 1965 President Sukarno of Indonesia, in a ceremony in the Presidential Palace in Djakarta that marked something of an apogee of the prestige and power of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), fastened the "Mahaputra" medal on the chest of PKI Chairman D. N. Aidit in recognition of his "extraordinary service and loyalty" to the nation.[1] "Mahaputra" means "Great Son," and Sukarno duly hailed Aidit as an "exemplary patriotic hero." Scarcely two months later Aidit was ignominiously shot and killed, reportedly near a prison wall in Central Java, in an "escape" attempt which proved no more successful than the communist coup d'état of September 30, 1965 that he tried in vain to direct after it had been virtually crushed within forty-eight hours.[2]

The surprise abroad over the abortive September coup and the abrupt change in Aidit's and his party's fortunes tends to obscure the long record of communist pressure tactics in Indonesia and the mounting resistance to them, especially in the past two years. Considering this perspective it is not so surprising that

[1]*Sinar Harapan* (Djakarta), September 14, 1965.

[2]There have been contradictory stories about Aidit's death. Toward the close of November 1965 initial reports in a few small Indonesian papers and weeklies were picked up by UPI and Agence France Presse and by a number of Japanese papers and given worldwide circulation. Indonesian military spokesmen at first refused to confirm or deny Aidit's death. Later, when speculation arose that Aidit might have escaped (according to one rumor, even in a submarine said to have been sent by People's China), army announcements asserted that Aidit had been "sighted" in Central Java (whether dead or alive, however, was not stated). (See *Djakarta Daily Mail,* November 4, 1965.) Peking also denounced the tale that Aidit had escaped to Communist China and generally seemed to intimate that Aidit, whom it described as the "Outstanding Helmsman of the Indonesian Communist Party," was still alive. (*Peking Review,* December 10, 1965, p. 8.)

On December 19, 1965, Japan's semi-official Radio NHK reported that Aidit had been executed by the army on November 24, 1965, in Central Java. By the following February, supposedly "last" photographs of Aidit being interrogated by army personnel had been published in the Hong Kong and Tokyo press. Little credence has been placed in the assertion of the then Minister for Higher Education, the left-leaning Brigadier Sjarif Thajeb, in an interview in Hong Kong early in January 1966, that Aidit was still alive and a prisoner, and there has been no contradiction of the Japanese reports and photographs.

It has generally been conceded that if Aidit were alive, he, rather than PKI Politburo member Njono, would have been the star of the special trial

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the "Gestapu" affair[3]—as acronym-minded Indonesians have quickly labeled the events of September 30—occurred, but that it, or something like it, took such a long time in coming. An understanding, both of "Gestapu" and of the new political alignments in Indonesia today, requires some consideration of the recent maneuverings and interactions of the country's principal triad of power: Sukarno, the army, and the PKI.

I

The origins of "Gestapu" can be traced to the final acceleration of the PKI's drive to power, which began almost exactly two years to the day before the September 30, 1965 coup. On September 29, 1963, just after he returned from Peking (the last leg of a two-month tour of communist countries that had taken him to Cuba, the Soviet Union and East Germany as well as to Communist China), Aidit announced that Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular had become the scene of the world's most acute "anti-imperialist struggle," opening new opportunities and responsibilities to the PKI.[4] Within weeks the PKI intensified its activity throughout Southeast Asia.[5] PKI publications, notably its daily *Harian Rakjat,* showed new vehemence in denouncing "revisionism," lending confirmation to reports that Aidit's appeal in his talks in Moscow for greater tactical militancy had met with little Soviet enthusiasm, in contrast to his apparently growing harmony with Peking. On November 12, 1964, Aidit, in a speech to the PKI youth front that was prominently quoted in the Chinese communist press, noted that the recent downfall of Khrushchev had been due to "the bankruptcy of his home and foreign policies," but that "we must not think that Khrushchev's

staged by the Indonesian military in mid-February 1966, designed to show PKI direction of the "Gestapu" affair. On March 16, 1966 Deputy Speaker of the Indonesian Parliament and Cabinet Minister Ahmed Sainu gave the first official confirmation of Aidit's death. See also *The Straits Times* (Singapore), December 20, 1965, and January 21 and February 8, 1966.

[3]"Gestapu" is constructed from the Indonesian *Gerakan September Tiga Puluh* or "Thirty September movement." Since the "Gestapu" affair started late at night on September 30 and in the early morning hours of the following day, it is sometimes also designated as *Gestok-Gerakan Satu Oktober* or "First October movement."

[4]See the essay "Gerakan Komunis Internasional dan Revolusi Asia Tenggara" in the collection of essays by D. N. Aidit, *Langit Takkan Runtuh* (Djakarta, 1963), pp. 24-40.

[5]For details see J. M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Expansionist Role in Southeast Asia," *International Journal,* Vol. XX (1965), pp. 189-205.

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removal from office means the end of the struggle to smash modern revisionism."[6]

Though party leaders appear to have been aware of the mounting hostility in Indonesia to their new campaign of pressure, the PKI became increasingly aggressive. One of the party's "theses" at its forty-fifth anniversary celebration in May 1965 declared: "The offensive spells success and victory, the defensive means failure and defeat."[7] Boldly proclaimed "revolutionary" and "unilateral action" methods for implementing the government's lagging land reform program were launched against "recalcitrant landlords" and "reactionary officials." A wave of PKI-directed mass demonstrations culminated in outright seizures of "landlord's land" and in outbursts of violence in which scores were injured or killed.[8] Despite government regulations, communist unions also seized control of foreign, especially British-owned, estates. British support for Malaysia, which Indonesia had vowed to crush since early 1963, was the ostensible reason. Initial murmurings of disapproval by the government over these seizures changed by the end of 1964 to official declarations that the estates would remain under government management and communist-dominated "workers councils." Meanwhile the PKI-led anti-American campaign greatly intensified, including agitation against American films, attacks on U.S. Information Service libraries, and the burning of "imperialist" books and magazines. In their efforts rapidly to radicalize the public temper, PKI leaders now even appeared ready to usurp Sukarno's role as the nation's chief ideologist. Revealing was Aidit's remark in mid-February 1965 that Sukarno's concept of "Nasakom" (meaning the unity of nationalism, religion and communism as the basis of the Indonesian state) had in fact been invented by Lenin "long before it was spoken of in Indonesia"[9] At about the same time Foreign Minister Subandrio, a particular party favorite as architect of the developing Djakarta-Peking axis, declared that "the Indonesian identity includes Communism, which now belongs to the whole Indonesian people."[10]

[6]See, e.g., *Renmin Ribao,* November 21, 1964, and *Peking Review,* November 27, 1964, p. 18.

[7]*Tesis 45 Tahun PKI (23 Mei 1920—23 Mei 1965)*, (Djakarta, 1965), p. 16.

[8]On the PKI's agrarian action campaign see especially Kasim, "Surat Hutang Landreform," *PKI dan Perwakilan,* Vol. 8 (1964), pp. 7-8; the report of Asmu, chairman of the PKI's peasant front, in *Suara Tani,* February 1965, pp. 6-24; and *Indonesian Observer* (Djakarta), October 27, 31, November 2, 3, 5, 1964.

[9]*Indonesian Observer,* February 15, 1965.

[10]*Antara Daily Newsbulletin,* March 4, 1965.

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Already in 1963 a handful of intellectuals, some affiliated with the proscribed Masjumi (Muslim) and Socialist parties, had rallied around a so-called Manikebu (from *Manifes Kebudajaan,* meaning Cultural Manifesto), an anti-communist declaration affirming the Indonesian "identity." "Manikebu-ism" was banned by the government, but resistance against the PKI continued to gather momentum and late in August 1964 found expression in a new informal opposition group, the "Body to Support Sukarnoism" (*Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme*—BPS). Space precludes a detailed analysis of the BPS,[11] except to note its rapidly growing support among newspapers, students, some political parties like the small but influential Titoist Murba (proletarian) Party; elements of the National Indonesian Party (PNI) and the Moslem Scholars Party (Nahdatul Ulama—NU); the army-influenced Socialist Labor Federation; some cabinet members; top army commanders (including Defense Minister General A. H. Nasution and Army Staff Chief General Ahmad Yani), and others —all of whom spontaneously appeared to be emulating PKI tactics by using Sukarno and his vaguely defined "ism" as a cover for their own "stop the PKI" objective. Especially important was the support of the army, because until now army leaders—mindful of a disastrous army attempt to intimidate the Indonesian Parliament in 1952—had sought to develop a professional, disciplined image of identity with Indonesian national ideals above political cabals. To be sure, with the encouragement of Sukarno, always anxious to preserve the domestic power balance, the army had entered into numerous levels of government and public administration. But thus far the army had not openly sided with a known anti-PKI organization or lent its name to a popular campaign such as the BPS which, through its seemingly innocuous defense of Sukarno's sacrosanct ideology, suggested that his ideology was being attacked by the PKI.

From the start the PKI bitterly excoriated the BPS, and nothing illustrates the party's growing power better than the BPS' denouement which soon followed.[12] On November 27, 1964, Communist China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Djakarta to implement the Sino-Indonesian political-military partnership, and reportedly demanded dissolution of the BPS and the Murba

[11]For details on the BPS, see J. M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Revolutionary Gymnastics," *Asian Survey,* May 1965, pp. 217-232.

[12]For the PKI reaction to the BPS see especially the party's publication *"BPS" Aksi Reaksi* (Djakarta, 1965).

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Party. Sukarno shortly complied. On December 17, 1964, the BPS was banned, followed by a temporary and then permanent proscription of the Murba Party. At once the PKI began agitating for dismissal of pro-BPS ministers and the banning of pro-BPS papers. Again Sukarno largely complied. Two Murba Party ministers were demoted, and toward the close of February 1965, a score of pro-BPS dailies and weeklies, most of them in Djakarta, were banned. Meanwhile Sukarno and other Indonesian officials declared the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to have been behind the BPS.[13] Bitter anti-PKI reaction continued to erupt in the following months, however, as Muslim youth groups and peasants battled communists in towns and villages in East Java. When Sukarno showed signs of complying with the PKI's heated demands that he outlaw the Muslim Student Association (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*—HMI), a prime force behind this East Java anti-PKI movement, all principal Muslim parties formed a "defense committee" whose spokesman warned that "even the worm will fight back if it is trampled."[14] Sukarno eventually thought better of the proposed HMI ban.

Sukarno's caution may have been prompted by his realization that the conflict between the PKI and the army was moving swiftly to a climax. Seeking to maintain its momentum of militancy, and encouraged by its successful demand for a ban on the BPS, the PKI by the middle of January 1965 began a campaign to arm organized workers and peasants. Sukarno at first rejected the notion but then, despite adamant army opposition, seemed to be softening, declaring on February 11, 1965 that "if necessary" workers and peasants would be provided with weapons. Aidit meanwhile sharpened the controversy by suggesting that special "supervisors," properly indoctrinated in the state's ideology, be given positions in the army, but an army conference promptly rejected the idea of a "political commissariat."[15] Subsequently

[13]*Berita Minggu* (Djakarta), February 21, 1965; *Warta Bhakti* (Djakarta), February 25, 1965; *Antara Daily Newsbulletin,* March 2, 1965.

[14]*The Straits Times,* March 26, 1965.

[15]For details on this proposed army reorganization crisis see J. M. van der Kroef, "Die indonesische Armee zwischen Soekarno und den Kommunisten," *Europa-Archiv,* November 25, 1965, pp. 831-842. The PKI long had desired to have its own paramilitary organization independent of army control. It gave the alleged British military buildup in Malaysia, however, as the reason for its demand for a "Fifth Force" (i.e., a military volunteer organization over and above the other four services, army, navy, airforce and national police). In January 1965 Aidit declared that "Recently when I met Gilchrist the British Ambassador to Indonesia at a reception, I said 'thank you' to him, because the dispatch of British troops to 'Malaysia' has provided me with a good reason to

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Sukarno expressed approval for the idea of arming peasants and workers, saying that Chou En-lai had given him the idea some time ago. During his early August 1965 visit to Djakarta, Lee Hsueh Fong, Deputy Chairman of Communist China's National People's Congress, pointedly noted that "in facing the imperialists" it was necessary to arm the whole people of a nation.[16] Given the PKI's pressure, it seemed to many to be but a matter of time before Sukarno would accommodate the communist demand for a new "people's army," Peking style.

The direction of prevailing political winds became unmistakable when the government announced on August 3, 1965 that the high court of North Sumatra province shortly would meet, not in its usual location in Medan, but in Djakarta, in order to reach a "more suitable" verdict than the fifteen-to-twenty-year prison sentences it had just meted out to twenty-three cadres of the PKI peasant front who had been convicted a few weeks previously of beating to death an army officer.[17] The officer in question, sent to clear squatters from government land, had, according to the communist press, "provoked" the "people's leaders" (i.e., the PKI peasant front cadres); the PKI raised such an outcry over the verdict that the government deemed it wise to order the court to reconsider the case—but this time in Djakarta, a precedent in Indonesia's judicial history and a portent hardly to be minimized. Equally noteworthy was Sukarno's fulsome praise for the PKI at the party's forty-fifth anniversary celebration in May 1965, and the President's exhortation to "Go Ahead . . . Go Ahead, PKI!"[18] With such assurances it seemed hardly surprising that Aidit, toward the middle of 1965, kept calling for an "increased revolutionary offensive" and for the holding of new national and local elections, and that party organs continued to insist that "relations between the people and the Army be strengthened."

It is difficult to say to what degree Indonesia's chronically chaotic economy contributed to the PKI's new momentum, but there is little doubt that party fronts, particularly communist trade unions and women's groups, unceasingly exploited it in

propose that workers and peasants be armed." See Aidit's address on the occasion of the anniversary of the party's daily *Harian Rakjat*, in the PKI monthly *Review of Indonesia*, February 1965, p. 3.

[16] *Djakarta Daily Mail*, June 2 and August 10, 1965.

[17] *The Straits Times*, August 4, 1965.

[18] See *Bintang Timur* (Djakarta), May 24, 1965, and *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), May 22, 1965.

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their demonstrations for lower prices. By early March 1965 the Djakarta press reported that during the previous year 12,000 had died of famine in Central Java province alone, and the index of food prices which had stood at 2,314 in December 1963 (1958 is 100) had risen to 7,707 by April 1965.[19] Sukarno, by the end of September 1965, complained that the people were "breeding like rabbits," and rice imports which had risen from 707,000 metric tons in 1958 to 1.2 million tons in 1964 were expected to rise still further despite the newly-announced policy of *berdikari* or economic self-reliance. In April 1965 the free market rate of the rupiah was about 5,000 to the U.S. dollar (as compared to the official rate of 45 to 1); by September it had risen to 20,000 to the dollar, as prices continued to soar. PKI exhortations to the Indonesian people to take "quick and proper actions" to bring prices down, and demonstrations by SOBSI (the communist labor federation) and GERWANI (the PKI women's front) toward the end of September only met with Sukarno's plaintive response that "I can't give any command to lower prices because the problems involved are very complex." On an earlier occasion Indonesia's President had recounted how he had once challenged his advisers: "Anyone among you who is capable of lowering prices in a short period, I will make a cabinet minister in charge of prices . . . but as a condition, failure—as a cabinet minister—would mean jail. . . . Nobody dared respond to my challenge," Sukarno concluded.[20]

Despite the potential advantages provided by the deteriorating economy and the momentum of its own new pressure tactics, major problems confronted the PKI. Though cowed,[21] the anti-

[19]*Suluh Indonesia* (Djakarta), March 3, 1965, and *Far Eastern Economic Review,* August 19, 1965.

[20]*Quarterly Economic Review: Indonesia* (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, October 1965), p. 8.

[21]Recent army-inspired revelations about the "Gestapu" affair should be treated with caution. But not altogether to be dismissed as an illustration of the post-BPS atmosphere in Indonesia, in which opposition to the PKI was quite difficult, is the story of the commander of the army's para-commandos in the Bojolali (Central Java) area: He reported that well before September 30, 1965, "authorities obtained proof of preparations" by the PKI for "a violent overthrow of the government," but "neglected" to press the matter "for fear of being accused of suffering from 'Communist phobia.'" *Djakarta Daily Mail,* November 30, 1965. Defense Minister Nasution has claimed that, as early as July 1960 when the PKI published a bitter denunciation of the government, he had attempted to call the government's attention to the "suspicious activities of the PKI." However, declared Nasution, "the prevailing campaign" against anti-communism at that time "made these warnings politically uncalled for until the so-called 'September 30' movement happened." *Antara Daily Newsbulletin,* December 16, 1965.

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communist opposition remained strong and widespread, as the sudden popularity of the short-lived BPS had demonstrated. The banning of the BPS had not shattered the opposition but merely intensified its bitterness and its search for new organizational outlets. The heightening of political controversy, moreover, amplified another problem for the party, namely, the relative weakness of its internal organization. The lack of good communications in the country, the profusion of fronts, and the enduring difficulty in maintaining adequate cadre and middle echelon discipline had been the subjects of frank self-criticism in party organs for several years.[22] In an atmosphere of struggle and tension, the difficulty of exercising proper "democratic centralist control" over the coterie of regular party units and over peasant, labor, women, student, youth and other front groups—together comprising over fourteen million members throughout the country by the middle of 1965—rose in proportion. The "Gestapu" affair was to demonstrate that poor coordination and a lack of tight, do-or-die discipline greatly contributed, as so often in the party's past history, to its undoing.

Finally, there was the question of Sukarno and the balance of power. Since the late 1950's the PKI had successfully hidden behind, leaned on, or fronted for Sukarno in the latter's relations with the army.[23] But by the beginning of 1965 the prospect that the hard-living Sukarno, at sixty-three old for an Indonesian of his generation and in noticeably failing health, would not be around much longer began to loom ever larger in the party's tactical calculations. (After the "Gestapu" affair, captured PKI Politburo member Njono confessed that the physical deterioration of the President had indeed been a major factor in the preparation of the coup, and undoubtedly Sukarno's Chinese doctors kept PKI leaders well informed about the President's condition.) Party leaders were compelled to plan ahead for the day when the President would be removed from the scene, triggering an open conflict with the army and the rest of the opposition. This, undoubtedly, was the larger meaning of Aidit's demand early in 1965 that peasants and workers be armed and that "political supervisors" be introduced into the army.

Some students of PKI strategy and tactics have tended toward

[22]On the problem of internal party discipline and organization, see J. M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program and Tactics* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1965), pp. 175-181.

[23]*Ibid.*, especially pp. 82-125, 227-266.

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the belief that the PKI would have had little to gain from a coup and planned instead to come to power through "popular acclamation" and a tactic of gradually and peaceably mustering overpowering mass organizational influence.[24] Even the eventual death of Sukarno would not force a change in tactics, it has been supposed, because Deputy Premier Subandrio, long considered Sukarno's heir apparent, had shown strong pro-PKI sympathies, and probably would also have been acceptable to the armed forces' leadership.[25] What they overlooked, however, was the cumulative impact on the PKI of the accelerating political crisis, particularly since early 1965: the highly charged day-to-day political situation in Djakarta; the PKI's open rupture with the army; the political suppression of anti-communist elements; the violent clashes between communists and their opponents in East Java; the steady but subtle pressures emanating from Peking which had been largely responsible for Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations on January 7, 1965;[26] the rampant inflation and increasingly precarious living conditions; and last but not least, the continuing radicalization of the public temper through demonstrations and mass agitational campaigns. For the PKI two lines of tactical analysis began to converge in the course of 1965. First, the accelerating revolutionary militancy, initiated as a matter of policy since 1963, by virtue of its own momentum would demand sooner or later a suitable climax lest the party suffer a dangerous retrogression. Second, after Sukarno's death the PKI would probably be provoked into a bloody fight with its enemies anyway, especially in view of the existing bitterness and tensions which the party's own pressure tactics had unavoidably helped to generate. Far better, then, to prepare for the conflict and indeed to strike the first blow.

[24]See, e.g., Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia: The PKI's Road to Power," in Robert A. Scalapino, editor, *The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 256-289; Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 301-302; J. M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 303.

[25]In March 1965 the Malaysian press reported that Subandrio had been a member of the PKI for the past 12 years. (*The Straits Times*, March 23, 1965.) The report has not been contradicted by any Indonesian source. While Subandrio was less than popular among the anti-communist army high command, he had a not insignificant following in the officer corps of the Indonesian airforce where pro-communist influence had long been considerable, in part because of the long-term assistance, both in training and matériel, provided by the Soviet Union in the modernization of the airforce.

[26]On Indonesia's policy convergence with Communist China, see my "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership," ORBIS, Summer 1964, pp. 332-356.

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II

It cannot be said that no one had wind of the PKI's plans. Already toward the close of December 1964, reports appeared in the Malaysian (though not in the censor-ridden Indonesian) press, and in U.S. wire service dispatches from Djakarta, about a recently exposed PKI Central Committee document describing stepped-up agitation planned for 1965 in preparation for an eventual coup d'état.[27] With each acrimonious exchange in the controversy over the arming of peasants and workers, public conviction that the party was preparing for a final showdown with the army grew. As late as two weeks before the "Gestapu" affair, Bangkok and Hong Kong sources reported on the extensive supplies of arms and explosives being sent to the Indonesian communists by Communist China via small East and West Java ports and fishing villages.[28] This military hardware was packed in crates supposedly containing building materials being sent by Peking to assist in constructing facilities in Djakarta for the "Conference of the New Emerging Forces," the Sino-Indonesian rival to the United Nations, to be held in August 1966. After the September 30 coup, the military administrative command of the Riau archipelago, near Singapore, disclosed that recently seized PKI documents revealed a plan for cadres to receive arms from People's China which were to be dropped in the area.[29]

The weapons found their way to all sorts of places: to the teeming dilapidated native quarters of sprawling Djakarta, where communist youth and women's front members, "sport" organiza-

[27]*The Straits Times,* December 24, 1964; UPI dispatch, Djakarta, December 23, 1964. According to a purported "confession" made by Aidit just before he was shot by the Indonesian Army—subsequently published in the Tokyo paper *Asahi Evening News*—the PKI had originally set 1970 as its "target year" to seize power, but since word of this planned coup d'état leaked out Aidit decided to reduce sharply the preparation time and move ahead toward a coup by the middle of 1965. See Arthur J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," *The China Quarterly,* January-March 1966, p. 168.

[28]For details see *Sabah Times* (Jesselton), September 14, 1965; also *Far Eastern Economic Review,* November 4, 1965, p. 189. Dommen (*op. cit.,* pp. 154-155), quoting "reliable information from private sources," states that the import into Indonesia of these supplies occurred without customs inspection as a result of an agreement reached between Foreign Minister Subandrio and Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi.

Indonesian Army sources have reported that the PKI was able to finance some of its activities through the illegal export of rubber to China via Singapore. Deputy Premier Subandrio and Minister without Portfolio Oei Tjoe Tat (widely regarded as "Peking's man" in the cabinet and said to have been a *sub rosa* member of the PKI) were the masterminds of this rubber scheme. See *The Straits Times,* March 16, 1966.

[29]*Armed Forces Daily Mail* (Djakarta), December 30, 1965.

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tions and volunteer "ward guard" units began to train with them; to a hilly, triangular region in Central Java formed by the towns of Bojolali, Klatèn and Kartasura at the foot of Mounts Merapi and Merbabu, a stamping ground of PKI guerrillas in earlier years; to cadres in Bandjermassin, South Kalimantan (Borneo), who were busily making plans to kidnap the regional military commander and leaders of Muslim groups.[30] "Lubang Buaja" (literally "crocodile hole"), a relatively remote native section on the outskirts of Djakarta and within the terrain of Halim Perdana Kusuma airforce base, became a principal communist training and staging ground. There is little doubt that the pro-PKI airforce high command, particularly Air Force Chief Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani and former Air Chief Suryadarma (both cabinet ministers), knew about and condoned this activity. Indeed, the army has claimed that airforce units lent additional weapons to the communist trainees. And it was from Halim air base on October 1, when the Djakarta coup had failed, that Aidit flew with Dhani in an airforce plane to Central Java. Confessions obtained from "Gestapu" participants agree that training at Halim began about mid-August. The profusion of uniformed paramilitary volunteer and civil defense groups in Indonesia, over which the army had long and vainly attempted to exercise some control, afforded additional cover for the exercises at the base. Even target practice and bayonet training were included. Sexual orgies, designed to promote abandonment of "religious rules" and moral restraints, were also encouraged at Lubang Buaja, according to confessions extracted by the army.

In various parts of the country, meanwhile, PKI leaders launched "Operation Naming Names," during which party and front members compiled "black lists" of the names of "obstructionists" marked for future elimination. According to the army, if "Gestapu" had been successful, mass trials conducted by the PKI were to have been held between October 2 and 5, 1965, culminating in the public execution of 600 "kabirs" (*kapitalis-birokrat* or bureaucratic capitalists, a favorite party epithet for its opponents, especially in the army).

It is still impossible to say whether the PKI leadership actually

[30]For details on PKI preparation for the "Gestapu" affair, see *Djakarta Daily Mail,* October 8, November 8-10, 17 and 22, and December 9, 1965. I have also relied on a number of private Indonesian sources whose identity I cannot reveal.

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wanted the coup to occur when it did. In his confession, published on December 2, 1965 by the army, Politburo member Njono declared that not until a mid-July 1965 Politburo meeting were he and other party leaders informed by Aidit that, as a result of Sukarno's deteriorating health, a critical point had been reached and that a "Council of Generals" was planning a coup.[31] Aidit himself assumed command of the campaign to alert party regional committees throughout the country, and he appears to have emphasized that the army was divided and that the airforce would help the PKI. According to Njono, the final decision to seize power was not taken until the end of August, when Aidit advised the Politburo that (1) a "Revolutionary Council" would be established to replace the present cabinet; (2) in order to forestall the supposed coup of the "Council of Generals," paramilitary units among the fronts were now to be mobilized; and (3) a political campaign would be launched to demand better living conditions and to reveal the danger of a military coup. But all tactical plans, according to Njono, were coordinated by Aidit alone; he, Njono, did not even know when the coup would actually be launched, until a youth front courier from Lubang Buaja informed him in the early evening of September 29. Njono's surprising ignorance may well be feigned, but there is little doubt that poor coordination and lack of communication—whether due to extreme secrecy, Aidit's allegedly one-man control, the *ad hoc* character of the PKI's tactics, or a combination of these—almost doomed the coup from the start. On October 2, 1965, for example, the PKI daily *Harian Rakjat* carried the statement that the people would rise in defense of "Gestapu"—although the coup was by then virtually crushed in Djakarta. On October 5 an unidentified PKI spokesman issued a statement on behalf of the party Central Committee, dissociating the party

[31]Broadcast, Radio Djakarta (Domestic Service), February 14-16, 1966; *Antara Daily Newsbulletin*, December 7, 1965; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 23, 1965, p. 538. Njono subsequently retracted his confession, but under what circumstances is not yet clear. It is difficult to say how many top PKI leaders were aware of the plot or the exact date of the coup. Politburo member Jusuf Adjitorop had been in Peking for medical treatment for some time; Lukman, Sakirman and Rewang were in various places in Central Java; Njoto was traveling with Subandrio in Sumatra. The selection of the night of September 30 and the day of October 1, 1965 (the latter the anniversary of Communist China's "national day") is also unclear: on October 1, 1965 PKI Central Committee member Sidik Kertapati was in Peking as a member of the official Indonesian delegation (headed by a number of Indonesian cabinet ministers) to the Chinese "national day" celebrations. Chinese sources do not mention any other prominent PKI figures in China at this time. See *Peking Review*, October 1, 1965, p. 6.

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from the coup, and describing it as "an internal affair of the army." Yet even then Aidit was rallying "Gestapu" guerrilla resistance in Central Java, and on October 6, *Djalan Rakjat,* a PKI daily published in Surabaya, East Java, printed a letter, purportedly written by Aidit, simultaneously urging all PKI members "to carry out their vital tasks" and declaring that the party would not intervene in "the September 30 event."

Aidit's assertion to the Politburo that the army was divided was almost certainly correct, but the role of various army leaders in the "Gestapu" affair is by no means clear. Unquestionably the huge PKI had influence among some younger staff and field grade officers, among them Lieutenant Colonel Untung, an Aidit protegé and battalion commander in the Tjakrabirawa regiment of Presidential security guards, and Colonels A. Latif and Agus Sigit, respectively brigade commander and first battalion commander in the Fifth Military Region Command of Djakarta. To what extent had these officers, some of them veterans of intra-service cabals and motivated by personal grievances (like Colonel Suherman of the Central Java Diponegoro military command) allowed themselves to be "coordinated" by Aidit? To what did they believe they were lending themselves and their units when they voiced support for Untung's "Revolutionary Council" on September 30? Specifically, were they inveigled by Untung, as has been rumored, to aid him on the assurance that Sukarno knew and approved of the plot? We still do not have the answers. In any case, eventually the "Gestapu" rebels were able to muster a force of about five army battalions—two in Djakarta, one in West Java, and two in Central Java. As for the airforce, its pro-PKI leadership was apparently not prepared to go beyond the moral support and facilities extended to the Lubang Buaja terrorists at Halim, and no airforce units openly sided with the "Gestapu."

In the highly-charged political atmosphere of the first half of 1965, it is not at all unlikely, as Aidit stated, that some army leaders had a "contingency" plan of their own and, like the PKI, were preparing for a pre-emptive coup and the establishment of a "Council of Generals." In its initial communiqué on September 20, 1965, Untung's "Revolutionary Council" declared that it had acted because the "Council of Generals" had organized a "show of force" and meant to seize power on or before Armed Forces Day (October 5) by bringing troops from various

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parts of Java to the capital.[32] However, spreading the tale of an impending coup is the oldest ruse to justify a pre-emptive strike of one's own, and there is no reason why the PKI could not have used such a tactic.

Although we are still in the dark as to the circumstances determining the particular timing of the coup and the nature of the tactical consultations, if any, between Aidit, Untung and others in the plot, the purpose of "Gestapu" itself is a good deal clearer. In the first place, the coup was not designed to establish a full-fledged communist "People's Democracy," but rather to turn the wheel of policy another hefty thirty or forty degrees toward it. Undoubtedly, some of the army officers who supported the "Gestapu" would never have agreed to participate had they been aware of the extent of PKI manipulations behind the scene. This was also true of Untung's forty-five-member "Revolutionary Council," proclaimed in Djakarta on September 30 as the new government. At least twelve members of this Council were believed to be friendly to the PKI, although no known party figures were included.[33] A few, like the veteran cabinet official Johannes

[32] *Djakarta Daily Mail,* October 2, 1965. For an alternative view, i.e., that the coup was instigated mainly by a group of "Young Turk" officers (among them Untung, Latif and Air Force Major Sujono) "disenchanted with the top army command" which was felt to be corrupt and incompetent, see Lucien Rey, "Dossier of the Indonesian Drama," *New Left Review,* March-April 1966, pp. 26-40. Untung, according to this view, got his chance when he was put in charge of the parade in Djakarta on Armed Forces Day, permitting him to bring a number of army units sympathetic to his cause into the capital. However, on February 25, 1966, Untung, then on trial, reiterated that the coup had been intended to save Sukarno from a "Council of Generals." Radio Djakarta branded his testimony as false.

[33] Among the pro-PKI figures in Untung's "Revolutionary Council" were two who deserve special mention, Siauw Giok Tjhan and Mrs. Utami Suryadarma. The former was general chairman of the "Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship" (*Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia*—BAPERKI), the latter "rector" (i.e., president) of BAPERKI's University "Res Publica" in Djakarta. Founded in 1954, BAPERKI originally was designed to advance the interests of Indonesian citizens of Chinese origin. But over the years and under the leadership of Siauw, a former editor of the PKI daily *Harian Rakjat,* it became one of the most effective conduits of pro-Peking political influence in the Chinese-Indonesian community and in Indonesian life as a whole, maintaining close ties with the PKI. The dovetailing of PKI and BAPERKI policies is, for example, particularly evident in such BAPERKI documents as *Vivere Pericoloso. Materi-materi Konperensi Pleno Pusat ke-II Baperki, 27-30 Augustus 1964 di Surabaja* (Djakarta, 1965), and Siauw Giok Tjhan, *Gotong Rojong, Nasakom untuk Melaksanakan Ampera* (Djakarta, 1963).

Mrs. Suryadarma, wife of the pro-PKI former Air Force Chief of Staff, had done yeoman service for the PKI in the course of 1964-1965 in the party's campaign to ban American films and mobilize anti-American sentiment generally. There is no doubt that by the middle of 1965 BAPERKI was one of Peking's principal, if unofficial, agencies on the Indonesian scene. BAPERKI headquarters and the premises of "Res Publica" University were among the first buildings to be sacked by anti-communist mobs in the aftermath of the "Gestapu" affair.

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Leimena, probably had no notion that they had been named, but the great majority of the Council were politically colorless military bureaucrats or second-echelon political hacks. This was clearly a transitional body, designed to allay suspicions among the unwary and politically untutored and to be replaced when things settled down.

A second and probably more immediate and important purpose was to destroy the command structure of the army and to begin elimination of major party opponents in the provinces. The decimation of top army leaders in the capital was assigned to the party's youth and women's fronts, and was evidently intended to bring the militancy of these groups, which had been given a major role as "shock troops" in the coup, to the highest pitch. A fifteen-year-old young woman, three months pregnant, who was proclaimed a "Lubang Buaja heroine" by the PKI, described in her confession how she and her associates were trained, were given "small knives and razor blades," and early in the morning of October 1 went to work on one of the six leading generals whose bodies were later found in a well in Lubang Buaja, "stabbing at the victim's private parts and cutting these parts and the body until he died."[34] The "Gestapu" assassins came within two generals of wiping out the Indonesian Army high command. The terrorists' failure to make a complete sweep was fatal, for army units outside Djakarta quickly rallied to the personal call of General Nasution who, though wounded, just managed to escape.

Finally, the coup was designed to establish a Maoist "base area" for potential PKI guerrilla activity in the Merapi-Merbabu mountain complex of Central Java, the staging grounds for what the Indonesian press has called "a second Vietnam."[35] Even if—indeed, especially when—the coup had succeeded, this communist base area was to have provided party leaders with political leverage as they proceeded with their intended transformation of the armed forces. It was to this planned communist base area, which two local pro-PKI army battalion commanders in Central Java and police officials in Jogjakarta had helped to establish, that Aidit ultimately fled to make a last and futile stand. And it was from this area that well-armed bands of young guerrillas swarmed

[34]*Sinar Harapan,* November 5, 1965.

[35]Cf., e.g., *Pewarta-Surabaia* (Surabaya), November 16, 1965. See also Boerhan and Soebekti, *Fakta dan Latar-Belakang Gerakan 30 September* (Djakarta, 1966), pp. 126-139.

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out into East and West Java to pillage and terrorize as late as the first weeks of November 1965, until they were finally destroyed, often by local "volunteer" village guards led by young Muslim fanatics belonging to the "Ansor" youth group (*Gerakan Pemuda Ansor*–GPA), an affiliate of the Moslem Scholars Party (NU). During this furious guerrilla and counterguerrilla campaign whole villages and parts of districts in Java were laid waste, and literally tens of thousands were killed–PKI and front members, party sympathizers and suspected sympathizers, and the usual victims of mere jealousy and personal grudges.[36]

It seems highly probable that Sukarno and heir-apparent Subandrio, who headed the civil intelligence agency, knew of the coup and tacitly assented to it. Sukarno's subsequent explanation of his activities on the morning of the coup (he voluntarily went, at the request of his own mutinous palace guards, to Halim air-force base, of all places, so that he would be able to fly away "should an unwanted eventuality arise") has only managed to arouse further suspicions, and Indonesia's President has deemed it wiser not to attempt to lay them to rest.[37] Sukarno's endorse-

[36]Estimates of the number killed in the anti-PKI pogrom vary. Sukarno, on January 15, 1966, said 87,000 had been killed, "all but a few hundred" of them communists and their followers. Sukarno declared that this figure had been given him by a special "fact finding mission." Somewhat earlier British sources put the number killed at between 100,000 and 150,000 (*New York Times,* January 13 and 16, 1966). The latter figure has also been advanced by the Malaysian government. Later estimates have gone as high as 300,000. Several thousands are believed to have been directly executed by the army, among them such top PKI leaders as D. N. Aidit and economic expert Sakirman (although toward the close of May 1966, an army spokesman urged an intensified drive to round up Sakirman and other former PKI Central Committee members whom he described as still at large). See also *Angkatan Bersendjata* (Djakarta), February 10 and 11, 1966.

Many aspects of the anti-PKI pogrom are likely to remain shrouded in mystery for some time. The extent to which the army passively or actively assisted fanatic Muslim youths in their extermination campaign is one, and the degree to which village *kiajihs* (Muslim spiritual leaders) contributed by proclaiming a *jihad* (holy war) against the "Gestapu" is another. On the other hand, there have been persistent reports of guerrilla activity being carried out by PKI followers in Central Java and of depradations by a "PKI-malam" (a "night" or underground PKI) in West Java. See *Armed Forces Daily Mail,* January 26, 1966, and *LKBN Antara Bulletin* (Cologne), May 6, 1966.

Under cover of the pogrom, long-standing personal and ethnic animosities were given free rein. For example, Arab textile manufacturers and distributors, long at odds with their Javanese and Chinese competitors in the batik (native printed cloth) industry, descended upon Surakarta, Central Java, and in the confusion set fire to competing plants and stores there. In many places mass public beheadings continued well into March 1966.

[37]*Antara Daily Newsbulletin,* October 6, 1965. U.S. officials, according to the *Washington Post* of October 13, 1965, possess "incontrovertible proof" that Sukarno was in fact in league with the PKI in the "Gestapu" affair. During the trial of PKI Politburo member Njono, in mid-February 1966, Air Force Major Sujono testified that Sukarno knew in advance of the September 30 coup. (Reuter dispatch, Djakarta, February 17, 1966.)

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ment of the PKI's plan to arm peasants and workers and his (and Subandrio's) general attitude toward the PKI and Peking in the preceding year suggest that the coup not only had their approval but, indeed, may have been welcomed as providing the basis for a settlement of Sukarno's succession. In any case, it is almost certainly impossible that no word of the training at Halim or of the Communist Chinese weapons shipments ever reached Sukarno's own extensive network of informants or Subandrio's agents.

But there is no clarity as to the involvement of Sukarno and Subandrio in the actual timing of the "Gestapu" coup. It has been rumored that on September 28, 1965, while making a public address, Sukarno showed signs of illness, and that this may have led Untung and his associates to launch the revolt. On the other hand, without minimizing the factor of Sukarno's health, the rebels may have decided to strike in any case because of their alleged expectation of a pre-emptive coup by the "Council of Generals" on or before October 5, when large military units would be concentrated in the capital. The communists might also have feared that the likelihood of such a pre-emptive coup by the army would increase with each passing day, for army intelligence would probably pick up information on PKI plans and alert army leaders.

III

Why did "Gestapu" fail? A complete answer probably cannot be given for some time, but several major reasons can be sug-

There seems little question of the connivance of high-ranking airforce officers with the "Gestapu," and airforce command statements in the early hours of the coup have generally been regarded as gravely compromising. At 9:30 a.m. on October 1, when the coup still seemed to have some chance of success, Air Force Commander Omar Dhani issued an "Order of the Day" declaring that the "September 30" movement had launched an action to "safeguard the Revolution" and to protect Sukarno against "CIA subversion." The order also stated that the airforce would always support the "progressive revolutionary movement." When, by 9 p.m. on October 1, the position of the "Gestapu" rebels was becoming untenable in Djakarta, Dhani flew with Aidit to Jogjakarta from Halim base. During the next day Dhani contacted airforce officers in Central Java, urging them to dissociate themselves from the coup, and returned late in the afternoon of the same day to the Bogor Presidential palace where Sukarno had gone. Late on October 2 he issued a statement formally dissociating the airforce from the "Gestapu" affair. (For various airforce pronouncements see especially "Selected Documents relating to the September 30th Movement and its Epilogue," *Indonesia,* April 1966, pp. 143-149.) By April 1966, 306 airforce personnel had been dismissed from their posts for complicity in the "Gestapu" affair. On April 20, 1966, Dhani was arrested.

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gested. For one, the Lubang Buaja terrorists' plan to wipe out the entire command structure of the army failed. As it was, six leading generals (among them the Army Chief of Staff and the chiefs of intelligence and supply) and, outside Djakarta, nearly a score of staff, field and subaltern officers in vital positions were killed. The fact that the assassins knew exactly where all these officers might be found late in the night of September 30 suggests a degree of planning and involvement by local intelligence services, both the military's and Subandrio's civil agency, that can hardly be overlooked. But Nasution, though wounded by the killers sent to his home, jumped over his garden wall and got away. How well aware the terrorists were of the danger posed by Nasution's escape and how desperate they were to kill him and make a clean sweep is revealed by their efforts to find him: early in the morning of October 1, when countercoup operations had already begun, one of the principal terrorists, the pro-communist army colonel Latif, was sent in disguise to the Central Military Hospital in Djakarta on the assumption that Nasution might be there, or else might soon come to visit his five-year-old daughter who had been severely wounded the previous night by a terrorist bullet intended for her father. But Nasution never came.[38]

Two others marked for death, including an important communications officer, escaped the dragnet simply because by chance they were not where they were expected to be. They soon joined Nasution "in an undisclosed safe place," as the Defense Minister subsequently put it in his account of the escape. Evidently "Gestapu" leaders were convinced that with the army chiefs out of the way and "Commander in Chief" Sukarno inaccessible because he was in protective custody at the Halim base, uncertainty and indecision on the part of provincial military commanders would allow time for the rebel hold on the capital to be consolidated; shortly thereafter elimination of PKI opponents throughout the country would begin. The rebels evidently counted, too, on the psychological effect of a sudden seizure of the city of Jogjakarta in Central Java by PKI units moving out of the Merapi-Merbabu area, so that the impression would not be created that the coup was confined merely to the capital. Resistance to the rebels in Jogjakarta was unexpectedly fierce, however, with the city virtually changing hands on several occasions.

[38]See the account of Nasution's escape in *Kompas* (Djakarta), October 22, 1965.

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Meanwhile Nasution's flight and speedy rallying of his supporters, and the swift communication established and maintained with the loyal Siliwangi division and additional units rushed from nearby Bandung by General Suharto, overwhelmed the rebels in Djakarta after they had barely established themselves in the radio station and other government centers. With order restored in the capital the rebel cause in Jogjakarta was soon lost, despite Aidit's apparently personal leadership. The bands of "Gestapu" marauders swarmed out into the countryside, eventually to be decimated.

Then, too, "Gestapu" leaders had counted on a "popular" uprising and outpouring of mass support in the streets of Djakarta led by party and front cadres. The cadres did appear on the streets, but their followers soon vanished—despite the PKI Djakarta district committee's last-ditch attempt to rally them with profuse praise in a public statement issued late on October 1. Even early demonstrators were greeted by truckloads of Siliwangi division soldiers rushing to rebel strongholds in the city and with overwhelming armor surrounding Untung's and Sigit's troops. Such discipline and coordination as the fronts possessed wilted almost at once in the face of this display of power. In the past the communist ability to mobilize effectively and in time the volatile Djakarta street mobs—when it was known that the military would not interfere—had often seemed to lend impressive strength to communist demands. This time the PKI's failure was perhaps most eloquently revealed in the earlier-mentioned exhortation, published in the party paper *Harian Rakjat* on October 2, announcing popular support for "Gestapu" at a time when the coup was to all intents and purposes already crushed. An outburst of massive and sustained revolutionary fervor in the Djakarta streets might have turned the tide, for it appeared that in several districts in Java, e.g., in Tjilatjap, Banjuwangi, Malang and Surabaya, cadres and front groups were ready and waiting for action and, indeed, even had begun attacking police and military posts.[39]

[39]Based on information by private Indonesian informants whom the author is not at liberty to identify. See also *Djakarta Daily Mail,* December 16 and 20, 1965, and *Armed Forces Daily Mail,* December 21 and 30, 1965, on PKI/"Gestapu" activity in the Tjilatjap and Magelang areas. As late as the evening of October 1, junior officers associated with "Gestapu" were prepared to hold all or parts of such Central Java towns as Semarang and Surakarta. The turn of the tide in Djakarta and Jogjakarta, however, quickly dampened resistance in Semarang and Surakarta.

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But when Radio Djakarta announced within hours of the first proclamation of Untung's "Revolutionary Council" that Nasution was safe and had re-established control, the rebel offensive beyond the capital, with the exception of the area in and around Jogjakarta, never really mustered any strength. The subsequent crushing of "Gestapu," the pursuit, arrest and execution of the armed rebels, and the rounding up of thousands of party and front group cadres (sometimes in a matter of hours and from all walks of life, even in relatively inaccessible regions), showed a remarkable degree of military and police staffwork, coordination and control over communication and transport—the elimination of which the plotters had realized was the *sine qua non* to their success. It also strongly suggests that army intelligence, even in the outlying districts, was not altogether unaware of the possibility of a PKI coup and was well prepared to crush it once the signal was given in Djakarta.

IV

The profound repercussions of "Gestapu" on Indonesia's political structure are still being felt, but it is possible to trace the outlines of the country's presently emerging power pattern. Perhaps the most significant development in the aftermath has been a new polarization of political forces stemming from Sukarno's determined effort to rescue the radical left, which in turn involved him in an increasingly sharper conflict with the army.

In the weeks following the September 30 coup the PKI organization was shattered. Party branches and fronts were banned by military commanders in nearly a dozen principal regions, although Sukarno at first was able to resist a formal, nationwide banning of the party. Virtually all of the party's principal leaders from the Politburo to the district level, PKI parliamentary deputies, mayors or other office holders, as well as thousands of suspected sympathizers, were either killed or arrested. Party offices were sacked again and again, and party publications were proscribed. But in the midst of the almost hysterical fury of the anti-communist pogrom President Sukarno gave an astonishing performance in trying to save, in effect, a place for communism in his nation's future development. Again and again Sukarno warned that the nation should not swerve to "the right," that Indonesia's revolution was and remained a "left revolution," and that even

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the concept of "Nasakom," which makes communism an integral part of the official state ideology, should be preserved.[40]

"There must be no more emotional agitation," Sukarno warned on October 16. "What has happened is part of our revolution, only a minor thing in the great ocean we describe as the revolution." The next day he lashed out at "subversion," not by the PKI or "Gestapu" as his listeners might have anticipated, but rather "of the imperialists, for example, the American CIA." Soon thereafter Sukarno proclaimed himself "prosecutor and judge" of the "Gestapu" and his counterploys became even more belligerent, as, for example, when he ordered the army to "shoot to kill" during any further anti-PKI demonstrations. By November Sukarno was asserting that the United States had offered him a bribe of 150 million rupiahs "to spread Western ideas" and he became increasingly critical of the army-controlled Indonesian press, which, he charged, had been repeatedly guilty of incorrect reporting in connection with the "Gestapu" affair. He accused Muslims of violating Islamic law by not burying the bodies of killed and mutilated communists and, at a time when anti-Chinese feeling was running high and mobs were attacking Communist Chinese consulates and looting Chinese shops, Sukarno called for an end to these demonstrations and a renewal of friendly relations between Peking and Djakarta. As late as February 21, 1966, and again a week later when his conflict with the army was rapidly coming to a showdown, Sukarno in various speeches insisted that "our revolution is marked with a leftist character," that deviations to the right were "counter revolutionary," and that any attempt to deter Indonesia from "her leftist course" would fail. On February 14, 1966, at a rally in Djakarta convened to condemn resumption of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, Sukarno praised the PKI, describing it (amidst jeers) as a party "which rendered considerable contribution and sacrifice to the independence of the country."[41]

In these exhortations Sukarno was evidently seeking to preserve the balance of power, which for so long had allowed him to play the PKI off against the army. With the PKI destroyed for the moment, Indonesia's President clearly had no wish to be-

[40]See *Antara Daily Newsbulletin,* November 2, 3 and 10, and December 9 and 15, 1965.

[41]Broadcast, Radio Djakarta (Domestic Service), February 21, 1965; *New York Times,* October 24, 25, November 7, 1965, and March 1, 1966; Reuter dispatch, Djakarta, February 14, 1966.

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come the army's puppet. This was the meaning of the Sukarno-inspired speculation heard in the capital in mid-November 1965 that a new "loyal" communist party might soon be formed. When this proposal met with a storm of opposition, especially among Muslim groups, Sukarno formally proposed, on January 15, 1966, establishment of a new national "left revolutionary" organization, to be called the *Barisan Sukarno* (Sukarno Front), an idea promptly seconded the next day by Deputy Premier Subandrio.

These suggestions were not wholly unrealistic, for there remained significant sources of strength upon which a resurgent radical left might draw. For example, in the left wing of the large but seriously divided Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party—PNI), in the smaller Partindo Party, a communist front which at first survived the aftermath of the coup, and in the radical student groups, Sukarno's appeals fell on sympathetic ears. Moreover, while the PKI's formal party and front structure was destroyed, its popular influence was by no means so easily eradicated. In many parts of Java and Sumatra the party had been almost unequaled in its ability to provide organizational focus for and meet some of the needs of the urban poor, the landless proletariat, estate workers, underpaid civil servants, and other groups. Indeed, through its local patronage powers the party had given numerous Indonesians a direct stake in its existence as defender of the *rakjat djelata* (the common man), while in the meantime it had been no secret that the army's involvement over the years in the bureaucracy of government and the economy had frequently been accompanied by spectacular incompetence and corruption on which the PKI had always been able to capitalize. Even the most ardent anti-communist in Indonesia realized that the PKI's destruction would not remove the administrative chaos in which the country was floundering.

But for the time being, cowed by the violence of the Muslim-led and army-approved anti-PKI campaign, most of the radical left thought prudence the greater part of political valor. Furthermore, it became increasingly clear that army leaders were greatly aroused by Sukarno's continuing attempts to protect the left. As early as October 14, under strong army pressure, Sukarno had replaced Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro with Lieutenant General Suharto as Army Chief of Staff. It was a significant change. Pranoto, an avowed Sukarno supporter with known

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leftist leanings, had been appointed by Sukarno immediately after the bodies of Army Chief Yani and five other generals, slain by the "Gestapu" terrorists, had been found. Suharto, a close friend of Nasution, had mobilized his scattered forces on the morning of the coup and had smashed the "Gestapu" in the capital. Nasution himself, with growing vehemence in various public addresses in the following weeks, excoriated "the masterminds and apologists of the counter revolution," demanded that the perpetrators of "Gestapu" not be given a chance "to legalize their activities" or another "opportunity to repeat their crimes," and complained that those responsible for the coup still "have not been totally destroyed."[42] It was only after further army pressure, and not until November 17, 1965, that Sukarno in a Presidential decree ordered all branches and services of government to purge themselves of "Gestapu" sympathizers through special "screening teams." It seemed to be a clear victory for the army. The city council of Bandung proposed that Nasution be appointed to the position of Vice President of the Indonesian Republic, vacant since Mohammad Hatta resigned in 1956. The proposal was quickly taken up in the press until Sukarno reportedly ordered the army to quash the idea as "inappropriate at this time."

Despite the clamor of student groups and Muslim party leaders, the President refused to issue a formal nationwide ban on the PKI. Known communists were out of the government, but there was no sign that Sukarno intended a significant revision of policies; figures like Subandrio and others who had been in the good graces of the PKI retained their cabinet and other posts. Even the announced "screening" of "Gestapu" sympathizers seemed to be only a formality. By the middle of December 1965, hundreds previously arrested for alleged involvement in communist activities in several government ministries and departments had been reinstated.

It was against this background that a kind of pamphlet war erupted against the government in Djakarta, Bandung, Surabaya and other major towns. Anonymous, crudely mimeographed or printed sheets, containing inflammatory revelations or accusations especially against Subandrio—who was fast becoming the

[42] *Sinar Harapan,* November 13 and 24, 1965; *Djakarta Daily Mail,* November 12, 1965. It may be speculated that the vehemence of Nasution and other army leaders at this time was caused at least in part by persistent rumors that the army itself had been riddled with pro-PKI supporters to a far greater degree than had been supposed. Cf. *The Straits Times,* November 4, 1965.

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symbol of Sukarno's policy of protecting the left—began to circulate widely and found eager readers.[43] Student "action groups," coordinated by a new "command" organization (*Komando Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*—KAMI), staged increasingly massive anti-government demonstrations in which the President himself clearly was becoming a target: "Setop import isteri dari Djepang" ("Stop importing wives from Japan"), one common picket sign read, an allusion to Sukarno's recent marriage to a Japanese beauty. Many of these demonstrations appeared to have tacit army support and the army unquestionably in this period was working closely with, if not controlling, such "anti-Gestapu" civilian "action" groups, including the "Front Pantjasila," created early in October 1965. Sukarno himself appeared to be manipulating left-wing student groups,[44] which now frequently began to clash with the followers of KAMI; and in mid-January 1966, Sukarno and Subandrio urged formation of the earlier-mentioned "Sukarno Front," a new mass organization clearly intended to stabilize their own power base. Although the left wing of the PNI and Partindo voiced approval for the "Sukarno Front," local military commanders (with the subsequent approval of Army Chief Suharto) banned the Front's formation "in order to preserve unity."

Throughout the early months of 1966 the power struggle continued. KAMI now took to demonstrating alternately for lower prices, a complete purge of government services and the formal dissolution of the PKI, and student leaders warned against the emergence of a "neo-PKI." Sukarno first sought to pacify the students, expressing to them his "understanding" of their demands, and even declaring on February 17, 1966 that the PKI had already been dissolved "within the framework of implementing a political

[43]See, e.g., such one- or two-page stenciled pamphlets circulating in Djakarta and Bandung as *Berita Revolusi*, No. 4, November 30, 1965, and No. 6, December 6, 1965, and the leaflet entitled "Subandrio!!!" signed by one "Anak Rakjat," circulating in Bandung in mid-November 1965. Subandrio himself in this period did his cause little good by accusing a number of Indonesian newspapers of being financed by the CIA, and then by issuing a "correction" of his statement which in effect was an affirmation of his original charge. See *Angkatan Bersendjata*, October 26, 1965, and *Djakarta Daily Mail*, October 28, 1965.

[44]Among the radical student organizations Sukarno mobilized were such groups as Germindo (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*—Indonesian Student Movement), PPMI (*Pusat Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia*—Central Indonesian Student Organization), MMI (*Madjelis Mahasiswa Indonesia*—Indonesian Students Council), and GMNI (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia*—National Indonesian Students Movement). These groups were almost entirely Djakarta based and had been expelled from KAMI. They numbered about 4,000 students altogether. On paper the groups affiliated with KAMI have three times that number.

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solution in an integral manner" to safeguard the national revolution.[45] In the absence of a formal decree banning the party, few took Sukarno's announcement seriously. When KAMI and pro-Sukarno, anti-KAMI students began to battle in the streets, Sukarno declared that he had proof of an underground plot to overthrow him, but he vouchsafed no further details.

In what was evidently a final effort to assert his authority, Sukarno abruptly announced on February 21, 1966 that he had reshuffled the cabinet. Nasution was dropped as Minister of Defense. To be sure, the names of Aidit and two other PKI leaders who had held minor cabinet posts were omitted. But fifteen new appointments were made, some of them well-known PKI sympathizers, like the new Minister for Basic Education and Culture, Sumardjo, who had been among the leaders of a teachers association closely involved in the "Gestapu" affair and who for this reason had been suspended from his post only a few weeks earlier. Such figures as Lenin Peace Prize winner Prijono and Oei Tjoe Tat, the latter widely regarded as "Peking's man" in the government, were retained. Former Air Force Minister Omar Dhani, who had resigned as Air Force Chief shortly after the "Gestapu" affair and had been immediately appointed by Sukarno to the newly created post of Minister of Aviation Industry, was also kept on. This fact, perhaps as much as the elimination of Nasution, enraged anti-communist elements, because Dhani was widely regarded as having supported the PKI's ambitions in the September 30 coup. In installing the new cabinet Sukarno had recourse to communist terminology, speaking of the "national democratic" phase of the Indonesian revolution that now had to be implemented by a "socialist" phase, and calling for a renewed struggle against "imperialism" and "feudalism."[46] It seemed to some as if "Gestapu" had never occurred.

But Sukarno lost his gamble. Students intensified their demonstrations and now repeatedly attempted to rush the President's palace. Neither a curfew, nor a formal banning of KAMI by Sukarno, nor the closing of the University of Indonesia to "stop students and non-students from using the university for

[45]Antara dispatch, Radio Djakarta, February 17, 1966.

[46]Broadcast, Radio Djakarta (Domestic Service), February 24, 1966. On the concept of the two-stage revolution, with the "national democratic" stage being succeeded by the "socialist" stage, see J. M. van der Kroef, "The Communist Concept of National Democracy," *Studies on the Soviet Union,* Vol. 4 (1964), pp. 39-63. Both Sukarno and Aidit used this concept extensively and it gave the latter the protection of the former in implementing PKI tactics.

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undesirable purposes," halted the agitation. On March 5 several thousand school children, some barely in their teens, stormed Subandrio's office while troops fired over their heads. In defiance of the President's ban but with the obvious approval of the army and police, KAMI continued to march, organize and press its protest against Nasution's dismissal, demanding a new cabinet purged of left-wing ministers, a formal ban of the PKI, and lower prices.

When it became apparent that leaders of the political parties were reluctant to back him openly against the students, and when it was reported that army units were beginning to concentrate in the area of the palace,[47] Sukarno, on the afternoon of March 11, summoned army commanders and agreed to a formal ban on the PKI, a purge of pro-communists, and formation of a new cabinet, in return for continued recognition as head of state and retention of all his titles. On the same day Army Chief Suharto was ordered "to take all steps" to restore order and the smooth functioning of government, and the next day Sukarno formally dissolved and banned the PKI. Within hours more than a score of cabinet members and political leaders, among them Subandrio and Basic Education Minister Sumardjo, were arrested; KAMI agitators also "arrested" three other ministers as students continued to swarm around the Presidential palace. A smaller, "purged" cabinet was announced on March 27, in which Nasution returned as Minister/Deputy Commander of the "Crush Malaysia Command" (*Komando Ganjang Malaysia*—KOGAM), Subandrio was replaced as Foreign Minister by the anti-PKI Adam Malik, and General Suharto emerged as the strong man in the post of Minister of Defense and Security. KAMI and the "Pantjasila Front" expressed themselves as only partially satisfied.[48] Even when Suharto ordered a further purge of pro-PKI elements from the government, the agitation did not subside, and periodic clashes between leftist and anti-PKI students continued in a number of towns, particularly in Jogjakarta and Djakarta.

[47]What ultimately impelled the army to move against Sukarno is not clear. It may have been that early in March 1966 the army got wind of an alleged secret agreement between Subandrio and Peking, concluded well after the "Gestapu" affair, in which Communist China promised support for Sukarno's proposed "Conference of New Emerging Forces" if the remaining anti-communist generals in Indonesia were eliminated. The killing of the anti-communist generals was to have been carried out by civilian assassins or sympathetic military personnel. *New York Times,* March 16, 1966.

[48]*Duta Masjarakat* (Djakarta), March 28, 1966; Antara dispatch, Radio Djakarta, March 29, 1966.

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Throughout April and May 1966, student groups continued their efforts to curtail Sukarno's position and indeed to remove him from office. Initially, the anti-Sukarno elements pinned their hopes on the convening of the Provisional People's Consultative Congress, a kind of superparliament charged with setting forth the state's principal policies (unlike the actual Parliament which is presumably concerned with the day-to-day implementation of these policies). It was thought that the Congress, which was originally scheduled to meet on May 12, would elect a new Vice President—former Vice President Hatta having resigned that office in 1956 after a dispute with Sukarno over the latter's "guided democracy" policies. The new Vice President, it was believed, would then begin the process of taking over power from Sukarno with the aid of the army.

But by early May this strategy had failed, as party leaders fell to wrangling among themselves over the future Vice Presidential choice. From various quarters there came increasing demands that only a new general election, in which banned political groups such as the Masjumi (Moslem Federation) and socialist parties could participate, would restore democratic and constitutional government, and that, therefore, both the Parliament and the Consultative Congress should return their mandates to the electorate. Sukarno's vociferous opposition, moreover, to the convening of the Congress could not be ignored: in Central and East Java, where the President's popularity has remained great, a strong current of political dissatisfaction with the army's attempts to undermine the chief executive was becoming evident. After initial postponement, the Consultative Congress finally met and, on July 5, issued a number of decisions, including revocation of Sukarno's title of "President for Life" (it allowed him to retain the constitutionally meaningless title of "Great Leader of the Revolution"), ordering of new elections by July 1968, a ban on the PKI and the propagation of Marxism and Leninism (although "academic study" of these ideologies is permitted), and a "review" of Sukarno's decisions and decrees. On July 25, a new "simplified" cabinet, with Suharto as chairman of the ministerial presidium, was announced, as armed clashes between pro- and anti-Sukarno elements and religious groups continued to erupt in Central and East Java. Even in the armed forces, notably in the Marine Corps, a quiet mobilization of anti-Suharto officers was begun, presaging future instability.

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For the moment Sukarno appears to have been reduced to a mere figurehead. But if he lives and is not eventually forced to go on an extended expatriate "vacation," his chances of a comeback remain considerable. For one thing, the army can now hardly escape what—despite its involvement at various levels of government in the past—it was essentially able to avoid, namely, direct responsibility for major government policies. It remains to be seen whether the present Suharto-centered government will be any more successful than its predecessors in resolving the country's economic problems. The staggering inflation, the crumbling transport system, the rapidly deteriorating rubber and copra processing industries are all symptoms of a deeper crisis that can be met only by such long-postponed, unpopular measures as fiscal reform, imposition of labor discipline, liberation of production from stifling controls, and bureaucratic retrenchment. Failure of the new cabinet in this critical area may eventually cause a new escalation in Presidential powers. Then, too, it is doubtful if political party leaders, functioning in coalition with the army in the cabinet, would accept what amounts to a thinly-veiled military dictatorship for very long. Should the army—and this seems most improbable—demand total and repressive control, the rising opposition almost certainly would rally around Sukarno. The President's sources of strength remain considerable, e.g., in the Ali-Surachman wing of the Nationalist Party (PNI), whose members now style themselves *Anak Sukarno* (ASU—Children of Sukarno); in the dissident officers corps of the Diponegoro and Brawidjaya divisions in Central and East Java, respectively; and in the radical elements of the trade union movement. Despite its quiet determination to neutralize Sukarno, the new Suharto cabinet is decidedly unwilling to drive toward a final test of strength with the President's supporters.

Meanwhile, the reorientation of Indonesian foreign relations has thus far proceeded only slowly, despite repeated disavowals of Subandrio's policies. To be sure, the Sino-Indonesian partnership seems virtually to have ended: the Indonesian ambassador has been recalled; anti-Chinese feeling continues to run high in Indonesia; Chinese aid, technicians and reporters have been withdrawn; and, since early October 1965, Peking has charged "Indonesian rightwing forces" almost weekly with assaults and worse

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upon its nationals and property in Indonesia.[49] Still, there has been no formal diplomatic break and neither Peking nor Djakarta seems anxious for one. Indeed, Foreign Minister Adam Malik, in line with the government's announced policy of true independence in foreign affairs, has even cautiously expressed the hope that relations with Peking may shortly be improved. On April 20, 1966 Malik declared that Indonesia's relations with People's China "are still good." As for Peking's condemnation of anti-PKI activity in the aftermath of "Gestapu," Indonesia's foreign minister said that what was happening in Indonesia represented only "signs of excesses" of popular wrath, and he subsequently added that the people in Indonesia were not so much anti-communist as "anti-PKI." Still, an eventual rupture of Peking-Djakarta relations may well occur if the present wave of anti-Chinese feeling in Indonesia continues much longer.

Equally ambiguous has been Indonesia's position toward the anti-Malaysia "confrontation." Indonesian spokesmen, from Sukarno and Subandrio to Nasution and Suharto, declared that "confrontation" against Malaysia would continue.[50] It was this PKI-initiated anti-Malaysia campaign that had been largely instrumental in forging the erstwhile Sino-Indonesian partnership.[51] Nor were the various official Indonesian reaffirmations of the "confrontation" policy merely verbal gestures, for in this period guerrilla attacks by Indonesian military and paramilitary units aided by local Chinese communists continued unabated in the Sarawak area of eastern Malaysia.[52]

In May 1966, however, Indonesia suddenly seemed ready to stop, or at least to mitigate, the campaign. After Sukarno at first objected, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Ma-

[49]See, e.g., *Peking Review,* in 1965, October 22, pp. 6-14; November 5, pp. 22-23; November 12, pp. 24-27, 29-34; November 26, pp. 20-22; December 3, pp. 8-10; December 17, pp. 13-15; in 1966, January 1, p. 3; January 21, p. 4; January 28, p. 4; March 25, p. 10; April 1, pp. 17-22; April 8, pp. 10-13.

[50]*Antara Daily Newsbulletin,* October 12, November 12, and December 8, 1965, January 7, February 4, and March 25, 1966. See also *LKBN Antara Bulletin* (Cologne), April 4 and 7, 1966, and the *New York Times,* April 10, 1966.

[51]See my "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership," *op. cit.*

[52]*The Straits Times,* November 23 and December 2, 1965, and February 28, 1966; *The Sarawak Tribune* (Kuching), February 17 and 19, 1966; *The Sunday Tribune* (Kuching), February 20, 1966. As late as April 6, Radio Djakarta (Domestic Service) reported that the chief of the Indonesian naval information service had declared that "fierce fighting in the border region is proof that our confrontation against . . . Malaysia is not an empty slogan." Indonesia continues to harbor and support representatives of the "North Kalimantan Revolutionary Government" (an anti-Malaysia group) in Djakarta. See *LKBN Antara Bulletin,* April 16, 1966.

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laysia's Deputy Premier Tun Abdul Razak concluded a preliminary agreement in Bangkok on May 31, looking toward "the beginning of the end" of hostilities. Although subsequently the Provisional People's Consultative Congress also approved termination of "confrontation," implementation of the Bangkok agreement continued to meet obstacles thrown up by Sukarno and the political and military elements associated with him. Given the instability of Indonesia's post-"Gestapu" political establishment, army leaders around Suharto are finding that the military emergency which the campaign against Malaysia created has aided the army in maintaining itself in power. Hence, the slowness in bringing the campaign formally to an end, even though most of the Indonesian military units involved in "confrontation" action along the Sarawak frontier have now been withdrawn. Then, too, Indonesia seems anxious—and Malaysia, reluctant—to devise some kind of face-saving formula, such as a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the population of Malaysian Borneo. To Malaysia such a plebiscite seems totally unnecessary—indeed, a blot on the constitutional legitimacy of the Malaysian state—but it may well be the price which Indonesia feels she must insist on.

Thus far the new Indonesian government has not rushed to embrace the United States, nor has there been any significant warming in Djakarta's relations with Moscow. On the contrary, nearly $1 billion of the $2.5 billion foreign debt of Indonesia is currently owed the USSR; given the state of the Indonesian economy, repayment of interest, let alone of principal, is unlikely to occur for some time, if at all. There has been sharp criticism in the Soviet press of the anticommunist measures taken in "Gestapu's" aftermath and of Indonesian policies generally.[53] Clearly the world's largest island republic remains in a period of uncrystallized adjustment to the most far-reaching alteration of its political system in more than a decade.

[53]See the editorial in *Pravda*, October 26, 1965, and the unsigned article "The USSR and Indonesia," *Mizan* (London), January-February 1966, pp. 14-22. Soviet reaction to the "Gestapu" affair was relatively slow in coming. As early as October 2, 1965, the Soviet press carried general and noncommittal articles on the affair, but not until October 10 did *Pravda* have a cautious and vaguely worded editorial reaction. Equally mild was the *Pravda* editorial of October 20, 1965, which expressed moderate concern for the "democratic forces" in Indonesia. After the Chinese government, on October 19, 1965, published the first of its increasingly bitter attacks on Djakarta over the affair, however, Moscow's tone also became increasingly sharp. On the nature and timing of this Sino-Soviet reaction to "Gestapu" see Joachim Glaubitz, "Die Vorgänge in Indonesien und ihr Echo in Peking und Moskau," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts zur Erforschung des Marxismus-Leninismus*, March 1966, pp. 10-18.

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SUKARNOISM: AN INTERPRETATION

by Willard Range

ALTHOUGH the foreign policy of a state is determined primarily by a variety of objective factors, it is a fact that a strong leader such as Stalin or De Gaulle can significantly modify a state's policy. In such situations, knowledge of the personality and views of that individual are essential to an understanding of the state's international behavior.

Indonesia's foreign policy is the result of a variety of objective factors—her 300 years of colonialism, geography, internal politics, the impact of the Cold War—but since the late 1950's it has been to some degree influenced also by the personality and ideas of President Sukarno.[1]

A thorough analysis of Sukarno's personality is beyond the competence of this writer. He has described himself as a romanticist. The literature on him suggests that he is an easy-going, carefree idealist who remains relaxed and smiling despite revolts, guerrillas and an empty treasury. He is said to be imaginative, intuitive, emotional, naive, a man who thinks in large terms but is weak on implementation, who sees things broadly rather than in detail, a conceptualist rather than an analyst. He is reputed to want power to "stage-manage, rearrange, sway masses, express his personality, exert influence, display showmanship. His power is for pleasure . . . . It is power for the joy of a theatre producer . . . ," preferably without the routine and paper work of executive office. The key to him, it has been said, is love: he loves his country, women, and himself. He is vain, wants a good place in history, is susceptible to flattery, and frequently exhibits a tendency toward extremism.[2]

[1]Until about 1957 Sukarno supported the Indonesian experiment with constitutional democracy, leaving foreign policy largely to whatever prime minister and cabinet happened to be in office. Even the famed Bandung Conference of 1955 is said to have been the work of the then Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo rather than of Sukarno. In those years when the young Indonesian state seemed constantly on the verge of falling apart, Sukarno seems to have devoted himself chiefly to promoting Indonesian nationalism and unity. For an excellent and detailed account of those years, see Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

[2]The above comments are derived from a perceptive journalist rather than a psychologist and must be so evaluated. See Louis Fischer, *The Story of Indonesia* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 147, 155, 225, 234-235, 237, 297. Fischer's description is quite in tune, however, with the literature on Indonesia and Sukarno.

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But we are concerned here with Sukarno's ideas. During the past twenty years he has expressed his views often enough for us to decipher what we might designate roughly as his theory of international relations. It might not be a good theory, but if it is his theory, it might contribute something toward an explanation of his state's past behavior, and incidentally to hypotheses that will help to explain the behavior of other states in similar circumstances or with similar leaders. We know that he is dissatisfied with the contemporary international system, that he wants to see a new system, and that he has been active toward this end. Thus his views on these matters will be explored.

Sukarno's Antipathy Toward the "Old Established Forces"

The phenomenon of our time that has most impressed Sukarno is the existence of a variety of concurrent revolutions—the anti-colonial revolution, the revolution of the underprivileged for the right to be heard, the revolution for education and higher standards of living, the revolution for justice. Significant also is the technological revolution in warfare—the nuclear revolution.[3]

He is struck by the fact that these revolutions differ from those of past eras in that they are not revolutions of elites, but are mass or people's revolutions. They affect all aspects of society, not merely a single aspect such as the political, while the economic and social environments remain unchanged. And being new in character, Sukarno argues, they must be carried out by new methods; the old liberal methods of the textbooks are out of date.

These revolutions, he adds, have thrown the non-Western world into torment. Non-Western peoples had to endure the first atomic bombs. Then came violence in Indonesia, Korea, Indochina, Tunisia, Iran, Egypt, Algeria and much of Africa. The period since World War II has been a time of trouble, with storm centers in many places, due to the convergence of the anti-colonial struggle, the Cold War and economic dislocation. The many revolutions have been as powerful as natural forces—as the waves of the seas—against which no one can stand. The best anyone has been able to do is to go along with them, steering his way carefully; and those conservatives (reactionaries to Sukarno) who have tried to oppose the waves have been overwhelmed.

[3]Sukarno's views on these topics are most readily available in a collection of five of his major speeches entitled *Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man* (Djakarta: Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, 1961). Hereafter cited as *Toward Freedom*.

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Fortunately, according to Sukarno, all these revolutions (except the nuclear one) have been progressive. They are glorious and exhilarating movements. The turmoil and turbulence accompanying them are but the birth-pangs of progress. They are an essential part of nation-building in the ex-colonial world; and while what is going on in the new states might look like chaos to outsiders, it is a quite normal process to which the newly freed peoples have become accustomed.

There are, however, many things about this world that give Sukarno moments of unhappiness. One is the danger of nuclear war that might destroy civilization, or any kind of war that might engulf Indonesia along with the rest of the world.[4] Another irritant is the liberal democracy of the West, which the underdeveloped world has been trying to adopt without much success. He equates Western liberal democracy with excessive individualism that allows each man to do as he pleases almost to the point of anarchy. It is a form of democracy, he thinks, that promotes disunity and the exploitation of the weak by the strong. He has referred to it as "free-fight" liberalism, and he argues that while it might produce a society run superficially *by* the people, it is not *for* the people due to the high degree of exploitation it permits. In 1945 he was already asserting the Marxist view that the right to vote and sit in a parliament meant little since the people were still at the mercy of capitalists. "In America," he declared, "there is a representative body of the people, but are not people in America at the mercy of the capitalists? Are not people at the mercy of the capitalists throughout the Western world?" Nor is there any appreciable sign that his views have changed significantly in the ensuing twenty years.[5] He concedes reluctantly that Western liberal democracy might be reasonably satisfactory for the West, but implies that he is not convinced it deserves much of a future anywhere.

Sukarno is disturbed at times also by his belief that the contemporary state system is not satisfactorily organized. Although once a staunch supporter of the United Nations, he became dis-

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 35. See also Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-300.

[5] *Toward Freedom*, pp. 16, 54-55; also Leslie H. Palmier, *Indonesia and the Dutch* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 114-115. Sukarno's thinking on this matter suggests that although he is relatively well-informed, he retains an image of the West as it was a generation or more ago when social Darwinism was still prevalent. It is worth remembering that Sukarno was 55 years old before he first saw the West and that his image of it was fixed at an early period through the lens of Dutch colonialism. He was over 40, incidentally, before he was ever out of Indonesia, thus even his knowledge of Asia was limited.

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illusioned with it when the UN failed to support fully his demands for West Irian, the anti-colonial revolution and his other favorite projects. For at least five years before Indonesia's withdrawal in 1965 from the UN Sukarno was unhappy about the system. The United Nations, he then asserted, was a product of the outmoded Western state system—the same system that had produced colonialism and two fratricidal world wars—and the major powers of that dangerous system were using and perverting the UN for their own purposes in the Cold War.[6] The UN was unrepresentative of the real world situation: Communist China was kept outside and the Afro-Asian areas remained underrepresented everywhere except in the General Assembly. Even the location of the UN headquarters in the United States was undesirable since it tended to thrust the United Nations into the Cold War. Thus the UN was not a competent institution for solving such problems as disarmament or moving the world into step with the powerful forces of history.[7]

It is the West, however, and especially the colonial or ex-colonial powers of the West, that has caused most of Sukarno's disgruntlement. Since 1960 he has been dramatizing his anti-Western orientation by referring to the Western states as "old established forces" (OLDEFOS) and to the non-Western and socialist states as "new emerging forces" (NEFOS). But his general anti-Western attitude was formed long before 1960; the events of passing years have served merely to harden a pattern of thought that has developed with considerable consistency over a span of four decades.

His basic position is that capitalism and imperialism are twin evils that not only have dominated the West of the past, but continue to dominate the West of the present.[8] He reasons that al-

[6]The quick UN response in Korea in 1950, when contrasted with the modest help given Indonesia against the Dutch in 1948, suggested to Indonesians that the West was willing to act only against the communists in the Cold War. A Western-dominated UN, they reasoned, would not act forcibly against a member of its own group (the Netherlands). See Jeanne S. Mintz, *Indonesia: A Profile* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961), p. 166.

[7]*Toward Freedom*, pp. 125, 145-147.

[8]While it might not be entirely accurate to say that Sukarno entertains a "devil theory" of politics, his view is akin to it. Studies of F. D. Roosevelt, Nehru, Nasser, Dulles and Sukarno indicate that something akin to a "devil theory" is prevalent in the thinking of contemporary practitioners of international relations. See my *Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1959), *Jawaharlal Nehru's World View* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961), and "An Interpretation of Nasserism," *Western Political Quarterly*, December 1959, pp. 1005-1016. Roosevelt's and Nasser's devils are individuals or groups; Dulles' devil was the communist creed; Nehru's and Sukarno's devils are systems.

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though the systems of capitalism and imperialism and the attitudes that go with them are dying, they are still far from dead; indeed, so ingrained are these evil systems and attitudes in the West that they continue to compel the Western states to engage in all sorts of misbehavior—misbehavior that would be far worse were it not held in check by the "new emerging forces" of nationalism and socialism. Sukarno long ago accepted the Marxist view that a capitalist state is by its very nature also an imperialist state, and that only the West is afflicted with this chronic compulsion toward imperialism. On a few occasions he has conceded that there might be such a thing as communist imperialism, but such concessions have been halfhearted and short-lived. He has conceded also that the United States has occasionally aided Indonesia and other states struggling against colonialism, but he seems to think that such aid has been a temporary aberration in American policy, which is substantially imperialistic.[9]

The Western belief that the East still needs Western leadership or tutelage is particularly galling to Sukarno. He recalls that a Western state provided Indonesia with leadership and tutelage for 300 years only to leave it 94 per cent illiterate, without doctors, and saddled with a feudal economic and social system. Indonesia has made more progress in its few years of independence, he claims, than in all the three centuries under the Dutch.[10] In other words, the West had its chance to lead and tutor—and it failed miserably and disgracefully.

Moreover, there is no doubt in Sukarno's mind that the West is still afflicted with a powerful urge to continue economic exploitation of the underdeveloped world. In the early days of independence he attacked those foreigners whom he thought were abusing Indonesian hospitality by evading Indonesian economic regulations designed to enforce responsibility of the rich toward the poor. Such regulations were common in the West, he noted, but widespread efforts were made by foreigners in the East to violate them.[11] While in the process of inaugurating his Guided Democracy in the late 1950's, he charged that his chief opponents were those who feared his new system would jeopardize the profits

[9]See Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-305 for an interesting interview with Sukarno on this topic.

[10]*Toward Freedom,* p. 28.

[11]*Indonesian Affairs,* December-January, 1951-1952, pp. 7-8. At that time Sukarno probably had in mind the rich Chinese businessmen as well as Europeans and Americans.

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of foreign investors.[12] And one of his arguments against the creation of Malaysia was that it would help to protect the rubber and oil of the "imperialists."[13]

Even when the West has given aid to Indonesia, Sukarno has been irritated by its slowness in doing so. The "old established forces," he complained, are so committed to imperialism and the status quo that they "haggle for days, weeks, months, even years." According to Guy Pauker, Sukarno is at least partly right. During the 1958-1959 uprisings against the central government, the United States refused for several months to sell weapons to the government, and finally sold it only small quantities with obvious reluctance. This dilatory action, Pauker asserts, and the hesitation of the West in helping Indonesia to get a satisfactory settlement over West Irian, provoked Sukarno into turning to the communist states for aid—and aid was supplied quickly, Sukarno noted, "without splitting hairs over terms of credit." All this has convinced Sukarno that the West wants to keep Indonesia weak.[14]

Sukarno also blames the West for much of the internal warfare that has plagued the underdeveloped world. He believes Western insistence on maintaining colonial controls has been at the root of most of the tension and conflict of recent years. The turbulence in Indonesia in 1958, the trouble in the Congo in the 1960's, and rebellions elsewhere are due largely, he charges, to subversive aid to rebels given by the Western powers in their effort to maintain imperialism.[15]

This intervention by the West, Sukarno argues, constitutes the major threat to world peace. It is the clashing interests of the great powers in the Cold War, not the indigenous disorder in the new states, that might lead to a third world war.[16] He seems to

[12]*Toward Freedom,* pp. 62-63.

[13]Bruce Grant, "Sukarno: Regional Bully," *Nation,* February 3, 1964, p. 114.

[14]Guy J. Pauker, "The Soviet Challenge to Indonesia," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1962, pp. 613-618, 625. Pauker maintains, however, that the goal of Soviet aid to Indonesia was to create such economic chaos in the country that the communists there would be given a favorable opportunity to gain political control.

[15]For detailed allegations on U.S. and British aid given to Indonesian rebels in 1958 see Feith, *op. cit.,* pp. 586-591; George McT. Kahin, editor, *Major Governments of Asia* (Second edition; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 647-648, 685; Fischer, *op. cit.,* Chapter 33. For Sukarno's views see also *Toward Freedom,* pp. 104, 128-129, 134. As we shall note later, aid to rebellions *against the West* is considered by Sukarno to be a moral obligation in the cause of freedom.

[16]*Toward Freedom,* pp. 135-136.

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blame the Cold War largely on the West, since he thinks the West opposes the progressive forces of history.[17]

Sukarno denounces the West for maintaining what he considers "stooges" in the underdeveloped world—Syngman Rhee in Korea, Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa, Tunku Abdul Rahman in Malaysia —all of whom work in cahoots with imperialism. He is indignant at what he considers the failure of the major powers (chiefly Western) to consult with Asian leaders, especially about Asian affairs. Sukarno has long entertained a profound conviction that Indonesia in general and he in particular have a special mission to provide leadership for nonaligned peoples and to act as champion of peoples not yet independent; it irritates him when these special roles are ignored, as he believes they have been on many occasions.

Finally, Sukarno is disappointed at the failure of the West or the "old established forces" to support his policies or to come to his rescue when he faced particular problems. The United States seems to have won his special disfavor. While he is not unaware of the help the United States gave to his struggle for independence against the Dutch in 1948, he tends to depreciate it on the grounds that it came rather late, that it was a Netherlands strengthened by U.S. aid that Indonesia had to fight, and that American help, when it came, was motivated by U.S. self-interest rather than by sympathy for Indonesian self-determination.[18] He has been irked

[17]Sukarno has not forgotten that there was a communist revolution against his government in 1948, but he has not provided any satisfactory explanation for what seems to be his blindness toward communist intervention and subversion. What little of it he seems to recognize is justified on the ground that it works against Western imperialism and in accord with the progressive forces of history.

After the abortive pro-communist coup of October 1965 he went so far as to excuse the conspirators as minor "disruptive elements" whose actions were not a serious threat to the future of Indonesia. He tried vainly but vigorously, moreover, to curb anti-communist retaliations against both Indonesian communists and Chinese communists, arguing that some form of communism was essential to Indonesia. In this effort he seemed to have three objectives: (1) to retain the communist movement as a counterweight to the army (thus maintaining his own power as arbiter between them); (2) to maintain the Djakarta-Peking axis; and (3) to keep Indonesia on the road to socialism. See *New York Times,* October 27-December 12, 1965, *passim.*

[18]In *Major Governments of Asia, op. cit.,* p. 680, Kahin attributes this attitude to Indonesia in general, but it is my conclusion that it represents Sukarno's view. It is notable, incidentally, that the Soviet Union's support for Indonesian independence has also been depreciated almost to zero due to the belief that the USSR encouraged the 1948 communist rebellion at Madiun. One further observation is that this Sukarno-Indonesian attitude is reminiscent of Alexander Hamilton's view in 1793 of French aid to the American colonies' independence struggle. Hamilton reminded President Washington that the United States owed no special gratitude to France since French aid was motivated by French self-interest (her desire to weaken England) rather than by French sympathy for American independence.

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by the strings attached to American aid, by alleged U.S. support to the rebellion against him in 1958, by refusal of the United States to sell him all the arms he wanted, and by lack of American support for his campaign to wrest West Irian from the Dutch. He blames the United States, in fact, for the failure of the United Nations on several occasions to take up the West Irian question.

The trouble with the United States, Sukarno has argued, is that she suffers from a "communist phobia." This has blinded her to reality and has often caused her to take the silly view that Indonesia is going communist.[19]

Sukarno's antipathy toward the West is complemented by his belief that the "old established forces" are being replaced by "new emerging forces" in a "Typhoon of Universal Revolution" out of which a new and better world is being created—a world to which the "old established forces" will have to adjust.[20]

Pantja Sila and the New World

Sukarno wants a new world. In 1960 he told the UN General Assembly that its job was to build a new world—not to defend the present one; and he is reported to have said three years later, "we are going to *change* this *damn* world to a *new* world of happiness—to *build* the world anew!"[21]

He has left little doubt about the broad philosophic base or *Weltanschauung* on which both the Indonesian state and a new global system should be built. His views are incorporated in his well-known package of five principles called Pantja Sila. The principles were worked out during World War II, unveiled in a major speech in 1945, and elaborated from time to time thereafter.[22]

The most interesting feature of Sukarno's Pantja Sila is his belief that it is a contribution to the history of man—not simply equivalent to the American Declaration of Independence and the Communist Manifesto, but superior to both those documents, for both, despite their progressiveness for their eras, are defective and inadequate to meet the needs of man in the twentieth century. The American Declaration of Independence is defective in that

[19]*Newsweek*, October 5, 1964, p. 84.
[20]*Toward Freedom*, p. 85.
[21]*Ibid.*, pp. 129-130; Jerry A. Rose, "We Are Going to Change this Damn World," *Saturday Evening Post*, November 2, 1963, p. 78.
[22]The major speech of 1945 is in *Toward Freedom*, pp. 1-21. For some elaboration see also Sukarno's 1959 Political Manifesto speech in *ibid.*, pp. 37-76 and his 1960 speech to the UN General Assembly, *ibid.*, pp. 121-149.

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social justice and socialism are lacking; the Communist Manifesto is defective in that belief in God and religious tolerance and respect are lacking. These two documents have also had the unfortunate result of dividing the world into two hostile blocs.

What is needed, Sukarno proclaims, is a *Weltanschauung* that is applicable to the twentieth century and can be used by all people everywhere; that proclaims peace, brotherhood, and welfare as ends of man; that will unite all men and put an end to the conflicts of ideologies, religions and classes; that contains great truths growing out of the conscience of man, and that provides a foundation for a *Pax Humanica.* The Pantja Sila, he declares, does all of this: it is universally applicable and should be written into the UN Charter. The Charter no longer reflects the real world, but rather the politics and distribution of power as of 1945; the Pantja Sila would bring the UN up to date and put it in tune with the powerful revolutionary forces out of which a new world is being forged.[23] Sukarno seems really to believe with all the sincerity of his being that he personally has become the catalyzing vessel in which all revolutionary forces, trends and ideologies of our epoch have been blended into harmonious unity and that he has, therefore, by some divine intercession, become the prophet of the coming world.[24]

The five principles of Pantja Sila are nationalism, internationalism, democracy, social justice, and belief in God.

National states and nationalism will be essential, Sukarno holds, as far into the future as man can see. But he supports a liberal nationalism—not the aggressive, greedy nationalism of the West, as he sees it, which grew out of imperialism and capitalism. This liberating nationalism is now a powerful force in the Afro-Asian-Latin American areas, creating new nations, dominating international activity and serving as the wellspring of freedom. It is a nationalism that asserts the right and determination of a people to take the future into their own hands.

Yet, since nationalism can be chauvinistic and dangerous, the second principle of internationalism is essential. Nationalism diluted with internationalism denies the superiority of one people over another. The two principles together proclaim that while each nation is entitled to respect and esteem, each is also only a fragment of humanity, each is only a small part of the brother-

[23]For specific references to the above see *ibid.,* pp. 8, 48-50, 116-117, 140-141.
[24]See Fischer, *op. cit.,* p. 154.

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hood of man and the family of nations. Thus foreign policy must be conceived with a broad rather than narrow conception of the national interest, a conception recognizing that the security and welfare of each nation is dependent on the security and welfare of the entire family of nations.[25]

The third Pantja Sila principle—democracy—calls for a kind of democracy that emphasizes social harmony and cooperation rather than the individualism of the West. Sukarno concedes that individualistic democracy wherein "50 per cent plus one are always right" might be all right for the West, but it is not suitable for the family-like or mutual-help society of Indonesia. His kind of democracy is per se superior and the type most in accord with the new emerging forces and revolutions of our time.[26] He implies, therefore, that it is the type of democracy that will be predominant in the new world.

Democracy to Sukarno emphasizes government *for* the people rather than *by* the people. It requires representation and consultation with all groups in the society, but the leader or leaders make the final decisions. The decisions must be unanimous and reveal a consensus, general will, or synthesis produced by the consultations. It is a type of democracy that assumes a basic harmony of interests among divergent groups and denies the incompatibility of group interests. It implies the possibility of harmonious cooperation among all religions, ideologies, classes, nationalities and cultures. Thus it is universally applicable, Sukarno believes, and should be applied in the UN in place of the resolutions and counterresolutions, the majorities and minorities, that now prevail there and perpetuate disunity. It contains the potential to unite Jews and Moslems, Hindus and Moslems, communists and capitalists, East and West, rich and poor. This is what

[25]*Toward Freedom*, pp. 10-14, 26, 108-109, 138-139, 141. Sukarno has insisted repeatedly, however, that internationalism should not be confused with cosmopolitanism—an undesirable concept that denies nationalism and declares "there is no Indonesia, there is no Japan, there is no Burma, there is no England, there is no America, and so on."

[26]See *ibid.*, pp. 14-16, 19, 96-98, 139, 142. See also Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 637-640; Feith, *op. cit.*, pp. 515, 517; Benjamin and Jean Higgins, *Indonesia: The Crisis of the Millstones* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963), pp. 39, 45-47, 115. For a perceptive summary analysis of the decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia see Feith, Chapter XI. Feith as well as others gives Sukarno and Indonesia credit for an honest effort over a period of several years to make Western-style constitutional democracy work, although it was not congenial to Sukarno or Indonesian society. It is believed that the unity and progress Sukarno saw in the Soviet Union and Red China in 1956 stimulated his desire to abandon the Western system and develop a more indigenous type of democracy.

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makes it, Sukarno thinks, the kind of democracy that is likely to be the wave of the future.[27]

Sukarno's fourth principle—social justice—seems to refer to a mixed economy in which socialism will be predominant and whatever private enterprise is allowed to exist will be carefully controlled and forced to serve a clear social function. It aims at the abolition of poverty and the establishment of economic democracy. It appeals to the masses rather than to the urban mercantile class, which has usually been the backbone of nationalist movements. Internationally it asserts the responsibility of rich states to help poor states, since all are members of the same family of nations and the same brotherhood of man, and it opposes the use of foreign aid as an instrument for fighting the Cold War.[28]

The fifth Pantja Sila principle—belief in God—embraces both the right to freedom of worship and insistence on mutual respect for all religions.[29] He denies the right of any particular religious group to control a state, and thus has opposed demands that Indonesia be made an Islamic state.

These are the principles that Sukarno believes can provide the basis for unity, both within states and within the whole international community. The concept of unity is one of the strongest of

[27]Sukarno is said to have derived his concept from the age-old guided democracy of the Indonesian village which ruled Indonesia, he has asserted, when wild tribes still roamed Europe. It produced a family-like society of mutual help, with all villagers working together on village tasks and assisting neighbors with their house-building, and with open discussion going on in the village councils until the leaders were able to discern a consensus. Its most difficult elements for Westerners to accept are its paternalism and ultimate authoritarianism, although those traits are not entirely alien to the West. Its nationwide application in Indonesia today is much more authoritarian than it was traditionally in the villages. Its kinship with the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism" is apparent. Tribal democracy in Africa has also been found to be similar in some cases. Regarding the point that the consensus finally derived from open discussion is a consensus *defined* by the leader or leaders, Westerners would want to know what kind of a process is used in selecting the leaders.

While the literature on Indonesia indicates that the practice of opposing forces discussing issues until there is a consensus is deeply rooted in Indonesian society, Sukarno seems to have excluded some groups from the process. He refused to deal with the rebels of 1958, for example, although it has been argued that their objective was to force negotiations rather than to fight or overthrow the government. See Reba Lewis, *Indonesia: Troubled Paradise* (New York: David McKay, 1962), p. 92.

[28]*Toward Freedom,* pp. 16-17, 144; Leslie N. Palmier, "Sukarno the Nationalist," *Pacific Affairs,* June 1957, pp. 101-119. See Higgins, *op. cit.,* pp. 128-129 for a list of six principles of Indonesian socialism enunciated at various times by Sukarno.

[29]*Toward Freedom,* p. 18. See Fischer, *op. cit.,* p. 18 for Sukarno's avowal that there is so much basic harmony among all religions that it is possible for him to be a Christian, Moslem and Hindu all at once. Fischer noted that although Sukarno is officially a Moslem, he has pictures of Christ in each of his offices.

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Sukarno's many obsessions—the unity of Indonesia, of Southeast Asia, of the Afro-Asian world, and of all the family of nations. He has admitted that unity is "Sukarno's hobby."[30]

Yet the unified international system that Sukarno yearns to see must be based, he asserts, on the voluntary cooperation of independent equally sovereign states. The states in his system must be freed from all imperialistic controls, from alliances that in any way limit freedom of action, and from the traditional dominant role of the great powers that allowed them to make major decisions for the international community without consulting the lesser powers. While the jewel of sovereign independence may have dimmed for the people of the older states, Sukarno has said, it has not lost all its charm for them; and for the people of the new states sovereign independence is a precious thing. Thus in his new world there would be no such thing as alliances, satellites, colonies, protectorates or spheres of influence—nothing but equally independent states. Nor would there be foreign aid or foreign investment used for political purposes. The multitude of independent states would be held together, supposedly, by a sense of internationalism, tolerance and willingness to settle disputes by discussion-*cum*-consensus. Sukarno is not averse to states surrendering part of their sovereignty to an international organization, but it must be done "freely, unanimously, and equally."[31] We can be assured that any such surrender of sovereignty would not be to the United Nations as now constituted.[32]

The kind of world Sukarno wants would *not,* it seems, be a world dedicated primarily to economic progress and industrialization. Like Gandhi, Nehru and many other Asians, he has advocated—in his Pantja Sila principle of social justice—a prosperity that seems to imply only a modest standard of living, a standard

[30]Indonesian Ministry of Information, *Indonesia,* III, No. 6, 1958, p. 9.

[31]*Toward Freedom,* pp. 123, 125-127. Having accepted the Leninist view that the West is capitalistic and therefore inherently imperialistic, he is much more suspicious of Western than of communist behavior. The fact that the West has done more to restrain Sukarno from time to time than has Moscow or Peking also supports his suspicion. It must be recalled, however, that Sukarno was also suspicious of Soviet behavior until after Stalin's death. And on one occasion (in 1960 following an Indonesian regulation prohibiting aliens, i.e., mostly Chinese, from engaging in retail trade in rural areas), when he thought Peking was attempting to intervene in Indonesian affairs, he retaliated with such vigor that Peking was forced to back down. See Kahin, *op. cit.,* p. 685.

[32]Evidence is flimsy that Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the UN with the objective of creating a rival organization. I see no reason for doubting his statement that he quit the UN chiefly to dramatize the need to reform it. Such dramatic action is in accord with his theory of political behavior.

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that can be attained without much sacrifice of the leisure, graciousness, simplicity, warmth and other merits of the East. Sukarno has not been enthralled by the frantic industrialized society of the West. He is, in fact, so bored by economic matters that he has said they make his head ache. The greatest weakness in his leadership of Indonesia has been his failure to come to grips with economic issues. The economic problems of the new world seem to be equally uncongenial.

The Romanticism of Revolution

Sukarno has given us no clear understanding as to how his new world will be or can be brought into being. By looking at both his statements and his statecraft of the last twenty years, however, it is possible to piece together at least a vague picture of his methodology.

He seems concerned first of all to support those progressive revolutions that are transforming the world. He proclaims proudly that he is obsessed by the spirit and concept of revolution and seems to want man to live forever in a revolutionary atmosphere. He belongs to those, he has said, "who are bound in spiritual longing by the Romanticism of Revolution. I am inspired by it, I am fascinated by it, I am completely absorbed by it, I am crazed, I am obsessed by the Romanticism of Revolution."[33] Successful revolutions are long-term affairs; the failures of the French Revolution and the Sun Yat-sen revolution were due to deviations and the decline of revolutionary fervor. Thus revolutions must be revived repeatedly, gotten back on the right track, and kept going until their goals are reasonably approximated, even if never reached.[34]

This requires struggle, constant struggle, endless struggle. Indeed, no *Weltanschauung* has ever been achieved without struggle. Whether it is the *Weltanschauung* of the Bible, the Koran, the Declaration of Independence, the Communist Manifesto, or *Mein Kampf,* struggle is essential; and struggle is good, for it tempers and strengthens mankind. Thus Sukarno was glad that Indonesian independence had to be achieved in the "midst of war's thunder" and with the "sound of the drums of war and in the fire of war." Had it come peacefully under a clear sky Indonesia would have

[33] *Toward Freedom,* p. 83.
[34] *Ibid.,* pp. 44-48.

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been less vibrant and sturdy.[35] For all of life is a struggle—a struggle that is essential to the development of character and personality.[36]

This struggle implies an adventurous, gambling attitude, a willingness to "dare to plunge into the turbulent unfathomable sea." Nor does Sukarno consider that men, while plunging audaciously forward, should spend much time evaluating the possible consequences of the plunge; they should simply be willing to face life in a daring and adventurous way.[37]

Essential also is the mobilization and activation of the popular will, for mass revolutions cannot be pressed forward if the masses become apathetic. Here is the major task of leadership: to agitate, to maintain an atmosphere of crisis and struggle, to promote pugnacity and the fighting spirit, and to persuade people to be willing to toil, wrestle, sacrifice and be prepared to "spring into a sea of fire to achieve an objective." The leader's job is to "shake, to waken, to move, to intensify the collective will," even to "set fire" to the collective will. For conflict there will surely be, and all conflict is a conflict of wills.[38] Supposedly Sukarno would also use the "startle" or "dramatic action" technique that Gandhi, Nasser, Martin Luther King and others have found so useful to awaken people to the need for change and to rally support.[39]

Sukarno seems to think power politics must be used in these revolutionary struggles. The revolutions are pitting the "old established forces" (OLDEFOS) against the "new emerging forces" (NEFOS) and the battles are not likely to be settled by friendly persuasion, although that would accord with Pantja Sila. His experience with the Dutch taught him that "no class or group in power ever voluntarily surrenders its position." De-

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

[36] *Indonesian Affairs, op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

[37] Indonesian Ministry of Information, *Indonesia, loc. cit.*

[38] *Indonesian Affairs, op. cit.*, pp. 8-10. See also Feith, *op. cit.*, p. 157. Several observers have noted that Sukarno used his campaign for West Irian and his campaign against Malaysia to help revive the Indonesian revolution, which he believes is far from complete. See Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 668-669.

[39] When trying to push a pro-Indonesian resolution on West Irian through the UN, Sukarno threatened that if it failed to be adopted Indonesia would act so as to "startle the world." See Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth McVey, editor, *Indonesia* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1963), pp. 320-321. When the resolution failed of adoption, Sukarno promoted a widespread seizure of Dutch property in Indonesia and supported a campaign to rid the country of 46,000 Dutch nationals. Sukarno's staging of the Games of the New Emerging Forces in 1963 is said to have been an effort to dramatize his "emerging forces concept"; the reason he gave for his withdrawal from the UN was, as mentioned above, a desire to dramatize the need to reform the UN.

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cisions are made on the basis of interest and authority. Power must be opposed by power. "One does not beg for rights, one only fights for them!"[40]

In creating his new world Sukarno shows a decided lack of interest in compromise and legalities. People who are "dynamically revolutionary," he has asserted, are neither possibilists nor legalists. Although compromise might occasionally be strategically necessary, as it was during his struggles with the Japanese and the Dutch, he looks upon it as essentially evil. Unjust international agreements, moreover, should be voided as quickly as possible; when the distribution of power provides such an opportunity, it is one's obligation to void them.[41]

In keeping with the Trotskyite diplomatic tactic of "neither peace nor war," Sukarno appears to regard threats of military action and small military engagements as helpful in maintaining popular fervor, satisfying dissatisfied groups such as youth and army, and keeping his opponents off balance, yet he shrinks from full-scale war. His attitude recalls the old Indonesian saying: "We don't like to fight. We like to negotiate." Nevertheless, some saber rattling and small-scale sword play are considered important to promote negotiation. This was Sukarno's position during the rebellion against the Dutch and during the campaigns for West Irian and against Malaysia.[42]

Sukarno is also a practitioner of "Pavlovian diplomacy" which calls for one to "blow hot and cold," employing alternating and confusing signals that defy rational interpretation and induce the same frustration in foreign offices that the Russian psychologist produced in dogs. For many years, he used this tactic of alternating favors and punishments to keep the army and the Communist Party under control within Indonesia and has applied it to a variety of foreign states. It has not been uncommon for him

[40]*Toward Freedom,* pp. 108-110; Feith, *op. cit.,* p. 159.

[41]*Toward Freedom,* pp. 42-44. Sukarno's Machiavellianism is said to have been evident during his days as a young nationalist in the 1920's when he is reported to have organized "fighting squads" of professional criminals to intimidate and enroll villagers in his movement. His arbitrary swapping of constitutions in 1959 is also said to illustrate his lack of concern with legality. See Kahin, *op. cit.,* p. 664; Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 352-354; Robert Van Niel, "The Course of Indonesian History," in McVey, *op. cit.,* p. 304; Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,* pp. 158-164.

[42]Lewis, *op. cit.,* pp. 95-96; Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," pp. 330, 350-358; *Newsweek,* January 25, 1965, p. 40. It has been noted that the Indonesian rebels of 1958 did not really want to fight either, and that they engaged in military actions simply to force negotiations.

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both to insult and please several governments on the same day, and to make quite a spectacle while doing so.[43]

The revolutionary struggle that Sukarno wants to keep alive and the tactics he applies are aimed at one overriding objective: the completion of the anti-colonial revolution. Just as he thought independence would provide a "golden bridge" to a better society for Indonesians, so he seems to think the extirpation of all vestiges of colonialism will open the door to a better world.[44] About this there must be no compromise. If he favors negotiation to fighting, it is still negotiation for total victory, as he applied it in the campaign for West Irian. The anti-colonial struggle going on throughout Afro-Asia is to Sukarno a single struggle. He sees elements of it also in Latin America, in the Negro movement in the United States and elsewhere. It will not be over until all men everywhere are free. Nor is legal or political freedom enough. There must also be economic and cultural emancipation. Thus, foreign aid, foreign investment, foreign minorities with external allegiances, and imported cultural influences such as dances, music and literature must be viewed with suspicion. At the faintest sign of undue foreign influence—which he equates with colonialism—confiscation of property, expulsion of minorities, bans on imports and similar drastic actions are justifiable. If these acts cause economic loss to a struggling people, it is of no importance. National independence and pride are more valuable than prosperity.[45]

In this anti-colonial struggle Sukarno has shared the common view of the Afro-Asian-communist world that aid to rebellions and wars of liberation is not aggression. Rather, it is a solemn

[43]Grant, *op. cit.*, p. 114; Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,* p. 245; Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 275; Willard A. Hanna, "Three Men and Three Revolutions," *The Reporter,* February 16, 1961, p. 24; *Time,* February 9, 1962, p. 25.

[44]It must be said to Sukarno's credit that he has never been afflicted with the illusion that independence alone would do any more than provide the bridge or open the door to a wider opportunity for colonial peoples to attack their problems. He made a clear statement on this as early as 1945. See *Toward Freedom,* pp. 4-7.

[45]*Ibid.*, pp. 27-28, 58-59, 65; Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-230, 300; Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 685; Denis Warner, "Malaysia: A Tempting Target," *The Reporter,* November 5, 1964, p. 44; *Newsweek,* October 5, 1964, p. 84. Note that Sukarno has applied this policy without regard to friend or foe. He has taken vigorous action against states on both sides of the Cold War when he suspected them of attempting to exert too much influence on Indonesia. When, in March 1964, he told the United States to "Go to hell with your aid!" he was not expressing a new policy. Egypt's President Nasser, and many other Afro-Asian leaders, have expressed the same view many times. Although there is nothing unique about status being more prized than prosperity, many Americans have had difficulty in understanding it in Afro-Asians.

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duty in the cause of freedom. Thus efforts to aid rebels in the form of training, supplies, volunteers, guerrilla raids and the like are noble deeds worth boasting about if they promote independence and the destruction of imperialism.[46]

Sukarno also shares the view common in the underdeveloped world that the West has an obligation to help the developing states because much of its wealth has come from colonial exploitation and much of the backwardness of the ex-colonies is the result of the West having kept them backward. But all foreign aid should be without strings, without even the faintest sign that the aid will limit the freedom of action of the recipient.[47]

The leadership of Sukarno's "Universal Revolution" that is creating a new world will naturally come from the "new emerging forces," that 75 per cent of the world consisting of Afro-Asian-Latin American-communist peoples. While the NEFOS have learned much from the West, and must still learn their science and technology from this source, he thinks the Afro-Asians, particularly, are looking more and more to their own accumulated experience and wisdom for guidance. Inspired as they have been by the Declaration of Independence and the Communist Manifesto, the Afro-Asian NEFOS intend to chart their own path; and in so doing they might produce a message and a methodology for the whole world.[48]

Sukarno asserts that in this movement Indonesia is already one of the leaders, for several reasons: (1) she was the first of the Asian states to proclaim her independence; (2) she was the initiator, through the Bandung Conference, of Afro-Asian cooperation to create a "New World"; (3) she "understands the needs of the times" (better than most states, he implies); and (4) she has produced an ideology—the Pantja Sila—for the new world.[49] He is confident that in due time Indonesia will move into the ranks of the major powers. Since Sukarno took command of foreign affairs in 1958 he has promoted his country's prestige with vigor and flamboyance.[50] He looks forward to Indonesia's

[46]Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 684; Warner, *op. cit.*, p. 36; Russell N. Fifield, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 156-157; *Newsweek*, September 21, 1964, p. 50 and October 5, 1964, p. 84.
[47]*Toward Freedom*, pp. 30-31, 33-34.
[48]*Ibid.*, pp. 136-138.
[49]*Ibid.*, pp. 72, 89, 113-114.
[50]Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, p. 595. The prestige drive has included building such status symbols as a steel plant, an atomic reactor, stadia for Asian games, and luxury hotels. It has also included Sukarno's many foreign tours and his entertainment of foreign leaders in Indonesia.

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more than doubling her present 100 million population on the assumption that by proper exploitation of her resources she can feed 250 million.[51] Although his general theory implies total opposition to the concept of spheres of influence, it is possible to infer from Indonesia's behavior that Sukarno has at least a subconscious urge to be the leading power in Southeast Asia and Oceania.[52]

Conclusions

On the assumption that Sukarno's world view is shared in large measure by other nationalist revolutionaries, it is possible to make a few generalizations about them:

(1) There seems no doubt that the nationalist revolutionaries of our time perceive themselves and their states as riders on the wave of the future; while they have no clear picture of where they are going, they are convinced it is toward a better future, and they glory and exult in the ride they are taking.

(2) The nationalist revolutionaries' view of the West was formed, in many cases, during the colonial epoch; thus, they learned little about the reforms instituted in the democratic and capitalist systems of the West over the last thirty years. They have retained a largely nineteenth-century picture of the West that is not likely to change during the remainder of their lives. Since they are indoctrinating their people with this out-of-date stereotype, their distorted and hostile views will color attitudes toward the West for a long time.

(3) Many Afro-Asian nationalist revolutionaries tend to judge other states by only one criterion—their record on colonialism. The record of the West, especially that of the United States, has been ambivalent, supporting independence one day and opposing it (at least indirectly) another day, depending on the demands of the Cold War. This has tended to confirm the Afro-

[51] *Newsweek*, October 5, 1964, p. 84.

[52] Debate on whether or not Sukarno has imperialistic ambitions has been limited to speculation with virtually no empirical evidence on either side. Pauker (*op. cit.*, p. 625) states that while there are imperialistic individuals and groups in Indonesia, Sukarno is not one of them. Other observers have been less generous. See Denis Warner, "Australia Girds for Defense," *The Reporter*, March 11, 1965, p. 20 and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "This War in Borneo: Whose Side Are We On?," in *ibid.*, June 4, 1964, pp. 16-20. I have found no reason to doubt Sukarno's explanation for his opposition to Malaysia. Originally he approved its creation, but when he concluded, rightly or wrongly, that it was to be a means of perpetuating British influence in the area, he turned against it. Obviously, he wants to get the British out of the area just as he drove the Dutch out; but it does not necessarily follow that he covets Malaysian territory for Indonesia.

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Asian conviction that the West is still imperialistic. At the same time the much clearer anti-colonial stance of the USSR and Communist China has produced an image of these states as the champions of anti-imperialism; thus the revolutionaries have been blind to communist imperialism.

(4) The leaders of the non-Western world proclaim ideals of great merit, but their claim that these ideals have universal validity does not stand up under close analysis. They are to be commended for their insistence that nationalism be diluted with internationalism, their reluctance to swap the leisure and graciousness of the East for the frantic urbanism of the West, and their stress on unity; yet their interpretation of democracy as government *for* the people rather than *by* the people is not likely to find acceptance in the more sophisticated political systems of the West.

(5) The nationalist revolutionary's method of creating the new world is the most questionable part of his theory. There is a glaring gap between the ends proposed and the means proposed to achieve those ends. Sukarno's new world based on the ideals of the Pantja Sila would be produced by fomenting turmoil and struggle, by promoting daring adventures, and by glorifying the "fires of war." He advocates the perpetuation of Machiavellian power politics, opposition to compromise, militancy, emphasis on status symbols, alegalism, "Pavlovian" diplomacy and many other practices that are likely to produce a far different world than the kind he wants.

Yet none of this should surprise us. Modern psychology tells us that no animal has yet been found to be as contradictory as man.

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THE OCEANS—A NEW FRONTIER FOR AMERICA'S PUBLIC POLICY?*

by Victor Basiuk

IN no other era of American history has technology afforded so many new opportunities and perils in so short a period of time as during the post-World War II decades. Developments in technology have led the United States, within the span of some twenty years, to undertake two national programs that, for peacetime, have been unprecedented in magnitude: the nuclear-missile program and the exploration of outer space. In recent years it has been suggested that technology discloses new opportunities, if not imperatives, for a third major national effort, namely, the exploitation of the potential of the oceans.

Technology and National Endeavors

In retrospect, one can detect an element of melioristic progress in the succession of technological impacts and the corresponding national response. The massive production of nuclear weapons and of the means of their delivery was essential to the nation's survival. It was a "negative" effort, however, in the sense that this was not clearly a use of technology to achieve a "constructive" goal. The missile-nuclear race was thrust upon the United States; we sought to defend ourselves and our allies against a threat from the outside. Politically, it has been a "power-unrewarding" area inasmuch as U.S. endeavors in nuclear weaponry could not over the long run significantly alter the world distribution of power. Because of the highly destructive nature of nuclear weapons and, hence, the unwillingness to use them, even an overwhelming nuclear superiority has but limited transferability into political power.

The situation has been complicated further by the relative successes of the Soviet Union in developing nuclear technology. After a certain point in weapons development had been reached, U.S. technological achievements have merely been pitted against those

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of the Soviets and the two powers have tended to neutralize each other. While qualitative breakthroughs in nuclear-missile technology are distinctly possible, quantitatively the activity in this area is beginning to show signs of relative decline. In turn, this carries a promise of release of resources for a more "constructive" undertaking.

America's development of space technology and her move into outer space provide greater satisfaction. Although the space effort was launched with an eye on a potential strengthening of the American military posture, it distinctly involved an element of choice, and the choice made reflects a deliberate act to use technology to benefit the nation in both the short and long run. Space achievements enhance the international image and political influence of the United States as a foremost technological leader, provide scientific and technological "spin-off" which stimulates the nation's economy, and strengthen the pride and confidence of Americans in the dynamic vitality of their nation. Unlike the arms race, the move into outer space is not dead end; it delineates a scientific, psychological and physical frontier of national endeavor.

The space effort, however, has never lacked critics. It has been charged that the effort is too expensive, the benefits too small or too intangible for the money spent, and that the allocated resources could be put to better use. With the growing promise of technologies pertaining to the utilization of the oceans' potential, this criticism is assuming a somewhat different character. In addition to the usual arguments about the limited benefits of the space activity (in particular, of the lunar landing), it is said that the most important new frontier for national endeavor lies here on earth—in the oceans. In this area, it is asserted, the potential benefits are distinct and extensive.

This juxtaposition of outer space and the oceans is unfortunate. It tends to reduce the problem of the search for new frontiers of national endeavor to a struggle between vested interests. To be sure, this nation's resources are limited and choices have to be made in the light of this fact. On the other hand, one should not overlook the significant areas of complementarity between the space effort and the exploitation of the oceans, such as the use of satellites and oceanographic knowledge for weather control. It is also entirely possible that a number of scientific and technological advances made in connection with the space program can

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be applied to an oceanic effort. Lastly, in viewing an oceanic program as a competitor of space exploration, one should keep in mind that the space effort is irreversible and has its own rationale. If an oceanic program holds the promise of paying major dividends to this nation, it should be expected to stand or fall on its own merits. The United States is still by far the richest country in the world and, if need be, can afford to invest additional resources in a promising undertaking.

There is a more fundamental politico-social element that would link a national oceanic program with both the space and the nuclear-missile efforts. The unifying rationale of our prodigious technological endeavors of the post-World War II period has been that of enhancing national power and vitality. It is precisely in this light that an oceanic program should be evaluated. If the potential of a national oceanic endeavor is as great as its advocates claim, it should be the next step in ensuring this country's power and vitality for this and future generations. Thus, such apparently diverse endeavors as the nuclear-missile program, the space effort, and a design for exploitation of the oceans can coexist and complement one another. The national interest, however, may require a shifting of emphasis from one program to another (or greater stress on certain aspects of each), depending on current needs and available technology.

Great Britain: the Rule of the World Through the Oceans

In order to understand the potential the oceans offer in the present, it is instructive to look to the recent past. In this respect, Great Britain's rise to world power through her mastery of the seas and the causes of her decline provide a helpful perspective.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Great Britain succeeded in dominating world politics by taking advantage of sea power—using the term in its broad meaning, which encompasses both military and nonmilitary elements. The British were able to gain predominance because sea power then was the only truly mobile form of power. Militarily, it enabled Great Britain to project her armed forces to any point on the globe and to achieve a local victory *before* a land-based power was capable of mobilizing its forces and transporting them to the battlefield. The foot soldier, even partially aided by the horse, was too slow. When manpower *was* brought in on time, the means of overland supply were fre-

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quently inadequate to sustain an effective military effort against the mobile British forces. Perhaps the best illustration of the advantage of sea power in this respect occurred during the Crimean War of 1853-1856, when limited British and French naval and sea-transported forces defeated the great Russian Empire on its own territory. In the nonmilitary sphere, one arm of sea power—the merchant marine—was, in those days, *the* significant instrument of trade. This gave the British a decisive commercial advantage.

The most important single reason for the decline of Britain's ascendancy lay in the rise of overland transportation—the steam railroad and, later, the automobile. These technological instruments greatly increased the mobility of land powers. No longer was it possible to achieve local victory with small naval forces along the coastal areas of land powers. The latter were now capable of mobilizing their military forces and throwing them into the battle within weeks, if not days.

Even more importantly, overland transportation enabled land powers to develop their resources located in hinterland areas hitherto inaccessible to effective exploitation. In this respect, overland transportation possessed a major advantage over sea transportation. Because nearly all recognized natural resources were located on land, overland transport had a developmental capability which sea transportation, despite its mobility and relative cheapness, could not match. When a merchant ship sails between London and New York, she exchanges commodities between the two cities and contributes to the economic growth of these cities and their environs. When a freight train moves between New York and San Francisco, it not only contributes to the economic development of the two widely separated terminals, but it develops resources and contributes to the economic growth of scores of localities en route.

Accordingly, the rise of overland transportation made possible the emergence of new land-based industrial giants—the United States, Germany and Russia. Unlike land powers in the past, these continental giants were capable of a high degree of mobility. As a result, Great Britain's relative power position declined.

The New Technology and New Horizons

What are the emerging elements that endow the oceans with new significance? Do these elements suggest a reascendancy of sea

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power comparable to that of the mid-nineteenth century? The answer to the latter question, obviously, is "no." There is no way of turning the clock back to the era when land powers lacked mobility and land-based resources were not integrated and developed. Moreover, instruments of national power have become so complex and diversified that no single instrument enjoys a genuinely overriding significance. This is true even though the military capability of contemporary sea power has exceeded the wildest dreams of the British Admiralty in the days of Palmerston: the Polaris system is capable of rendering mass destruction to strategic centers of land-based nations located thousands of miles away from the coast.

Despite these qualifications, the fact remains that we appear to be on the threshold of a major change in the historical pattern —a change which opens up opportunities to augment national power by taking advantage of the oceans. New technology and the present pattern of economic demands are changing the function of the oceans from mere routes of transportation to significant sources of raw materials. The new technology allows mankind to exploit oceanic resources—foodstuffs and minerals—on an increasingly large scale. At the same time, the demand for foodstuffs to feed the burgeoning world population and the continuous depletion of land-based mineral resources induce nations to look to the oceans for help in solving their economic problems.

Aside from resource benefits, scientific and technological mastery of the oceans could lead to major advances in activities that will benefit national economies on land. For example, reliable weather forecasting—which involves a study of the interaction between the oceans and the atmosphere—would make long-range planning more feasible and thus effect large savings and increased productivity in both industry and agriculture.

All of these new developments promise ocean-oriented nations precisely the element Great Britain lacked in competing with the rising continental giants and their vast resources: an effective means—which the ship alone was not—for increasing her economic potential through the use of the seas. The basic instrument for taking advantage of this new potential is the science of oceanography leading to marine technologies.

The evidence of the rising significance of ocean-based economic benefits is manifold. The wealth of the continental shelf and the resultant claims and territorial appropriations—which now extend

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for hundreds of miles—are but some of the more obvious examples. Abundant deposits of manganese nodules, containing from 20 to 50 per cent of manganese, up to 2 per cent each of cobalt and nickel, and up to 3 per cent of copper, are found on the deep ocean floor. According to some authorities, the nodules can be economically mined at this time, with far-reaching implications for national economies deficient in these metals. The recent technological breakthroughs in the production of clinically pure and odorless fish protein concentrate which could be readily added to most foods and would assume their flavor, carry great promise for solving the world's nutrition problem. The commercial possibility of extracting industrial minerals and drugs from sea water; the present production of magnesium which comes mainly from the sea; new techniques for harvesting the oceans; improvement and greater economy of sea transportation for commerce and pleasure; desalination of water in conjunction with extraction of minerals—all these are further examples of economic benefits that marine research holds for mankind.

A recent study by the National Academy of Sciences, entitled "Economic Benefits from Oceanographic Research," estimated that, through oceanographic research, within ten to fifteen years the United States can expect a net increase of new production of $2.7 billion annually, and a net saving to the national economy of $2.9 billion annually. By the study's admission, this is a conservative estimate which does not take into consideration potential scientific and technological breakthroughs, and is based solely on the projected Federal increase in oceanographic expenditures from $196 million in fiscal year 1965 to an average of $280 million annually in the next ten to fifteen years.[1] The study does not attempt to measure the results of a truly accelerated program which would take into account needs beyond our borders, such as those of the underdeveloped countries receiving U.S. foreign aid. Similarly, the NAS study does not examine the possible effect of governmental subsidies in the area of development, in addition to research.

In this connection, one might ask: Is there any particular need for accelerating the development of technologies for utilization of

[1]Both figures include oceanographic expenditures for defense, whose benefits to the national economy have not been estimated by the National Academy of Sciences. In the case of the projected figure of $280 million, the defense share amounts to about $114 million. Therefore, the cited benefits are expected to be produced by the $166 million of the nondefense appropriations.

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the oceans? Why not let marine research and development proceed in response to economic demands as they emerge? The answer is rather compelling: The problem of developing technologies for utilization of the oceans' potential is not narrowly economic; it is linked to the problem of national power and vitality. The economic factor is highly important, but political and military considerations are hardly less essential. Under international law, the vast area of the oceans—some 70 per cent of the earth's surface—is the common property of all nations. Historically, however, it was mainly technological capability and preponderance of power that molded the law, and not the other way around. Acquisition of marine space will come in the wake of technological capability for exploitation, and the recent national appropriations of resources of the continental shelf are merely a portent of future developments. The United States possesses a technological potential vastly superior to that of any other country in the world, and she enjoys an unusually favorable geographic position with respect to the oceans. These assets can be crucial in developing the new potential of the seas.

Responding to New Opportunities

Given foresight and determination, a nation can expand opportunities even against unfavorable odds—as the Soviet Union appears to be doing. Although a power with limited access to the oceans, the USSR is expanding its merchant marine fleet so rapidly that it is expected to surpass the American fleet's carrying capacity at sea in the 1970's. Its catch of fish, twice as large as that of the United States, places the USSR third among the nations in quantity of fish caught. The Soviet Union is engaged in building fishing stations all over the globe, and its large fishing fleet provides a base of operations for its oceanographic effort which is quantitatively, though not qualitatively, superior to that of the United States. For a land-oriented country that has only recently launched a major effort in oceanography, this is an achievement of consequence. To be sure, the Soviets' oceanic program does not have a resource backing comparable to that which they are devoting to outer space. However, present Soviet activities in the oceans have significant implications for future Soviet power, strategic and economic, and may merely foreshadow things to come.

Does our own activity in the oceanic realm demonstrate an

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adequate awareness of the potential offered by the oceans to the nation's economy and international power? On the non-military side of the picture, the sad state of the American merchant marine and the fishing industry (the United States imports over 60 per cent of the fish its people consume) indicates a negative answer. On the other hand, there is evidence that this awareness is spreading, and that some remedial action is forthcoming in both the private and public sectors of the American society. Major companies have begun to turn increasing attention to the resource potential of the oceans. Union Carbide and General Precision established an affiliate, Ocean Systems, Inc., with the purpose of developing oceanic resources. Lockheed and Westinghouse are also engaged in ocean-oriented research and development. In Februrary 1965, a new center for oceanic research was established by seven southern universities at a projected cost of $25 million. Within the U.S. government the Interagency Committee on Oceanography (ICO), established in 1959, has done a great deal to strengthen the oceanographic efforts of the various governmental agencies. The potential of oceanography in other fields, hitherto unexplored, has begun to receive attention. In April 1965, the Department of State, the National Academy of Sciences and the Interagency Committee on Oceanography jointly sponsored a conference on the role of oceanography in foreign affairs.

Several bills attempting to promote ocean-based activities were introduced in Congress. By and large, however, these bills did not enjoy the support of the administration, and they encountered difficulties in the legislative process. A major breakthrough in this respect was made in the summer of 1966, when the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 was approved by both the House and the Senate and signed by the President on June 17.

If it receives adequate Congressional and Executive support, this act can do for the exploitation of the oceans what the National Space Act of 1958 has done for the exploration of outer space, although at present it fails to provide a firm institutional foundation. The act establishes the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, which will be composed of the Secretaries of the principal Departments concerned with the oceans, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of the National Science Founda-

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tion. The Chairman of the Council will be the Vice President of the United States. A major purpose of the Council will be to develop a comprehensive policy with respect to the oceans. The National Council, however, is not a permanent institution. An *ad hoc* commission, created by the act to study the manifold problems of marine development, is expected to recommend a governmental organization plan. The provisions of the act with respect to the Council will expire four months after the submission of the commission's report, which presumably will be followed by the establishment of a permanent institutional framework for oceanic development.

Creation of appropriate institutions for coping with a problem as challenging as that presented by the oceans is highly important, but it will not necessarily provide a solution. It is essential that the principal interests engaged in the exploitation of the oceans be represented in the new national institutions (as appears to be the case under the recently enacted law), and it is of equal, or perhaps greater, importance that in the actual functioning of the institutions these interests make every effort to strengthen each other's operations. The three principal interests involved—economic-industrial, foreign policy, and military—are basically interdependent, and unless this fact is fully recognized and implemented in actual programs, an effective exploitation of the oceans will be delayed.

Because the United States is reasonably well endowed with natural resources and has access to raw materials outside its borders, there is no strong domestic economic pressure at the moment to develop ocean resources. Thus, if left to the industrial sector alone, oceanic development may proceed at a slow pace for a number of years. However, when U.S. political and military interests are considered, the case for developing marine technologies appears in an entirely new light. The United States is committed to providing billions of dollars in foreign aid to underdeveloped countries whose food and resource problems can be solved, in part, by oceanic research and development. Technologies that the United States can help to develop for these countries in the very near future may cut down our foreign aid bill or increase its effectiveness. They are also likely to constitute a sound investment in our own economy, for in the years to come, as our population grows and as the availability of competing

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land-based resources diminishes, we must be ready to utilize these technologies to full advantage at home.

Under circumstances where political, economic and other factors are reasonably favorable, the exploitation of oceanic resources affords broad opportunities for international cooperation with possible political as well as economic rewards. The case of the Western nations bordering on the Atlantic Ocean—the Atlantic Community—provides an example. The West European nations are deficient in a number of natural resources—considerably more so than the United States—and an effective exploitation of the Atlantic and its adjacent seas would enable them to improve greatly their resource situation. A joint United States-European program would not only significantly speed up the economic exploitation of the oceans, but would create functional ties which might eventually make the Atlantic Community a politically viable entity.

Other political or military interests will be closely affected by the development of oceanic resources. If a manganese mining establishment on the ocean bottom near India, or in another strategic area, can become a paying proposition for private enterprise only fifteen or twenty years from now, how much would it be worth to the U.S. government if it is producing in five years? In pursuit of its political or military interests, would the U.S. government be willing to pay the difference to make it worthwhile for American industry to undertake the effort? Conversely, the scientific and technological advances gained from the U.S. Navy's activity in oceanography, when properly channeled to the nonmilitary sector, may result in significant short-cuts and savings for industry.

Guidelines for a National Maritime Effort

These considerations suggest two things. First, a close practical cooperation among the three principal interests involved—economic-industrial, foreign policy, and military—accompanied by a keen appreciation of the actual or potential areas of mutual support, is critical to the success of exploiting the oceans. Second, exploitation of the oceans cannot be measured by strictly economic values; it must be viewed in terms of cost-benefits to the entire nation (including its military and foreign policy interests) today as well as years from now. Our annual investment of $5 billion in the conquest of outer space is, in part, indicative

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of the value we ascribe to political, psychological and military factors in such efforts to explore new frontiers. The potential of the oceans, when exploited with a sense of national purpose, provides benefits analogous to those of the conquest of outer space *plus* the advantages of tangible economic rewards.

Along with close cooperation among the principal interests, a thorough survey and analysis of social needs and scientific-technological possibilities is a *sine qua non* of a comprehensive national maritime effort. The concept of the oceans as a new national frontier can capture the imagination of the American people, but one should be careful not to build castles on sand. A major maritime effort makes sense only if it pays off—economically, politically, or militarily. Considerable evidence exists that it will pay off in all of these areas, but before the nation engages in wholesale public and private institution-building for this purpose, we need a realistic blueprint of what is achievable. There has been no overall analysis of how the oceans can contribute to national needs—in the broad sense in which they have been discussed here—even though there have been studies on some isolated segments of the problem. The recently enacted Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act provides for "a comprehensive investigation and study of all aspects of marine science in order to recommend an overall plan for an adequate national oceanographic program that will meet the present and future national needs." While the intent is promising, it does not guarantee that the right kind of studies will be undertaken.

Because of the integral relationship of the three principal interests involved in a maritime public policy, such a study cannot be produced by any one of them independently of the others. To provide the needed balance and intellectual insight, the study has to be a joint effort of individuals from the government, universities, scientific institutions and business. It must suggest a system of priorities and timing, and show how different results can be achieved with resource inputs of variable magnitude and in response to likely scientific-technological breakthroughs. In the last analysis, the challenge of the oceans provides a challenge of how successfully we can plan and control technological capabilities to enhance the interests of the nation for many decades to come. One can ill afford to do this in an overly zealous or haphazard fashion.

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Social needs, and even more technology, undergo continuous change: a blueprint for policy is fully adequate for only a limited period of time. Therefore, it is important to monitor social needs and scientific-technological potential on a continuous basis. Only in this fashion can the nation bring technology under control in pursuit of its interests and, conversely, avoid falling victim to technology either because it failed to foresee the implications of technological development or because some other nation took advantage of the potential more effectively than did the United States.

The Future: National Interest in an International Context

It is not too early to consider the implications of America's oceanic activities for foreign affairs several decades from now. As technologies for exploiting the oceans develop and proliferate globally—as they undoubtedly will—areas of conflict are bound to increase. The present law of the sea has been rendered obsolete in many respects by recent technological developments; unless a deliberate remedial effort is made, new marine technologies will further aggravate the situation. The future technological capability of establishing national claims on the bottom of the oceans carries dangerous implications for international stability. America's policy toward the oceans and their national or international exploitation will be a major factor in molding the future law of the sea.

It would appear to be to America's advantage to develop as an integral part of its own oceanic policy an international cooperative program in which the United States would play a leading part and which would have as one of its purposes the promotion of international stability. In thus acting in accordance with the principle of enlightened self-interest, the United States may have to forgo certain obvious immediate advantages of unilateral action—such as relative freedom in decision-making—but it is likely to be more than compensated by long-range benefits that would derive from international cooperation.

Given their global dimensions, the oceans can be exploited most effectively if the research and surveying is carried out on an international cooperative basis. If the United States undertakes a narrowly national effort, in the absence of relevant legal and regulatory institutions, access to areas critically significant for research or concerted development may be impeded or denied

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for political reasons. Geography also imposes economic limitations: even if politically feasible, a global network of support activities for a comprehensive oceanic program, run and manned centrally from the United States, is likely to prove expensive, thus impeding rapid progress. On the other hand, locally developed (perhaps with initial assistance from the United States) and locally supported marine activities could go far in stimulating the overall endeavor.

In summary, the United States appears to be facing three alternatives with respect to the oceans: First, the government can choose to let the various domestic ocean-related interests pursue their goals independently, with no overall purpose. This would mean, among other things, that the exploitation of oceanic resources would be left primarily to American private enterprise without government support—a situation which would result in relatively slow progress. Another likely consequence of this course of action would be a lopsided and overlapping growth of marine institutions in private enterprise and the government. Second, the United States can choose to develop a national program, which would give support to the various interests concerned and would result in a purposeful, tightly coordinated effort. This effort, although much more effective than the first alternative, would be strictly national and thus subject to the limitations and disadvantages of a national response to an international challenge. Third, the United States can launch its oceanic program as the nucleus of an international—or initially regional —endeavor which, if organized and conducted with foresight, would be the most effective way of taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the oceans.

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SOVIET INTERVENTION IN MANCHURIA, 1945-1946*

by Raymond L. Garthoff

RUSSIA has been actively involved in the affairs of Manchuria since the late nineteenth century. The Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin retained its interest in the area. In 1929 the Red Army actually occupied several towns in Manchuria in order to maintain Soviet management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was harassed by the local Chinese warlord, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. Also in 1929, Soviet military forces in the Far East had been constituted as the substantially autonomous Special Red Banner Far Eastern Front.

With the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, Soviet interests in that region became counterposed to those of Japan. The first major point of friction arose from an incident at Mukden in September 1931 involving the Soviet-owned Chinese Eastern Railway, and tension continued over the next four years until the Kremlin eventually sold this precarious asset to the Japanese-puppet regime of Manchukuo in 1935. A series of more or less serious border incidents, beginning in 1935, culminated in large pitched engagements at Lake Khasan (Changkufeng) in July-August 1938, and Khalkhin-Gol' (Nomonhan) from May to September 1939. At Khalkhin-Gol' on the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier, the Soviet Union eventually put into the field a force of several divisions, with 500 tanks and 500 aircraft. In general, over the decade from 1931 to 1941 Soviet relations with Japan, particularly over Manchuria, remained tense and hostile.

The German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 either coincided with, or led to, Japanese consideration of the possibility of making war on the USSR. However, at an Imperial Conference on July 2, 1941, it was decided to proceed with occupation of French Indochina, putting aside for the time the question of undertaking operations against the Soviet Union.[1]

*This article will be included in a forthcoming book, *Sino-Soviet Military Relations*, edited by Dr. Garthoff, to be published by Frederick A. Praeger.

[1]See Saburo Hayashi in collaboration with Alvin Coox, *Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War*, translated from the Japanese (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Association, 1959), pp. 19-20.

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The Soviets claim that in October 1941 Japan developed a secret "Plan for Administering the Territories of Greater Eastern Asia," which included Soviet territory. The Maritime Provinces, reportedly, were to be made part of Manchukuo, and Soviet deportees were to be replaced by Japanese colonists.[2] Whether or not that particular allegation is true, we know that, beginning in August 1941, the Japanese in two months doubled their forces in Manchuria (from nearly 400,000 to nearly 700,000 men) under cover of "special maneuvers," and by January 1, 1942 had placed fully one-third of the Japanese Army—1,100,000 men—in Manchuria and Korea.[3] And this occurred at the time of full Japanese commitment in China and after initiation of war with the United States.

Japan's contingency buildup in Manchuria would have permitted her to move rapidly had the Germans been victorious in the West, and since the Japanese Navy was at that stage bearing the burden of the Pacific and South Seas offensives, this may have seemed a feasible option for Tokyo to keep open. But the Germans were turned back short of Moscow, and the United States showed no disposition to settle for Japanese mastery of the Western Pacific. Accordingly, despite the fact that the Soviets had been compelled to withdraw large forces from Siberia for the German front, the Japanese decided not to attack the USSR.

There was a tacit Soviet-Japanese moratorium on hostile actions toward one another from April 1941, following the signature of a nonaggression pact between the two states, until late 1944. The Soviets, however, claim that the Japanese detained illegally 178 Soviet vessels, and sank three, in the years 1941 through 1944.[4] The first small armed border incident after 1939 occurred at Wuchiatzu (near Lake Khasan) in July 1944; judging from Japanese records and the general situation, it would appear that it reflected the start of Soviet probing. Similar incidents occurred at Mongoshili on the Mongolian border in August, on the eastern

[2]*Istoriya velikoi otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1941-1945* (*History of the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*), Vol. 5 (Moscow, 1963), pp. 524-525. (Hereafter cited as *IVOVSS.*)

[3]Marshal R. Malinovsky, *Krasnaya zvezda* (*Red Star*), September 2, 1965. All Soviet accounts give the Japanese increase in August 1941 as 300,000 to 600,000; Colonel Hayashi, who was in a position to know, gives the figures 400,000 to 700,000 (*op. cit.*, p. 20). In all other respects, there is agreement in the Russian and Japanese accounts.

[4]Malinovsky, *op. cit.*

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border of Manchuria at Kuangfengtao in October, and at Hutou in December 1944.[5]

Soviet cordiality toward Japanese diplomats in Moscow declined noticeably during 1944. It did not pass without notice in Tokyo that while Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov himself had greeted the Japanese Ambassador at the reception on November 7, 1943, his deputy Andrei Vyshinsky substituted on May Day, 1944, and by November 7, 1944 only the chief of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Foreign Office, Dmitri Zhukov, deigned to be seen with the Japanese plenipotentiary. Finally, in his speech of November 7, 1944, Stalin castigated Japan as an "aggressor," following articles which appeared in the summer and fall of that year on such themes as Japanese barbarity in the intervention at the time of the Russian civil war.

In talks with his Western allies, Stalin had taken the initiative in stating at the Moscow Conference, in October 1943, that the USSR would join the war against Japan after Germany was defeated. At Tehran in November, he added that while Soviet forces then in the Far East were adequate for defense, a threefold increase would be required before they would be ready to initiate offensive operations. Also at Tehran, President Roosevelt presented Stalin with several questions prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including both a request for Soviet military intelligence on Japan, and a request for the Soviets to indicate what "direct or indirect assistance" they could provide in case the United States launched an attack on the northern Kuriles. Subsequently, the Soviets provided intelligence information, but deferred discussion of the "other questions," including the Kuriles.[6]

In October 1944, Stalin agreed to missions for the Soviet military forces in the Far East that had been suggested by the United States, mainly occupation of Manchuria and southern Sakhalin.

[5]*Study of the Strategical and Tactical Peculiarities of Far Eastern Russia and Soviet Far East Forces,* Japanese Special Studies on Manchuria (Tokyo: Military History Section, Headquarters [U.S.] Army Forces Far East, 1955), Vol. XIII, 43; and *Japanese Preparations for Operations in Manchuria, January 1943-August 1945,* Japanese Monograph No. 138, Military History Section, Headquarters (U.S.) Army Forces Far East (hereafter abbreviated MHS, AFFE), Tokyo, 1953, pp. 82-89.

[6]The most convenient authoritative summary source for these American-Soviet exchanges is *The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945* (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 1955). On the Moscow and Tehran Conferences, see this source, pp. 22-27; also see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943* (Washington: GPO, 1963), Vol. 1, 513-781, for the Moscow Conference, and *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran* (Washington: GPO, 1961), *passim.*

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He stated that Soviet forces would be ready to move about three months after the end of the war in Europe, after doubling the number of their divisions in the Far East. At that time Stalin accepted the idea of U.S. operations in the Kuriles before the Soviet Union entered the war. He again expressed agreement to American requests for bomber bases and use of the Petropavlovsk naval base. In general, in repeated discussions throughout most of 1944, the Soviets agreed in principle to later American use of bomber bases in Siberia for B-29 raids on Japan; but on December 16, General Alexei Antonov gave a completely negative answer on that question, reflecting either a new or (more likely) newly-revealed firm Soviet decision against the long-standing American request.[7]

On December 14, 1944, Stalin for the first time spelled out, to Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, Soviet war aims: annexation of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, "restoration" of former Russian holdings in Manchuria, and recognition of the status quo, i.e., communist rule, in Mongolia. On February 8, 1945, at the Yalta Conference, the Western powers accepted these Soviet claims, and agreed to urge their acceptance by Chiang Kai-shek as well.[8]

There has been much postwar controversy in the United States about the Yalta agreements. It is, therefore, perhaps worth noting that in November 1944, and again immediately prior to the Yalta Conference, on January 24, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remarked that while they no longer considered Soviet participation in the war as essential, "We desire Russian entry into the war against Japan at the earliest date commensurate with her ability to engage in offensive operations and are prepared to offer the maximum support possible without prejudice to our main effort against Japan." These JCS assessments also observed that in any case the Soviet Union would no doubt enter the war in its own self-interest, regardless of our position.[9]

II

By February 27, 1945, the Japanese had received their first

[7] *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 28-38. See also *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington: GPO, 1955), pp. 361-383.

[8] *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 46-49.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 38-45; the quotation cited is on p. 43. For the relevant background and discussions at Yalta, including the text of this JCS study, see *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, op. cit.*, pp. 385-400 and 549-965. The JCS paper is given in full on pp. 388-393.

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intelligence on Soviet troop movements to the Far East. On March 5, they learned about the Soviet promise at Yalta to attack three months after the defeat of Germany. (Japanese intelligence on this point was confirmed to them by Ribbentrop in Berlin, from German intelligence.) On April 5, 1945, the Soviet Union publicly denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. (It was due to expire on April 26, 1946, but could be denounced at any time, to be effective one year after the denunciation; in other words, the Soviets were still legally bound not to attack Japan until April 5, 1946.) From May through June, in addition to intelligence on Soviet movements of troops and supplies across Siberia, the Japanese took note of the recall of an unusual number of Soviet diplomats and dependents from Japan.[10]

Despite these growing indications of Soviet intent to attack, in April 1945 the Japanese began extending peace feelers through Moscow.[11] These overtures were not, however, transmitted by Stalin to the United States.

In April the United States gave up the effort to get Soviet agreement to American use of Siberian air and naval bases, and the projected Pacific supply route. On May 28 Stalin assured Harry Hopkins that the Soviets would attack during August. He also declared the Soviet desire to receive the Japanese surrender in northern Hokkaido, and to participate in the occupation of Japan. Finally, he noted Soviet intentions to occupy the Kuriles, since their annexation by the Soviet Union had already been agreed to.[12]

On May 21, 1945, in reply to a query from the U.S. Secretary of State, the Secretary of War stressed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan for its own purposes, and that the most we could hope to do was to get some political concessions toward China. A War Department assessment concluded that the United States could not in any case pre-emptively intercede in the areas of intended Soviet military operations, except in the Kuriles, and there only at the expense of other planned operations against Japan.[13] The United States therefore accepted the Soviet decision to occupy the Kuriles, but declined Moscow's request to take the surrender in northern Hokkaido, and insisted that all questions with respect to the occupation be left to the Supreme Allied Commander, General Douglas Mac-

[10]Data from reliable Japanese sources.
[11]*IVOVSS*, pp. 537-538.
[12]*The Entry of the Soviet Union . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 60-61 and 72-74.
[13]*Ibid.*, pp. 68-71.

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Arthur, in effect rejecting the Soviet demand to share in the occupation of Japan.

On June 18, the Secretary of War and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the President to decide on the proposed invasion of Kyushu. The invasion ("Olympic"), by three-quarters of a million men, was agreed upon and set for November 1, 1945. The Chiefs informed the President that Soviet entry into the war would have a major impact on the Japanese, and "may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan."[14]

At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the Soviet Chief of Staff stated that the Soviets planned to attack *late* in August, depending on the timing and success of their negotiations with the Chinese.[15] The Soviets thus revealed their great desire to tie down the Yalta agreements by getting Chiang Kai-shek's concurrence; so long as China did not agree, there would always be a loophole for the United States to disavow its commitment at Yalta, which was explicitly—if ambiguously and only formally—conditioned on Chinese concurrence. In fact, the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed on August 14.

On July 26, the Potsdam Proclamation carried a call for the unconditional surrender of Japan. On July 18 and 28, Stalin informed the U.S. government of two official Japanese bids to send a delegation led by Prince Konoye to discuss ending the war; he tended to dismiss the first as too imprecise, and stated that he would of course reply negatively to the second since it did not include acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation. Stalin was clearly anxious not to see the war end before Soviet entry. The Japanese could not have selected a worse medium by means of which to open surrender talks, as their Ambassador in Moscow repeatedly advised Tokyo.[16]

In early 1945, after Yalta, the Japanese had expected the Soviet Union to enter the war at the time the United States invaded. They believed the U.S. invasion to be planned for April 1946, and assumed that the one-year grace period after Soviet denunciation of the Neutrality Pact in April 1945 confirmed this expectation. On May 17, 1945, the Imperial General Headquarters con-

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 76-89; the quotation cited is on p. 79.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 105. See also, for the revealing texts of the telegrams between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945* (Washington: GPO, 1960), Vol. 11, 1248-1255 and 1291-1298.

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cluded that the Soviet attack might come in August or September. The Kwantung Army Intelligence Division in May still estimated that war with the Soviet Union in 1945 was *not* likely, but after Potsdam it reversed this judgment in late July and concluded that war was very likely "in the early fall." The last official Japanese estimate, on July 31, was that the Soviets would probably attack in late August or early September 1945.[17]

The Japanese noticed a distinct improvement in diplomatic relations with the Soviets in the early summer of 1945. There were no more major border incidents after December 1944, until one on August 6, which was not regarded as significant.[18] When Japanese Ambassador Sato was called in by Foreign Minister Molotov on the night of August 8, he was expecting to receive the Soviet reply to the July 25 Japanese proposals that the USSR undertake to mediate peace between Japan and the Western powers.

On August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

At about midnight on August 8-9, Ambassador Sato in Moscow was given the Soviet declaration of war with Japan.

At ten minutes after midnight, the Soviet military offensive in Manchuria began. On the same day, the second American atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki.

III

After the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Soviet Army in the Far East had been depleted (especially of trained divisions) to meet the need in Europe. By the time major Soviet transfers westward ceased, at the end of 1942, the estimated order of battle stood at 19 infantry divisions, 10 infantry brigades, 750,000 men, 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft.[19] These force levels were approximately maintained until the end of 1944. A Soviet buildup began in February 1945. During the four months from April to August 1945, the Soviets moved 39 divisions and brigades and other units from Europe to bolster their forces already in the Far East.[20]

[17]See *Record of Operations Against Soviet Russia, Eastern Front (August, 1945)*, Japanese Monograph No. 154, MHS, AFFE, Tokyo, 1954, pp. 1-2.

[18]*Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

[19]These data are taken from *Japanese Preparations for Operations in Manchuria (Prior to 1943)*, Japanese Monograph No. 77, MHS, AFFE, Tokyo, 1954, pp. 16-17 and 35-36, and *Study of Strategical and Tactical Peculiarities, op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

[20]See Marshal M. Zakharov, in *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (The Military Historical Journal)*, September 1960, pp. 15-16.

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Soviet forces available when the campaign began on August 9 comprised three Fronts (Army Groups), having 11 combined-arms armies, one tank army, and three air armies—in all 80 divisions (including two tank and six cavalry), four tank and mechanized corps (of U.S. armored-division size), and 40 tank and mechanized and six infantry brigades. The total in military manpower (excluding the Navy) was 1,577,725 men, of whom 1,058,982 were in combat units; 26,137 artillery pieces and mortars; 3,704 tanks and 1,852 self-propelled guns; and 5,368 aircraft of which 4,807 were combat planes.[21]

By August 9, 1945, the Japanese had 24 divisions and 11 brigades in Manchuria, seven divisions in Korea, and three divisions and one brigade on Sakhalin and in the Kuriles.[22] Overall Japanese strength in these areas, including Manchukuoan and Inner Mongolian satellite troops, totaled a little over one million men, of which 787,600 were in the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. The Japanese had, in all, about 1,215 tanks, 1,800 aircraft, and 6,700 artillery pieces and mortars in the theater.[23]

But these figures do not tell the whole story. The Kwantung Army had been bled white of trained units and of first-line equipment. Virtually all of its matériel was obsolete. For example, the most "seasoned" division (the 107th Infantry) had only been established in the spring of 1944. As late as July 1, 1945, the Kwantung Army in Manchuria had but 11 divisions. Eight of the 24 divisions, and seven of the nine infantry brigades—comprising over one-quarter of the total Japanese military manpower in Manchuria—had been mobilized only ten days before the Soviet attack. One of the two weak tank brigades in the whole area (both were in south-central Manchuria) had been formed in July 1945. Reinforcements were in the process of being transferred from China, but many of them had only one out of the usual nine artillery companies per division. The 149th Infantry Division had not a single artillery piece. There was practically

[21]These data are taken from the official Soviet archives, as given in a detailed breakdown in "Campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East in 1945," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal,* August 1965, pp. 67-70; see also *IVOVSS,* p. 551. Contemporary Japanese estimates, which were close on men and major matériel but far off on units, are given in *Study of Strategical and Tactical Peculiarities, op. cit.,* p. 112.

[22]*Japanese Preparations . . . , January 1943-August, 1945, op. cit.,* pp. 127 and 141-162; Hayashi, *op. cit.,* pp. 173-174; and *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal,* August 1965, p. 69.

[23]Various sources. See especially *IVOVSS,* p. 548; Hayashi, *loc. cit.; Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, loc. cit.;* and B. G. Sapozhnikov and V. B. Vorontsov, "The Liberation Mission of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East in the Years of the Second World War," *Istoriya SSSR* (*History of the USSR*), July-August 1965, p. 35.

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no artillery above 75 mm. caliber, no modern anti-tank guns, and no rocket artillery; most of the Japanese tanks were very light (14-ton) and obsolete. The tactical aircraft were all obsolescent, and much inferior to the Soviet planes. In all, the Japanese rated the real effectiveness of their 24 divisions in Manchuria at only seven or eight divisions (and the seven in Korea as two). Thus they were woefully unprepared, even though after June 14 they had been rapidly attempting to rebuild their strength in Manchuria, with a "deadline" goal of late September.[24]

By late July the Soviet buildup of men and units was virtually completed, but the Soviets were still bringing in aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, rocket guns, vehicles and fuel. The Soviet higher staffs completed their disposition only on August 8. In fact, it seems clear that they had *not* completed their preparations for the offensive by August 9.[25] There are considerable grounds to conclude that the Soviets' decision to launch their campaign was precipitated somewhat earlier than planned; this writer would assume the decision was prompted by the first American atomic attack on Japan on August 6. Moscow simply could not afford to let Japan surrender before launching its offensive. Thus the offensive began almost immediately after the first atomic bomb was dropped.

IV

A special High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East had been set up under Marshal Alexander M. Vasilevsky, until shortly before this the Chief of the General Staff. Three Army Groups were established: the Transbaikal Front under Marshal Rodion Ya. Malinovsky, the First Far Eastern Front under Marshal Kyril A. Meretskov, and the Second Far Eastern Front under General of the Army Maxim A. Purkayev (the Far Eastern commander during most of the Soviet-German war). Admiral Ivan S. Yumashev was Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.[26]

The strategic plan was simple, though some elements of its execution were complicated and bold. The two main thrusts

[24]The best source for this evaluation, and for most of the data cited above, is *Japanese Preparations . . . , January 1943-August 1945, op. cit.*, especially pp. 141-162. For a surprisingly frank Soviet admission of the shortcomings of the Kwantung Army see *IVOVSS*, p. 549.

[25]See, for example, *Study of Strategical and Tactical Peculiarities, op. cit.*, p. 117; and *Japanese Preparations . . . , January 1943-August 1945, op. cit.*, p. 139.

[26]*IVOVSS*, p. 552.

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would be made by the Transbaikal Front from the west, cutting through most of Manchuria to Mukden and Changchun, and by the First Far Eastern Front from the east, breaking through the Japanese fortified area facing the Maritime Province and moving to Kirin and on to Changchun. The Second Far Eastern Front in the north would make a lesser thrust down the Sungari toward Harbin.[27]

The main striking force of the Soviet offensive was Marshal Malinovsky's Transbaikal Front, deployed mainly in Mongolia, which comprised six field armies, including the Sixth Guards Tank Army. Nearly half of Soviet military power in the Far East was assigned to this Front—which faced only weak Japanese concentrations. It had, however, unusually challenging terrain and a difficult supply problem. The Soviets calculated (and authoritative Japanese sources have subsequently confirmed) that the enemy would not expect a major offensive over hundreds of miles of the Gobi Desert in Inner Mongolia and across the Great Hsingan mountain range.

By the time of the Japanese surrender on August 15, Marshal Malinovsky's Front had crossed the desert, surmounted the Great Hsingan range, and reached its initial-phase objectives. Despite a major shortage of fuel, this Front was prepared to move on to the south-central Manchurian industrial centers of Changchun, Ssuping, Mukden and Anshan. The opposing Japanese Third Area Army, however, had withdrawn the bulk of its forces in good order and had concentrated them in those areas. (Only two Japanese divisions and one brigade had been actively engaged and overcome by the massive thrust of the Transbaikal Front.)[28]

In the east, Marshal Meretskov's First Far Eastern Front faced the strongest Japanese concentrations and fortifications. It had, however, a great superiority (all the opposing Japanese forces totaled fewer divisions than just one of the four field armies of Meretskov's Front). By the time of the Japanese capitulation the Soviet forces had taken the forward Japanese defense line, and threatened the main defense concentration at Mutanchiang. But the Japanese First Area Army on this front retained about two-

[27]*Ibid.*, pp. 552 ff.; also see Zakharov, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12. Except as otherwise noted, the following summary of the military campaign draws from various published Soviet military works, including *IVOVSS*.

[28]For a more detailed account of the operations of the Transbaikal Front, see this author's "Marshal Malinovsky's Manchurian Campaign, August, 1945," in the forthcoming October 1966 issue of *Military Review*.

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thirds of its effectiveness, and was withdrawing to the planned and prepared defense redoubt in southeastern Manchuria.[29]

Complementing the main thrust of Marshal Meretskov's forces into Manchuria, one army of his Front moved down the coast of northeastern Korea. "Naval infantry" were landed in several small Korean ports: Yuki, Rashin and Chongjin (and after the surrender of Japan also in Odaejin and Wonsan). These were small scale, and against little opposition—except the landing at Chongjin. There, the initial Soviet force was pinned down, and only the hasty commitment of the entire available marine force, an infantry brigade, secured the landing.[30]

In the north, General Purkayev's Second Far Eastern Front had the mission of auxiliary offensive thrusts down the Sungari River and across the Amur at Aigun, as well as defense along the remainder of the long northern frontiers with Manchuria. Although this was the weakest of the three Soviet fronts, it faced the weakest Japanese forces, and had a tremendous superiority. The modest sized Japanese forces were pushed back, but not overcome by the end of hostilities.[31]

At the beginning of the campaign, Soviet forces on northern Sakhalin and Kamchatka were ordered to assume defensive positions. In view of the initial Soviet successes, on August 10 Marshal Vasilevsky decided to proceed with an invasion of southern Sakhalin, and on August 15 to mount operations to occupy the northern Kurile Islands.

On Sakhalin the Japanese held their narrow defense line near the border for nine days before being defeated by much stronger Soviet forces. Two small landings were made on the west coast of the island from the mainland, and a third landing to the south

[29]*Record of Operations Against Soviet Russia, Eastern Front, op. cit.*, pp. 70-71. See also the memoirs of Marshal K. A. Meretskov, "Combat Paths: 3—The Far Eastern . . . ," *Voprosy istorii* (*Problems of History*), February 1966, pp. 101-109.

[30]For a more detailed account of Soviet landing operations in northern Korea, southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, see this author's "Soviet Operations in the War with Japan (August, 1945)," in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1966. See also Captain First Rank G. Gelfond, *Sovetskii flot v voine s Yaponiei* (*The Soviet Navy in the War with Japan*) (Moscow, 1958), pp. 65-79; and A. Mitin, *Tikhookeanskii flot v velikoi otechestvennoi voine* (*The Pacific Fleet in the Great Fatherland War*) (Moscow, 1948), pp. 11-14. No good Japanese accounts of these landing operations are available.

[31]*IVOVSS*, pp. 551-552, 562-569 and 575-578; *Record of Operations Against Soviet Russia—On Northern and Western Fronts of Manchuria, and in Northern Korea* (*August, 1945*), Japanese Monograph No. 155, MHS, AFFE, Tokyo, 1954, pp. 172-184 and 205-216; Gelfond, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-170; and Captains First Rank N. V'yunenko and R. Mordvinov, *Voennye flotilli v velikoi otechestvennoi voine* (*The Naval Flotillas in the Great Fatherland War*) (Moscow, 1957), pp. 233-245.

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after the Japanese surrender (to prevent withdrawal to Hokkaido).

The only combat operation in the Kuriles was a bitterly contested landing and subsequent battle on the northernmost island, Shimushu, from August 18 to 23. In this case, Soviet and Japanese forces on land were about equal, 8,824 men against 8,480 (the Soviets had matériel superiority, except in tanks, but the Japanese had prepared defensive positions). The other islands of the Kurile chain were occupied from August 23 to September 6 without combat.[32]

Air and naval operations played only a secondary, even minor, role. In all, the Soviet air forces flew a total of 14,030 combat sorties, and 7,427 noncombat sorties, and dropped 2,773 tons of bombs. (The entire Manchurian theater was plagued with rain from August 11 through 20, greatly hampering air activity.) Reconnaissance accounted for more than one-quarter of all sorties. Air transport, particularly of petroleum and lubrication products (POL) for armored units, was extremely important. In all, the air forces transported 16,497 men, 2,777 tons of POL (2,456 tons of it to units of the Transbaikal Front), 549 tons of munitions (over half to the Second Far Eastern Front), and 1,496 tons of other supplies to all three fronts. There was no "strategic" bombing.[33]

Japanese air activity was even less significant. The Japanese had a total of about 1,200 aircraft of all types in Manchuria, including a small Manchukuoan element, plus about 600 in Korea. Almost all, however, were obsolete. The 2nd Air Army, controlling all tactical military air forces in Manchuria, had only 360 aircraft available for combat, including 225 fighters, 40 bombers, 45 reconnaissance planes and 20 attack aircraft. Furthermore, most of the effective air defense-fighter aircraft, as well as anti-aircraft artillery, had been deployed in southern Manchuria in the year preceding the Soviet attack, to meet the U.S. B-29 raids (which had begun with a raid on Anshan in July 1944).[34]

Upon notification of the outbreak of war on August 9, the 2nd Air Army was ordered to implement its standing war plans, and on that basis began reconnaissance, bombing of advancing Soviet

[32]For the Sakhalin and Kurile operations, see my above-cited article in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1966.
[33]*Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, August 1965, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
[34]*Air Operations Record Against Soviet Russia*, Japanese Monograph No. 151, MHS, AFFE, Tokyo, 1952, pp. 25 and 33; *Record of Operations Against Soviet Russia, Eastern Front, op. cit.*, p. 99; and *IVOVSS*, pp. 548-549.

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forces in the west, and fighter defense—but all on a modest scale. Plans to attack Soviet forces in Mongolia, and the Trans-Siberian Railway near Chita, were—for reasons unknown—never actually put in operation. There is little information available on Japanese air activity in the campaign, but judging from both Soviet and Japanese accounts it was not great. Japanese air units were concentrated in the Changchun-Ssuping-Mukden-Anshan area of south-central Manchuria. Reconnaissance was conducted on both fronts, with priority to the western front where Marshal Malinovsky's attack was underway. On August 12, in what was probably the maximum effort, a total of 184 fighter sorties was mounted on the west against Linshi and Lichuan. Japanese claims for that day's operations (on which we do not have Soviet reports) were destruction of 42 trucks and 27 guns, and an estimated 500 men and horse casualties. On August 13 bad weather hampered operations, and only seven attacks were mounted; on the 14th, only 29. On the morning of August 15, 39 fighters attacked Taonan, claiming destruction of 23 aircraft on the ground at the airfield, 135 trucks, and estimating 300 casualties inflicted. Some suicide missions were flown on that front.[35]

At noon on August 15, the Imperial order on the cease-fire was received by the 2nd Air Army headquarters, and all planned air combat operations were canceled. While ground operations continued in some sectors, there was no further air action except for reconnaissance. In all, unofficial and probably incomplete Japanese estimates tallied only 10 of their aircraft lost in August due to enemy action and about 50 lost due to other causes. On the day of the revolt of Manchukuoan units along the Sungari River, August 19, after cessation of hostilities against Soviet forces, Japanese air attacks were made against the rebels.[36]

Naval operations were even less notable. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was given the following initial missions: to disrupt Japanese maritime communications in the Sea of Japan; to prevent Japanese naval use of the north Korean ports; and to assist the army in preventing any Japanese landings in the USSR. Later, it was assigned its primary mission: to take by assault Japanese ports in northern Korea, southern Sakhalin and the northern Kurile Islands.[37]

[35]*Air Operations Record Against Soviet Russia, op. cit.*, pp. 36-44.
[36]The Japanese Air Academy located in Manchuria, with most of its aircraft, succeeded in evacuating to Japan, but the other air units remained to surrender. *Ibid.*, pp. 36 and 42-46.
[37]*IVOVSS*, pp. 552-553.

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The Pacific Fleet at that time consisted of two Kirov-class cruisers, 11 destroyers, 19 destroyer escorts, 78 submarines, 49 subchasers and 204 motor torpedo boats. Pacific Fleet Aviation had 1,549 land-based fighter, attack, reconnaissance and light bomber aircraft. Most of the fleet was based at Vladivostok, but a "Northern Pacific Flotilla" was based in part at Sovetskaya Gavan on the west coast of the Tartar Straits, and in part at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka. The opposing Japanese naval and air forces were insignificant: one old light cruiser, one destroyer, 45 small patrol and mine warfare craft and 170 aircraft, and most of these were in the northern districts of the Japanese home islands and were kept there. (For example, the Japanese had only seven military aircraft in the Kuriles and none on Sakhalin.) We have noted the Soviet landing operations—all unopposed at sea. There were no naval battles; the Soviet fleet sank one Japanese destroyer.[38]

V

The surrender came in stages. On August 14 a junior staff officer in Third Area Army Headquarters misunderstood a message from Kwantung Army alternate headquarters at Tunghua referring to unofficial radio reports of Japanese surrender, and issued a cease-fire order; the order was subsequently rescinded by General Yamada. On August 16 the Imperial Rescript on capitulation was formally received by Kwantung Army Headquarters, where it became the subject of debate. A majority wanted to resist to the last,[39] but General Otozo Yamada, the Commander in Chief, and General Hikosaburo Hata, his Chief of Staff, decided they must obey any order from the Emperor. Japanese Imperial Army Order No. 2544 dated August 16 (received August 17) formally directed General Yamada to negotiate a surrender, and on the

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 551; *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, August 1965, *op. cit.*, p. 69; and Admiral I. S. Yumashev, *Morskoi sbornik* (*Naval Journal*), August 1965, p. 16. For the Japanese forces, see *Naval Operations Against Soviet Russia*, Japanese Monograph No. 106, MHS, AFFE, Tokyo, 1952, p. 10. (Note: This monograph is not accurate in its accounts of operations in the Kuriles and Sakhalin.)

[39] It is interesting to note that Japanese Military Intelligence, even as late as August 15-16, grossly underestimated the weight of the Soviet attack. On the Transbaikal Front, where there had been extensive aerial reconnaissance but very little direct combat contact, the Soviet force—actually numbering six field armies—was estimated by the Japanese at four infantry divisions, two tank divisions, three tank brigades, and one cavalry division. The Second Far Eastern Front in the north was estimated at four infantry divisions and one tank brigade. The First Far Eastern Front, which had been most heavily engaged, was estimated at 10 infantry divisions, one tank corps, one tank division and two tank brigades. The total Soviet force was thus believed to be about 24 divisions and six brigades, while in fact it numbered 80 divisions and 46 brigades. (See Hayashi, *op. cit.*, p. 217, for the Japanese estimate.)

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18th this order was read to the hastily assembled Chiefs of Staff of all area armies and armies. General Hata then flew to the field headquarters of Marshal Vasilevsky to arrange the surrender. Arrangements were formalized on August 19, with a technical effective date of August 25, but in fact were put immediately into effect in most areas. On August 19, by Soviet order, the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army ceased to function. On August 23, Stalin announced the successful conclusion of the Manchurian operation. On September 2 the Japanese surrendered formally on the U.S.S. "Missouri." On September 5, General Yamada and almost all Japanese general officers in Manchuria were flown to the USSR. On September 13 the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo formally dissolved the Kwantung Army, effective September 17.[40]

So ended the Manchurian campaign. Soviet victory would no doubt have come soon even if the surrender of Japan had not precipitated it. But the Japanese forces might have delayed the Soviet forces for some weeks in their planned redoubt area in southeastern Manchuria and northern Korea. The bulk of the Kwantung Army, never committed to battle, was concentrated in a position to impede the Soviet advance and defend the redoubt area.

The Far Eastern campaign was far less demanding than the Soviet High Command could prudently have anticipated. Perhaps the chief indicator of the intensity of the combat (since real casualties are not known) is the amount of munitions used. We have no figures for the full Soviet ammunition stock established for the theater, but we do know that, in addition to munitions already in the Far East and those brought in during the last few months of intensive preparations, from December 1, 1944 to April 1, 1945 more than 3.2 million shells and 410 million small-arms cartridges were transferred from European Russia to the Far East. And we know that the total ammunition expended during the campaign, on all fronts, was only 361,079 shells and 1,023,697 bullets.[41]

The Soviets estimate Japanese casualties at 83,737 killed and 594,000 prisoners. (Unofficial and perhaps incomplete Japanese estimates are about 21,000 Japanese killed.) Acknowledged Soviet losses, which probably understate, were 8,219 killed and 22,264 wounded. Data on captured Japanese weapons and matériel are

[40] *IVOVSS*, pp. 578-581; and *Record of Operations Against Soviet Russia, Eastern Front, op. cit.*, pp. 18-25.

[41] For the transfers, see *IVOVSS*, p. 560; for the ammunition expended, by fronts and totals, see *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, August 1965, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

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not entirely consistent. Official Soviet claims in September 1945 were that 925 aircraft, 369 tanks, 2,566 artillery guns and mortars, 4,836 machine guns and 300,000 rifles were captured. The recent major Soviet multi-volume history of World War II does not give comparable overall figures, but lumps together booty of the Transbaikal and First Far Eastern Fronts as 861 aircraft, 600 tanks, 3,704 artillery guns and mortars and 11,988 machine guns—thus claiming larger numbers of tanks and guns for these two fronts than the earlier official grand total.[42]

Of the nearly 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war, virtually all were taken to the Soviet Union (and several thousand to Mongolia) for several years of forced labor. During the period from 1948 until 1950, a total of 513,139 were repatriated.[43]

Japan capitulated before the final battles between the opposing sides could be joined. But if there are qualifications to the Soviet record, it also was impressive, and mounting the campaign only three months after being bled for four years in Europe represented a major achievement. In the words of the official Soviet war history, "The defeat of the Kwantung Army was a model of a real lightning strike, accomplished by the Soviet armed forces."[44]

VI

The Manchurian military campaign was successful. Were Soviet political objectives in undertaking the campaign realized? The underlying objective was to establish the USSR as the major Far Eastern power in the vacuum left by the defeat of Japan. More specifically, I believe we can outline Soviet objectives as follows: (1) to incorporate southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands into the Soviet Union, (2) to gain international acceptance of their Mongolian satellite, (3) to get a foothold in Manchuria and Korea, (4) to keep the United States off the continent in northeastern Asia and to counterbalance American presence in China, and (5) to get a foothold in Japan. The first two were attained, and the third at least for a time; the fourth only in part; and the fifth was not. Today Japan is united, noncommunist, and allied with the United States. Even the status of the Kuriles is disputed by Japan, and there is no Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. Korea is divided, and the more important southern half is strongly anti-

[42]Sovinformburo communiqué, *Pravda*, September 12, 1945; and *IVOVSS*, p. 581.
[43]Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 143.
[44]*IVOVSS*, p. 581.

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communist, allied with the United States and host to American military forces. Mongolia is widely recognized, a member of the UN, and a faithful ally to the USSR. All Soviet presence in Manchuria, including the base at Port Arthur, is now removed—the Soviet Union does not even have a consulate there.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the key question with respect to Manchuria was the nature of the Chinese succession to the temporary Soviet occupation. Manchuria, as the most industrialized and economically advanced region of China, was of particular economic as well as political importance to the Nationalist Chinese government—and to the Chinese communists. In addition, the Soviets had made clear by their demands for "restoration" of former Russian rights in Port Arthur and Dairen and in the management of the railways, that the USSR intended to exercise some continuing direct role there. Although involved less directly, the United States was committed to assisting the Chinese Nationalists. Consequently a complex multi-sided period of maneuver ensued.

The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Between the Republic of China and the USSR, signed on August 14, 1945, affirmed "the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other contracting party." In an exchange of notes on the same day it was specified that "the Government of the USSR regarded the Three Eastern Provinces [Manchuria] as part of China and reaffirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognized their territorial and administrative integrity." An additional agreement signed the same day governed relations during the Soviet military presence in Manchuria and noted that a Nationalist Chinese government representative and staff would "establish and direct the administration for the territory cleared of the enemy," and "as soon as any part of the liberated territory ceases to be a zone of immediate military operations, the Chinese National Government will assume full authority in the direction of public affairs. . . ."[45] The duration of the Soviet military presence was not specified, but Stalin assured the Chinese that it would be not more than two or three months. In the treaty negotiations, the Soviets had attempted to extract more for themselves than had been agreed upon at Yalta

[45]The treaty, protocols and agreements of August 14, 1945 are given in full in the Department of State's *United States Relations with China* (hereafter cited as *USRC*) (Washington: GPO, 1949), pp. 585-596; the above quotations are to be found on pp. 586-587 and 592-593.

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but, bolstered by advice from Washington, the Chinese Nationalist representatives held out successfully against these additional demands.[46]

On August 31, the Nationalist government announced the framework for the new administration of Manchuria, named General Hsiung Shih-hui as chief of this administration, and charged him with liaison with Marshal Malinovsky, who had been placed in command of all Soviet forces in Manchuria.[47] Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek and for over ten years resident in the Soviet Union, was soon named Special Foreign Affairs Commissioner for the Northeast, and after October he had the chief role in negotiating with the Soviets. Chiang Kai-shek was wary of moving into Manchuria precipitately, despite his eagerness to re-establish Nationalist Chinese government rule. Accordingly, while he sent some 500 officials under General Hsiung to Changchun by early October, he held back from any premature attempt to send troops there until he could move up in force his elite U.S.-trained armies from Yunnan. General Tu Yü-ming was named commander-in-chief of Nationalist military forces for the Northeast (Manchuria) only in mid-October, and arrived in Changchun with a small staff on October 29.[48]

Meanwhile, the Soviets had been violating at least the spirit of the recent treaty by permitting a substantial influx of Chinese communist soldiers from Lin Piao's 8th Route Army in northern China and from Chen Yi's New Fourth Army in Shantung Province (as well as some others resident in the Soviet Union, including the long-exiled leader Li Li-san). By November at least 100,000 men had been infiltrated, increasing the number of Chinese communist military forces in Manchuria to 200,000 plus local auxiliaries. The Soviets did not officially "recognize" these forces, and most of them entered in small units, many without arms. The communists were, however, permitted to recruit personnel from the disbanded ex-Manchukuo army (which had numbered 187,000 men). Moreover, they were permitted to obtain large stocks of captured Japanese small arms, and some artillery; the Soviets even went through an elaborate charade of conniving

[46]For reviews of the Sino-Soviet treaty negotiations, see Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 270-287; and Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 333-351.

[47]See O. Edmund Clubb, "Manchuria in the Balance, 1945-1946," *Pacific Historical Review*, November 1957, p. 379; and Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

[48]Clubb, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-380.

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to permit "unauthorized" Chinese communist "seizures" of "inadequately guarded" stockpiles of Japanese weapons.[49]

The first in a series of crises between the Chinese Nationalist government and Soviet authorities came on October 6, when the latter objected to Chinese Nationalist plans to disembark troops at Dairen, on the clearly trumped-up grounds that such an action would be contrary to the Sino-Soviet treaty, since it guaranteed Dairen would be a "commercial port." Marshal Malinovsky, however, suggested that use of the other Manchurian ports, Yingkow or Hulutao, would be acceptable. But upon arrival at these ports the U.S. Seventh Fleet found them already occupied by Chinese communist forces—the Soviets having departed—and was compelled to disembark the Chinese Nationalist armies at American-held Chinwangtao in north China.[50]

Thus in September and October 1945, the Soviets indirectly harassed the entry of Chinese Nationalist troops, and facilitated a thinly veiled buildup of Chinese communist military power in Manchuria. Also, as the U.S. Observer Group at Chinese communist headquarters in Yenan reported, the Soviets established direct communication and liaison with the Chinese communists.[51] But in some respects the most serious interference of Soviet occupation forces was their assistance to the Chinese communists in gaining control over the local administration in Manchuria. This assistance is a subject on which there is little concrete information, although the general procedure was evident at the time. The Soviet naval newspaper on September 6, 1945 contained the first press admission of Soviet aid to "progressive" local political forces in Manchuria.[52] Far more revealing have been several recent Soviet admissions—prompted by a desire in their polemic with the Chinese communists to show that they did their duty in assisting their Chinese comrades from the beginning and that the Chinese communist successes owed much to this Soviet aid. One such account cited several specific cases to illustrate its general statement that: "In creating the new Chinese police [in Man-

[49]See A. M. Dubinsky, "The Liberation Mission of the Soviet Union in the Far East (1945)," *Voprosy istorii*, August 1965, p. 60; O. Edmund Clubb, *Twentieth Century China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) (hereafter cited as *TCC*), pp. 260-262; Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 331-332; and David Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949), pp. 249, 251 and 332.

[50]See Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 328-330; Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 252; Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 384-386; and Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 210-211.

[51]Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 377-378.

[52]*Krasnyi flot (Red Fleet)* (Moscow), September 6, 1945; cited by Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 381, from a contemporary U.S. Embassy Moscow dispatch.

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churia] the Red Army command relied on fighters of the [Chinese communist] 8th Army."[53] It notes that as early as August 17, a new Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for Northern Manchuria was established in Harbin by fifty-four underground party members, and that subsequently city party organizations were established in Mukden, Dairen, Port Arthur and elsewhere.

VII

The second crisis in Soviet-Nationalist relations arose in early November, when Chinese communist armed units—in the face of Soviet occupation forces—surrounded and disarmed the local police and administration which had been established by the Nationalists in Changchun. Chiang Kai-shek on December 9 withdrew his mission from Changchun altogether and placed full responsibility upon the Soviet Union.[54]

The Nationalist government and the Soviet government had to face up to the situation. Nationalist troops in north China began to push north from Chinwangtao on November 11, on the 15th took Shanhaikuan (where the Great Wall meets the sea), and went on to take Hulutao on November 22 and Chinchow on November 26. There Chiang Kai-shek held them.[55] General Wedemeyer had recommended to the Generalissimo that he concentrate first on consolidating control in north China between the Yangtse and the Great Wall, but Chiang was determined to move into Manchuria as soon as he could.[56]

The Soviets, too, changed tactics at this juncture. On November 13 they agreed to allow the airlift of 1,500 Chinese Nationalist troops per day into Changchun, and on the 17th they disclaimed any assistance to the Chinese communists at Changchun. They agreed to a request of Chiang that they postpone their departure from Manchuria again (as they had in November) from December 3 to January 3, 1946, in order to allow more time for the Nationalist government to establish its authority. Chiang Ching-kuo was sent to Changchun to talk with Marshal Malinovsky, and on December 5 Malinovsky agreed to the airlift of one Nationalist division to Changchun and two others to Mukden, *and promised to guarantee their security*. On December 9, the Soviets agreed to postpone their departure until February 1, 1946.[57]

[53]Dubinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
[54]Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 330 and 332; and Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 387.
[55]Tsou, *op. cit.*, p. 332; Clubb, *TCC*, p. 263.
[56]Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 397 and 399.
[57]Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-334.

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The Soviet government had, in the meantime, introduced an entirely new element into the picture, one which helps to explain its new policy of limited assistance to the Nationalists. On November 24, M. I. Sladkovsky, the economic adviser to Malinovsky, formally presented to Chang Chia-ngau, Chairman of the Economic Commission of the Northeast Headquarters for Manchuria, a proposal for joint Sino-Soviet operation of 80 per cent of the heavy industry in Manchuria. The Chinese Nationalists replied a few days later that they could discuss economic cooperation only after Soviet withdrawal was completed. Sladkovsky then, on December 7, raised the new argument that all industry which had "assisted" the Japanese war effort was booty subject to unilateral Soviet removal. On January 16, Malinovsky said that he could not predict the date of Soviet withdrawal until the economic cooperation question had been settled.

By now the situation with respect to continued Soviet occupation had reversed itself. Now the Nationalists wanted the Soviets to withdraw, but the latter unilaterally put off the agreed February 1 deadline to March 1—offering transparent excuses about bad weather, insufficient fuel, and the like. On January 21 the Soviet Ambassador also raised the issues of joint Manchurian industrial control and war booty in Chungking. On February 9, the United States addressed identical notes to the Soviet and Chinese governments protesting the Soviet arguments on reparations and booty. On March 27 the Soviets asked 50/50 Sino-Soviet administration of the major mines, industries and airfields of Manchuria for thirty years. The Chinese rejected this demand outright. The issue subsequently tended to die out; meanwhile, the Soviets proceeded to strip much of Manchurian industry. The Pauley Commission, which investigated in May and June 1946, found that Soviet confiscation (and attendant damage) totaled $858 million, or $2 billion replacement value.[58]

The extensive Soviet stripping of Manchurian industrial facilities and attempts to gain long-term concessions from the Chinese Nationalists strongly indicate that the Soviets did not expect the Chinese communists to be able to consolidate their control in Manchuria. In any case, the communists could scarcely have appreciated this Soviet action. Nonetheless, the pro-Soviet Chinese communist Li Li-san approved the Soviet actions by saying that the machinery removed by the Soviet Union was "not a large

[58]See Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 335-337; Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 244-246 and 318-320; and Beloff, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-41. For the U.S. notes and findings of the Pauley Commission see *USRC*, pp. 596-604.

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amount compared with its war losses [in Europe!]."[59] One recent Soviet account has been so bold as to note that the Soviet Command "uncovered" many cases of alleged Japanese industrial enterprises nominally held by Chinese, which were "thus preserved for the Chinese people."[60] No doubt there may have been some cases of masked Japanese control, but no Chinese administration would have given such enterprises to the Japanese. Considering what the Soviets did to "Japanese" assets in Manchuria, it is brazen to recall such actions by claiming that Soviet authorities were doing a favor for the Chinese!

Another issue which had become intertwined with the matter of Soviet withdrawal was the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from China. By October 1945 there were 113,000 U.S. marines and soldiers in China, including 53,000 marines in Peiping, Tsingtao, Tientsin, Chinwangtao, and a few other coastal centers in north China. At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes rejected a direct link of American and Soviet withdrawals sought by the Soviets, but he did agree to a vague formulation which at least tied together reference to the withdrawals, and the Soviets continued through February to link Soviet with U.S. withdrawal. When Chiang Ching-kuo visited Moscow in December 1945, Stalin told him bluntly that it would be difficult to settle the Manchurian question if a single U.S. soldier remained in China. Although the Soviets did not maintain this stand, by the time they did complete their withdrawal the United States had already begun to reduce its military forces in China.[61]

Thus the Soviets attempted to use their occupation as leverage to remove the U.S. military presence from China and to gain economic concessions from China, as well as to bolster the Chinese communists as a counterweight to the Nationalists.

In January 1946 the Chinese Nationalist armies moved farther into southwestern Manchuria. A truce between the Nationalist and communist forces in China itself, signed on January 10, provided explicitly that the cease-fire did "not prejudice the movements of the National Army into or within Manchuria which are for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty." It is just possible that the communists, confident in their ultimate victory over the Nationalists, were themselves somewhat alarmed over the long Soviet occupation and Soviet demands for long-term concessions

[59]Quoted by Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
[60]Sapozhnikov and Vorontsov, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
[61]Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 334-335; and Beloff, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-47.

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giving the Soviets benefits at the expense of the Chinese economy. In any case, the Soviets and the Chinese communists did not interfere with Chinese Nationalist troop movements from January to April 1946. On January 5, troops were airlifted to Changchun. Chinese Nationalist officials, with Soviet approval, were sent to the ten main cities in Manchuria, including even Harbin. On March 12 the Soviets withdrew from Mukden, and on the 15th this city was formally occupied by the Chinese Nationalist 52nd Army without incident. By that time there were 137,000 Chinese Nationalist troops in Manchuria and adjoining Jehol.[62]

In March the Soviets stepped up their withdrawal in ways that again aided the Chinese communists. Although on March 22 the Soviets announced that they would complete their withdrawal by the end of April, they refused to provide a schedule of evacuation to the Nationalist government representatives. On March 17 they evacuated Ssuping, permitting the Chinese communists to take over. On March 26 they announced that they could not delay their withdrawal from northern Manchuria any longer, and would therefore turn over authority to whatever authorities were present—thus turning the whole of Manchuria north of Changchun over to the communists. The situation was increasingly explosive, and on April 14 it ignited. Soviet forces withdrew on that date from Changchun, leaving it in the hands of 12,000 to 14,000 Chinese Nationalist troops. A Chinese communist force of 20,000 to 30,000 men attacked the following day, and after bitter fighting, on April 18 took Changchun.[63]

VIII

This flagrant communist violation of the truce gave Chiang Kai-shek an opening to press ahead while he had an advantage. The Chinese communists had 250,000 to 300,000 men in Manchuria by April 1946, but during March and April the United States transported seven more Nationalist armies—228,000 men—to Manchuria, giving them an edge.[64] But the communist seizure of Ssuping and Changchun, even though they could not be held for long, did serve to tie down the Nationalist forces completely. Consequently, while the Soviets completed their withdrawal from the north and east in April, the communists were able to take

[62]Clubb, *TCC*, p. 267; Tsou, *op. cit.*, p. 334; and *USRC*, pp. 137 and 147.
[63]*USRC*, p. 149; McLane, *op. cit.*, p. 228; Clubb, *TCC*, p. 268; Major Robert Rigg, "Campaign for the Northeast China Railway System (1946-1947)," *Military Review*, December 1947, p. 29; and Tsou, *op. cit.*, p. 338. The relative strength estimates of Rigg, who was in Changchun at the time, are used.
[64]*USRC*, p. 151; McLane, *op. cit.*, p. 245; and Tsou, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

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over Tsitsihar, Harbin, Kirin and the major part of Manchuria.

On May 3 the Soviets announced the completion of their withdrawal. At that time, future Chinese control of the region was moot. While assisting the Chinese communists (especially those under Li Li-san engaged in political consolidation and the local guerrilla leader Chou Pao-chung) in the north and northeastern portions of Manchuria, the Soviets had in the last analysis handed over south-central Manchuria, the main center of population and industry, to the Nationalists. They had failed to obtain the long-term economic concessions (beyond the railway and Port Arthur-Dairen) which they had sought, but they had taken the most valuable industrial machinery. It was, by then, clear that the United States would not place any troops in Manchuria, and was in fact reducing those already in China (from a high of 113,000 in October 1945 to 12,000 by the end of 1946).[65] The Soviets had, however, clearly been inhibited in their actions during the occupation by concern over possible U.S. counteraction and extension of direct influence on the continent. In addition, they had initially overestimated the strength of the Nationalist government and underestimated that of the communists. Apparently, they believed their own maneuverability would be enhanced in a situation where Li Li-san and local communists would be in control of a buffer zone, the northeastern half of Manchuria, the Nationalists in southern Manchuria, and Mao Tse-tung's communists in north China between Manchuria and Nationalist China.

The Chinese Nationalist armies had assumed the offensive on April 16, taking Ssuping on May 19 and Changchun on May 23. This operation was the first in which the Chinese Nationalist forces used air power (B-25's and P-51's based at Mukden). The United States was seeking to restore the truce, but Chiang pleaded inability to maintain contact with his forces, which continued to advance toward Kirin and Harbin. Kirin was taken on May 28, and the Nationalists gained a bridgehead over the Sungari River below Harbin. Then, on June 6, they agreed to a truce, which lasted uneasily until October.[66]

General Marshall's mission continued through 1946 to seek a coalition of the Nationalist and communist sides.[67] During the year, the Nationalists built up their forces, but these remained

[65]Clubb, *TCC*, p. 279.

[66]Rigg, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-31; Clubb, *TCC*, pp. 268-271; and Liu Yun-an, *Demokraticheskoe i sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo v severo-vostochnym Kitae* (*Democratic and Socialist Construction in Northeastern China*) (Moscow, 1957), p. 38.

[67]For accounts of General Marshall's mediation efforts, see Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 349-440; *USRC*, pp. 127-229; and Clubb, *TCC*, pp. 264-273.

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concentrated in the main cities of south-central Manchuria. The communists consolidated their control in the northern and northeastern two-thirds of Manchuria, where, in April, a "North Eastern Democratic Liberation Army" had been formed. In July the communist army in China was named "The People's Liberation Army."[68]

The truce in China proper collapsed in July 1946. In October, the Nationalist armies launched an offensive that took most of Chahar and Jehol provinces adjoining Manchuria, and Antung in southeastern Manchuria. In the wake of the latter operation, a Chinese communist force which was compelled to withdraw into Soviet-occupied northern Korea was "interned," but soon after released with its weapons some 150 miles to the northeast to re-enter Manchuria.[69] This flagrant unneutral act was the only known Soviet intervention in the Chinese civil war in Manchuria after the end of the Soviet occupation.

By the end of 1946 the Chinese Nationalist government had reached the high point of its postwar fortunes in Manchuria. All major cities except Harbin and Tsitsihar in the north, Hailar in the west, and Mutanchiang in the east were in Nationalist hands. There were some communist guerrilla forces, and even civil administration in some rural areas, in south-central Manchuria. But an offensive to clear Harbin and the north was planned for the spring. It was necessary first to clean out a pocket of Chinese communist forces on the eastern flank in the Chang Pai Mountains, and by January 1947 Nationalist forces were concentrated for that clearing operation. Suddenly and unexpectedly, the communists launched an offensive from the north, across the frozen Sungari. In late February a second communist offensive was launched in the north, and in March and April yet two more. These offensives were important and successful only in that they kept the Nationalist forces off balance.[70]

Then, on May 11, 1947, the communists launched major coordinated offensives on several fronts. Changchun, Kirin and Ssuping were cut off from one another and isolated. Chihfeng in the west and Antung in the east fell in May and June. The communists claim that in fifty days the Nationalists suffered 89,000 casualties in these battles. New offensives followed in July and September, and in the final offensive of the year, launched on

[68]Liu Yun-an, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-42.
[69]Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 326; Clubb, *TCC*, p. 278; and Rigg, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.
[70]Clubb, *TCC*, pp. 279-280; Rigg, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34; and *USRC*, p. 315.

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December 15, and carrying on to March 15, 1948, the communists took Ssuping, Kirin and Anshan and claimed to have inflicted another 150,000 casualties. Some of these gains, notably the seizure of Kirin, followed partial Nationalist withdrawals to reinforce their main centers at Changchun and Mukden. By the end of 1947 the National armies in these and a few other centers were isolated and could be supplied only by airlift.[71]

The year 1948 spelled complete defeat for Nationalist China in Manchuria. In March, at the close of the major communist offensive, American Major General David Barr advised Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw gradually from Manchuria—but the Generalissimo was aghast at the idea. Alternatively, Barr recommended offensive action to open up the route for sea and land supply to central Manchuria, but even though Chiang accepted this concept and gave orders accordingly, Nationalist generals in the field failed to attempt it. All during 1947 and 1948 a "Maginot malaise" afflicted most of the Nationalist commanders in Manchuria (and frequently elsewhere in China too).[72]

As early as July 1947, General Wedemeyer had been sent back to China, and again recommended to Washington in September 1947 (as he had in November 1945) a five-power (U.S., USSR, UK, France and China) "trusteeship" over Manchuria. The United States, certain that this idea would not be acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek and not wishing to appear to undermine his authority in any part of China, did not make this proposal known to anyone at the time.[73]

In January 1948 the Soviet Union privately offered the Chinese Nationalist government mediation in the civil war.[74] At the time, such an offer must have seemed entirely out of the question; in retrospect, one wonders whether in fact Stalin saw this as the last chance to keep China a weak and divided neighbor, amenable to Soviet pressures.

On September 12, 1948, General Lin Piao opened the final offensive of the Communist Chinese Manchurian campaign. A parallel operation in nearby Shantung province led to a major Nationalist defeat at Tsinan on September 24, with 80,000 men

[71]Clubb, *TCC*, pp. 280-286; Liu Yun-an, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45; *USRC*, pp. 315-318; and V. P. Ilyushechkin, "The Third Revolutionary Civil War in China, 1945-1949," *Uchenye zapiski instituta vostokovedeniya,* Tom XI Kitaiskii sbornik (*Learned Journal of the Institute of Oriental Studies,* Vol. XI, China Issue) (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1955), pp. 117-141.
[72]*USRC,* pp. 320-330.
[73]*Ibid.*, p. 260; and Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 454-462.
[74]*USRC,* p. 266.

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lost, a major fraction of them by defection. At Hulutao in Manchuria, part of the 93rd Army defected, and the Nationalist Command feared to commit the remainder. On October 15, Chinchow fell, with eight divisions and some 120,000 men. On October 17-18, the 60th Army—some 26,000 men—defected near Changchun. On the 19th the 39,000 men of the New 7th Army surrendered in Changchun. The Mukden garrison, once 200,000 strong, had remained inactive while other Nationalist garrisons were picked off one by one. Too late, an attempt was made to break out from Mukden to Chinchow; the 100,000 men who made the attempt were surrounded and defeated by October 30. On November 2 Mukden itself surrendered. The port of Yingkow, the last Nationalist-held city in Manchuria, fell on November 5. By the 27th, the Nationalists had lost Shanhaikuan and Chinwangtao below the Great Wall; then followed the critical battle of Hwai-Hai, the fall of Tientsin, and on January 31, 1949, the fall of Peiping.[75]

The fall of Manchuria was the turning point of the civil war, in more ways than one. Nationalist losses only from September 12 to November 5, 1948 totaled 472,000 casualties and prisoners. And for the first time, in November 1948, overall Chinese communist troop strength outnumbered Nationalist forces (3 million to 2.9 million, compared with 2.8 to 3.6 million in September).[76] Moreover, Lin Piao's army in Manchuria could now pour into China proper. Perhaps most important of all was the heavy blow to Nationalist morale, and the rise in communist *élan*.

Manchuria under Communist Chinese rule (with Li Li-san participating in the leadership until he was removed in 1949, followed by Kao Kang until he was purged in 1954) necessarily had a different relationship with the Soviet Union. The USSR negotiated a new Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the Chinese People's Republic, signed on February 14, 1950. In auxiliary agreements, the USSR undertook to give up its role in the Chinese Changchun Railway, and its naval base at Port Arthur, upon the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan or in any event by 1952. (The agreement on Port Arthur was amended in September 1952, during the Korean War, to extend the Soviet base rights indefinitely until a peace treaty was con-

[75]Liu Yun-an, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-47; Ilyushechkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-145; V. I. Glunin, *Tret'ya grazhdanskaya revolyutsionnaya voina v Kitae (1946-1949)* (*The Third Revolutionary Civil War in China, 1946-1949*) (Moscow, 1958), pp. 138-140; and Clubb, *TCC*, pp. 289-290.

[76]Glunin, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-140, and Ilyushechkin, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

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cluded with Japan; but in October 1954 the Soviet Union agreed to give up the base completely, and did so on May 1, 1955.)[77]

Thus by 1955, a decade after the Soviet military campaign, nothing remained of the Soviet special rights and presence in Manchuria. In 1962 even the last Soviet consulates in Manchuria (and in all of China) were closed by the Chinese communists. In the early 1960's border incidents again marred the Soviet-Manchurian frontier as they had in the 1930's.

IX

In Order of the Day No. 247, September 3, 1965, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, now for many years Minister of Defense of the USSR, acknowledged the assistance of the Western allies and the Chinese communist armies (also the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army), while crediting mainly the Soviet armed forces for the defeat of Japan in 1945.[78] The Chinese communists are less generous: the *Liberation Army Daily*, commemorating the same twentieth anniversary, claimed that the Chinese communist armies "played the main role in defeating Japanese imperialism and winning the war," and did not even mention the Western allies—or the Soviet Union. Another commemorative article, carried in all major Chinese communist newspapers, did note that the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan, but failed to mention that the Soviets had waged a military campaign, much less to credit them with any major contribution to Japanese defeat or Chinese communist victory. This marks quite a comedown for the Soviet Union from Mao Tse-tung's statement in August 1945 that Soviet entry into the war was "the decisive factor in Japan's surrender."[79] But such are the fortunes of communist politics and "history."

The Soviet Manchurian campaign had, without question, considerable impact on the subsequent course of political relations in the Chinese upheavals of the late 1940's. Apart from its longer-run effects for the Soviet position—some of which, as we have noted, have been short-lived—it remains of considerable interest for its indication of military, politico-military, and foreign political aims and means of Soviet policy.

[77]For the texts of all save the 1954 agreement, see Beloff, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-266.
[78]Radio Moscow, September 2, 1965.
[79]"A Victory for Our Politics, A Victory for Mao Tse-tung's Thinking," editorial from *Liberation Army Daily*, on Radio Peking, September 1, 1965; *Hsinhua*, August 15, 1965; Mao Tse-tung, "The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan" (August 1945), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV (Peking, n.d.), p. 11.

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THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE STUDY OF DEVELOPING STATES*

by Benjamin Rivlin

AMERICAN political scientists have devoted considerable attention during the past decade to reformulating the concept of "the political system" as part of their efforts to introduce more rigorous methods of analysis into the discipline. During this same period the discipline has also expanded its frames of reference beyond that of European and American political systems by concerning itself increasingly with the politics of the developing areas—Asia, Africa and Latin America. These two disciplinary foci have been brought together in a number of studies in recent years[1] and the purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and implications of this marriage for the study of the politics of developing areas and for the furtherance of a political science. Specifically, we are concerned with the role of systems analysis in the study of developing areas and its consequences for a developing political science. Our attention will first be directed to the subject of systems analysis in political science, and particularly toward an understanding of the reformulated concept of "the political system," before we examine the applicability of this concept to the study of politics in the developing areas.

Systems Analysis: Its Place in Political Science

A basic aim of systems analysis in political science has been defined by David Easton:

> We can try to understand political life by viewing each of its aspects piecemeal. We can examine the operation of such institutions as political parties, interest groups, government and voting; we can study the nature and consequences of such political practices as manipulation, propaganda,

*Revision of paper delivered at the 1963 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 1963.

[1]Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, editors, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis, editors, *Modern Political Systems: Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); and Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

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and violence; we can seek to reveal the structure within which these practices occur. By combining the results we can obtain a rough picture of what happens in any self-contained political unit.

In combining these results, however, there is already implicit the notion that each part of the larger political canvas does not stand alone but is related to each other part; or to put it positively, that the operation of no part can be fully understood without reference to the way in which the whole itself operates.[2]

These claims for the advantages of systems analysis seem direct and straightforward enough. The total polity is the sum of its parts, which are interrelated. The relatedness of the parts must be grasped in order to understand the total or any part of it.

The purpose of systems analysis, however, is not merely to provide an understanding of the whole polity but is, in the words of Gabriel Almond, "to separate analytically the structures which perform political functions in all societies regardless of scale, degree of differentiation, and culture."[3] This requires the establishment of a set of categories, attributes, components or characteristics that constitute the political system and that could serve as a basis for comparative analysis.

Thus, the two operating themes of the concept of "the political system" are *relatedness* and *categorization*. Neither of these notions is new. Students of politics as far back as Aristotle have been studying total systems and have been establishing analytical categories. Studies that today are considered old-fashioned also examined relationships within an entire system. What is new in the reformulation of the concept is the nature of the categories established and of the relationships among the elements.

The older so-called formalistic studies of relationships of a legal, constitutional, institutional or normative nature are not to be belittled. Scholars making these studies were examining political phenomena according to categories and classifications available to them, inside and outside the discipline. The older categories are still an essential part of political analysis, but they do not describe the political system completely or adequately. As students of the political process became aware of new data that did not fit easily into the previous patterns of analysis and of new developments in related disciplines, they recognized the shortcomings of traditional methodology and undertook to refine old

[2]"An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, April 1957, p. 383.
[3]Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

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tools of analysis and develop new ones. This is in the nature of any vital inquiry into knowledge. As Charles E. Merriam put it in his pioneering *Systematic Politics,* "Old material and new material are brought together under new classifications and lines of arrangement. This has been done before in the history of political science, but from time to time it must be done again in the light of new materials and methods."[4]

The big change in the notion of the political system involves the shift away from the study of mainly legal and normative relationships to the study of relationships of a less formal character subsumed under the general category of behavior, with greater emphasis placed upon empirical data. Furthermore, the universality of the political system is established by assuming a set of indispensable political functions performed in every society from the most primitive to the most advanced.

Implementing the new formulation of the political system in teaching and research is fraught with a number of dangers. First, the total system is not an easily manageable entity. It is too cumbersome and too complex. It is therefore necessary to break down the total political system into component subsystems—i.e., party, communications, constitutional, administrative—keeping in mind that these components are not independent but are constantly interacting parts of the whole. Second, implicit in these basic formulations is the notion that clear boundaries exist between the political and other social systems. The problem of boundaries is perplexing, however, because there is a constant interaction between the polity and other spheres of society. The problem of discipline boundaries is particularly difficult insofar as the developing areas are concerned, and we will have more to say about this below.

A third difficulty inherent in the use of the system concept emerges from the nature of the political system. As a social system, the political system is greatly influenced by what Kenneth Boulding calls the "stochastic" element, that is, some environmental factors attributable only to chance.[5] Attempts have been made to deal with this element, generally using mathematical and statistical formulations. These aim at a homeostatic or self-maintaining concept of the system, much like that found in the physical sciences, which are less influenced by chance or situa-

[4](Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), p. x.
[5]"The Relations of Economic, Political and Social Systems," *Social and Economic Studies,* December 1962, p. 352.

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tional elements. Such efforts are beyond the purview of this paper. Reference is made to them only to illustrate the difficulties presented by the chance element. The problem posed by random factors is a difficult challenge in pursuing any form of systematic analysis.

A fourth difficulty in systems analysis grows out of the fact that the system is constantly in flux. Political behavior, like all other behavior, is dynamic, as are all the social factors that affect it. Consequently, one must avoid becoming too preoccupied with a static depiction of the system and the functional roles of its various components. Basic to the "systems" concept is the proposition that change in one part of a system induces changes in all others. For example, Almond has pointed out that

> In political systems, the emergence of mass parties or mass media of communication changes the performance of all the other structures of the political system, and affects the general capabilities of the system in its domestic and foreign environments. In other words, when one variable in a system changes in magnitude or in quality, the others are subjected to strains and are transformed, and the system changes its pattern of performance. . . .[6]

While recognizing this significant characteristic of systems theory, one must acknowledge that for practical reasons the system must be examined at as stationary a point in time as possible in order to capture relevant relationships of an arrested moment. When this has been done, one must be mindful that these relationships are not fixed and are subject to constant modification and adjustment.

Despite these difficulties and, doubtlessly, other shortcomings, the concept of the political system as reformulated has considerable utility in political science. Its chief merits reside in that it provides a scheme of analysis more meaningful than those which preceded it, by benefit of a better framework for the classification and explanation of similarities and differences among systems. In this way it can lead to the establishment of generalizations about political phenomena. Generalizations are needed, not necessarily for the ideal goal of establishing a general theory of politics, but to enable us to deal with politics anywhere in the world without relying solely on a country-by-country approach. Criticism has been leveled at this trend toward generalizations because it disregards the unique character of the behavior of different

[6]Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," *World Politics,* January 1965, p. 185.

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peoples. To these critics one has but to point out that an understanding of the general is necessary in order to discern the unique.

Generalization is therefore a necessity in comparative analysis, and generalizations require analytical categories. The literature concerned with the reformulated concept of the political system yields as many definitions of the system as there are authors. Despite differences in terminology, the varying definitions have many things in common, focusing on the process of decision-making or, as Easton put it, "the authoritative allocation of values." As for the analytical categories, called attributes, components, characteristics, properties, variables, and the like, the variations are even greater, ranging from four to as many as eighteen.[7] Thus, for example, what Beer labels the "pattern of interests," Almond calls "interest articulation" and "interest aggregation." Nevertheless, all definitions and categories are in agreement as to purpose: to provide a concept with analytical categories for the comparison of politics in all social settings.

The ubiquity of politics has prompted certain political scientists to consider all forms of association, such as tribes, companies, trade unions, civic groups and fraternal orders, as loci of the political function offering data for comparative analysis.[8] This broad claim has relevance for this article because politics in the developing states cannot be analyzed without taking into account the political function in traditional groups such as tribes and extended families. However, the concept of the political system as employed here refers to decision-making on issues of public policy. Thus, our working definition of the political system is: the pattern of interactions within a territorial society for the identification and posing of problems, and the making and administering of decisions through the legitimate use and regulation of force. Actually almost any one of the standard definitions could serve our purposes, as would any of their accompanying sets of analytical categories. But, for the sake of convenience, the following simplified list of categories is presented:

1) *Political Culture* or *the Foundations of Politics*—includes such factors as history, ecology, belief-system, values.

[7]Four categories are used in Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam, editors, *Patterns of Government* (New York: Random House, 1962), by S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), and in Ward and Macridis, *op. cit.;* Almond and Coleman use seven categories; Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963) uses a total of eleven, eight similar and three different; and Binder, *op. cit.*, uses eighteen.

[8]Harold Lasswell and Robert Dahl, for example. See Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

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2) *Political Dynamics* or *Input Function*—includes interest groups, parties, political socialization and recruitment, communication system.
3) *Decision-Making* or *Output Function*—includes government power and authority, i.e., rule making, rule application, rule adjudicating.
4) *Patterns of Policy*—includes effect of policy decisions, policy content, quality of decisions.

Levels of Analysis

The various but not too disparate definitions of the political system and its attributes or categories offered during the past decade subscribe to the purpose of providing a means for analyzing all political systems and are therefore conceived of at a high level of abstraction. At this level, the concept of the political system is designed to cover developed and underdeveloped, modern and primitive, Western and non-Western societies, so as to establish a unity within political science, not merely with uniform analytical categories but with hypotheses and generalizations emanating from them. At this level, only the broadest generalizations are possible.

Generalizations of this order provide limited help in the study of a particular system. Since they are so broad, they do not take into account different ways in which the various components of diverse systems operate. Before the developing states can be treated systematically, the level of generalization must be brought down a notch and the political system considered restrictively. The case of the developing areas requires a focus on development. What are the distinguishing characteristics of this type of political system? For example, as one of his four universal characteristics of all political systems, Almond offered the generalization that "all political systems are 'mixed' systems in the cultural sense" since "there are no 'all-modern' cultures in the sense of rationality, and no all-primitive ones, in the sense of traditionality." But he goes on to qualify this generalization by pointing out that "they differ in the relative dominance of the one as against the other, and in the pattern of mixture of the two components."[9] That all political systems are culturally "mixed" is an example of a generalization on the highest level. In trying to understand a specific political system, in particular that of developing states, this level must be lowered and our attention directed to the nature of the "mix," i.e., the relative proportions of "modern" and "traditional" elements within it.

In suggesting a lower level of generalization, I am not postu-

[9]Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

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lating an absolute dichotomy between *developed* and *developing*. Neither does making this differentiation imply that the political system within all developing states is the same. Actually, there is a considerable range of diversity within this group, as evidenced by the typologies drawn up by various authors. Coleman used seven categories in describing the functional specificity of structure in Asian and African political systems: (1) political democracy; (2) tutelary democracy; (3) terminal colonial democracy; (4) modernizing oligarchy; (5) colonial and racial oligarchy; (6) conservative oligarchy; and (7) traditional oligarchy, while using three different types: (1) competitive; (2) semi-competitive; and (3) authoritarian, for Latin American countries.[10] Shils' types, from which the Coleman types were derived, are only slightly different: (1) political democracy; (2) tutelary democracy; (3) modernizing oligarchy; (4) totalitarian oligarchy; (5) traditional oligarchy; and (6) traditionalistic and theocratic oligarchies.[11] Kautsky arrives at five types: (1) traditional aristocratic authoritarianism; (2) a transitional stage of domination by nationalist intellectuals; (3) totalitarianism of the aristocracy; (4) totalitarianism of the intellectuals; and (5) democracy.[12] Apter and Rosberg present three models for sub-Saharan Africa: (1) the mobilization system; (2) a consociational system; and (3) a modernizing autocracy.[13]

The Political System of Developing Areas and the Developing Science of Politics

The conventional analytical unit in political science has been the state. But since there are so many states, and the number is increasing every year, it is highly desirable, for efficiency's sake at least, to be able to group states into units of analysis. The challenging problem is that of establishing criteria for groupings. In light of the many typologies advanced for the developing states, it might seem that a single analytical unit called "developing" is too broad because it includes so many different types.

[10]*Ibid.*, pp. 562-567.

[11]Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1962).

[12]John H. Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962).

[13]David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg, "Nationalism and Models of Political Change in Africa," in *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa* (Washington: The National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, George Washington University, December 1959).

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The contention of this paper is that regardless of typology there is subsumed under the rubric of "political modernization" enough similarity in the patterns of political behavior, political leadership, and the types of problems posed to enable political scientists to treat the developing countries as a meaningful unit of analysis. Research using this framework is still sparse. Although a number of general works have treated political as well as other aspects of development, notably the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Brookings studies,[14] there is yet no full-scale work, stated strictly in terms of political science, dealing with the political system in developing states. Significantly, work pointing in this direction has already appeared in the form of Coleman's concluding essay in *The Politics of the Developing Areas;* in Kautsky's lengthy and stimulating essay in his anthology, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries;* in Shils' *Political Development in the New States;* in articles by Pye, Kahin and Pauker; and in studies of aspects of the political system such as the military, the political role of labor, and the communications function.[15]

A work that uses most of the developing world of Asia, Africa and Latin America as a unit of analysis is *Old Societies and New States* edited by Clifford Geertz for the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations. This book, subtitled *The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa,* is composed of eight papers, most of which treat an aspect of the political system in the "new states" of Asia and Africa.[16] The new states are defined as those

[14]Max Milikan and Donald Blackmer, *The Emerging Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), is the M.I.T. study; that of the Brookings Institution is *Development of the Emerging Countries: An Agenda for Research* (Washington, 1962).

[15]Leading articles are: Lucian W. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," *Journal of Politics,* August 1958; George McT. Kahin, Guy J. Pauker and Lucian W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," *The American Political Science Review,* December 1955. Function studies include: John J. Johnson, editor, *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Bruce H. Millen, *The Political Role of Labor in Developing Countries* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963); Lucian W. Pye, editor, *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[16](New York: The Free Press, 1963). The eight papers in the collection are: Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States"; McKim Marriott, "Culture Policy in the New States"; David E. Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations"; Lloyd Fallers, "Equality, Modernity, and Democracy in the New States"; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution"; Max Rheinstein, "Problems of Law in the New Nations of Africa"; Mary Jean Bowman and C. Arnold Anderson, "Concerning the Role of Education in Development"; and Robert LeVine, "Political Socialization and Cultural Change."

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which have acquired full sovereignty since 1945 and are distinguished from the older underdeveloped states of Asia (i.e., Turkey, Iran and Thailand), Africa (Ethiopia and Liberia) and Latin America. While recognizing that affinities exist between these two groups in their common underdeveloped status—both have largely agricultural economies, masses that are uneducated, traditional and parochial, and a young elite insisting upon the modernization of their countries—this volume draws a line between the two because there is sufficient uniqueness among the newly independent states.

Undoubtedly, the reason for sparsity of overall analysis of politics in developing areas is the difficulty involved in integrating so vast and disparate a world. A less comprehensive but closely related approach is the use of regional or area analysis. It, too, strives to overcome the inefficiency of the country-by-country approach, but instead of using the entire developing world it focuses on culture areas as units of analysis. A notable example is Manfred Halpern's *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*.[17] In spite of the irregularities and differences that inevitably exist within this vast culture area, Halpern effectively combines the process of political modernization and the area's cultural uniformities into a highly pertinent framework of analysis. Other examples of the area approach are contained in the five regional studies (Southeast Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Near East and Latin America) in Almond and Coleman. Ward and Macridis' *Modern Political Systems: Asia* uses both the area and country-by-country approaches; it presents studies on Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia side by side with those on India, China and Japan.

This eclecticism suggests that it is difficult to establish uniform units of analysis. Different areas lend themselves to different grouping arrangements. In some cases such as India or China, the country approach would seem in order, while in other cases a broader grouping is appropriate. Country-by-country approaches make a very important contribution to the study of developing areas for in these units of analysis, more than in any other, the researcher is closest to the data. Country studies are somewhat more plentiful—Pye on Burma, Ashford on Morocco, Safran on

[17](Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

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Egypt, Binder on Iran, Zolberg on the Ivory Coast, Grossholtz on the Philippines, to mention just a few—but one would not consider the list overwhelming.[18]

Both the volumes by Almond and Coleman and by Ward and Macridis contain opening and closing essays that generalize about the politics of development on the basis of the findings reported in the regional analyses. In a similar fashion, Ashford, Safran, Binder and Pye present theoretical generalizations in their individual country studies. In this connection, it should be noted that in 1959 Kahin—who participated with Pye and Pauker in drafting one of the earliest formulations of an overall approach to comparative politics in non-Western countries[19]—edited *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia,* which contained studies on six countries. An integrative, generalizing or comparative chapter was deliberately excluded from this volume. Kahin wrote in the preface that "because of insufficient fundamental monographic material, an attempt at this stage to form broad generalizations about the political systems of the states of Southeast Asia would be premature."[20]

Kahin's decision raises a fundamental proposition for comparative analysis in general: On what basis does one generalize? No one will deny that data concerning politics in the developing areas are fragmentary when compared with material accumulated on any of the developed states. But not all political scientists studying these areas view this as a barrier to generalizing about the political process in them. Ashford, for example, feels that "to some extent our ignorance of underdeveloped countries has encouraged more careful and thoughtful generalization, since we have had to maximize the value of the available data."[21] This approach makes much sense, for we are in need of generalizations in order to establish a theoretical context for research design, comparative analysis and teaching about developing areas.

[18]Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961); Douglas E. Ashford, *Political Change in Morocco* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Binder, *op. cit.;* Aristide R. Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Jean Grossholtz, *Politics in the Philippines* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).

[19]Kahin, Pauker and Pye, *op. cit.*

[20](Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959).

[21]Ashford, *op. cit.,* p. 406.

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The reformulation of the concept of the political system is the key to all these approaches and studies, and more significantly to the treatment of the developing areas as a meaningful unit of analysis: it clears the way for the study of developing areas on a new basis. Heretofore, Asian, African and Latin American politics were viewed essentially within the context of international politics or as appendages to European politics. The focus was heavily on colonial policy and administration and on the nationalist protest movements.

This orientation was well suited to the period of colonialism, but with the attainment of independence a new frame of reference was needed. One could not study politics of the new nations with the traditional yardsticks of Western political institutions and practices, such as the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, separation of powers, individual rights, the party system and public administration. The structural-functional categories of the reformulated concept of the political system proved eminently more rewarding as an analytical framework. Thus, even without the effective operation of familiar Western institutions in the newly independent states, it was possible to identify political functions operating in them. New categories established by the structural-functional framework, such as political recruitment and socialization, interest aggregation, and communication, now enabled one to discern a functioning polity that made sense and was not merely an aberration of Western government.

As discerned in the developing areas, the political system possessed traits that distinguished it from the systems of the modern developed world. These traits were produced by the disturbing impact of economically and technologically advanced societies upon traditional non-industrial societies during the era of colonialism and imperialism. For the relatively static pattern of society in the traditional world with its subsistence economy, parochial communities and social groupings based on kinship, tribe and caste, its theologically oriented belief system and its lack of functional differentiation, the effect of the introduction of modern technology, mass communications and new ideologies was corrosive and profound. The new dynamic trends that were set in motion included a galloping population growth, social mobility, rapid urbanization, stimulation of non-agricultural eco-

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nomic activity, the breakdown of traditional groupings and the emergence of new groups, the development of functional differentiation, the stimulation of a new type of political activity in the form of the nationalist movements, and the undermining of the traditional theologically-oriented belief system by greater dependence upon reason and science. The factor of change, thus introduced in every aspect of traditional society, touched off the complex processes of modernization and development. Because this process is so complex, modernity cannot be decreed for a society by fiat, and the societies that have felt the disturbing impact of the industrial world find themselves in a transitional status somewhere in between the traditional and modern "ideal types."

For political scientists, this modernization or development process has particular interest because it involves: (1) the organization of society along a concept totally new for these countries, the modern nation-state; (2) the differentiation of a distinct political function; (3) the creation of a modern public service; (4) the involvement in the political process of groups which in the past did not participate in it; and (5) the evolution of public policy to cope with the forces of social change set in motion by the modernist impact. For the first time in the areas experiencing the transition from traditionalism to modernity, a political system that could be differentiated from the social and economic systems became evident. In a sense one can say that a political system per se did not exist as long as there were no boundaries between the political and other social functions and that its emergence as a distinct system is the mark of modernization. With more persons assuming basically political roles, with new groups participating in the political process, with the individual becoming aware of belonging to an association larger than his immediate group, there was a fundamental breakdown in the traditional pattern by which the political function was discharged.

The traditional pattern was broken but not eliminated. Aspirations for modernity essentially belong to the small elite in control of the government apparatus, which finds that it cannot impose them easily upon a largely traditional society. A start at modernization has been made, but the road is long and tortuous, and it is not certain that all societies whose leaders strongly desire modernization will eventually achieve it. In studying the political system in the developing states, the focus must be on

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political modernization.[22] In this compass, one must look for factors contributing to the process as well as those impeding it. It must not be assumed that because the societies are called transitional and developing, real progress toward modernization is automatic. For some states in this category, an appropriate metaphor is the treadmill: there is a lot of activity but no real movement. A propensity for this condition exists in the developing world because of such factors as the pull of the past with its particularist loyalties, inherent negative ecological factors that rule out economic development of any significance, and the pattern of demography whereby a runaway population growth cancels out any growth in the economic sphere.

Focusing on political modernization reveals the basic difference between the developed and the developing political systems. The goal of political modernization is the establishment of a political community in which (1) the legitimacy of the state is generally unchallenged—its decisions and authority are almost always accepted, with the nation-state serving as the means through which ideological and social conflicts are resolved; (2) the people share a deep sense of common destiny in their nationality; and (3) the people participate in the political process in that they produce pressures on the government for policy decisions in response to their needs. In brief, a modern polity is one with effective organization, normally found in the developed states.

This goal obviously has not been achieved in the developing states, even though they have all the formal and legal trappings of developed states—sovereignty, a vote in the United Nations, a chief of state, a bureaucracy, their own postage stamps and a variety of relations with other states. A structural-functional analysis reveals that the underpinnings of this formal superstructure are missing or are weak. The informal structure and functioning of society are still tradition-bound. Organizations capable of articulating diverse interests are hard to discern and there is little awareness of belonging to the nation. Loyalty is generally directed to the immediate group but the individual,

[22]On this subject see a paper focusing directly on political modernization in the developing world, "On Comparing Political Systems in Process of Transformation," delivered by Manfred Halpern of Princeton University at the 1963 annual meeting of the African Studies Association in San Francisco on October 25, 1963. In this paper, Halpern addressed himself to questions directly related to the subject of this article, such as: "What are the prerequisite and requisite patterns of interactions for the take-off of a political system into self-sustaining growth?" and "What are the requisites for sustaining a resiliently stable political system in the midst of continuing social change?"

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subject to exhortation from those in control of the government apparatus and its communications system, undergoes a disjointed socialization process that hardly prepares him for effective citizenship. In essence, there is no national polity that conforms to the boundaries of the newly emergent state. Ethnic, religious and linguistic factors, local communities kept isolated and parochial by economic and social underdevelopment, and masses who adhere to traditional patterns of life and authority, all stand in the way of the creation of effective organization.

The Developing Areas as a Distinct Unit of Analysis

It is often suggested that the developing states are going through the same modernization process which the developed states have already experienced, particularly with regard to nation-building. In a general sense this is the case, as Emerson points out:

> Nationalism wherever it manifests itself is in essence a response to the forces which in recent centuries have revolutionized the West and have penetrated in successive waves to the farthest corners of the earth. Despite vast differences in time, place, and setting, characteristic threads of circumstance and development bring a measure of common identity to all emergent nationalisms.[23]

However, there is a basic distinction in the historical experience of Europe and the United States, on the one hand, and Asia, Africa and Latin America, on the other. In the case of the developed states, the process of national integration was achieved over a long period of time, predominantly through the effects of industrialization. The developing states are attempting to accelerate the process into decades instead of centuries, with the communication function serving as the major vehicle for nation-building.[24]

The crux of the political system in all developing countries, regardless of typology, is involvement in a distinct process of nation-building. To repeat a point made previously, in this process a modernist elite, seeking to integrate the people into a national community, comes into conflict with the traditional and underlying values of society which are basically incompatible with the requirements of political modernity. One must not assume that the traditional elements, by definition, are unalterably opposed to the modernized sector. During the struggle for inde-

[23]Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
[24]See Pye, editor, *Communications and Political Development.*

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pendence, for example, they often gave strong support to the Westernized nationalists and their participation frequently tipped the balance in favor of independence. After independence the ties binding the coalition of forces that constituted the nationalist movement were loosened as latent differences in social goals and values came to the fore. Thus, despite the victory of the nationalist protest movements over colonialism, the developing states are involved in the process of nation-building. In developed societies, the nation already exists and its legitimacy is generally unchallenged. This is the essential difference between the *developed* and *developing* states, enabling us to employ the construct of the developing areas as a distinct unit of analysis.

The process of nation-building is not to be construed as focusing exclusively or mainly on the establishment of a new sovereignty per se, but rather on the integration of various elements of the society into a political community, in which common goals (in this case development and modernization) are shared and in which there is agreement on the governmental machinery to implement these goals. In this sense, the older sovereign states of Asia and Africa and parts of Latin America share this problem of nation-building or political integration—for them, too, the issues are development, modernity and overcoming the inertia and pull of the past.

The distinguishing characteristic of the developing areas is thus found in the modifying adjective "developing." To understand this political system, it is necessary to seek answers to this question: What processes of change must take place for a traditional society to develop to the point that a national community exists? This recalls the proposition advanced earlier concerning the level of generalization or abstraction most suitable when employing the political system concept in the analysis of developing areas. I have tried to show that by moving to a lower level of abstraction, that is, by not generalizing for all political systems, we are able to establish a meaningful and distinct unit of analysis called the developing or transitional areas. As already noted, this does not deny the propriety of generalizing about all political behavior in order to arrive at concepts applicable to all political systems. We can establish distinct political systems only by starting with the general concept and then qualifying it, as I have noted with regard to the "culturally mixed" character of all polities.

All or most of the characteristics that we attribute to the devel-

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oping areas also exist in the developed states. For example, all polities have problems concerning consensus and group alienation. But the distinction between the developed and the developing is a matter of degree. The problem of consensus and group alienation is hardly the same in the two systems. In the case of the developing states, consensus is so minimal and the problem of achieving and maintaining it so chronic that it calls into question the legitimacy of the state and its authority. This is generally not the case in the developed states. Similar distinctions can be seen in the area of power, the functioning of political parties, and the like.

In being less general, we are taking increased account of unique phenomena. Uniqueness in the case of the developing areas requires greater awareness of phenomena that are not purely or essentially political. The lack of functional differentiation in the traditional sector of society in developing states calls for an interdisciplinary area analysis. Moreover, since the problem of political change is intertwined with social and economic change, the integrative area studies approach is appropriate. This blurs the boundaries of the political system, to the dismay of some political scientists, but this cannot be avoided. Most studies of the political systems of developing states that have appeared, correctly take this into account, for it is only within this broader cultural context that a developing area's or state's political system can be understood.

Conclusion

The attributes of the political system (political culture, political dynamics, decision-making policy patterns) in the developing areas are sufficiently distinct from those in the developed states to require separate treatment. At the same time, they are sufficiently regular within the developing world to permit treatment as a unit of analysis, but not to the exclusion of more specific area or country-by-country analyses. Politics in the developing states cannot be studied adequately with the old legalistic and formal postulates of political science. The reformulated concept of the political system with its structural-functional categories and its emphasis upon the interrelatedness of all parts of the polity, plus an awareness of the interaction of the polity and other spheres of society, is basic to the study of developing areas.

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EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE COMMON MARKET AND GROUP LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES IN THE MEMBER STATES*

by Werner Feld

ONE of the most intriguing features of the treaty establishing the European Economic Community is the authority of top-level Community institutions to determine the direction and substance of some of the relations between the Community and third countries. Thus, in certain functional areas foreign policy powers normally exercised exclusively by the governments of the six member states—France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries—have been transferred to the Commission and the Council of Ministers.[1] When one considers that foreign policy is traditionally one of the most jealously guarded spheres of national sovereignty, it becomes manifest that the framers of the EEC Treaty were treading on dangerous, often emotion-laden ground when they boldly embodied in the treaty this transfer of powers from national governments to the organs of an international organization.[2]

In keeping with the treaty's primarily economic objectives, it is the economic sector in which Community organs are authorized to evolve certain relations of the Common Market with the world. The extent of this authority is to be broader after the expiration of the current twelve-year transitional period which the treaty has provided so that the customs union, the basic

*The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Ford Foundation, whose financial support made it possible to carry out field research for this study during the summer of 1965.

[1]Although it is composed of ministers of the member states, the Council is an organ of the Community. Its two major responsibilities are to represent the interests of the member states and to promote the objectives for whose pursuit the Community was established.

[2]The earlier treaty (1951) establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was considerably more restrictive; in general the six member states retained full control over foreign policy formulation and execution. On the other hand, the Euratom Treaty conveys a number of competences for the conduct of external relations to the Community organs; in certain respects the powers of these organs are broader than those granted by the EEC Treaty. For details see Werner Feld, "The Competences of the European Communities for the Conduct of External Relations," *Texas Law Review,* July 1965, pp. 691-926.

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structure underlying the Common Market, may progress toward its full realization. The competences of the Community organs for the conduct of external relations involve principally the formulation and implementation of commercial policy and the association of third countries with the Community, the latter a relationship that has not only far-reaching economic significance, but also important political implications.[3]

An essential ingredient of a customs union, and closely related to the formulation of commercial policy by the Community organs, is the institution of a common external tariff. During 1960 the Community established such a tariff, based in principle on the arithmetic average of the tariffs in force in the member states prior to the introduction of the customs union. However, the establishment of this tariff did not signify its immediate application on all goods entering the Common Market. Rather, it served as a guide toward which the national tariffs of the member states were to be adjusted in three stages during the transitional period, and required a progressive reduction of customs duties by traditionally high-tariff Italy and France as well as gradual increases of duties by less protectionist Germany and the Benelux countries. Two 30 per cent adjustments of the national tariffs of the member states toward the Common External Tariff (CET) have taken place, one on December 30, 1960 and the other on July 1, 1963. In addition, the Dillon Round negotiations, held under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and aimed at a decrease in tariffs, were concluded successfully in 1962. The result has been a 20 per cent reduction of the CET on a large majority of tariff positions, providing a new lower base toward which the national tariffs of member states were to be aligned.[4]

[3]Other competences include the assumption of relations to international organizations, international transport problems, and, implicitly, the accreditation of diplomatic missions by third countries.

[4]The Dillon Round negotiations did not actually produce a 20 per cent reduction of tariffs, but lowered them only 7-8 per cent. However, the Community reduced the CET by 20 per cent with the proviso that this reduction might be rescinded should the Kennedy Round negotiations not produce adequate concessions on the part of the United States by the end of 1965. In April 1966 the Council of Ministers decided to continue until June 30, 1967 the 20 per cent reduction for all industrial items for which no exemptions in the Kennedy Round were requested. As a consequence, for a large majority of tariff positions the CET remained unchanged after January 1, 1966. For additional details regarding the CET and the Dillon Round negotiations see Finn B. Jensen and Ingo Walter, *The Common Market* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965), pp. 51-54, and Randall Hinshaw, *The European Community and American Trade* (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 98-99. Cf. also articles 18-29 of the EEC Treaty.

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During the transitional period Community organs are empowered to open tariff negotiations with third countries regarding the CET; they can also conclude appropriate trade agreements in the name of the Community. The Dillon Round of negotiations presented a first opportunity for the Commission to try its hand in international tariff bargaining, and the agreements concluded were signed not only by the member governments but also by a representative of the Council of Ministers acting for the Community as a legal international person.[5] Later, the Community engaged in trade negotiations on a bilateral basis with a number of third countries, resulting in tariff agreements signed with Iran (1963), Israel (1964) and Lebanon (1965).[6] While these agreements represent first steps in the formation of a common commercial policy by the Community, their substantive content is relatively meager. On the other hand, the multilateral negotiations now under way in Geneva generated by the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Kennedy Round) have great potential significance for the participating states, even though the prospects for their successful conclusion are uncertain at the present time.

When the transitional period expires, the powers of the Community organs with regard to the formulation and execution of a common commercial policy will be considerably enlarged. These powers go beyond the conclusion of tariff or trade agreements to include accords concerning export policy, anti-dumping as well as trade liberalization measures, regulation of export and import prices, the issuance of currency regulations for commercial transactions, tourist trade and other activities.[7] The introduction of a common commercial policy is a highly complicated matter since at present approximately 800 bilateral commercial agreements are in force between the member states and third countries. It would be a difficult problem even were member governments to initiate willingly the transfer of their bilateral agreements to the Community. Given the interdependence between foreign economic and national security policy, the difficulty of defining precisely the boundaries of commercial policy, and the natural reluctance of member governments to relinquish control

[5]See articles 111, 114 and 116 of the EEC Treaty, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, July 16, 1962, U.S. Treaties and International Agreement Series, No. 5253, pp. 13-15.

[6]See *Amtsblatt der Europaeischen Gemeinschaften* (hereafter referred to as *Amtsblatt*), 1963, p. 2554/63; 1964, p. 1517/64; and *European Community*, April 1965, p. 3.

[7]Articles 113 and 114, EEC Treaty. Cf. also Feld, *op. cit.*, p. 901.

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over their economic policies, its solution will beset the Community for years to come—even after the transitional period has expired.[8]

The Community organs have used their competence to negotiate association agreements with third countries on several occasions. Agreements concluded with Greece and Turkey, in 1962 and 1963, both aim at creating custom unions between the Community and the associated countries and envisage eventual full membership for the latter. Another agreement, known as the Convention of Yaoundé, was concluded with eighteen African states in 1963; in this case the association was structured in the form of a free trade area between the Community and the associates.[9] Other countries in Europe and Africa have expressed an interest in association with the Community. Negotiations have been successfully concluded with Nigeria and are at an advanced stage with Austria. Preliminary discussions on this subject have also been held with Denmark, Spain, the Maghreb countries, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

The Formulation of Community Policy

The usual procedure through which Community organs are authorized to formulate and implement the Community's foreign economic policy consists in appropriate proposals by the Commission upon which the Council of Ministers must act either by unanimous or qualified majority vote. For the conclusion of association agreements the European Parliament also has to be consulted, but the Council of Ministers is not bound by the parliamentary advice and so far has not taken this requirement very seriously.[10]

While on paper the interaction between the Commission and

[8]New bilateral agreements continue to be concluded by the member states but now contain a so-called EEC clause permitting the reopening of the agreement at a later date. This clause is also added to older agreements when they are renewed. For the text of the clause see Feld, *op. cit.*, p. 902 and *Amtsblatt*, 1961, p. 2173.

[9]See *Amtsblatt*, 1963, pp. 293/63-358/63; 1964, pp. 3685/64-3708/64; and 1964, pp. 1431/64-1471/64. Cf. also Werner Feld, "The Association Agreements of the European Communities; A Comparative Analysis," *International Organization*, Spring 1965, pp. 223-249. The association with the African countries was a continuation of a similar relationship instituted by the EEC Treaty (articles 131-136) with the former African colonies of France and Belgium. The countries involved are Burundi, Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo (Brazzaville), the Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Upper Volta and Malagasy.

[10]Cf. articles 111-116, 228 and 238 of the EEC Treaty.

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the Council of Ministers as specified by the EEC Treaty is clear-cut and relatively simple, in practice it entails a highly complex decision-making process. Participating prominently in this process is a third organ, scarcely mentioned in the treaty, namely, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, consisting of the ambassadors of the six member states to the Community supported by their not inconsiderable staff.[11] Because any proposal for the formulation of economic policy toward third countries obviously affects economic and perhaps political interests in the member states, the decision-making process underlying the pattern of trade relations and association as evolved so far has been characterized by extensive bargaining sessions in Commission, Committee and Council meetings in order to hammer out acceptable compromises among conflicting private as well as national interests.[12] Economic interest groups in the member states have sought in various ways to influence Community decisions. Because the final decision is made in the Council of Ministers and is prepared by staff work performed in the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the most promising method seemed to be to enlist the support of their national governments and influential political parties. However, national economic groups have not neglected the Commission as a target for their efforts and for this purpose have created in many instances umbrella organizations to represent them on the European level.[13]

The ability of national economic groups to induce their governments to represent their interests forcefully in the bargaining sessions of the different Community organs varies from country to country. It is safe to assume that at present it is lowest in France: General de Gaulle has a personal antipathy for what he calls the "intermediaries" who stand between the state and the people and who, according to him, thrive on the promotion of the particular interest over the national interest.[14] In the sum-

[11]The Commission frequently consults this Committee or its staff before submitting a proposal to the Council. At the same time, it is the Committee, and especially its working groups, which screens final Commission proposals for the Council and prepares recommendations for Council action.

[12]Cf. Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 211-218.

[13]The Commission usually insists on dealing only with "European" interest groups. For amplification see the interesting study prepared by the Europa Institute of the University of Amsterdam entitled *Les Groupes de Pression dans la C.E.E.* (Amsterdam, 1965).

[14]Nicholas Wahl, "The French Political System," in S. H. Beer and A. B. Ulam, editors, *Patterns of Government* (Second edition; New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 275-467, especially p. 420.

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mer of 1965 the anguished pleas of all French farm groups to halt De Gaulle's boycott of the Common Market institutions fell on apparently deaf ears.[15] In Italy, on the other end of the spectrum, interest groups appear to exert appreciable influence on the government's formulation of economic foreign policy, and their lobbying activities are accepted practice.[16] The responsiveness of the remaining four governments to such demands lies between the French and Italian extremes; individual governmental reactions most likely depend on the effective political power these groups can wield on the domestic scene and their skill in enlisting the assistance of influential political parties and personalities.[17] As a consequence, although it would be hyperbole to claim that economic interest groups in the member states determine the external relations of the Common Market, the pressure they exert may be in many instances a significant factor in the Community decision-making process.

Another source of potential influence for economic interest groups is the Commission's practice of seeking their advice on many subjects before presenting a proposal to the Council of Ministers. However, this advice is sought usually only from groups operating on the "European" level; in order to press their demands, therefore, national interest groups must persuade umbrella organizations to adopt these demands as their own. Finally, the Economic and Social Committee of the EEC is especially designed to be a forum for the expression of interest group views, although so far it has not proven to be an effective channel for the infusion of demands into the Community decision-making machinery.[18]

From the foregoing it seems reasonable to infer that the objectives of economic interest groups are apt to be reflected in varying degrees in the formulation of foreign economic policy by the

[15]Cf. *Le Monde,* August 26, 1965, and *European Community,* October 1965, p. 10.

[16]See Norman Kogan, *The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 87-106, 135-156; and Mario Toscano, "The Foreign Policy of Italy," in J. E. Black and K. W. Thompson, editors, *Foreign Policies in a World of Change* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 171-196.

[17]Cf. H. Speier and W. P. Davison, editors, *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957). For a discussion of the American scene see Bernard C. Cohen, *The Influence of Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign-Policy Making* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959).

[18]For an excellent analysis of this Committee see Gerda Zellentin, *Der Wirtschafts-und Sozialausschuss der EWG and Euratom* (Leyden: Sythoff, 1962). It seems, however, that Miss Zellentin overestimates the influence of the Committee on the Community decision-making process.

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Community organs. To what degree they are reflected depends probably on the acceptance and support accorded them by other influential groups in the member states, especially the major political parties and officials of foreign and economics ministries. Therefore, an inquiry into the pertinent attitudes of leadership echelons in influential economic interest groups, major political parties and relevant government departments may yield clues as to which objectives have a good prospect of being favored in the decisions that fashion the Common Market's external relations. An elaboration of these attitudes toward selected issues may permit a tentative forecast of policy development by the EEC institutions.

An attempt to determine such attitudes was made by the writer during the latter part of 1964 and the first eight months of 1965. Two hundred twenty-one questionnaires were sent to interest groups and political parties in the six member states, and replies to the questionnaires were supplemented by sixty-eight personal interviews with officials of important economic interest groups, political parties, government ministries, and a few prominent business enterprises (Italy only).[19] Although the questionnaires and interviews covered both substantive and procedural aspects of the Community's foreign economic policymaking, this article will concentrate only on attitudes and views toward three substantive issues: the Kennedy Round negotiations, the Community's association policy, and the chances for a common commercial policy toward the communist bloc countries. These issues were selected because of their vital importance for U.S. foreign policy and their direct or indirect bearing on the prospects for a broadened Atlantic partnership. The results of the analysis of the questionnaires and interviews are reported below under these three headings.

The Kennedy Round Negotiations

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the relationship between the Common Market and the United States is the fate of the

[19]Fifty-eight completed questionnaires were returned; the percentage of returns varied between a high of 60 per cent from Germany and a low of 10 per cent from France. Most of the questions were of the "open-response" kind, but a few structured (dichotomous) questions were also included. The interviews followed closely the pattern laid out in the questionnaires and were open-ended to permit intensive probing of respondents. In order to ensure spontaneity of expression all interviews were conducted without the aid of memoranda and without taking notes; the latter were assembled as soon as possible after the interview, on forms used for the questionnaires.

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Kennedy Round negotiations. Initiated at the request of the late President's administration, these negotiations, based on the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, aim at a broad, across-the-board reduction of tariffs and other kinds of restraints upon the flow of international trade. Conducted under the auspices of GATT, they mainly affect the United States, Canada, and the members of the EEC and EFTA; however, the primary negotiating focus is on the United States and the Common Market.

In terms of American interest the purpose of the Trade Expansion Act is twofold: (1) to expand U.S. exports and imports, thereby contributing to employment and benefiting the balance of payments; and (2) to persuade the Common Market to pursue liberal "outward-looking" trade policies.[20] Fearing that the emerging Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the Community would threaten the export of American farm products, the U.S. negotiating position from the outset included as an essential element the demand that U.S. agricultural exports to the EEC retain their "historic" or "fair" share as a source of food in the Common Market countries and, moreover, participate in the anticipated growth of demand for farm products. No ultimate agreement was considered acceptable unless it was a single package for both industrial and agricultural items. The feature of the CAP causing the U.S. government special concern was the introduction of a system of variable import levies tied to fixed target prices in the member states, which is used instead of tariffs to protect intra-Community farm production of grains, beef, pork, dairy products and other commodities. Because they are tied to target prices, these levies do not lend themselves to reduction in the same manner as do tariffs.[21]

During 1963 preliminary negotiations succeeded in overcoming the bothersome problem of disparities in the distribution of the U.S. tariff and the CET, which, unless solved, would have made the across-the-board reduction principle unacceptable to the EEC. The Kennedy Round opened officially on May 4, 1964.

[20]For an excellent analysis of the trade relationship between the U.S. and the Common Market see Hinshaw, *op. cit.*

[21]See *New York Times,* March 2, 1964, and Hinshaw, *op. cit.,* pp. 150-152. For an excellent exposition of the rationale for the U.S. stand see Orville L. Freeman, "U.S. Position Regarding Agricultural Trade," *Vital Speeches,* January 15, 1963, pp. 211-215. The U.S. position was further amplified in a number of speeches by the Secretary of Agriculture during 1964 and 1965. See U.S. Department of Agriculture releases 355-64, 1675-64, 2431-64 and 599-65. For a concise analysis of the implications of this position see *New York Times,* May 7, 1964.

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For the remainder of the year, the major effort consisted of the preparation and submission of lists of exceptions to the tariff reductions; these lists are still secret and bargaining on their acceptance has not been initiated. Preliminary discussions concerning the treatment of agricultural products began during 1964, and grain proposals were submitted in May 1965. At present, the negotiations are at a standstill; they await a final agreement on the Community's CAP which has been delayed by the crisis provoked by General de Gaulle in the summer of 1965.

This then, in brief, is the background and present status of the Kennedy Round negotiations. Discussion and analysis of the questionnaire responses and interviews will bring out additional significant points. For this discussion it seems useful to differentiate between attitudes toward the industrial sector and those toward the agricultural sector of the negotiations.

With reference to the industrial sector, 67.5 per cent of the respondents firmly supported the aim of the Kennedy Round negotiations to bring about substantial across-the-board reductions of the U.S. and EEC tariffs; 17.4 per cent were halfheartedly in favor of the tariff cuts, expressing various reservations; 7.2 per cent were strongly opposed; 3.1 per cent were more moderate in their opposition; and 4.8 per cent were undecided or neutral on this issue. Although varying in intensity, the overwhelming support for industrial tariff cuts (85 per cent) suggests acceptance of the basic premise underlying the Trade Expansion Act, that increased international trade will be mutually beneficial to the economically advanced countries of the Western world. This acceptance is especially noteworthy in light of the EEC's growing trade deficit toward the United States; between 1958 and 1964 U.S. exports to the Common Market rose 93 per cent, whereas the reverse flow increased only 71 per cent. Moreover, total U.S. exports to the EEC in 1964 amounted to nearly $5.5 billion, while EEC exports to the United States were only slightly more than half this figure ($2.85 billion).

The opposition to industrial tariff cuts was encountered mainly in France and Italy. This is not surprising when one considers that the French and Italian tariffs have already been adjusted downward toward the CET by 60 per cent, and that the CET was reduced from its original level by 20 per cent during the Dillon Round negotiations in 1962. Several respondents in these countries expressed the fear that many industrial plants might

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flounder if exposed to a further reduction of tariffs, since they would not be able to compete with the more efficient U.S. plants. The opinion was advanced in several interviews that the United States had moved into a second revolution by the widespread adoption of automation, which would further enhance the competitive position of American industry, whereas European industry still relied for the most part on traditional methods. In any case, industry in France and Italy needed a breathing spell after the elimination of duties within the Common Market. On the other hand, some respondents pointed out that French and Italian industries had feared the effect of the impending interior tariff reductions when the Common Market came into force, but that re-evaluation and rationalization of their own operations caused by the introduction of the Common Market had increased their efficiency sufficiently to make them fully competitive in the enlarged trade area. A similar development might be conceivable when new tariff reductions on both sides of the Atlantic and between the EEC and EFTA were instituted. As one respondent put it, "the industries in France and Italy need a cold shower of reduced tariffs which would be healthy for them."

In all member states, including those where support for industrial tariff cuts was predominant, it was advocated that certain vulnerable or "sick" industries, such as textiles but also others, should be exempted from the general tariff reductions.[22] Interestingly enough, a number of respondents representing influential groups in Germany, Holland and Belgium that basically supported the industrial tariff cuts, intimated that some industries in these countries actually welcomed the newly-found protection afforded by the upward adjustments of national tariffs toward the CET and in fact were inclined toward protectionism, although proclaiming publicly their interest in the success of the Kennedy Round negotiations.

Those who were lukewarm in support of broad tariff cuts justified their attitudes by advancing a variety of reservations. Representatives of two powerful groups in France and Belgium argued that the EEC should not agree to tariff cuts unless they ensured a redress of the increasingly favorable U.S. trade balance toward the Common Market. In this connection fears were expressed

[22]The EEC exemption list as constituted at the end of 1964 comprised about 19 per cent of total dutiable EEC imports (*European Community,* November-December 1964, p. 2).

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about the difficulty of successfully penetrating the highly competitive American market. Other respondents felt that it might be better to delay the negotiations until the transitional period had expired in order to provide a more solid negotiating basis for the Community. One knowledgeable government official (not French), thought that the stress laid by some Europeans—including a few of the respondents—on the need for quick success in the Kennedy Round may be a serious tactical error and that prospects for success might improve if the urgency and importance of the talks were de-emphasized. A parliamentary deputy in the Netherlands held that the Kennedy Round negotiations should play a secondary role to the task of "making Europe" and stated that other Dutch parliamentarians appeared to have a similar concept of priority. A few respondents, mostly labor union officials, stressed the need for solving the problems of the developing countries prior to or simultaneously with an agreement on cuts of industrial tariffs because "merely to increase the exchange of goods between economically advanced countries was not enough." Finally, some respondents stated that in the GATT negotiations it might be more important to come to an agreement with the EFTA countries than with the United States, since an agreement with EFTA would contribute to bridging the gap between the two European trade groups and might lay the groundwork for the economic integration of a larger Europe.

With respect to the agricultural sector of the negotiations, the attitude pattern disclosed by the responses to questionnaires and interviews turned out to be almost the reverse of that indicated by responses regarding the industrial sector. Fifty-six per cent of the respondents firmly opposed any weakening of the walls protecting Community agriculture and strongly rejected U.S. demands for a "fair" or "historic" share in the agricultural market of the Community; 12.9 per cent appeared to accept some long-range reduction of duties on commodities protected by traditional tariffs, but resisted any change in the principles underlying the variable import levy system and opposed any quantitative import guaranties; and 11.2 per cent indicated that they would agree with some minor quantitative guaranties and would favor a gradual reduction of target prices. Only 12 per cent supported the U.S. concept of essentially equal treatment of agricultural and industrial products when the overall package is put together in the negotiations.

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Various reasons were given for this generally negative attitude. Prominently cited was the unfavorable trade balance in the agricultural sector, where American exports to the EEC in 1964 were over six times as large as EEC exports to the United States. Since 1958 U.S. agricultural exports have more than doubled; in fact they increased substantially in 1964 over 1963, although some commodities did not participate in this increase.[23] Several respondents stated that in view of this tremendous imbalance in agricultural trade between the United States and the EEC, they could not see any justification in the demands of the American government. They could conceive of no reason why European farmers should make sacrifices for the benefit of American farmers. A number expressed the opinion that the accusation of protectionism frequently hurled at the EEC agricultural policies applied equally or perhaps more to U.S. farm policies.

Most severely criticized was the demand of the United States for a "fair share" in the existing and probably growing market for agricultural products in the Community, a demand which was closely identified with Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman and his vigorous campaign in support of it.[24] This criticism was voiced by many respondents in all member states and was not confined to agricultural interest groups. The vast majority of the respondents seemed well satisfied with the CAP as it has evolved and considered it an important instrument—the "cohesive cement" to bring about European integration which "must not have holes." As a consequence, the "fair share" concept was termed "unsound," "unreasonable," "unrealistic" and "unfortunate." One respondent stated that Secretary Freeman's statements had "aroused hostile reactions in Europe"; another, a foreign ministry official, held that they had "seriously and effectively damaged United States interests"; several declared that they reflected an "improper psychological approach" on the part of the United States and had "strengthened those who oppose the United States." A representative of an important German industrial group stated that the farm policy in Europe required its own solution and that the "chicken war is not forgotten and American retaliation still in force." One influential respondent considered

[23]See Statistical Office of the European Communities, *Commerce Extérieur: Statistique Mensuelle,* No. 5, 1964; No. 5, 1965.

[24]In a radio interview in Cologne in July 1965 Freeman threatened "radical import restrictions of the United States" if the EEC persisted in its protectionism. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* July 31, 1965.

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Secretary Freeman's declarations as unwarranted meddling in the formulation of Community agricultural policy and asked what the United States would think if Europe tried to participate in U.S. policymaking.

The respondents were asked whether they considered it important that EEC protectionism, as evidenced by high variable import levies, might turn public opinion in the United States against the EEC. A majority thought that such reaction was important and had to be taken into account in the formulation of Community policy. Some hoped such a reaction would not disturb the good relations that the United States maintained with most of the member states. A few recognized that the United States "had been a friend," and one respondent wondered what effect unfavorable public opinion in America might have should an EEC member government seek American support for one of its policies.

On the other hand, the majority of those who considered unfavorable American public opinion important thought that such a reaction was unwarranted because of the United States' own protectionism—not only in the agricultural field, but also with respect to certain industrial products. It was suggested that the American public should be informed about the reasons why it was necessary to create a protective system for agriculture in the Common Market; in this connection one respondent raised the question whether perhaps the "fair share" concept was advanced primarily by Secretary Freeman for "home consumption," i.e., domestic politics.

Many respondents felt that instead of bargaining out import guaranties or the reduction of agricultural tariffs, the Kennedy Round negotiations should concentrate on finding agreement on the margins of price supports and subsidy payments provided by governments for farm products. Several indicated that they would like to see these margins frozen and later reduced on a worldwide basis, actions they felt would benefit world trade and perhaps help the developing countries.

Fear was expressed by a number of respondents representing diverse groups in all member states that the difficulties inherent in the agricultural sector would lead to the failure of the negotiations as a whole. A foreign ministry official and a representative of a large industrial group both advanced the opinion that some Common Market industries gave only lip service to the success

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of the negotiations and secretly hoped for their collapse on the agricultural issue.

The suggestion was made that, in view of the tensions generated by the problems of the agricultural sector, it might be best to separate the Kennedy Round negotiations on this sector from those involving industrial products and perhaps delay discussion of the agricultural problems until the Common Market and its agricultural policy was fully implemented. In support of this suggestion it was argued that these tensions might endanger the making of "Little Europe," whereas a measure of autarky might promote political integration which, after all, was also a strategic goal of the United States. On the other hand, two respondents specifically rejected these arguments; they held that the tensions might contribute to developing greater cohesiveness within the Common Market, and that in any case the negotiations on the agricultural and industrial sectors should be pursued simultaneously and vigorously.

Finally, some comments must be made about the feasibility of enlisting the aid of industrial interest groups and labor unions in the member states to achieve a reduction of agricultural protectionism in the Common Market. Labor unions are usually interested in lowering the cost of food for their members and therefore should be expected to demand reduced agricultural prices. In turn, the competitive position of industry in domestic and especially export sales might be enhanced if the cost of labor could be reduced through a lowering of food prices. Moreover, the export sales of industrial goods may benefit from the favorable image created by an agriculturally outward-looking Common Market. Thus, labor unions and industry would appear to have a natural interest in bringing pressure to bear on national governments, and through them on Community institutions, to open up the Common Market to low-priced agricultural imports from nonmember countries.

Responses to pertinent questions indicated that most unions in member states other than France indeed favored a reduction of food prices but, somewhat inconsistently, also fully supported the variable import levy system as devised by the CAP. Most of the industrial spokesmen minimized the advantages their plants may derive indirectly from lower food costs and stated that it was essential to accept the CAP as a most important contribution to the successful implementation of the Common Market. For

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this reason they acquiesced to current high agricultural prices and approved, though perhaps grudgingly, protection of the EEC farmers; some, in fact, were even prepared to go further and accept higher prices if that proved to be necessary.

In sum, then, if the interest groups and parties queried are able to convert their demands and supports into Community policy, the prospects for a successful Kennedy Round do not look bright. The best to be hoped for would be a rather modest agreement in the industrial sector—precisely what a number of respondents predicted. As a high-ranking foreign ministry official expressed it, "the United States must accommodate itself to temporary protectionism for the sake of building a united Europe." In this connection it should be pointed out that the industrial and agricultural groups are likely to be much more effective than the unions in promoting their interests; they are more directly affected by issues of foreign economic policy and consequently their demands and supports will receive greater attention in their national governments and influential political parties, as well as in Community institutions.[25]

The Association Policy of the EEC

In the association agreement the EEC Treaty provides the Common Market institutions with a highly flexible instrument of foreign policy that has potentially far-reaching economic—and possibly also political—significance. Through the creation of new preferential tariff zones, the agreements signed with Greece, Turkey and the eighteen African states (the Convention of Yaoundé) are affecting the existing pattern of world trade. Moreover, negotiations concluded for an association agreement with Nigeria, as well as the pending talks exploring the possibility of associating Tunisia, Morocco, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, may produce several additional preferential arrangements in Africa. Eventual

[25]Socialist parties in the member states no longer are oriented narrowly toward ideological goals, nor do they merely represent the interests of the workingman; rather, they seek to represent in various degrees other interests as well. This is not only the case where socialist parties participate in the government as in Holland, Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg, but also in Germany and France. Union officials admit that the influence their organizations could bring to bear upon the formulation of the Community's foreign economic policy is considerably less consequential than that exerted by industrial and agricultural interest groups. This was corroborated by officials of the foreign and economics ministries in the member states and of the Community institutions.

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association with Austria, Denmark and Spain could alter significantly the flow of trade in Europe.[26]

The United States and Great Britain have protested to the EEC as well as to member states against the proliferation of preferential arrangements in Africa, claiming that they were inimical to the letter and spirit of GATT, were spreading discrimination in world trade, and thereby tended to result in a poor use of world resources.[27] Underlying these protests there may also have been apprehension that additional associations would extend the Community's economic and political influence in Africa, chiefly at the expense of the United Kingdom, and that they might strengthen those elements both within and outside Africa which see in these new "spheres of influence" a clear manifestation of neocolonialism—regardless of the economic and financial benefits the associated countries might enjoy.

In an attempt to detect possible future trends of the Community's association policy, a cluster of questions was included in the questionnaires[28] and interviews to elicit the respondents' attitudes with regard to the motivations for and implications of this policy. The answers made one thing clear: the overwhelming majority of the respondents (nearly 97 per cent) perceived the association agreement to be a useful tool of policy.

In view of the considerable financial aid and the preferential treatment for many imports into the EEC accorded the associated states, the question was raised whether the Community had not sacrificed too much in the association agreements concluded so far. Only a small minority (8 per cent) answered in the affirmative, but most respondents conceded that the concrete benefits derived had been extremely meager. Italians complained most, because not only had new exports of industrial goods to the associated countries fallen below expectations, but preferences given to some of the agricultural commodities grown in these countries, such as citrus fruits, vegetables and tobacco, were adversely affecting the sales of similar Italian products. For this reason several Italian respondents urged that future agreements, especially with Mediterranean countries, must ensure proper protection for Ital-

[26]Cf. Feld, "The Association Agreements," *op. cit.*, pp. 246-249.

[27]See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 28, 1965. The protests were rejected.

[28]These questions were omitted from the German questionnaires, which were sent out a few months earlier than the others. However, in the interviews in Germany the questions were included.

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ian agriculture.[29] Several German, Belgian and Dutch respondents also complained because hoped-for increases of exports to the African associates had failed to materialize to any extent. The main cause for this, apparently, was that non-French exporters found it difficult to penetrate France's long established position as the traditional supplier of goods, since most of the African associates had been French colonies. A few French respondents warned of the dangers to French agriculture if the principles of the CAP were diluted in future agreements with developing countries, particularly in the Mediterranean, and a representative of a French agricultural group voiced the fear that providing developing countries with the wherewithal for industrialization would contribute to raising new competitors for the established industries in the Community.

If in spite of these expressions of dissatisfaction and concern there is widespread support for the association agreement as a tool of policy, what are the reasons? The majority of respondents in all member states explained that with respect to underdeveloped countries—Greece and Turkey fall into this category to some extent—economic aid was a necessity and that association agreements provided a suitable vehicle to advance their state of development. A number stressed the humanitarian aspects of this aid and considered that the European Community had a moral obligation to extend help to the less developed countries not only in Europe but also on other continents. Some of the labor union representatives thought that association with the African countries may permit some restructuring of their societies, and to this end the possibility of training African union leaders either in Africa or in Europe was suggested.

Only a few of the respondents viewed as serious or harmful the problem of discrimination caused by the preferential tariff systems of existing and future association agreements and deplored the prospect of splitting the African continent into preferential zones. Some thought that the practical effect of discrimination had been overstated—"Europeans still prefer to drink Latin American coffee"—and others asserted that the regional solution

[29]The Italian government, in April 1964, submitted a memorandum to its five EEC partners which advocated the elaboration of a comprehensive association policy. However, the proposals it contained seemed to be designed primarily to safeguard the interests of Italy in future association agreements. For the text of this memorandum see *Europe, Agence Internationale d'information pour la presse* (Luxembourg), No. 261, May 16, 1964.

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of economic problems would in due time lead to a larger and finally worldwide solution. A substantial majority strongly favored association with Nigeria and the East African British ex-colonies; it was apparent from the answers of non-French respondents that the absence of French influence and consequent greater business opportunities in these countries played an important role in this attitude. The American and British protests against the Nigerian association were considered by a few respondents as expressions of legitimate concern by GATT members. However, others considered them as unwarranted interference, especially because the Africans themselves asked for the preferences.

In the questionnaires and interviews the respondents were asked whether they believed the association agreements would permit the member states to extend their economic and political influence in the world. Seventy-nine per cent replied in the affirmative, 5 per cent said no, and 16 per cent did not commit themselves. It should be pointed out that an affirmative reply could suggest either merely a judgment regarding the economic and political implications of these agreements or also a motivation for their conclusion. Although a few thought that the agreements did not materially extend the economic and political influence of the member states, others pointed especially to their long-range political significance. Whatever their view, most of the respondents appeared to approve of this extension of influence; perhaps this is an indication that enlargement of international influence might indeed be one of the motivations for their favorable attitudes toward the institution of association. Certain comments, some rather defensive in nature, seem to substantiate this assumption. For example, it was asserted that "traditional ties between Europe and Africa justify the special concern of the Community with the developing African states in a similar manner as the United States emphasizes its relationship with Latin America." Moreover, the opinion was expressed that the Africans themselves did not consider the association agreements as "neocolonialist," although at the same time care was advised "to soft pedal the expanding influence of the Community" and "not to appear colonialistic." A number of respondents pointed out that the agreements constituted an important instrument against Soviet and Chinese efforts to penetrate Africa and that from this point of view the expanding influence of the Commu-

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nity in fact benefited the United States and the West in general.[30] One respondent, representing a minor economic interest group in France, went so far as to state that association agreements were "the surest guaranty for maintaining world peace."

Agreements with economically advanced European countries, now under consideration with Austria and Denmark, also have various economic and political implications although of a somewhat different nature. Only European countries may become full members of the Common Market. The question was raised whether association with European countries might not only expand the economic and political influence of the EEC, but in fact could be viewed as leading to a larger Community. The Greek and Turkish agreements provide for eventual full membership in the Community, and current talks with Denmark and Spain regarding association might conceivably consider such a step. Austria's declared neutrality, on the other hand, appears to preclude any thought of full membership.

Respondents were divided as to whether association agreements with European states could be seen as forerunners of a larger Community: 36.8 per cent agreed; 28.4 per cent disagreed, and 34.8 per cent had no opinion. Since, with the exception of Spain, Ireland and Iceland, likely future European candidates for association are EFTA members, prominent consideration in answering the question had to be given to the consequences of such associations for EFTA and the Common Market. Those agreeing felt that the tariff "trench" between the two trade blocs needed to be filled and that associations with EFTA and other European countries could well be the tools for this task, thereby also creating a larger economic community. In general there was no clear idea about the exact form such a community would take: for example, whether it should be a free trade area or a customs union. One important motivation seemed to be the creation of a relationship with Great Britain which could be used to counterbalance the economic and political power of either France or Germany and thus establish a political equilibrium.

Those disagreeing argued mainly that a broad enlargement of the Community by means of association agreements would tend to dilute its political content and thus diminish the prospects

[30]Japan was included in the "West." Noteworthy also is an observation of a Dutch Foreign Service official who pointed out that because of the agreement with the African states, the latter sided with Holland in the New Guinea dispute in the United Nations. This indicates that the political significance of the association agreements is well recognized.

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for political integration. Moreover, associates would receive the tariff and other advantages of the EEC Treaty without having to accept all of its obligations. However, most in this group were prepared to support individual associations of special merit such as the one with Austria, although a few expressed serious doubt that in this case the neutrality question and other problems[31] could be successfully solved.

By way of summary, the answers appear to indicate general support for association agreements as a significant instrument of EEC policy toward third countries. The main motivation professed was the need to extend aid to developing countries, and this was given as the basic reason for the rejection of American and British protests regarding the discriminatory nature of the agreements. However, the far-reaching economic and political implications of these agreements are well understood and seem to serve in many instances as a secondary motivation. A number of respondents regard associations with European countries as precursors of a larger Community; others fear undesirable consequences for the progress of political integration and increased competition for industrial and agricultural production in the member states unless the associates are bound by compensating EEC Treaty obligations.

Commercial Policy Toward Communist Bloc Countries

Although the conduct of a comprehensive common commercial policy is not a Community responsibility until after the expiration of the transitional period, the Commission initiated in 1964 a strong effort to speed up the introduction of a common policy toward communist bloc countries.[32] Community trade with

[31]Austria would like to remain a member of EFTA after becoming an associate of the EEC. This is strongly opposed by the Commission and by most of the respondents. One of the foreign ministry officials, familiar with the Austrian case, expressed the opinion that Soviet demands for neutrality would give the Austrian government an eventual excuse to abandon negotiations.

A very difficult problem is posed by the Spanish request for association. It is opposed by many Belgians and Dutchmen for political reasons, and Italians have strong economic as well as political anxieties about it. One powerful Italian businessman thought that the problem would be solved in this way: Spain as well as the Maghreb countries would become associates and would be placed under arrangements with regard to fruits and vegetables similar to those which apply to Greece and Turkey. A number of French respondents also favored the Spanish association but were less generous with respect to competitive agricultural products.

[32]The countries involved are the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Red China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia.

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these countries amounts at present to only 6-7 per cent of the total trade of the member states with third countries.[33] However, this trade has political implications, and for this reason the United States and other NATO countries have a special interest in the kind of policy that may be elaborated by the Community. Of particular concern to the United States is the embargo on the export of "strategic" goods to communist countries and a uniform credit policy for all other exports.[34] With regard to the embargo, NATO guidelines have been worked out but are not always followed scrupulously or consistently. In the matter of a uniform credit policy, discussions within the framework of NATO have failed to bring about agreement; also, a resolution by the EEC Council of Ministers in May 1962 requiring consultation by member states before deviating from the five-year credit limit stipulated in the Berne Convention has not been effective in holding the credit line.[35]

How do the respondents view the formulation and implementation of a common commercial policy toward communist bloc countries? The great majority, 75.4 per cent, advocated a common policy, with 12.3 per cent opposed and 12.3 per cent undecided.[36] The advocates gave various reasons for their position. The structural differences between the state-trading countries of the communist bloc and the free enterprise countries of the EEC necessitated a unified approach to trade between the two groups. A common policy would result in better terms for exporters and importers in the member states, since it would reduce the rough-and-tumble competition prevailing among the "Six" in their zeal to do business with the communist countries. At the same time,

[33]For an excellent exposition of the problems involved in the development of a common policy toward bloc countries see Europaeisches Parlament, *Sitzungsdokumente* (1965-1966), Dokument 10, March 22, 1965: Bericht ueber die Fragen der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik der Gemeinschaft gegenueber Staatshandelslaendern.

[34]Cf. *New York Times,* July 24, 1960, November 19, 1963, and September 13 and 16, 1964.

[35]See pp. 14-16 of the Report of the European Parliament cited in note 33. The Berne Convention is technically the International Credit Insurers' Union established in Berne in 1933. Its members are organizations from 16 countries including Great Britain and all EEC states except Italy and Luxembourg. The five-year ceiling for credits granted for large capital equipment orders was instituted in 1960. Although the Berne Convention is not a treaty between governments, it has been regarded as a kind of gentleman's agreement by the 16 countries and all Common Market governments. Great Britain first deviated from the five-year rule in the fall of 1963. (For additional details see *Opera Mundi-Europe,* No. 269, September 10, 1964.)

[36]On the questionnaires mailed to German groups this cluster of questions was omitted, but was included in the interviews.

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it would curb dangerous individual initiatives on the part of Common Market firms. Finally, a coordinated approach might be more useful than unilateral action in attaining the political goal of loosening Soviet control over the East European satellites.

However, most of the respondents who thought a common policy would be desirable were pessimistic about its prospects in the near future.[37] They saw as major difficulties the member states' inability to agree on the principles of a common policy, the lack of interest displayed by most large national business enterprises, and the fact that the Soviet bloc had not granted diplomatic recognition to the Community as was done by most Western countries. German respondents were also apprehensive that a common policy might weaken the Western stand on nonrecognition of the East German regime of Walter Ulbricht.

Those opposed pointed out that competitive pressures within the Community were generated in part by the attempts of German and French firms, until recently relatively restrained in their quest for communist bloc markets, to catch up with EEC competitors who had solicited business in these markets earlier. As a consequence it was unrealistic to talk now about a common policy. Moreover, eagerness to do business with communist countries was not confined to firms in the Common Market, but extended to other Western countries as well; formulation of a common policy embracing only the member states therefore would be useless. Finally, some respondents in this group opined—in contrast to the majority view—that commercial policies devised by individual states might be more effective in promoting the secondary political goal of drawing the East European satellites away from the Soviet Union.

A special effort was made to elicit views on the issue of a uniform credit policy. Since this has become a particular concern of the U.S. government, the respondents were asked whether they thought that long-term loans as part of a "hard-sell" commercial policy of the EEC toward the communist countries would arouse significant opposition in the United States. Of their replies, 22.3 per cent were affirmative, 26.3 negative, and 51.4 per cent felt that they were insufficiently informed to make a judgment. Those answering in the negative pointed out that it was not a Common Market country, but Great Britain, which had first violated the

[37] A few thought that as a maximum the Community might develop some defensive measures such as an anti-dumping regulation.

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Berne Convention's five-year limit for the extension of commercial credit to communist countries. In addition, American firms seemed increasingly eager to sell to a number of communist countries and there was evidence that the U.S. government now favored expanded commercial relations with some of the European satellites. Under these circumstances U.S. opposition was viewed as neither plausible nor justified, particularly since it appeared that the expansion of commerce with communist bloc countries was also intended to serve the political goal of loosening Soviet control over them. Even some of those apprehensive of U.S. opposition thought that while the opinion of other Atlantic partners should be taken into consideration, the Community must develop its own policies regardless of possible opposition.

Summing up, it seems clear that the formulation of a common commercial policy toward the communist bloc is still far off. Although officials of important industrial and other interest groups recognize that a common policy is desirable, individual industries and enterprises apparently prefer to make their own arrangements when seeking to sell their goods in communist countries. At the same time, in spite of pleas by most political parties to the contrary,[38] the national governments seem to prefer using commercial policy toward the communist countries as an instrument to pursue their own foreign policy goals over submission to a joint approach under Community auspices.[39] Thus, regardless of the respondents' views about U.S. opposition to the extension of credit beyond five years, the Common Market organs may not be able to come up with a uniform credit or any other common policy toward communist bloc countries.

Conclusion

The variety of responses elicited in the survey is a natural phenomenon in pluralistic democratic societies such as those of the EEC member states. If the leadership of economic interest groups can arrive at a substantial consensus on an issue that is also supported by the members of these groups and the leaders of major parties, it is reasonable to presume that eventually this consensus will be reflected in Community decisions on the Com-

[38]It is interesting to note that the communist parties and unions in both France and Italy strongly oppose a common commercial policy because it would infringe on the national sovereignty of the member states.

[39]One foreign ministry official suggested that his colleagues were reluctant to give up their power of making bilateral agreements.

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mon Market's external relations. This presumption, however, may not hold true if demands of interest groups run counter to what one or several of the national governments perceive as vital strategic interests. Moreover, one must not overlook that the EEC Commission has the ability through contacts with European-level interest groups to exert influence of its own on the national groups and through them on political parties and national governments.[40]

The foreign policy decision-making process is subject to pressures not only from domestic interest groups and political parties, but also from governments of third countries. The United States, Great Britain and other nonmember states have a stake in the evolving relations between the Common Market and the world and undoubtedly seek to influence the formulation of the Community's foreign economic policy by expressing their views to Community institutions and member governments. It is interesting to note that some foreign ministry officials in the member states and in the EEC Commission regard certain issues such as the Kennedy Round negotiations more favorably and optimistically than do interest group leaders further removed from the influence of third-country diplomacy. While the attitudes of these officials seem to suggest the effectiveness of diplomatic and other influences from third countries, there is also the danger that they may mislead third-country foreign offices attempting to evaluate the trend of Community policy with regard to the external relations of the Common Market.

[40]Cf. Lindberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72. The Commission may also exert some influence through its many contacts with officials of the member governments.

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THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT AS AN ISSUE IN BRITISH POLITICS, 1964-1966

by Edward G. Janosik

ISSUES debated in political campaigns are rarely unpremeditated arguments. Nearly all campaign issues have a basis in the interparty and intraparty struggles that have flourished since the previous election. Ideally, a political party enmeshed in a campaign looks for a relevant issue that promises not only to give it an advantage but also to embarrass the opposition. With this intent, the Conservative Party in Britain's 1964 General Election endeavored to make British retention of an independent nuclear deterrent an important campaign issue, while Labour attempted to ignore it.

Traditionally, the British electorate has evinced more confidence in the Conservative Party than in Labour on matters relating to foreign policy. Beyond that, there remains a sizeable minority of voters who think in terms of Britain's obligation to help to maintain a peaceful world, if not globally at least on a regional basis. In the fall of 1964 little internal dissension could be found among the Tories on the question of retaining an independent nuclear deterrent.

The same could hardly be said of Labour, for the dispute over unilateral disarmament which had dominated the party's 1959 Conference remained the most controversial issue at the following two annual meetings. At the 1960 Conference the unilateralists succeeded in passing two resolutions supporting unilateral disarmament, whereas in 1961 their opponents within the party carried the day. An interesting question posed by students of the British party system is whether Labour could have withstood another unilateralist victory in 1961. Although Party Leader Hugh Gaitskell was able to defy the unilateralists for one year, there is some doubt that he could have retained his position in the face of successive defeats in the Conference. By 1964 this internal problem which had threatened to disrupt the Labour Party was sublimated, but the Conservatives realized that if open discussion of any issue could destroy Labour's facade of unity, that issue concerned Britain's possession of nuclear weapons.

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The contrasting emphasis placed upon foreign and defense policy by Britain's two major parties in the 1964 election was revealed in the respective party manifestoes. It was the only specific issue developed in Sir Alec Douglas-Home's preface to the Conservative Manifesto and the first to be elaborated in the body of the document, where it was given 9 per cent of the total space. In Labour's Manifesto the section on foreign and defense policy was placed at the very end and constituted 6 per cent of its total length.

The Conservative View of the Nuclear Deterrent

It became apparent early in the 1964 campaign that foreign policy in general was not to be debated at all, and that the sole aspect of defense policy to receive attention would be Britain's independent nuclear deterrent. On September 21 Sir Alec described the retention of Britain's nuclear arm as one of the two main issues of the election; a week later he stated that if he had to rank one issue first, that issue was security and defense through the retention of the nuclear deterrent. During the campaign every Conservative leader of importance was given an opportunity to present his views on the subject.[1] The issue was emphasized in the first and the last of Sir Alec's campaign appearances on television, and it was the only topic discussed at an extensive press conference presided over by Peter Thorneycroft, whose opinion was that "When all other issues in the election have been forgotten and have passed into oblivion, the one issue that will really be remembered is whether Britain decided to retain control over her deterrent or not."[2]

A studied appeal to nationalism was probably a causative factor in determining Conservative strategy on the nuclear deterrent, for British pride had suffered sharp blows during the recent years of Conservative governments. Among the setbacks were the humiliation of Suez when the United States opposed British actions, the decision by the Kennedy Administration to cancel the agreement for joint development of the Skybolt missile, and the unilateral action of President de Gaulle in effectively denying Britain entry into the European Economic Community. The Tories attempted to reassert British self-esteem through Iain

[1]These included Edward Heath, Reginald Maudling, Duncan Sandys, John Boyd-Carpenter, Harold Macmillan, Quintin Hogg, Iain Macleod and R. A. Butler.

[2]See the *Times, Guardian, Financial Times* and *Daily Telegraph,* October 8, 1964.

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Macleod's claim that Britain had been able to initiate discussions leading to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty only because she was a nuclear power. R. A. Butler warned the electorate of a loss of diplomatic influence should the nuclear deterrent not be retained. These and similar arguments constituted the positive stand as presented by the Conservative Party.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home continued the appeal to nationalism on October 6, when he resumed the theme of a speech made by Harold Macmillan at the outset of the campaign which premised that more was at stake than Britain's position among the world's nations. As Sir Alec interpreted the facts, a nonnuclear Britain would be superseded by other nations, and, in view of their respective efforts, the new representatives at world conference tables would be France and China. Not content with presenting the electorate with this unpleasant alternative, the Conservatives introduced other somber prospects. During the latter days of the campaign Sir Alec, with strong assistance from Harold Macmillan, Duncan Sandys and John Boyd-Carpenter, stressed the final and irreversible nature of the decision to forgo nuclear weapons which a Labour victory almost certainly augured. On October 13, two days before the election, Sir Alec declared:

> This [the defense issue], therefore, is the supreme issue of this election. If the Socialists got in, and economic disaster followed, as it surely would, the Conservatives would eventually get back and clear up the mess. It would take a long time, but we would eventually do it. But if the Socialists got in and threw away Britain's nuclear arm, the damage would be done for all time and our power for good in the world would be irrevocably weakened.[3]

Fear was also expressed that without the deterrent Britain would be subject to nuclear blackmail by nations possessing such weapons, and that "Britain would surrender all her authority in world affairs and hand over decisions about the future of Britain to another country."[4] Another ominous note was introduced by Quintin Hogg, who suggested on October 7 that Labour's position on phasing out Britain's nuclear weapons was "something very near to treason"; on October 13 Hogg reiterated that "The Socialists propose to gamble with Britain's safety, to give up the

[3] *Financial Times,* October 13, 1964.

[4] *Ibid.,* October 14, 1964. This point is related to the statement in the Conservative Manifesto that "Conservatives do not accept the view that we could never be threatened on our own, or that an enemy will always assume we shall have allies rushing to our side." For a verbatim copy of the Conservative Manifesto, see the *Times,* September 18, 1964.

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bomb, and leave our fighting men at the mercy of nuclear blackmail from China and the Soviets. . . . This is treason to the true interests of Britain, and we ask you to reject it."[5]

The purely military justification for retaining nuclear arms was made by Peter Thorneycroft, Secretary of State for Defense in the Home Government, speaking on October 7 at a press conference:

> We live in a nuclear age. . . . There is no conventional defense that is possible for this island. You cannot defend it through the English Channel and the Royal Navy. . . . Nor can you defend it by trebling the size of the Fighter Command. There is only one certain security, and that is the absolute sureness of being able to retaliate—the certain knowledge in the mind of any enemy that there is no prize he could ever win which would compensate him for the damage that he would suffer in the process.[6]

The Conservatives did not permit to go unnoticed the point that Labour had already shifted its position on the independent nuclear deterrent. In response to a question by the *Guardian,* Sir Alec noted that defense "was not an issue in 1955 or 1959 because in both these elections the Labour leaders shared our belief in the policy of the British deterrent. They changed their minds in 1960 and withdrew their support."[7] Public attention was directed to the Labour stand on nuclear weapons by Earl Atlee's last political broadcast of the campaign on October 12, when he challenged the Conservative position. Atlee stated that the nuclear deterrent was absolute nonsense, and that there was no such thing as national defense, but only collective security.[8] Harold Wilson, Labour's new Party Leader, spoke at greater length during the same broadcast without referring to the defense issue, whereupon Edward Heath charged Wilson with "sheltering behind an aged ex-Prime Minister." Heath went on to say that Earl Atlee's claim to the nation's gratitude rested on the fact that Atlee was responsible for the secret development of the country's atomic weapons, and quoted Atlee as saying in 1955 that deterrence by the possession of thermonuclear weapons was the best way of preventing another war.[9]

The Labour View: Neither Independent Nor a Deterrent

The posture of the Labour Party on the nuclear deterrent was

[5]The *Guardian,* October 7, 1964 and the *Express,* October 13, 1964.
[6]The *Times,* October 8, 1964.
[7]The *Guardian,* September 21, 1964.
[8]*Financial Times,* October 13, 1964.
[9]The *Daily Telegraph,* October 14, 1964.

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essentially defensive, for the strategy of the party was to focus on domestic issues such as education, housing, pensions, transportation, health services, and the drift of industry and population to the south of England. Parliamentary candidates had been instructed to avoid as much as possible the whole area of foreign and defense policy. Among Labour leaders only Denis Healey and Patrick Gordon Walker joined Harold Wilson in discussing the defense issue, although some isolated comments by a few other Labourites were reported in the press.

The defense policy that the Labour Party proposed in 1964 was set forth in the following paragraphs from the Labour Manifesto:

> We are not prepared any longer to waste the country's resources on endless duplication of strategic nuclear weapons. We shall propose the renegotiation of the Nassau agreement. Our stress will be on the strengthening of our conventional regular forces so that we can contribute our share to NATO defense and also fulfill our peace-keeping commitments to the Commonwealth and the United Nations.
>
> We are against the development of national nuclear deterrents and oppose the current American proposal for a new mixed-manned nuclear surface fleet (MLF). We believe in the interdependence of the Western Alliance and will put forward constructive proposals for integrating all NATO's nuclear weapons under effective political control so that all the partners in the Alliance have a proper share in their deployment and control.[10]

These statements signified the party's intention to terminate Britain's status as a nuclear power in the late 1960's, after its V-Bomber force had become obsolete. Forsaking nuclear weapons was dictated by the limited resources available for defense purposes and by the desire to remove an incentive for other nations to produce national deterrents as the price of admission to negotiations at the highest level. A fundamental feature of Labour's defense policy was its willingness to rely completely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and its refusal to accept the argument that Britain might some day find herself in an emergency necessitating the unilateral use of nuclear weapons or requiring that she stand alone against nuclear attack.

Thus, apart from the pronouncement in its Manifesto, Labour paid little attention to foreign and defense policy in the campaign. Harold Wilson was the author of three statements on the subject, only one of which could be described as extensive. In a speech on

[10]The *Times*, September 12, 1964.

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September 27 to a nautically oriented audience in Plymouth on the need to rebuild the Royal Navy, Wilson suggested that the cost of this effort could be met "through stopping the wasteful expenditure on the politically inspired nuclear program." In response to a rumor circulated by Conservatives that a Labour victory would endanger employment in dockyard towns because of his party's pledge to renegotiate the Nassau Agreement, he said, "This we emphatically deny. We have to renegotiate the Nassau agreement. The submarines may be wanted for NATO. . . . If they are not wanted as nuclear carrying vessels, they will still be built, with whatever modifications are needed, as nuclear-powered tracker submarines."[11]

During his press conference of October 9, defense policy was one of a number of topics mentioned. To questions on the MLF, Wilson replied that the Conservatives could not resist U.S. pressure to join since Britain depended on the United States for the Polaris missile. On the ability of China to produce nuclear weapons, he predicted that China could undoubtedly produce a nuclear device, but would not develop a means of delivery for some years. He stated that the drafting and ratification of a nuclear nonproliferation agreement which included China would be the Labour Government's main task in foreign affairs. When asked what disposition a Labour Government would make of the Polaris-carrying nuclear submarines then under construction, Wilson responded that if a point of no return in the construction of the submarines had not been reached, they would not be built. If it had been reached, the submarines would be completed and would be integrated into NATO's nuclear forces.[12]

Midway in the campaign, on October 5, Wilson made his one and only major speech on foreign and defense policy. Surely by design, his comments covered a broad range of topics, including those the Conservatives had made or were likely to make in support of their determination to retain nuclear weapons. He observed that Britain's nuclear deterrent had not admitted her to important nuclear disarmament talks earlier in 1964, whereas it did provide valid argument for every nation, including Germany, to strive to achieve nuclear power. Wilson enumerated the dangerous illusions in Conservative nuclear policies, one of these being the presumption that the United States would not come

[11] *Ibid.*, September 28, 1964.
[12] The *Guardian*, October 10, 1964.

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to the aid of her allies in a crisis but would furnish Britain with weapons for a nuclear war to which America was opposed. Wilson also wondered whether the Conservatives really had "a serious intention, if the bluff is called on both sides, to embark on a go-it-alone thermonuclear war with Russia, without allies and with enough American weapons to inflict on Russia only a limited posthumous revenge." As for proposals by the Tories that Britain pursue an independent foreign policy, Wilson reminded his audience that it was the Tories who had advocated the admission of Britain into the European Economic Community as a prelude to a political federation "which would have meant Britain's foreign policy and her defense policy would be decided not in London, but in Brussels."[13]

Labour at a Disadvantage

In presenting their defense policy to the nation, the Conservatives had certain advantages over their opponents. Britain already possessed a nuclear deterrent which the Tories wanted to keep and to extend through the nuclear-powered Polaris submarines obtained in the Nassau Agreement. While there were incompatibilities in the Conservative wish to retain an independent deterrent and the avowed Tory aversion to the proliferation of national deterrents, their policy was difficult to oppose in a country whose electorate was not yet accustomed to its lesser role in world affairs. In addition, the Conservative Party's position derived strength from united party support among its leaders and candidates, at least in their public statements. The only exceptions to this unanimity were the qualification of Earl Jellicoe, Minister of Defense for the Royal Navy, that Britain might not be able to justify its independent nuclear deterrent indefinitely,[14] and the remark attributed by Denis Healey to Lord Carrington, deputy to R. A. Butler at the Foreign Office, that Britain should support the American MLF proposal in order to make national deterrents unnecessary.[15]

The Labour Party was less fortunate in this regard, for the initial decision to develop nuclear weapons for Britain had been

[13]See the *Times* and the *Guardian*, October 6, 1964, for the most extended but not verbatim accounts of Harold Wilson's remarks.

[14]The *Times*, October 7, 1964, and Frank Giles, "China, the Bomb, and Us," the *Sunday Times*, October 4, 1964.

[15]The *Guardian*, September 21, 1964.

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taken by a Labour Government, and the decision had not been questioned by the party during the 1955 and 1959 General Election campaigns. Controversy was rife in 1964 as to whether Harold Wilson had used the term "cancel" in relation to the Nassau Agreement. Speculation also developed over the precise meaning of "renegotiation" in this context. For the Conservatives it was relatively easy to present Labour's views on the nuclear deterrent in extreme terms which suggested that the first act of a Labour Government would be to discard British nuclear weapons as casually as one would a spent cartridge case. Labour spokesmen made only token efforts in trying to answer this accusation. In an article in the *Guardian* early in the campaign, Roy Jenkins wrote that he "did not think a Labour Government would hasten to make any irrevocable nuclear decisions."[16] On October 3 Woodrow Wyatt, a right-wing Labour MP of independent political habit, commented on the possibility that his party would get rid of nuclear weapons as soon as it arrived in power. Said Wyatt: "If I thought that, I would not be in the Labour Party . . . . We have made two things clear. We will keep our present British-made air system of delivery going so long as it is useful. And we will get a new and better agreement with the Americans on Polaris. . . . I was Under-Secretary of State for War in the last Labour Government. I know very well that a Labour Government is just as keen on defending Britain as the Tories."[17] The only other germane remark by a Labour candidate was that made by Tom Fraser in a speech at Glasgow. Despite the marked opposition of Scottish Labour supporters to the U.S. nuclear base at Holy Loch, Fraser said that the base would be retained by a Labour Government and would not be moved to another location. Neither would it be the policy of a Labour Government to abandon nuclear arms entirely. Labour wanted Britain to remain strong and to be in a position to wield influence, but was opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[18]

[16]September 25, 1964. Jenkins is Minister of State for Air in the Wilson Government.

[17]The *Express*, October 4, 1964.

[18]The *Daily Telegraph*, October 14, 1964. Retention of the American base at Holy Loch had been contended within the Labour Party since the 1961 Annual Conference at which Labour had passed a resolution demanding removal of the base from Britain. The Parliamentary Labour Party, led by Hugh Gaitskell and Harold Wilson, refused to accept the Conference resolution on the Polaris base. See R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (Second edition; New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 624-625.

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The Press, the Polls and the Nuclear Deterrent

Of all British newspapers only the *Telegraph* and the *Guardian* exhibited editorial interest in the defense issue, and they took opposite sides. On at least six occasions between September 20 and October 15 the *Telegraph* printed editorials or articles supporting the Conservative position on the nuclear deterrent and attacking the stand taken by Labour. Peregrine Worsthorne led off by proposing that foreign affairs be an issue in the coming election.[19] This was followed by an article from the *Telegraph's* military correspondent on the credibility of the British deterrent,[20] and a piece which speculated on how the British electorate would react should the Chinese explode their first nuclear device before election day.[21] After an editorial attacking socialist internationalism and another article by Worsthorne pointing out the danger in Wilson's defense policy,[22] the *Telegraph* concluded its campaign for an independent deterrent with an editorial on October 12 entitled "Giving Away The Bomb."

The *Guardian* chose to criticize the Conservative position on the deterrent rather than support the views put forward by the Labour and the Liberal parties. Four of the five statements appearing on its editorial page during the campaign were point-by-point refutations of arguments by the Conservative Leader that Britain should retain a national nuclear deterrent.[23] The fifth statement was an editorial stressing the current state of interdependence among Atlantic Alliance nations and advising Britain on how to increase her influence on nuclear policy decisions in Washington.[24]

The *Telegraph* and the *Guardian* did little more on the defense issue than display partisanship and print campaign distortions

[19]"Look Ahead and Far Afield," the *Sunday Telegraph*, September 20, 1964. While conceding that he was exploring a volatile area, Worsthorne looked far afield in this article, stating at one point, "In the next year or so, probably much earlier than we expect, General DeGaulle is going to retire." Further on he commented, "the great post-war debate about the future of Germany is going to reach its climax in the next few years, probably after Mr. Khrushchev's sensational visit to Bonn early in 1965." Less than four weeks after the appearance of this article, Khrushchev was replaced, and a year later General de Gaulle announced his determination to seek another seven-year term as President of France.

[20]Brigadier W. F. K. Thompson, "Why Britain's Deterrent Deters," September 30, 1964.

[21]"Of Course the Chinese Could Put a Bomb Under Harold," (Sunday) October 4, 1964.

[22]October 7, 1964, and "A Man with Fire in His Belly, But . . ." (Sunday) October 11, 1964.

[23]September 25, September 28, October 6 and October 15, 1964.

[24]October 10, 1964.

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and exaggerations. But certain other newspapers appeared to believe that the disparity between the parties on this issue was in reality not so great and they sought to narrow rather than widen the differences. To this end Walter Terry of the *Daily Mail* interpreted Harold Wilson's reluctance to define Labour's course of action should his party be unsuccessful in renegotiating the Nassau Agreement as testifying to the flexibility of Labour policy. Using the same evidence, the *Telegraph* tried to convince the electorate that the Labour Party's policy was more rigid than that of the Conservatives. Noting the remarks made by Roy Jenkins and Woodrow Wyatt a few days before, Terry suggested that "some of his [Wilson's] own party members believe that in certain circumstances a Labour Government would have to retain the bomb."[25] In a lengthy and thoughtful article published in the *Sunday Times* of October 4, Frank Giles analyzed the simplified positions adopted by both parties, and wondered whether there was any choice between them on the defense matter. In Giles' opinion the difference was merely one of timing, since the Labour Party intended to destroy neither Britain's stock of nuclear arms nor the V-Bomber force, refusing only to proceed with the next generation of nuclear weapons, namely, the Polaris submarines provided under the Nassau Agreement. The Tories wished to acquire the Polaris submarines, but in light of the 5 per cent proportion of the defense budget allotted by the Conservatives for nuclear weapons in the 1970's, it was apparent that they had no intention of continuing in the nuclear field after Polaris had become obsolete.[26]

The same tenor was taken in the *Times*' lead editorial of October 7, entitled "Not a Bomb Apart." It stated that the differences between the parties on the nuclear issue were so slight as to be negligible and concluded that "There will be a number of good reasons for choosing this party or that on October 15. The independent deterrent is not one of them." This editorial was considered to be directly helpful to Labour's efforts to neutralize the issue, although the *Times* did endorse the Conservative Party.

The public opinion polls indicate that the Labour strategy of deliberately underplaying foreign affairs was successful. For nine months prior to the election, National Opinion Polls had been asking respondents which of eleven issues they deemed particu-

[25]"Labour May Have to Keep the Bomb," the *Daily Mail*, October 10, 1964.
[26]"China, the Bomb, and Us," *op. cit.*

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larly important. Defense, foreign affairs and the independent deterrent invariably ranked near the bottom of the scale, and early in October 1964 were considered of least importance. There was some movement of opinion on each issue, with 13 per cent of the respondents mentioning in October that the independent deterrent was most important, as opposed to 9 per cent in September. At the same time the issue of foreign affairs was considered most important by only 10 per cent of the respondents in October, as compared to 17 per cent in September. Combining the three issues, the October polls showed that 35 per cent of the respondents regarded them as most important, as against 39 per cent in September.[27] In response to the Gallup Poll query, "What questions would you like to see the parties and the candidates discussing in the General Election?," 6 per cent of respondents in the national sample and 7 per cent in marginal constituencies chose defense, armaments and nuclear weapons, while 4 per cent of respondents in these groups chose international affairs.[28]

One poll result was not consistent with the prevailing pattern of response on the issue of nuclear weapons. On October 8 the *Daily Mail* published a NOP report which showed that in response to the question "How important do you think it is that Britain keeps the independent nuclear deterrent?," 55 per cent of respondents answered very important and 17 per cent fairly important. Unfortunately, this question was not reported in the NOP *Bulletin* from which three other questions discussed in the *Daily Mail* article were also taken, thus making it difficult to check the accuracy of the newspaper account.[29]

The Wilson Government and Nuclear Weapons

Those political writers who pointed out the limited options on defense policy available to a Labour Government, and the Labour spokesmen who insisted that their party would take no hasty action on Britain's nuclear deterrent, have been eminently justified by the behavior of the Wilson Government. A critic of the Prime Minister might aver that it is characteristic of Harold Wilson to say one thing and do another, but his friends claim that he based his defense policy statements during the campaign

[27]National Opinion Polls *Bulletin,* October 1964, Appendix A, p. 1.

[28]The Gallup Poll figures were released early in October 1964 and reported in the *Sunday Telegraph,* October 4, 1964.

[29]National Opinion Polls *Bulletin,* October 1964, Appendix A.

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on the incomplete information available to him as Leader of the Opposition.

Whatever the cause, it was apparent from the first days of the Labour Government that Wilson was making no overt effort to carry out the undertakings on nuclear arms advocated in the Party Manifesto or in speeches of Labour leaders. No attempt has been made to renegotiate the Nassau Agreement or to halt or alter the construction program for the Polaris submarines that Britain was to acquire under the terms of the agreement. Three months after taking office Wilson outlined to the House of Commons a defense policy which included the proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force composed in part of the British fleet of American Polaris submarines as these vessels become available. In the debate on defense policy which ensued and which centered on Britain's strategic nuclear role in Western Europe, the Labour Government accepted without qualification the responsibility already assumed by Britain for maintaining peace in certain areas outside the Western alliance. Minister of Defense Denis Healey stated that "this is an essential role which Britain must perform and which indeed no other country is capable of performing if Britain does not."[30] Needed to support the East of Suez policy, according to Healey, were highly mobile conventional forces capable of rapid deployment and sufficient sophisticated weapons to prevent the escalation of a local conflict.

The Labour Government's intention to retain the nuclear deterrent as an important element of its defense policy can be inferred from the emphasis it has placed on Britain's responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the area East of Suez.[31] The extent of this commitment was suggested by the Prime Minister on June 10, 1965 at the opening ceremony of the Nehru Memorial Exhibition. Although the occasion hardly required such a pronouncement, Wilson said that "Britain's frontiers are on the Himalayas," following which he defined the policy of the British government as the commitment "to use all means necessary to maintain the political and geographical integrity of India."[32] This pledge, according to political writer Robert McKenzie, could hardly be discharged in any other way than by the use of nuclear weapons, since the limited manpower of Britain

[30]*British Record* (British Information Services), Number 20, December 28, 1964, p. 4.
[31]Cmd. 2592, Statement on the Defense Estimate, February 23, 1965.
[32]The *Guardian,* June 11, 1965, p. 1.

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would preclude any other form of effective support for India against another Chinese attack. McKenzie also noted that cuts in public spending announced by the Treasury in July 1965 involved a modest reduction of 5 per cent in the defense budget, not effective until the following year, whereas Treasury funds available to local governments to encourage construction of residential housing were reduced by 30 per cent for the current year.[33]

Britain's determination to continue her peace-keeping role East of Suez is implicit in her concern for building defense bases which might eventually replace those in Aden and Singapore. The White Paper of February 23, 1965 on defense estimates stated that "It would be politically irresponsible and economically wasteful for Britain to abandon her bases at Aden and Singapore while they were still needed to promote peace in the areas concerned. But they can be maintained only in agreement with the local governments and peoples."[34] With the imminence of independence for the South Arabian Federation, promised for 1968, and the detachment in 1965 of Singapore from Malaysia, the political reliability of the sites of British defense bases East of Suez has been so compromised that alternative locations are being developed. In January 1966 Defense Minister Healey consulted the United States and Australia with regard to continuance of the British base at Bahrein in the Persian Gulf and the search for other defense deployments. These would include a series of islands in the Indian Ocean—Diego Garcia, Aldabra, Farquhar, Des Rochas, the Cocos and Gan—with an air base at Darwin serving as terminus to this broadly dispersed defense system. While the costs of this project have not yet been allocated, the decision seems to have been made to abandon Singapore as a major defense base in the near future and to substitute new bases with a more reliable political foundation.[35]

The Labour Government's retention of the nuclear deterrent may have come as a welcome surprise to the partisan Conservatives of Britain, but it has desolated the Labour Left. The ap-

[33]Robert McKenzie, Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1965.

[34]Cmd. 2592, *op. cit.*

[35]Andrew Wilson, "Britain May Quit East of Suez," *The Observer,* January 23, 1966; Melvin Whiteleather, "British Seek Help East of Suez," Philadelphia *Bulletin,* January 23, 1966; William Fitter, "Healey Convinces Holt," *The Observer,* February 6, 1966; "Australians Face Bigger Arms Cost," *New York Times,* February 6, 1966.

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palled reaction of the left wing of the Labour Party was exemplified in an article in the *New Left Review* of July-August 1965, which stated that "Long before the election, it was abundantly clear that fidelity to NATO and a close association with Washington would be the key features of Labour's foreign policy." What was unpredictable to the author of the article was the servility with which the Wilson Government followed America's lead in world affairs. Indeed, "Labour's criminal complicity with the American war in Vietnam has done more than anything else to awaken opinion to the real situation. But this is only one aspect of a whole dimension of betrayal, the result of failing to renounce the imperial heritage and all its costly but precarious burdens."[36]

Public opinion in Britain on the Labour Government's support of American policy on Vietnam is, as a rule, either unawakened or uninformed. When the Gallup Poll asked respondents early in December 1965, "Do you approve or disapprove of the recent American armed action in Vietnam?," the response showed that 27 per cent approved, 37 per cent disapproved, and 36 per cent did not know, almost exactly the proportions elicited by the same question when it was asked six months earlier. However, during the same period of time, according to the Gallup Poll's surveys of voters' party preferences, the Labour Party had pulled from a dead heat with the Conservatives into a 6.5 per cent lead, with the proportion approving the government's record increasing from 36 to 55 per cent and the proportion satisfied with the performance of the Prime Minister rising from 51 to 66 per cent, his highest rating since the 1964 General Election.[37]

More probative evidence that feeling on the Vietnam question was not intense among British voters was furnished by the Hull North by-election of January 8, 1966. Although it is hazardous to generalize from the results of a single election, Hull North was significant in that a group of left-wing organizations calling themselves the Radical Alliance combined to present a candidate who stated candidly that he did not expect to win, nor cared who did. His campaign was based on a denunciation of British support for U.S. action in Vietnam, and his goal was to drain votes from the Labour Party, whose majority in this constituency in the General

[36]Tom Nairn, "The Wilson Record," pp. 10-11.

[37]Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., Gallup Political Index, Report Number 64, August 1965, and Report Number 68, December 1965, Tables 1 and 2.

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Election of 1964 had been only 1,181. His campaign was a resounding failure. Labour increased its majority to 5,351, with the Radical Alliance candidate receiving 253 votes or .5 per cent of the total cast, a result especially noteworthy considering the strong radical tradition of Hull North in times past.[38]

On the basis of its record, the first Wilson Government obviously veered from the policies of the Labour Party on nuclear weapons as stated in its Manifesto for the 1964 General Election and as outlined in Labour's sparse statements on the subject made during that campaign. The reasons for the change are perhaps less important than the fact that the alteration did not harm the political fortunes of the party, either in Parliament or in the constituencies. The marginal nature of Labour's victory in the 1964 election undoubtedly imposed severe restraints upon the Labour Left. Regardless of the varying degrees of support for unilateral disarmament to be found in the left wing of the Parliamentary Labour Party, no MP or group of MP's was willing to risk the defeat of the Labour Government in an untimely general election. The *Tribune* lamented over the government's retention of nuclear weapons and its support of U.S. action in Vietnam, but no call was sounded to vote against the government on this or any other issue. Labour's defense policy was vigorously attacked in letters from *Tribune* readers, but this newspaper and the MP's whose views it reflects clearly recognized that possession of office was to be preferred to the defense of an abstract principle. Raymond Fletcher, *Tribune's* former editorial writer and now Member from Ilkeston, stated the position succinctly during the debate on British support of the U.S. decision to resume bombing of North Vietnam when he said, "We think this matter should be brought to the conference table, and sooner rather than later, but when it happens, we mean for Britain to be represented by a Labour Prime Minister and a Labour Foreign Secretary."[39]

In the constituencies, as in Commons, the same discipline was maintained by the Labour Left. When the Radical Alliance chose to contest in the Hull North by-election, it was expected that its candidate would draw considerable support from organized left-wing groups. This speculation, mentioned in a *Tribune* article,[40] drew a lengthy disclaimer from an officer of a left-wing organization who wrote that party members recognized their responsibility

[38]The *Times*, January 9, 1966.
[39]*Ibid.*, February 9, 1966.
[40]December 10, 1965.

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for protecting Labour's slim majority in Commons. Election results in Hull North demonstrated that the left wing was able to direct the votes of its members to the official Labour candidate, despite an energetic campaign waged to woo them away.

Labour's changed policy on nuclear arms might have been politically damaging had it not been for Harold Wilson's leadership. The Labour Left, leaderless since the death of Aneurin Bevan in 1960, had given hostages to Wilson long before he became Prime Minister. In two intraparty contests the Left had supported Wilson against Hugh Gaitskell and rejoiced when Wilson rather than George Brown was elected Party Leader after Gaitskell's death in 1963. When Wilson, as Leader, established rapport with the right wing of his party he was in a strategic position to deal with malcontents within the ranks of the Left. When thirty MP's tabled a motion criticizing the Government for supporting U.S. resumption of bombing in Vietnam, Wilson lectured them as if they were recalcitrant schoolboys. As the closing speaker in the parliamentary debate on defense policy on February 9, he defended the position of his government, chastised those in his party who opposed his actions, and met the challenge of the Opposition head on.[41]

The 1966 Election

The imposing victory of Labour in the 1966 General Election cannot be attributed solely to Harold Wilson's skill in defending the foreign policy of the Government against the Opposition and the Labour Left. It is quite apparent, however, that the question of foreign policy occasioned no revolt against or within his party on March 31, 1966. In this election all fifty-seven communist parliamentary candidates lost their deposits, as did the few candidates sponsored by the Radical Alliance. The proportion of the total vote cast for candidates other than those of the three major parties was 1.7 per cent, slightly above the figures of 1950, 1955 and 1964, but well below the postwar high of 2.8 per cent in 1945. Many voters in Britain may have been dissatisfied with the foreign policy of the Labour Government, but if they were their discontent did not prevent them from increasing Labour's proportion of the total vote by almost 4 per cent, while reducing the Conservative and Liberal vote by 1.5 per cent and 2.5 per cent, respectively.

[41]The *Times*, February 9, 1966.

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Foreign policy played no more important a role in the 1966 General Election than it had in 1964. Labour's retention of the nuclear deterrent and its continuation of other aspects of Conservative foreign policy effectively neutralized the deterrent as an issue. Furthermore, the replacement of Sir Alec Douglas-Home by Edward Heath as Leader of the Conservatives caused the party to modify its focus on foreign policy. Heath was not disinterested in matters such as Britain's East of Suez role, but he had been, after all, the chief British representative in the abortive Brussels negotiations regarding Britain's entry into the EEC. An opening to the familiar ground of the Common Market was presented to him when Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart announced rather prematurely (after a March 16 meeting of the Western European Union) that, although many unsolved problems remained, there had been a softening of France's attitude toward British membership in the EEC. Heath promptly described the reaction of the Labour Government as a "paralytic response to a magnificent opportunity." For the ensuing two weeks until election day, the issue of Britain's entry into the Common Market dominated the Conservative campaign. Heath dealt at length with this issue in at least seven major campaign addresses. Yet the 1966 election results suggest that the new Conservative Leader was even less successful in stressing the Common Market as an important election issue than Sir Alec had been in his effort to make Britain's nuclear deterrent the dominant issue of 1964.

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Reviews

New Perspectives of Latin America*

by Fredrick B. Pike

It is almost too much to hope that so slim a volume as Edwin Lieuwen's new study, *U.S. Policy in Latin America,* could deal effectively with a topic so broad and controversial. University of New Mexico historian Lieuwen, however, is an unusually well-informed and perceptive authority on affairs south of the Rio Grande—even though his anti-military views are not shared by all of his colleagues —and he has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to compress much important information into limited space. His present study will be highly valuable to the reader with a passing interest in Hemisphere relations. It does not, nor was it intended to, fill the need for an in-depth survey of United States-Latin American relations. Not since 1943 when Samuel F. Bemis published his *The Latin American Policy of the United States* has this task been attempted by an author in this country. The Bemis study, for all of its merit, was in the super-patriotic school of historical writing and is sorely in need of serious revision.

Following a strictly conventional description of the early years of U.S. relations with Latin America and of the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, Lieuwen deals at greater length with the advent of imperialism and Pan Americanism, 1890-1932. He observes that "the renewed thrust southward of United States influence involved something broader than pure commercial interest. Linked with it was international rivalry. The United States was coming of age just when several industrialized powers had become engaged in a race of control of overseas markets. . . . What was more natural than that the United States, struggling for recognition as a first-rate power, would be caught up in the race? And what was more logical than that she would turn to neighboring Latin America as her chief area of imperialist activity?" (pp. 30-31.)

After properly stressing the importance of Alfred Thayer Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History* (the publication date is given as 1890 rather than 1886) in shaping this country's foreign policy, Lieuwen discusses the Spanish-American War, asserting that "United States businessmen did not advocate war against Spain, for they believed this would be even more damaging to their trade and

**U.S. Policy in Latin America: A Short History.* By Edwin Lieuwen. New York: Praeger, 1965. 149 pp. $4.95.

New Perspectives of Brazil. Edited by Eric N. Baklanoff. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966. 328 pp. $7.50.

The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics. Edited by John D. Martz. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 283 pp. $6.00.

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investment." (p. 33.) This statement, reflecting traditional views, does not do justice to a complex subject and ignores the recent contributions of Walter Lafeber in *The New Empire* (1963). In arguing that the subsequent twenty or so years of U.S. policy toward Latin America were guided primarily by strategic rather than economic considerations, Lieuwen fails to recognize the importance which economic factors held for Woodrow Wilson and Robert Lansing. These two men reflected the views of many contemporaries in believing that only United States, as distinct from European, investment in Latin America could contribute toward a climate conducive to the establishment of democratic institutions. However exalted his motivation, President Wilson in effect was often a more zealous spokesman of the glories of United States private investment than Thomas Mann and J. Peter Grace.

In treating the formation of the Pan American system the author appropriately stresses that difficulties arose because the United States was interested primarily in economic issues and the Latin American republics in political issues. Most especially, the latter hoped to find in Pan Americanism an instrument that would transform the unilateral, interventionist policies of the United States into a genuinely multilateral approach to Hemisphere relations. Ignoring, because of obvious space limitations, the contributions made by Republican administrations to converting Pan Americanism into a movement more acceptable to Latin Americans, Lieuwen writes: "The key political aspect of the Good Neighbor Policy was the United States' unequivocal abandonment of intervention in Latin America." (p. 62.) This statement suggests neglect of material presented by Bryce Wood in *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (1961) which shows that the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration at first sought a return to intervention-interference in Latin America, only gradually altering these policies when they were found to be unworkable.

Lieuwen fails to emphasize that exigencies arising from the approach of World War II forced the United States to become a much better neighbor than it would have been otherwise. Nor is any attempt made to explain why, after becoming such a good neighbor to Mexico following the oil expropriation in 1938 (in stark contrast, incidentally, to our Cuban policies of 1959 and 1960), the United States continued to be truculent and intolerant when dealing with another Latin American trouble spot, Argentina.

When treating "The Cold War: 1945-65" and "The Alliance for Progress," Lieuwen is often at his best. He shows that the United States, by concerning itself primarily with hemispheric security against the communist threat at a time when Latin Americans were becoming enmeshed in "revolutions of rising expectations" and increasingly concerned with socio-economic problems, contributed after 1945 to new areas of misun-

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derstanding. This was one reason why the elaborate organizational machinery for an inter-American security system failed to function as administrations in Washington felt it should.

Although Lieuwen acknowledges the friction inevitably arising from lack of United States attention to socio-economic problems in Latin America, he proceeds to ignore what he has written in this regard when dealing with the Cuban crisis that followed Fidel Castro's rise to power in January of 1959. Failing to show how resentment arose against the United States because of its backing ever since the 1930's of a socially-unjust established order—the main redeeming feature of which was its friendly attitude toward foreign investment—Lieuwen implies that the issue of communism was alone responsible for developing friction with the island republic. Moreover, he states: "The record reveals that the Eisenhower administration made every reasonable effort to do business with the Castro regime, but exercise of the utmost patience and forbearance availed it nothing." (p. 93.) Other authorities have studied the record, even as found in Eisenhower's *The White House Years* (1965), and reached altogether different conclusions. By dismissing their findings in cavalier fashion, Lieuwen contributes nothing toward clarification of a vastly complex issue.

The author is also overly simplistic when justifying the Johnson Administration's intervention in the Dominican Republic. Patriotic platitudes are no substitute for the type of research that Theodore Draper has conducted (the results of which he published in 1966 in *The New Republic*) which raises serious doubts about the most recent United States adventure in the troubled island.

In discussing the tricky subject of U.S. relations with extraconstitutional military regimes, Lieuwen gives a distorted account of a 1962 incident involving Peru. The military in that country seized power in July and set up a governing junta. Lieuwen contends that the Kennedy Administration extended recognition only after exacting a promise from the junta to hold elections and in the interim to work for economic and social progress. In fact, the junta had extended guarantees for elections long before Washington's recognition. And the junta's socio-economic reform program slowed down rather than accelerated after United States recognition. In any event, the junta throughout its tenure demonstrated concern for change and it prepared the way for the rise to power of the most reform-oriented administration that Peru has had in the twentieth century, that of Fernando Belaúnde Terry, thus throwing into question the well-known Lieuwen thesis that the Latin American military generally constitute a bastion of conservatism.

In *New Perspectives of Brazil*, a collection of high-level and often genuinely distinguished essays which constitute what is probably the best survey of the contemporary

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Brazilian scene available in English, Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic contributes a piece dealing with Brazil's foreign policy in the twentieth century. His emphasis is on the period of the Jânio Quadros (1961) and João Goulart (1961-64) governments. In an intriguing and skillfully developed hypothesis, he contends that Quadros and his advisers believed that a globally-oriented Brazil, removed as far as possible from the Cold War, would gain additional prestige "which in an atmosphere of great national aspirations might make the domestic sacrifices and prolonged austerity more bearable." (p. 86.)

Under Goulart, Brazil advanced even further toward neutralism. But the nonalignment policy, which actually amounted to a reversal of traditionally friendly relations with the United States and a conscious quest for closer diplomatic and economic ties with communist countries, did not produce the hoped-for results. Communist nations were not in a position to help Brazil economically, and Goulart's attempt to align Brazil with them alienated West European powers and the United States, whose close economic cooperation had been vital to Brazil. The author concludes that the evolution of Brazil's foreign policy during the four years from the inception of the Quadros term to the beginning of the military regime of Humberto Castelo Branco in April 1964 "might serve as an example that nonalignment and neutralism, in vogue a few years ago, ceased to represent a rational alternative among the developing Latin American countries." (p. 96.)

In a stimulating and carefully-researched article the editor of the book, Louisiana State University economist Eric N. Baklanoff, presents one of the most sophisticated defenses of the role of foreign capital in Brazil—and often by inference in Latin America as a whole—that has appeared in print. He notes that U.S. firms, with a 19 per cent average annual increase in production figures, spearheaded the 14 per cent average annual advance in industrial output achieved in Brazil between 1955 and 1960. In considering the arguments of economic nationalists who contend that profits remittances of U.S. firms produce an overall capital draining effect, Baklanoff argues that these remittances averaged 3.5 per cent of the value of investment, 1946-1953, and only 1.5 per cent, 1954-1961.

He further contends that economic nationalists fail to take into account the foreign reserves that U.S. firms save Brazil because of the lead they have taken in import-substitution programs. Economic nationalists, moreover, do not include in capital inflow figures the amount of profits earned in Brazil that is reinvested in that country. Between 1947 and 1961, United States firms enjoyed an average annual profit of $80 million, one-half of which was reinvested in Brazil. Total profits remittances during this period amounted to only one-fifth of one per cent of the Brazilian gross national product.

In developing these and other

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points, Baklanoff shows the importance of U.S. investment to Brazilian development in the 1945-1961 years, and suggests that the decline in the economic situation after 1961 was due largely to the unfriendly climate for foreign capital produced by the Quadros and Goulart administrations. He also brings into serious question some of the extremely anti-foreign capital views advanced by Irving Louis Horowitz in *Revolution in Brazil: Politics and Society in a Developing Nation* (1964).

Although recognizing the positive role that foreign investment can play, Werner Baer in a provocative essay maintains that the economic imbalances which accompanied Brazil's rapid development in the 1945-1961 period actually contributed to grave crises. In particular, private capital's neglect of agriculture, social programs including educational development, and the entire infrastructure led to the slowdown in Brazilian development after 1961. Thus, economic stagnation was not the result of the unfriendly climate for private investment that prevailed after 1961 but rather the consequence of the pre-1961 assumption that private capital, foreign and domestic, could solve all of Brazil's problems.

In another of the volume's distinguished essays, Juarez R. B. Lopes describes the changing political power structure in Brazil since 1945. He emphasizes the results accompanying the rise of a bureaucracy whose powers extend throughout the land. By insisting upon implementation of social and labor laws in provincial cities, the bureaucracy put a profits squeeze on local manufacturers, making it more and more difficult for them to compete with large São Paulo firms. As a result local manufacturers sought new ways to exploit labor, and the old paternalism which had characterized management-labor relations was gradually broken down.

Since 1945, also, the Northeastern landowners, acting because of the high prices commanded by sugar, began to reclaim the land whose use they had once assigned to peasants. The reclaimed lands were then utilized for sugar production. The former peasants became wage earners but, no longer able to produce their own food, they were forced to pay high prices for commercially-produced dietary staples. These changes resulted in erosion of old patterns of paternalism and encouraged the rise of Peasant Leagues which sought radical solutions to socio-economic problems.

A highly perceptive study by Emilio Willems on "Religious Mass Movements and Social Change in Brazil" and a brilliantly written essay on Brazilian national cultural traits and values, "A Psychologist Reflects on Brazil and Brazilians," by John F. Santos, add enormously to the value of the book. In addition, Roland E. Chardon contributes a thoroughly documented paper on the important topic of "Changes in the Geographic Distribution of Population in Brazil, 1950 - 1960," which emphasizes new frontier and colo-

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nization movements. Armin K. Ludwig writes on "The Planning and Creation of Brasilia," and Earl Thomas on "Emerging Patterns of the Brazilian Language."

The only serious criticism this reviewer has to make of the book concerns the opening essay by John W. F. Dulles, "Post-Dictatorship Brazil, 1945-1964." Although Dulles does know Brazil well, he seems intent upon obscuring this fact in this paper which is trite and conventional and all too often based only upon two sources, the *New York Times* and the now defunct *Hispanic American Report*—through which Stanford University once made a valuable contribution to the Latin American field.

In a volume of collected readings dealing with *The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics,* editor John Martz, the prolific University of North Carolina political scientist, has judiciously brought together many of the most justly famous essays on Latin America published in the past decade. Written by some of the best-known political scientists and historians in the field, many of the selections reveal, as Martz phrases it, "a shift away from traditional historical studies and . . . a move from institutional analyses to those centering upon dynamic forces." They point further to the fact that scholars today are attempting to analyze problems differently than in the past, "employing analytical tools and techniques that are sometimes still being tested elsewhere." (pp. 1-2.)

The twenty-seven essays that comprise the book deal with such topics as social thought, constitutions, presidential power, nationalism, the hacienda and land reform, communism, the military and middle sectors, labor, political parties, the university, and the Church. Although the specific subject of United States-Latin American relations is not included, much of the material pertains directly and indirectly to it. Of particular interest are those papers that study the relationship between poverty, instability and Hemisphere relations. The present review is limited to a consideration of this portion of the book. A timely point of departure is suggested by the Montreal address of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in May 1966 in which he tended to associate elimination of poverty in the underdeveloped republics—to be achieved in part through greater investment from the developed countries—with attainment of stability, encouragement of democracy, and containment of communism.

Kalman H. Silvert writes of the inclination to place primary attention on economic factors as the key to social change and concludes: "The United States has . . . contributed to this kind of easy analysis by an accent on economic development and the ingenuous insistence that people with full bellies don't become Communists . . .; in an amorphous way, anyone who subscribes to the absolute premise that 'Money Talks' contributes to a dime-store variety of economic determinism." (p. 18.) Martin Needler argues (pp. 21-23)

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that stability in Latin America depends not so much upon economic development as upon widespread acceptance of institutions as legitimate.

Russell H. Fitzgibbon and Kenneth J. Johnson list fifteen criteria for determining whether Latin American republics stand on a scale of political change relevant to democracy and stability. Two of the criteria are a belief by the people in their individual political dignity and maturity, and an absence of foreign domination. Merle Kling in a highly original analysis suggests that economic development which depends primarily on direct foreign investment impedes rather than encourages stability. William S. Stokes considers the widespread assumption that if the Latin American countries are assisted in raising living standards, democratic procedures will in some way result; and then he explains persuasively why he cannot accept "so simple an explanation." Finally, George Blanksten writes: "It would be gratifying to be in a position to make a solid . . . pronouncement on the relationship between the economic development of the area and the strengthening of democracy there. However, the current state of our knowledge does not yet offer definitive insight into this crucial question." (p. 158.)

Many leading intellectuals in Latin America are similarly dubious that economic betterment alone will bring about such desirable goals as political stability, democracy and elimination of communism. Leaders of the increasingly important Christian Democratic parties, for example, feel that attainment of these goals depends as much upon ideological and attitudinal factors as upon economic determinants. Because of this they have frequently been outspokenly critical of the United States, feeling that this country considers Latin America purely in economic terms and ignores the importance of ideology.

Undoubtedly, stability in Latin America depends upon far more than rising economic indices. It depends also, among other considerations, upon giving to the masses, no longer protected by private paternalistic structures that have long since crumbled, a feeling that their dignity is recognized and that they are treated at least as fairly as other groups within society, and as well as economic limitations within the country permit. Francisco I. Madero, President of Mexico from 1911 to 1913, once observed that the peasants in his country were as much concerned with the right to vote as they were with bread. Perhaps the masses in today's Latin America do not value suffrage this highly; but they do insist upon some indication that their interests are taken seriously and that they are participating members of society.

Dictators Rafael Leonidas Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, Manuel Odría of Peru, Marcos Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela, and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, to cite only a few arbitrary and authoritarian rulers, undoubtedly gave

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some measure of economic security to a broad section of the proletariat. In the long run, however, they contributed to instability and multiple related evils because they did not bring to the lower classes any degree of genuine participation in society. They made their mistake, and spokesmen in this country who frequently praised them joined in the blunder, of assuming that bread was the only vital concern of the masses.

Given the existing obstacles to modernization in Latin America, and taking into account especially the appalling population increase, it is likely that no short-term economic miracles could be wrought even if the United States decided to support a truly generous program of Hemisphere aid. This pessimistic appraisal does not imply, United States economic determinists to the contrary notwithstanding, that Latin American republics will necessarily undergo violent communist revolutions. Probably far less materialistic than we assume them to be, the Latin American masses may well continue to endure conditions that could drive our citizens to violence, if only they are given the sense of meaningful participation in national life.

Just as the emerging masses of each Latin American republic want to be assured that their dignity is recognized and that they are being treated as justly by the government as any other social group, so also emerging Latin American nations want to feel that they are being dealt with by the United States as fairly as any other area in the world. They are keenly resentful when, because of the fact that they are within the United States "sphere of influence," the Marines are landed in the Dominican Republic and subtler pressures are applied in other countries to protect the economic interests of Yankee investors. A feeling of frustration inevitably arises as Latin Americans are given continual reminders that they are not being dealt with as justly as other areas of the world where the United States is less able to practice interventionist policies. This resentment and frustration can be as inimical to Hemisphere stability and containment of Marxian influence as economic underdevelopment.

The exercise of U.S. power in Latin America has been good for many of the southern republics in roughly the same way that dictators have been good for the masses in individual countries. In both instances certain material benefits have accrued. But just as dictators have crushed certain psychological and spiritual aspirations of the masses, so also U.S. power, often exercised in this reviewer's opinion with considerable "arrogance," has crushed the nationalistic aspirations of emerging nations.

To think today that we can solve Hemisphere problems merely by contributing to economic advance while keeping intact our old power relationship to Latin America is to ignore the lessons that should have been learned from the Mexican Revolution. We should not forget that in 1910 our immediate neighbors violently repudiated

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the glittering, United States-supported prosperity of the Porfirio Díaz period. Nor should we forget that even as economic problems mounted in the 1930's and as the country purposely rejected many of the development gains that could have resulted from foreign investment, stability came to Mexico. It came as the government slowly learned how to give once ignored population elements a voice in decision-making processes that vitally affected them.

Revolutionary War: Theory and Practice*

by Bryce F. Denno

At a time when our expanding commitment in Vietnam parallels increasing domestic debate over our objectives and tactics there, Peter Paret's recent book, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria,* holds particular interest. The author analyzes a politico-military doctrine of revolutionary warfare developed by French theorists from French experience on Indochinese and Algerian battlegrounds and describes the impact of that doctrine on France itself. As used by Paret, the term "revolutionary war" is synonymous with "national wars of liberation," insurgency or counterinsurgency, and internal war.

The defeat of France's modern army in Indochina by a primitive enemy was as incomprehensible as it was traumatic. To find an explanation, French military thinkers reviewed events of the conflict and examined especially the theories and practices of their victorious enemy. Their conclusions provided a basis for a doctrine on *guerre révolutionnaire* which they deemed applicable not only to the war in Algeria but to revolutionary war elsewhere.

This doctrine consisted of two incongruous parts. The conceptual part envisaged a world torn by continuous strife between the Western democracies and international communism. France was in the vanguard of this contest; Indochina and Algeria were opening rounds. The anti-colonial revolt worldwide was solely and completely the result of a giant communist plot to overcome the Western democracies.

A second "operational" part of the doctrine consisted of an elaborate and comprehensive set of principles and techniques. These derived from experience not only in Indochina but from France's colonial past and even, according to Paret, from France's counterrevolution of the early 1790's. He finds the complete doctrine striking in that "its detailed concept of counterrevolution is taken directly from its vague view of revolution; the reflection in the mirror is sharp, while the thing reflected remains shadowy." (p. 20.)

Paret's ambivalent attitude toward these two aspects of French doctrine on revolutionary warfare

**French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria.* By Peter Paret. New York: Praeger, 1964. 163 pp. $4.95.

Internal War. Edited by Harry Eckstein. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. 339 pp. $6.50.

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colors his analysis and shows up throughout his book. He concedes, for instance, the usefulness of the doctrine for the soldier who wishes to "blunt the military edge" of an insurgency. He has reason to recognize the importance of French principles of counterinsurgency derived from years of experience in many wars. Indeed, *most* of the counterinsurgency techniques being used in Vietnam today stem from French experience, at least in part. For example, the French found during their era of colonial expansion that military columns could seize a country but not control it. Pacification of an area required two types of forces. One, comprised of elite, mobile units, could move rapidly to meet and overcome sizeable enemy military threats. Another, equally if not more important, consisted of units assigned to specific areas where they not only protected the population from military attack but insulated it from enemy political overtures. Military forces in Vietnam today are divided into these two types, U.S. combat units and Vietnamese regular forces comprising, generally, the mobile element.

In their operations against the Viet Cong, these two types of forces employ the *tache d'huile* or "oil spot" technique. This consists of a systematic expansion from controlled areas to those under contention. The effort involves the identification and destruction of the local Viet Cong "shadow government" and its replacement by a friendly government. This identical technique was employed not only by the French in Algeria but by Marshal Lyautey in French Morocco. The "fortified hamlets" which the French developed in Algeria have obvious similarity to Vietnam's "strategic hamlets" of the Diem regime and to the later "new-life hamlets."

The French civil affairs officers of the *Section Administrative Spéciale*, with their enlisted and civilian assistants, performed primarily governmental functions in districts of Algeria during the insurgency there. They provided the backbone of the effort to separate the population from insurgents. Their modern Vietnamese counterparts are provincial and district chiefs, almost entirely military, who—assisted by U.S. advisers—govern at the local level. It may be that we are learning in Vietnam some of the military lessons which battlefield experience taught the French earlier. In Algeria, for instance, the French learned to substitute small-scale attacks achieving surprise for large-scale operations that did not.

Despite its military utility, Paret concludes on balance that "the doctrine of *guerre révolutionnaire* contains a high potential of political explosiveness, a characteristic that should severely limit its usefulness as a counterstrategy for other countries." (p. 120.) The manner in which the doctrine evolved, as well as its subsequent impact on France, substantiates this conclusion. In their study of the enemy who had defeated them in Indochina, most French military

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analysts reached a consensus: An inferior force could outpoint a modern army so long as it succeeded in gaining at least the tacit support of the local population. The contest for popular support was primarily ideological. Hence the need, as a starting point, for "an international doctrine capable of effectively opposing Marxist-Leninist theories . . . a system of values strong enough to unite and stimulate national energies." (p. 27.) The theorists were thinking of an ideology that could arouse support not only in Algeria but in France itself. In studying the reasons for their defeat, the military thinkers blamed what they considered a political, social and moral decay within France itself as an important contributory factor. To many French soldiers, this malaise was only a more recent display of an underlying national attitude which, in 1940, had permitted a disciplined Germany to conquer, within weeks, an ill-disciplined and irresolute France.

Such an attitude on the part of a defeated military establishment is not uncommon. Many German soldiers, for instance, stoutly maintained that Germany, in World War I, was defeated not on the battlefield but on the home front. The significant thing about the French revolutionary war theorists, Paret maintains, is the new perspective with which they viewed France after studying the doctrine of Mao Tse-tung and General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of the Viet Minh army. These communist leaders had emphasized the indispensability of secure bases where political, as well as military, power could be regenerated during protracted war. Likewise, reasoned the French military theoreticians, counterrevolutionary forces require secure bases and the ultimate base was France itself.

In their search for an ideological basis for the doctrine of revolutionary war, French military thinkers gravitated toward neofascism and authoritarianism. The trend toward authoritarianism especially, maintains Paret, was in keeping with historic military tradition. He cites the views expressed, near the turn of the century, by soldiers such as Marshal Lyautey who envisaged the dedicated military officer as an educator of the youth and a guardian of the nation's welfare. In its more extreme form, this philosophy implied a responsibility for the military to regenerate, when necessary, a decadent civilian society and to reform a corrupt civilian government. (This view maintains a current popularity, especially in some of the developing countries.)

As the war in Algeria drifted inconclusively, some advocates of revolutionary warfare began to exhibit extremist tendencies. Their involvement in psychological warfare furnishes an example. The emphasis on the ideological nature of the war had led, quite naturally, to the enlargement of a psychological warfare organization within the French Army. This took the form of a "Fifth Bureau," incorporated into the staffs of combat units and territorial commands.

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The bureau had two functions. One was to wage *guerre psychologique* against the enemy to destroy his will to fight. The other was to perform *action psychologique* to protect French morale and unity of purpose—civilian as well as military. In time, the Fifth Bureau became deeply involved in French politics, identifying especially with the aims of French settlers in Algeria and with neofascism in metropolitan France. The bureau boasted openly of organizing the French *colons* into "political shock troops" whose pressures on the government could not be blamed on the army. In early 1960 the Fifth Bureau was disbanded.

Extremism took even more virulent form on Algerian battlefields, where prisoners of both sides were tortured habitually. Torture was not condoned by most practitioners of revolutionary war. However, one of its advocates, Colonel Trinquier, openly supported its use when interrogating captured guerrillas. He reasoned that a guerrilla, by violating the rules of organized warfare, forfeited thereby the traditional rights afforded a prisoner of war. His thesis added a new and ominous ethical dimension to revolutionary war.

Paret convincingly traces the evolution of the French doctrine of revolutionary war as it developed from an answer to insurgency into a move to "regenerate" French society along authoritarian lines and thence into a challenge of governmental authority that brought France to the verge of civil war. He points out that advocates of the doctrine of revolutionary war supplied leaders, as well as participants, to the abortive 1961 putsch and the subsequent Secret Army Organization (OAS) insurrection in Algeria. Ironically, the OAS revolt ended in a vain attempt to establish "maquis" forces in Algeria. In other words, the counterrevolutionists, at the end, adopted the tactics of the guerrillas they had long fought.

Paret rightly censures the advocates of *guerre révolutionnaire* who created a neofascist totalitarianism to combat a communist totalitarianism. He also condemns what he describes as their superficial study of enemy doctrine designed to provide the "quickest possible operation payoff." This latter criticism is open to question. For one thing —as indicated earlier—*most* of the counterinsurgency techniques being employed in Vietnam today, of a politico-military as well as a military nature, were developed previously by the French. If they stem from superficial study, no one has yet been able to improve on them in a truly fundamental way.

Paret also criticizes the view held by French theoreticians that Mao Tse-tung's writings constitute a general theory of war. He explains that the French chose to emphasize in Indochina the potency of ideology and new techniques rather than "to admit that France, however strong her determination to gain victory, was too weak to have won this war." (p. 102.) This line of reasoning is disturbing because it minimizes a new

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form of warfare developed primarily by the Chinese communists. If Mao has not developed a general theory of war, his politico-military strategy (as updated in September 1965 by Lin Piao, the Communist Chinese Minister of Defense) will do until a theory of war comes along. His strategy put mainland China behind the Bamboo Curtain, and—despite Paret's debatable contention that Mao and Giap fought very different wars—defeated French forces in Indochina, notwithstanding their decided matériel advantage and a 1.2 to 1 numerical advantage. His strategy prolonged the Filipino rebellion, during which the Huks used Edgar Snow's book, *Red Star Over China,* describing the Chinese civil war, as a "field manual"; was employed by communist terrorists in Malaya in a prolonged war against a vastly larger enemy; and has caused the United States to fight in Vietnam a frustrating and, so far, inconclusive war of increasing dimension. It is a strategy that demands counterinsurgent forces vastly superior to the enemy rather than the vastly outnumbered armies that Clive used to conquer India or the French used to overcome nineteenth-century Indochina. It attempts to erode an opponent's will, in his homeland as well as on the battlefield. It is a strategy that the Western democracies must find an answer to. While doing so, it behooves them not to ignore the French who have had more experience than most in counterinsurgency war.

Unquestionably, Paret's greatest contribution lies in his clear and convincing exposition of what can happen to an embattled democracy waging a protracted and inconclusive revolutionary war. The results of pressures and frustrations generated by Indochina and Algeria on the French Army, the French government, and the French people provide lessons applicable elsewhere. Certainly, they are pertinent to the Republic of Vietnam. They may well be pertinent also to the United States.

In approaching the subject of the French doctrine of revolutionary war, Paret notes, with surprise, how little previous study had been devoted to the theoretical aspects of this doctrine. Harry Eckstein, editor of *Internal War,* asserts that the whole subject of revolutionary war has been neglected by theoreticians of the social sciences. *Internal War* is an attempt to remedy this deficiency. It is a collection of essays by a group of distinguished social scientists dealing with "the application of contemporary social theories to the study of internal wars, including, for example, functional theory, action theory, communications theory, theories of group dynamics, theories of attitude formation, and the like." (p. 4.) As Eckstein himself concedes, the result is not an unqualified success. Some of the contributors skirt the fringes of the subject without attacking it directly. Conversely, Eckstein observes, "the greater the author's concern with internal war itself, the less he seems to use social science equipment."

Nonetheless, the book provides a

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variety of theoretical views of internal war illuminating to the student of this subject. Lucian Pye's essay on "The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of Rebellion" is an example. He maintains that, in attempting to understand insurrection in developing countries—a product of the intellectual, political and social changes they are undergoing—we should review the Western Renaissance during which Western nation-states were born. (Interestingly enough, some economists seeking solutions to the economic problems of developing countries are reverting to economic theories of the past.)

Pye also compares American, British and Chinese explanations for insurrection. To Americans, rebellion automatically casts suspicion on the government, for people do not revolt against "good governments." (There are no bad children, only bad parents.) Drawing on their colonial experience, the British take quite an opposite view, maintaining that civil disorders spring from "man's inherent and compulsively irrational urge to violence and mischief." (Children will be bad if not controlled by the parents.) The Chinese view, according to Pye, lies between that of the Americans and British. People will tend to revolt against a "bad government" but the natural rascality of a government's subjects can also contribute toward insurrection.

An essay of particular timeliness is Thomas Perry Thornton's "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation." The habitual and systematic employment of terrorism, especially selective terrorism, marks a major Viet Cong tactic. The rise in attacks on local officials and other terroristic activities in northeastern Thailand is viewed by some as an ominous sign of impending insurrection there. The insurgent uses terror to discredit and destroy a government, creating a social disorientation upon which he can capitalize. Unless the insurgent possesses a high potential for political support, says Thornton, terror is likely to be counterproductive. On the other hand, if insurgents are in a position of political strength, it is unnecessary—and even wasteful—for them to initiate terrorism. Thus, terrorism might be used as an indicator of the insurgent's view of his situation. Terrorism can also be an instrument of last resort. The OAS, for instance, resorted to terroristic tactics in Algeria when it was probably clear to it, as well as to its opponents, that its cause was hopeless. An important subsidiary product of terror is to propagandize for the insurgent's cause.

In his essay titled "Authority and Violence: The Political Framework of Internal War," Andrew C. Janos emphasizes the compulsion of the insurgent to win legitimacy, not only in the eyes of a domestic audience but within the international community. This goal, says Janos, marks a prime characteristic of internal wars, distinguishing them from international conflicts.

Surprisingly enough, despite the wealth of operational information available from the current war in Vietnam and similar conflicts of

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the recent past, contributors to *Internal War* make little reference to such data. In this respect, they differ diametrically from the French who developed their theory of *guerre révolutionnaire* predominantly from battlefield experience. Perhaps Thornton best sums up the attitudes of his fellow essayists on this score when he concedes that "operational information would be useful, but it is first of all necessary to achieve theoretical understanding. . . ." Perhaps, but can theoretical understanding be attained in a vacuum?

In any event, *Internal War* marks a start toward theoretical analysis by social scientists of the phenomenon of revolutionary war. Many feel that, although this is the form that most future wars will take, we know least about it. Perhaps study combining the theoretical approach of *Internal War* and the pragmatic approach of the French veterans of revolutionary war can provide the most fruitful and usable return.

Postwar Occupation: A Case Study of Mainz*

by Dorothea S. Michelman

When American tanks entered Mainz, Germany, on March 21, 1945, they found a city 86 per cent destroyed—a *Kellerstadt,* a city of cellar dwellers—half of whose population had been killed or had fled before the approach of Allied troops. Communications were virtually wiped out; there were no newspapers or broadcasts. Economic activity had ceased. Transportation was paralyzed. To get merely from one block to another required a punishing journey over vast piles of masonry and twisted steel. Numbing cold and gnawing hunger were constant companions, together with fear, suspicion and hatred. This was "Golden Mainz," the city of Gutenberg, when on March 21 it became the first major Rhenish community to fall under American occupation in World War II.

Military occupation was not a new experience for Mainz. As *Moguntiacum,* this one-time Celtic settlement was from 12 to 9 B.C. a major base for Drusus, stepson of Augustus, in his campaigns against the Germanic tribes that dwelt between the Rhine and Elbe. Much more recently, the city several times has borne the weight of occupation as a result of the changing tides of national fortunes, most notably in 1792 during the Napoleonic era, and again in 1825, when Mainz was garrison for some 12,000 Austrian and Prussian troops.

But the American occupation, though of only three months' duration, and the French one that succeeded it, differed radically from earlier occupations in one outstanding respect: Unlike the others, which sought to enforce the authority and control of the victor over the vanquished, the Allied presence aimed largely at re-establishing the democratic process that for over twelve years had been sup-

**Wie es war, Mainzer Schicksalsjahre 1945-48.* By Erich Dombrowski, Emil Kraus, Karl Schramm. Mainz: Mainzer Verlagsanstalt, 1965. 251 pp. DM 19.50.

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pressed by the totalitarian dictate of Hitler's Third Reich.

This was no simple task. The magnitude of the military disaster, coupled with the absence, for more than a decade, of humane, responsible political norms, raised formidable obstacles to reviving those elements of decency and respect—essential to democratic institutions—that remained in the community.

The fact that the Americans, and the French who followed them in occupation of Mainz from June 22, 1945 until the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, were successful in helping to restore a dynamic, democratic life to this Rhenish city is a remarkable footnote to history. This success attests, in large part, to the vigor of the Allies in pursuing a firm yet understanding program of democratization. As much credit, however, is due those surviving indigenous democratic elements whose resilience in rebounding from years of suppression supplied vital local leadership at a most critical time.

The story of how Mainz regained its political prominence and economic prosperity—it is now the flourishing capital of the Rhineland-Palatinate—might have remained buried in military annals and state archives had not several of these "indigenous democratic forces" recently documented the city's experience in one of the most perceptive and historically important studies to appear on the postwar occupation period.

Wie es war, Mainzer Schicksalsjahre 1945-48 (*How it Was: The Fateful Years of Mainz 1945-48*) represents the first study from West Germany that details the role of the Allied occupation in effecting the physical, moral and cultural renewal of a city of the defeated Reich. With Mainz as its prototype, it brings into sharp focus the problems that all three Western powers had to contend with in seeking to restore democratic processes in their zones of occupation.

Revival of a responsible, free press is a case in point. During the first days of occupation, word-of-mouth was the only effective means of communication between the occupation authorities and the people of Mainz. To combat the plague of misinformation and rumors that threatened to engulf the city, the American command quickly instituted free distribution of a semiweekly newspaper. With this stopgap action, it was possible to counter the rumor mill and to acquaint the population with some of the facts that had been withheld from them for well over a decade. Meanwhile, attention was directed to laying the groundwork for a new, native democratic press.

First, and most important, professionally qualified journalists with established credentials of opposition to the National Socialist regime had to be located and recruited. A lack of newsprint, ink and equipment slowed the return of a free press. But when, through a stroke of luck, a virtually undamaged press was discovered in the nearby town of Ingelheim, success of the operation was assured. On October 26, 1945 the first edition

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of the *Neuer Mainzer Anzeiger* appeared. Mainz once more had a newspaper of its own.

To be sure, the French, now occupying the city, retained control over what the fledgling newspaper could print. But it was a measure of the high caliber of the editorial staff and its rapport with the French press office that the *Anzeiger* required little attention from the censor's pencil. This newspaper and its successor, the *Mainzer Allgemeine Zeitung,* succeeded in gaining broad acclaim from both the occupation command and its German readers.

"What was a city without a newspaper?" ask the authors of *Wie es war.* "In this time of misery, a cry without a sound, a sorrow that could not be expressed. A word spoken in a void." The day the first edition appeared on the streets, "the copies were torn from the hands of the carriers. . . . People had a newspaper again!" The historical and intellectual void of some twelve years' duration could now be filled.

So it was with the other institutions of community life—the gradual restoration of democratic local government, the reconstruction of educational facilities, the reopening of religious and cultural centers. There were, of course, many obstacles to a rapid return to normalcy: widespread physical destruction, denazification proceedings, closed banks, damaged utilities, a soaring public debt, and the problem of living space—most of it at a bare subsistence level, adequate for only 18,000 persons in a community of 76,000. Yet these problems, too, yielded to a city convinced that its salvation lay in close cooperation with the occupation forces and in its own determined efforts to erase the stigma of the recent past.

The French, sensitive to the animosity that for centuries had separated France and Germany, seemed particularly anxious to contribute to improved mutual understanding and good will. So it was that, in February 1946, the French commandant of Mainz, Major Ludwig T. Kleinmann, presented a complex of barracks to the city to serve as the nucleus of a new university—the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz. This generous gesture of Major Kleinmann was not lost on the intellectual leaders of the city, who recognized the farsightedness that prompted the French action. When the French occupation of Mainz ended in 1949, the University was a fitting memorial to those who had died in previous Franco-German wars and a promise of improved relations in the future.

The eyewitness accounts in *Wie es war* lend a sense of immediacy and personal involvement to its essentially documentary style. This technique is especially effective in evoking recollections of the first days following the collapse of German military resistance and the efforts to supply basic living essentials to the sorely stricken city.

The integrity of *Wie es war* as a faithful account of the American and French occupation rests, in the final analysis, with the intellectual

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and professional integrity of its three author-editors. Their credentials give good reason for confidence. Erich Dombrowski is an internationally known and respected journalist, author and political democrat, whose openly expressed opposition to National Socialism made him a natural choice at war's end as a leader in creating a new German press. Founder of the *Mainzer Allgemeine Zeitung* and co-founder of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* Dr. Dombrowski is still active in a professional career that now spans sixty years. He is known in the United States for his penetrating study of personalities in the Weimar Republic, *German Leaders of Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow* (New York: D. Appleton, 1920).

Emil Kraus, Bürgermeister of Mainz until forcibly dismissed from his post by the National Socialists in 1933, served at the request of the French occupation forces as Oberbürgermeister of the city from 1945 until the first community elections in 1948. Since his retirement from political life in 1957, Dr. Kraus has devoted himself exclusively to writing. Dr. Karl Schramm, chief dramaturgist of the Mainz Stadttheater, has written numerous books on local area history.

Wie es war is in German. The story it tells, its reproductions of occupation-period documents, and its wealth of statistical material are directly available, therefore, only to those who have a facility in that language. The more than one hundred photographs depict the trial of Mainz (and, in a sense, of every other city in the western zones of occupation) as it struggled to return to physical and economic viability and social and political self-respect. It is to be hoped that an English-language edition may soon be commissioned.

The occupation of Western Germany will be noted in history for its considerable success in wiping out the legacy of National Socialism and reinvigorating the forces of political morality and social justice in this conquered land. One hopes that the forces that have been set in motion can prevent a recurrence of Germany's disastrous adventure with a totalitarian philosophy. Perhaps the ultimate message for readers of this remarkably candid volume lies in the introductory statement: "It will be a warning for the present generation and for generations yet to come."

Soviet Policy and the Austrian State Treaty*

by Kurt L. London

After five years as Royal Swedish Ambassador to Prague and Budapest, Sven Allard was transferred in 1954 to Vienna where he stayed for almost a decade. He set down his experiences and observations in a book, *Diplomat in Wien.* (At this writing, no English edition is available.) It is without doubt the work of a man who combines the talents of a highly skilled diplomat with the knowledge and analytical powers of a consummate scholar.

**Diplomat in Wien.* By Sven Allard. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1965. 248 pp. n.p.

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The book fulfills a double function. It chronicles the convulsions that led to the freedom of Austria and it does so within the frame of reference of the Soviet political system. It is one of the very few books I have read in which a writer on international affairs never forgets that Soviet foreign policy is not of traditional character; it is not a national foreign policy as we understand it but, to a considerable extent, a communist foreign policy.

The complete objectivity—one could almost say detachment—which distinguishes the Ambassador's narrative is rare in contemporary political literature. If the author has any bias, it is a sympathy for the aspirations of the Austrian people to be free and independent. And yet, even on this issue, his analysis of how this goal finally was achieved remains objective. After reading the manuscript of the book, the then Austrian Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky, obviously a good friend of Ambassador Allard, remarked in a letter of July 29, 1964: "You will understand that I cannot agree with all of your observations and that I saw some of the problems differently—but such difference of opinion would have to be expected in our profession."

The book begins with a sketch of life in Prague and Budapest during the Stalinist era. It is a depressing picture. Small wonder that the Ambassador was glad to be transferred to a somewhat more congenial political climate, although Vienna in the year 1954 was no haven of serenity.

Appropriately, Allard first outlines Austrian politics. He then immediately raises a fundamental question: What is the rationale of Soviet foreign policy? These first chapters are of major importance, for they contain the eloquent testimony of an objective, neutral diplomat who argues that the goals of Soviet foreign policy are *not* merely an extension of Czarist Russia. "There is an enormous difference between Czarist and Soviet imperialism," he writes. "The former aspired to territorial expansion in Europe and Asia; its goals were limited and, so to say, local. Communist imperialism, however, is by its very nature ideological and international. Its goals are unlimited and, therefore, global." (p. 51.) And further: "If the question is examined whether Soviet policy pursues world revolutionary or national aims, the answer is that the question is wrong and unrealistic. Both aims have merged." (p. 52.)

This is a realistic recognition of the nature of Soviet policy. Few theorists or practitioners of foreign affairs have been successful in clarifying this policy in so few, unadorned words. When Allard examines the crucial months of the negotiations toward the Austrian State Treaty, which finally led to that country's independence and status as a neutral power, he keeps his analysis in mind. The result is one of the clearest exposés of Soviet political behavior in existence.

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Not only was the Ambassador in close contact with the leading officials of the Austrian government, but he also had many opportunities to discuss these and related problems with Soviet and Western representatives. After analyzing Soviet policies toward Austria, he describes the first negotiations, featuring Molotov's role in 1953 and 1954, the effects of the Berlin Conference in 1954, and the significance of West Germany's admission to NATO. Of special importance were the changes in Soviet political strategy and tactics introduced by Khrushchev against Molotov's wishes. One of the most interesting of these was the eventual Soviet decision to agree to a form of neutrality for Austria similar to that enjoyed by Switzerland —which played a decisive role in the successful conclusion of the treaty. The Kremlin's acceptance of Austrian neutrality was, the author believes, the result of sober calculations by Soviet leaders and Khrushchev's belief in the necessity of adjusting to the changed conditions of the postwar world with its new weapons and communications technology.

Allard concludes that few negotiations have been so valuable for throwing light on Soviet foreign policy, contributing to the understanding of the strategic and tactical goals of the communist movement, or explaining the "balancing of national and revolutionary interests." It is for this reason that the book should be published in as many languages as possible. Its clear organization and lucid style make it easy reading for the interested layman and a pleasure for students of international affairs. Indeed, anyone interested in the character and techniques of Soviet foreign policy—which have not changed perceptibly since 1955—should study this book in order to realize what to expect from a communist regime which has at its disposal an arsenal of power second only to that of the United States.

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Books Received

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I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Accelerating Development: The Necessity and the Means. By Lauchlin Currie. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 255 pp. $7.50.

Dr. Currie, who is presently Professor of Economics at the Graduate School of Sociology, National University of Colombia, argues that the dominant capital-output approach to the problem of breaking the vicious circles perpetuating poverty has led development efforts into a blind alley. He stresses the need for "a single concentrated effort to raise the standard of living of the poorest half of the people." In the first section of the book, he diagnoses the problem of continuing underdevelopment, discusses the well-intentioned prescriptions that are not working out as planned, and lists the measures necessary to achieve a breakthrough. In Part II, he applies his diagnosis to Colombia.

Beyond Sovereignty. By Max Mark. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965. 178 pp. $3.75.

The author compares traditional with contemporary international politics and identifies the forces responsible for the movement away from the "obsolescent" nation-state toward a world community, treating the East-West struggle for power, the armaments race and the interplay of demand and response between newly emergent and advanced countries as phenomena hiding deeper changes that will lead to transnationalism.

Cause and Effect: The Hayden Colloquium on Scientific Method and Concept. Edited by Daniel Lerner. New York: The Free Press, 1965. 211 pp. $4.95.

In this fourth volume which concludes the Lerner-edited Hayden Colloquium series on common problems of concept and method in contemporary research (previous titles were *Evidence and Inference, Quantity and Quality, Parts and Wholes*), a distinguished company of scholars shapes the classic concept of causality into a working research and analysis tool in such diverse fields as logic, biology, sociology, economics and political science.

Conversations with Walter Lippmann (transcribed with the cooperation of the Columbia Broadcasting System). Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1965. 242 pp. $4.95.

Seven conversations with the dean of American journalists conducted by Howard K. Smith, Walter Cronkite, David Schoenbrun, Charles Collingswood and Eric Sevareid over the CBS Television Network from August 1960 through February 1965. Major themes of the interviews are Germany's reunification, the

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problems of coexistence with the Soviet Union, the threat of Red China, the neglect of American education because of our involvements abroad, the cost of armaments, and the war in Vietnam.

Developmental Planning. By Richard L. Meier. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 420 pp. $10.00.

Dr. Meier's premise is that economic development is influenced by social, political and cultural factors. From an analysis of the outstanding successes in development since World War II, he constructs a body of realistic procedures for developmental planning which can be put to use by administrators, planners and technicians, emphasizing as the first order of business the need to create an effective national state. He discusses at length the strategy for planning in the areas of industry and education, and concludes with a chapter on urban planning.

Education, Manpower and Economic Growth: Strategies of Human Resource Development. By Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 229 pp. $7.50.

The first eight chapters of this policy-oriented book provide a global analysis of human resource development, in which countries are grouped into four levels: underdeveloped, partially developed, semi-advanced and advanced. Each grouping is analyzed qualitatively as to problems of education and training before the authors outline a "logical" strategy stressing the relationship between human resource development and economic growth. Chapters 9 and 10 reveal how education and manpower planning should be integrated with economic and social development.

The Foundations of Freedom: The Interrelationship Between Democracy and Human Rights. By Durward V. Sandifer and L. Ronald Scheman. New York: Praeger, 1966. 139 pp. $5.00.

Drawing on their extensive experience in United Nations and inter-American affairs, the authors emphasize the dynamic and indissoluble ties between democracy and human rights and discuss the role of international organization in guaranteeing these concepts which, "far from being theoretical ideals, are among the most pragmatic and practical notions that man has devised for his own protection and advancement." Their thesis is that man's rights are secure only when he participates in controlling them through representative government, and that respect for human rights is linked to world peace.

Governmental Policy and International Education. Edited by Stewart Fraser. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. 373 pp. $7.50.

Eighteen conference papers from a symposium held at the International Center, George Peabody College for Teachers, in October 1964, compiled by the Director of the Center, compare the programs of various governments in encouraging and directing education through international exchange. There are papers on "Government Encouragement and Control of International Education in Communist China," "Foreign Students in the Soviet Union and East European Countries," "The Cultural Background of International Education," and on French, German, Canadian, Japanese and U.S. government policies and experience in international educational exchanges.

The International Development Association: A New Approach to Foreign Aid. By James H. Weaver. New York: Praeger, 1965. 268 pp. $15.00.

The author shows how the establishment of the International Development

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Association in 1960 was influenced by the unsuccessful United Nations proposal for SUNFED and the attitudes of the U.S. government and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; considers its problems and effectiveness in promoting the economic development of poor countries whose needs could not be met by the International Bank; and appraises its significance and future.

Die Macht als Mythos und als Wirklichkeit. By Arnold Bergstraesser. Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1965. 192 pp. 12.80 DM.

Dr. Bergstraesser, former professor of political science at several German universities, interprets the ideas of Jacob Burckhardt, Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, Georges Sorel, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto and Alfred Weber on power (*Macht*). This collection of eight lectures, delivered in 1959, inquires into the nature and application of power. The author argues that a lasting peace can be obtained only by the control of power within the framework of international law, and by its transformation from a disordering into an integrating force.

Manpower and Education: Country Studies in Economic Development. Edited by Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 343 pp. $9.00.

Eleven social scientists relate the analysis of human resource problems to economic advancement in a number of countries, including Argentina, Uganda and Communist China. Their penetrating case studies support the conclusions of the editors' earlier treatise, *Education, Manpower and Economic Growth:* that the efficient use of human effort is central to economic development, and that an integrated strategy for human resource development—encompassing a balance of effective formal and technical education, on-the-job training, individual self-development, incentives, manpower assessments, training surveys, wage and salary studies—must be incorporated into the framework of general development planning in order for a country to achieve economic growth.

Politics: A Study of Control Behavior. By Neil A. McDonald. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965. 264 pp. $7.50.

In this study of the dynamics of political organization, Professor McDonald, Chairman of the Political Science Department at Douglass College, takes as his central theme the concept of control. The author contends that man, in seeking the good, orderly, predictable life, develops a loyalty to a control system or "polity." He discusses the basic methods used to achieve control, and the response and resistance of individuals, economic systems, religious institutions and other groups to these methods and instruments of control.

Population Dynamics: International Action and Training Programs. Edited by Minoru Muramatsu and Paul A. Harper. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. 248 pp. $6.50.

Proceedings of the International Conference on Population at the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health in May 1964, which examined action programs in several countries with national policy concerning birth control, including India, Pakistan, Japan and Korea, as well as the administrative, educational, medical and personnel problems entailed in family planning programs.

Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes. By Jacques Ellul; translated by Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner. New York: Knopf, 1965. 320 pp. $8.95.

Professor Ellul, who teaches the history of law and social history at the Univer-

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sity of Bordeaux, discusses the characteristics of propaganda, the conditions for its existence, and its psychological and socio-political effects. In two appendices, he gauges its effectiveness and limitations and briefly reviews Mao Tse-tung's propaganda campaigns from 1926 to the present. Ellul believes that propaganda, the sociological phenomenon that conditions and regulates man, is one of today's greatest dangers to mankind. Moreover, it has become "an inescapable necessity for everyone" in a technological society. "Man must become *aware* of it, if he is to master it." He shows how the communists see it as an all-powerful, legitimate instrument for creating a new type of man. The author, an advocate of democracy and the pre-eminence of man, warns that man is "terribly malleable, uncertain of himself, ready to accept and to follow many suggestions, and is tossed about by all winds of doctrine."

Regionalism and World Order. By Ronald J. Yalem. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965. 160 pp. $4.50.

Professor Yalem assesses the record of regional and universal international organizations since 1920 and the legal, administrative and political relationships between them as approaches to the ideal of world order. He concludes that the drift to regionalism is both a symptom and a cause of disorder, and that the reintegration of regional groupings into a universal organization is unlikely unless the United States and the Soviet Union can reach an enduring accommodation and agree not to disperse nuclear weapons to third powers.

The Springtime of Freedom: The Evolution of Developing Societies. By William McCord. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. 330 pp. $6.00.

Professor McCord portrays "transitional man" in the new nations as affected by the pull of traditional culture and the seductions of authoritarianism. He sets forth existing conditions and changes necessary for economic growth, and measures historical examples from 19th-century Europe, post-1917 Russia and Japan against contemporary India, Indonesia, Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt, China and Bolivia to show that dictatorship is no solution to the political and economic problems of development. His defense of democratic values affirms "that development can proceed without totally uprooting traditional culture; that a pluralistic society provides the surest defense of human dignity; and that totalitarian centralization offers no high road to abundance."

The United Nations at Work: Developing Land, Forests, Oceans . . . and People. By Joseph Marion Jones. London: Pergamon Press, 1965. 238 pp. 21/- (paper).

An account of the efforts of the United Nations and its related agencies to combat hunger and overpopulation and lay the basis for sound economic and social progress by extending capital and "the benefits of modern science to the production, processing, storage, marketing, and consumption of food, fish, fibers, and wood in the underdeveloped countries of the world."

World Trade in Transition. By Virginia L. Galbraith. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965. 104 pp. $2.50 (paper).

Dr. Galbraith, Associate Professor of Economics at Mount Holyoke College, discusses the three competing approaches to international trade—world-wide, as represented by GATT; regional, exemplified by the EEC; and the "new nationalist" policy of the developing nations—in terms of national interest and political prudence as well as purely economic accommodation. She concludes that hope

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of achieving a higher level of world-wide economic welfare lies in the Kennedy Round and subsequent negotiations in GATT.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

Air Transport Policy and National Security: A Political, Economic and Military Analysis. By Frederick C. Thayer, Jr. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965. 351 pp. $8.00.

This book, written by an Air Force lieutenant colonel who has spent 11 years in operational and staff assignments involving airlift or air transport, started out as a dissertation for the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies. Dr. Thayer analyzes the interrelationships of the political, military and economic aspects of both military airlift and commercial air transport policy, treated as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. He traces the development of air transport; explores the controversies regarding its functions, regulation and compartmentalization that have resulted in deficiencies in effectiveness; and makes specific suggestions for refinements of economic theory, revisions to the airline regulatory process, and organizational solutions in matters of strategy and defense.

Defense and Disarmament: The Economics of Transition. Edited by Roger E. Bolton. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 180 pp. $4.95.

The editor, who teaches economics at Harvard, has assembled an assortment of periodical articles, parts of reports published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and excerpts from Congressional hearings, capped by those passages from President Eisenhower's last official address to the nation in which he spoke about the "military-industrial complex." Dr. Bolton in his introduction argues that defense is an economic burden and that the transition to general disarmament is economically feasible.

Deterrence and Strategy. By André Beaufre. New York: Praeger, 1966. 174 pp. $6.95.

French Army General Beaufre sets forth the laws of deterrence and then examines the effects of these laws on contemporary strategy and military force structure. He argues that "the most striking discovery to which study of deterrence leads is that it is the risk of nuclear conflict which keeps the peace so stable. This essential contradiction between the magnitude of the danger and the beneficent effect of its risk is one of the essential characteristics of our era. . . ."

Existing Mechanisms of Arms Control. Edited by Wayland Young. London: Pergamon Press, 1966. 150 pp. $4.95 (paper).

Six European and American arms control experts, in papers which originally appeared in the editor's quarterly, *Disarmament and Arms Control,* discuss various bilateral and multilateral treaties, organizations and methods which have been worked out for the international control and inspection of weapons. The focus is upon the U.S. bilateral safeguards system, the Western European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community, the European Nuclear Energy Agency, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists Movement in America 1945-47. By Alice Kimball Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. 591 pp. $10.00.

The former assistant editor of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* presents a

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well-written, judicious and carefully documented account of the growing interest of scientists in influencing the formulation of public policy attitudes during the period from the later stages of the Manhattan Project through the first two years of postwar efforts to secure international control of the atom. Appendices include the Jeffries Report and the Franck Report in full text.

Science and the University. Edited by Boyd R. Keenan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. 207 pp. $5.95.

Fifteen scientific and administrative experts, all closely identified with scientific research, institutions of higher education and/or public policy, reflect upon such problems as teaching versus research, the dependence of university scientific programs upon federal or foundation support, the relation between the discipline-oriented university and a mission-oriented society, and similar questions.

III. United States and Canada

The American Past: Conflicting Interpretations of the Great Issues. Two volumes. (Revised edition.) Edited by Sidney Fine and Gerald S. Brown. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 555 pp.; 610 pp. $3.95 each (paper).

The editors of this text, first published in 1961, seek to bring into sharp focus the major issues of American history and present conflicting interpretations of these issues. They draw their selections from books, professional journals, monographs and other sources not easily accessible to college students. The first volume begins with selections on the Puritan leadership and democracy in colonial America and ends with the Civil War; volume two concludes with selections on the Truman-MacArthur controversy and the election in 1960 of a Catholic President.

The American Presidency: Leadership, Partisanship, and Popularity. By Stuart Gerry Brown. New York: Macmillan, 1966. 279 pp. $5.95 ($2.50, paper).

By selecting examples in which popular Presidents have or have not made important decisions and have or have not carried out effective policies, the author of this work attempts to illuminate the process of presidential leadership from the perspective of presidential popularity. He discusses presidential popularity in relation to constitutional and domestic issues and foreign policy.

Changing Administrations. By David T. Stanley. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1965. 147 pp. $3.95.

One of Brookings' studies of the transfer of power and continuity of administration in the federal government, this volume concentrates on the Kennedy transition in five departments—State, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, and Health, Education and Welfare—and the Federal Aviation Agency. There is also a brief treatment of the initial transition to the Johnson Administration. The author discusses key appointments; information and briefing sessions supplied by outgoing officials; program changes; changes in organization and personnel administration; effects on career employees; and budgets.

A Day of Dedication: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Woodrow Wilson. Edited by Albert Fried. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 478 pp. $7.95.

A compilation of more than one hundred of the letters, speeches, writings and state papers of Woodrow Wilson, arranged chronologically.

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Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy. By Charles A. Beard. New York: The Free Press, 1965. 474 pp. $2.95 (paper).

A recent edition of Charles Beard's classic work in which he stresses the domination of economic interests in the determination of political issues during the 1790's.

The Making of Foreign Policy. By Andrew H. Berding. Washington: Potomac Books, 1966. 95 pp. $3.00.

Mr. Berding, former Assistant Secretary of State for public information under President Eisenhower, presents a brief survey of the evolution of the roles of the President, Congress, and important departments and officials in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.

Problems of National Strategy. Edited by Henry A. Kissinger. New York: Praeger, 1965. 477 pp. $3.95 (paper).

A collection of readings on strategy and U.S. defense policy, alliances in the nuclear age, the problem of insurgency, the control of modern weapons, and national security policy and governmental organization.

The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation. By Bruce L. R. Smith. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. 332 pp. $7.95.

The postwar phenomenon of the government-contract-supported research or advisory institution—as exemplified by the RAND Corporation—is analyzed for its role in defense policy formulation, in "relating the expert to the politician within some framework of public accountability." Mr. Smith, who undertook this study for his doctoral dissertation in the Department of Government at Harvard and is now a Research Associate at RAND, considers that the advisory groups function not as a "power elite" but in response to "science's growing impact on both the structure of government and the content of public policy." He concludes that "The presence of a number of advisory institutions like RAND helps to assure decision makers of a broad base of scientific advice and to guard against the dangers of a closed system with a narrow technocracy cut off from the healthy effect of outside criticism."

Republic in Crisis: Congress Against the Executive Force. By Alfred de Grazia. New York: Federal Legal Publications, 1965. 303 pp. $7.95.

Professor de Grazia of New York University, who is editor and publisher of the *American Behavioral Scientist,* examines the conflict between freedom and order in the institutions of government and especially in the relations between the U.S. legislative and executive branches. After arguing that the executive represents the national movement toward a society of order while Congress expresses the national urge to liberty, the author finds in the great legislative tradition of the Western world the basis for an ultimate reconstruction of American government, a substitute for "benevolent despotism" and bureaucratic centralization.

Sources in American Diplomacy. Edited by Armin Rappaport. New York: Macmillan, 1966. 367 pp. $3.50.

This collection of documents fundamental to college-level study of the diplomatic history of the United States has been designed to supplement the editor's two-volume *Issues in American Diplomacy* (1965). Each document, selected for its relevance to a major event, is introduced by running narrative that places

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event and document in proper perspective. The introductions also pose questions to guide the student in evaluating documents and issues with reference to other diplomatic events or to domestic affairs.

IV. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

Anatomy of Britain Today. (Revised edition.) By Anthony Sampson. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. 720 pp. $8.50.

The first edition of this unique guide to British society and institutions was published in 1962; about one-quarter of this edition is composed of new material on such subjects as the new party and government leaders, the scandals including the Profumo affair, the reorganization of the Treasury, the new universities, the Plowden report on diplomats, and a final chapter assessing Britain's success in modernizing herself. The book is divided into 37 chapters, each describing an institution or social group, including the aristocracy, royal family, parliament, press, churches, law, civil service, armed forces, bankers and financiers, corporations, nationalized industries, trade unions and television.

The Chair of Peter: A History of the Papacy. By Friedrich Gontard. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. 629 pp. $12.50.

A comprehensive history of the men who have held the Papal office from the time of St. Peter to Paul VI and the Second Vatican Council. The author places more emphasis upon the personal character of the Popes than upon the institution itself, but he nevertheless relates the development of the Papacy to the historical background. This work by a German Protestant has been well received by Catholic, Protestant and secular scholars.

De Gaulle: Implacable Ally. Edited by Roy C. Macridis. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. 248 pp. $6.00.

De Gaulle's dedication to French supremacy is revealed through his major pronouncements over a period of 25 years, from his impassioned resistance speech of June 1940 through the crisis he has provoked in the Atlantic Community. Dr. Macridis, Professor of Politics at Brandeis University, has organized De Gaulle's thought under three topics: the basic conditions of French recovery and independence; the role of France as an independent world power; and the game of balance played by an assertive France as the center of gravity in Europe. His introductory essay sketches De Gaulle as both political philosopher and statesman.

France. By John C. Cairns. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 180 pp. $4.95 ($1.95, paper).

In this volume of the series "The Modern Nations in Historical Perspective," the author presents an interpretive appraisal of the Fifth Republic, describes the chief historical trends and personalities that have contributed to the character, achievements and problems of modern France, and probes the causes for the decline of French power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Die neutralen Alpen. By Manfred Sell. Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1965. 241 pp. n.p.

The author, an internationally known historian and geographer, devises a political and strategic concept for the Alps, based on neutrality for all states in the region. He describes the geography of the Alps; examines the political,

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economic and military environment; and makes an effort to solve the South Tyrol question.

The Political Institutions of the German Revolution 1918-1919. Edited by Charles B. Burdick and Ralph H. Lutz. New York: Praeger, 1966. 305 pp. $7.50.

Published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, this volume has as its purpose to make more readily available to scholars the records of the political institutions of the German revolution of 1918-1919. The editors hope that these documents may shed new light on the successes, compromises and failures of the German government's efforts to cope with the upheaval.

West Berlin: The Legal Context. Edited by Roland J. Stanger. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966. 133 pp. $4.75.

A publication of the Mershon Center for Education in National Security at Ohio State University, this volume consists of four essays, originally presented at a regional meeting of the American Society of International Law, which consider the legal problem of Berlin and suggest possible means for its solution. Stanley D. Metzger writes on The Division of Berlin and of Germany; J. W. Bishop on The Origin and Nature of the Rights of the Western Allies in Berlin; Hans W. Baade on Some Basic Legal Problems Underlying the Berlin Dispute, and Saul Mendlovitz on A Relevant Legal Context for the Problem of West Berlin.

V. Communist Bloc

Communism in Europe: Continuity, Change, and the Sino-Soviet Dispute. Volume 2. Edited by William E. Griffith. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966. 439 pp. $12.50.

This is the second of four collective volumes on the interaction of developments in European communism and the Sino-Soviet dispute, the first having been published in 1964. Both are products of the M.I.T. Center for International Studies' International Communism Project, directed by Professor Griffith. In his introductory essay, Dr. Griffith analyzes the present state of European communism, thereby updating his introduction to Volume 1; sets forth some provisional hypotheses concerning the course of its development; and compares the communist parties in the five countries treated in the major sections of the book—East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Norway and Finland.

The Communist Economic Challenge. By David Ingram. New York: Praeger, 1965. 168 pp. $6.50.

An examination of the "economic achievements and potentialities of communism," particularly as stimulated by Khrushchev, who felt that the economic virtues of communism would overcome the capitalist world. In attempting to distinguish the genuine from the spurious in communist pronouncements on economic matters, the author finds shortcomings as well as advantages in the practical application of communism in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Communist China.

The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction. By Yuan-li Wu. New York: Praeger, 1965. 225 pp. $6.00 ($2.25, paper).

Professor Wu examines the Chinese economy as a planned socialist system dedicated to self-sufficiency and rapid industrialization for the ever-greater power of the Communist Party. He traces the government's efforts to design adminis-

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trative machinery capable of directing the "command economy" both in its long-range plans and its day-to-day operations; discusses resource allocation and income distribution; and investigates the overall "bootstrap" record from 1949 to 1964, evaluating performance in industry and agriculture, the state of Chinese technology, and the fluctuations and growth rate of the economy as a whole.

Leningrad 1941: The Blockade. By Dmitri V. Pavlov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. 186 pp. $4.50.

In the siege of Leningrad, for 900 days between 1941 and 1944, a third of the city's three million people perished; in the blockade, for five critical months from September 1941 through January 1942, 250,000 died of cold and starvation. This is the story of the blockade crisis, told by the chief of all food supplies for the city and the troops defending it.

Russia and Germany: A Century of Conflict. By Walter Laqueur. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965. 367 pp. $6.75.

A study of the history of ideas and attitudes which shaped the political consciousness of Germans, Russians and the East Europeans between them during the last century. After a brief treatment of the historical origins of Russophobia in Germany and Germanophobia in Russia, the author examines in depth the Soviet-German conflict from the end of World War I to 1963.

Warsaw in Exile. By Stefan Korbonski. New York: Praeger, 1966. 325 pp. $8.75.

This is a continuation of the author's experiences as detailed in *Fighting Warsaw,* the story of the Polish Underground State in the period 1939-1945, and *Warsaw in Chains,* an account of Poland in the first three years of communist rule. Combining personal reminiscence with sidelights on major events of recent history, he describes his life as a Pole in the United States and his quest, under the auspices of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, for support to liberate his own and other countries of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. The book also provides a distinctive view of the America he has discovered.

VI. Middle East and Africa

Africa: A Handbook to the Continent. (Revised edition.) Edited by Colin Legum. New York: Praeger, 1966. 558 pp. $18.50.

A comprehensive source book on Africa, brought up to date since its original publication in 1962. Under Mr. Legum's editorship, 42 experts on African affairs survey "the sixty or so territories and islands that constitute the African jigsaw," and examine a number of general subjects concerning the continent as a whole: attitudes of the major powers toward Africa, art and literature, changing cultural patterns, religion, economics, and the role of the United Nations. Detailed maps accompany the discussions.

African Tightrope: My Two Years as Nkrumah's Chief of Staff. By Major-General H. T. Alexander. New York: Praeger, 1966. 152 pp. $4.95.

As Nkrumah's Chief of Staff from January 1960 to September 1961, General Alexander was the first British officer to serve the head of an independent African state; he also led a Ghanaian contingent into the Congo in the days before the arrival of the UN peace-keeping force, when Nkrumah hoped to effect a union between the Congo and Ghana. His account of his experience provides a perceptive analysis of Nkrumah, the man and the political leader; evaluates the

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significance of the Congo crisis and the UN action; and discusses the role of tribalism, nationalism and communism in Ghana's present and future.

Area Development for National Growth: The Turkish Precedent. By Malcolm D. Rivkin. New York: Praeger, 1965. 228 pp. $15.00.

Turkey's program for the development of interior areas, begun under Kemal Ataturk in 1923, has extended urbanization and socio-economic modernization deep into the Anatolian peninsula. Part I of the Rivkin study examines the global problems to which the Turkish experience has relevance. Parts II and III assess Turkey's development effort between 1923 and 1950, under one-party government, and during the 1950's, the decade of multi-party democracy. In Part IV Rivkin studies economic growth in a coal-and-steel producing area, Zonguldak. In Part V the author, who served in Turkey during 1960-1962 as an OECD Consultant to the Regional Planning Bureau of the Ministry of Reconstruction, summarizes lessons that may be useful to other nations seeking to stimulate growth in special areas.

Education and Nation-Building in Africa. Edited by L. Gray Cowan, James O'Connell and David G. Scanlon. New York: Praeger, 1965. 403 pp. $7.50 ($2.95, paper).

Three well-known authorities on African government and education provide materials on the crucial relationship between education and political and economic development in contemporary Africa. The source materials shed light on the expansion of education in Africa, the nature of political decision-making in the sphere of education, and the need to correlate the extension of education with economic growth.

False Start in Africa. By René Dumont. New York: Praeger, 1966. 320 pp. $7.00.

This book by a noted agronomist deals with tropical ex-French Africa, although it touches briefly on the former Belgian colonies and includes a chapter on English-speaking Africa contributed by John Hatch. Professor Dumont emphasizes the necessity for agricultural reform to provide the capital basis for economic takeoff into a fully industrialized society, and believes world cooperation combined with African effort can conquer underdevelopment in 20 years.

A History of Postwar Africa. By John Hatch. New York: Praeger, 1965. 432 pp. $8.50.

A survey of the political aspects of African independence movements, covering the period from 1945 to the achievement of statehood in each new country. The author, former head of the Commonwealth Department of the Labour Party, treats each region of Africa (West, Southern, Central, East and Arab North) separately and in two phases: 1945 to the early 1950's, and the mid-1950's to the early 1960's, during which African independence movements gathered momentum.

Mauritius: Problems of a Plural Society. By Burton Benedict. New York: Praeger (for the Institute of Race Relations, London), 1965. 72 pp. $4.00.

On Mauritius, a speck in the Indian Ocean 500 miles east of Madagascar, nearly 700,000 people depend on sugar production for their existence. Descended from African, Chinese, English, French and Indian forebears, this ethnically fragmented population is attempting to weld itself into a nation. Dr. Benedict describes Mauritian society—its local groupings, occupations, religious composition,

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social stratification, languages—against the island's historical background and present problems of geographical isolation, population explosion and economy, and then discusses politics and government on both local and national levels in evaluating Mauritius' potential for development as a modern state.

Modernization and African Labor: A Tunisian Case Study. By Willard A. Beling. New York: Praeger, 1965. 259 pp. $12.50.

The author's interest in political trade unionism led him to select the Tunisian labor movement as a case study of the relative roles that ideology and nationalism play in the international posture of African labor. He discusses Tunisian labor's activity in the modernization process, its contacts with French, American and other national labor movements, its affiliation with both the communist (WFTU) and anti-communist (ICFTU) federations and the consequent shift of alignment from East to West in 1951, and its involvement with Pan-Arabism, Pan-Maghrebism and Pan-Africanism.

The Politics and Administration of Nigerian Government. Edited by L. Franklin Blitz. New York: Praeger, 1965. 281 pp. $7.50.

A basic textbook on the political, constitutional and administrative systems of Nigeria, as of 1964, written for Nigerians. Chapters cover land, people and tradition; constitutional development; the structure of government at the federal, regional and local levels; political parties; the courts and the legal system; the maintenance of public order; the higher public service; and Nigeria's foreign relations.

Politics in Lebanon. Edited by Leonard Binder. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966. 345 pp. $8.50.

A collection of papers presented three years ago at a conference on the problems of Lebanon at the University of Chicago, and subsequently revised. Most of the contributions deal with political change, socio-economic development and the prospects for stable democratic institutions in one of the world's few remaining confessional states. Contributors include Edward Shils, Albert Hourani, Charles Issawi, Pierre Rondot, Malcolm H. Kerr and J. C. Hurewitz.

Population and Society in the Arab East. By Gabriel Baer. New York: Praeger, 1964. 275 pp. $7.50.

An analysis of demographic trends—including rates of increase, age distribution, and birth and death rates—and the interrelationship between these trends and various components of the social structure, such as women and the family, religious and ethnic communities, bedouins, fellahin and urban groupings in that part of the Arab world stretching from Libya in the west to the Fertile Crescent countries in the east. The author teaches the modern history and development of the Middle Eastern countries at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

South Africa. By John Cope. New York: Praeger, 1965. 236 pp. $7.50.

A member of the South African Parliament from 1953 until 1961 takes an objective look at his vast, fertile, richly endowed country and condemns its policy of apartheid. He sets forth the historic, economic and sociological factors responsible for the interracial crisis, the contributions of the English, Afrikaners, Africans and Asians to the country's development, and the many forces working against apartheid. His conclusion is that inevitably the preponderance and economic indispensability of the non-whites will gain them political and economic freedom, and that the overthrow of apartheid will come from within the Republic rather than from without.

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South Africa's Hostages. By Jack Halpern. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966. 496 pp. $2.25 (paper).

As the three Trust territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland approach political independence, Britain confronts the possibility that her efforts to develop them into democratic nonracial countries will result in a confrontation with South Africa. This book describes the present social and political situation in the territories and offers suggestions as to how Great Britain might conclude satisfactorily her imperial experience on the African continent.

VII. East Asia and the Pacific

Asian Economic Development. Edited by Cranley Onslow. New York: Praeger, 1965. 243 pp. $7.00.

Six national studies of the economic progress, since 1945, of Burma, Ceylon, India, Malaya, Pakistan and Thailand, written by leading economists in these countries, examine rate and progress of economic growth; government attitudes toward planning; relative achievements of public and private enterprise; and internal and external factors that have influenced performance. Mr. Onslow's comparative analysis, which forms Part II of the book, assesses the objectives and experience of the six countries as a group.

China and the Peace of Asia. Edited by Alastair Buchan. New York: Praeger, 1965. 253 pp. $6.00.

This important book, a major contribution to our understanding of Chinese policy and the defense of the noncommunist countries of East Asia, contains papers presented at a conference of some 180 scholars, government officials and experts held at Oxford in September 1964. The contributors include William P. Bundy on "The United States and Asia," Samuel B. Griffith on "The Military Potential of China," Morton Halperin on "China's Strategic Outlook," Charles Wolf on "The Limits of Nuclear Deterrence in Asia," and John W. Holmes on "Techniques of Peacekeeping in Asia." The security problems of India, Japan and Australia are examined, and French and British views of conflict and coexistence in Southeast Asia are presented.

The Chinese in Southeast Asia. (Second edition.) By Victor Purcell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. 623 pp. $13.45.

Victor Purcell completed this revision of his standard work on the Chinese living in Southeast Asia (first published in 1951) just before his death. After a brief introduction, he devotes separate chapters to the Chinese in Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya and Singapore, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines. New demographic material has been included, a new introduction and conclusion have been written, and at the end of each country study an outline of developments since 1949 has been added.

The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia. By Bernard K. Gordon. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 201 pp. $4.95 ($2.45, paper).

The author, Research Professor of Political Science at The George Washington University, examines the major intraregional conflicts besetting Southeast Asia. He traces them from their origins—often lying deep in history—to the current foreign policies of the Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaysia. The last three chapters are devoted to a study of personality in Southeast Asian international politics, and the prospects for regional cooperation and stability.

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Foreign Policy of Pakistan. By Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1964. 125 pp. Rs. 7.50.

A compendium of Foreign Minister Bhutto's speeches in the National Assembly of Pakistan, 1962-1964, in which he discusses the four main aspects of Pakistani foreign policy: relations with India, the Kashmir question, relations with the Western powers, and Western arms aid to India. Also covered are relations with China and the USSR; the boundary agreements with China and Iran, and relations with Afghanistan and other Asian countries.

South Asia and United States Policy. By Norman D. Palmer. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966. 332 pp. $4.25 (paper).

This is a comprehensive examination of U.S. relations with and policy toward the countries of South Asia; the influence of India's and Pakistan's domestic affairs on their foreign policies; and the international relations of the subcontinent, especially the Indo-Pakistan confrontation and Communist China's involvement in South Asian affairs. Some attention is given to Nepal and Ceylon.

VIII. Latin America

How Latin America Views the U.S. Investor. Edited by Raymond Vernon. New York: Praeger, 1966. 117 pp. $10.00.

Four papers treat the role of foreign private investment in Latin American development as it conflicts with the aim of the new elites to achieve real political and economic independence and, in the process, challenge various preconceptions of the U.S. investor. Miguel S. Wionczek gives the overall Latin American view; Enrique Garcia Vazquez, an Argentine view; Helio Jaguaribe, a Brazilian view; and Professor Vernon concludes with his interpretation of the Mexican view.

Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America. By Albert O. Hirschman. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday (An Anchor Book), 1965. 397 pp. $1.45 (paper).

Professor Hirschman chronicles how three stubborn Latin American economic problems—the backwardness of Brazil's northeastern provinces, the need for land reform in Colombia, and inflation in Chile—have been handled throughout modern history, as a means of appraising the problem-solving capabilities of public authorities in Latin America. The study was undertaken for and originally published (1963) by the Twentieth Century Fund.

Latin America. By Tad Szulc. New York: Atheneum, 1966. 185 pp. $1.65 (paper).

A *New York Times* Byline Book by a correspondent who for a decade covered Latin America's revolutionary convulsions and less dramatic efforts at economic and social development, which he terms the parallel themes of this vast region in transition.

Latin American Economic Integration: Experiences and Prospects. Edited by Miguel S. Wionczek. New York: Praeger, 1966. 310 pp. $7.50.

Nineteen essays provide a detailed inventory of the experience of the two Latin American economic integration programs, the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market, and evaluate their outlook and potential. The contributors, economists and social scientists of a dozen nationalities, living on four continents, discuss preferential trade, customs unions,

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economic cooperation, international financing and common markets. They are united in their belief that a revitalized integration program can promote rapid economic growth.

Latin American Trade Patterns. By Donald W. Baerresen, Martin Carnoy and Joseph Grunwald. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1965. 329 pp. $6.00.

A statistical study intended as a basis for further research on the economic integration of Latin America, particularly as regards the Latin American Free Trade Association. Existing patterns of trade among LAFTA members and countries likely to join the association are examined through a historical survey and systematized collection of trade data.

Obstacles to Change in Latin America. Edited by Claudio Veliz. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. 252 pp. $6.75.

A number of prominent Latin American scholars, most of them with substantial practical experience in their respective countries, agree that foreign models cannot be applied successfully to the Latin American scene. In their essays, they attribute this fact to the existence in Latin America of a sophisticated pre-industrial urban civilization and to the extraordinary strength of traditionalism, stagnation and stability in the area. They conclude that unless the traditional institutional structure is fundamentally transformed, the area will be unable to develop satisfactorily.

Organized Labor in Latin America. By Robert J. Alexander. New York: The Free Press, 1965. 274 pp. $5.95.

Professor Alexander, who has studied the labor movements of Latin America for a quarter of a century, generalizes on the economic and social background of organized labor in Latin America, its politicalization and the achievements of collective bargaining, and then devotes fourteen chapters to a highly detailed survey of the history and present condition of labor in the separate countries of the region, including Central America and the Caribbean. The concluding chapter examines the role of international trade union organizations in the Latin American labor movement.

Transport and the Economic Integration of South America. By Robert T. Brown. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1966. 278 pp. $6.00.

Starting from the assumption that larger export markets, wider geographic distribution of industrial activity, and an improved transportation network to support a common market approach are prerequisites for economic progress in Latin America, the author examines the relationship between transportation and economic integration of South America. Based on his findings, the author attempts to outline a general transportation strategy for the whole area.

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Monographs and Reports Received

Argentine Radicalism: The History and Doctrine of the Radical Civil Union. By Peter G. Snow. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1965. 137 pp. $3.75 ($2.75 paper).

Arms Control and Disarmament: The Critical Issues. By James E. Dougherty. Washington: Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic Studies, Special Report Series, No. 1, 1966. 88 pp. n.p.

Canadian Wheat in a Hungry World. By Lewis A. Fischer. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Behind the Headline Series, April 1966. 13 pp. 35 cents.

Chinese Communist Intrigues Against the Second Afro-Asian Conference. By Feng Wen. Taipei, Taiwan: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, December 1965. 60 pp. 65 cents.

The Chinese Communists' Role in the War in Vietnam. By Chen Tse-ming. Taipei, Taiwan: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, December 1965. 50 pp. 55 cents.

The Chinese People's Republic. By Dennis J. Doolin and Robert C. North. Stanford: Stanford University, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, *Hoover Institution Studies, No. 14, May 1966.* 68 pp. $2.00.

Dominican Action—1965: Intervention or Cooperation? By Willard L. Beaulac, Karl H. Cerny, Jules Davids, Eleanor Lansing Dulles and Joseph S. Farland. Washington: Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic Studies, Special Report Series, No. 2, July 1966. 85 pp. $2.00.

Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework. By Andrew F. Westwood. Washington: The Brookings Institution, a Staff Paper, April 1966. 115 pp. $1.95.

France and its Armed Forces. Embassy of France, Service de Presse et d'Information, New York, December 1964. 56 pp. n.p.

The Involvement of Peasants in Internal Wars. By Gil Carl Alroy. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 24, June 1966. 38 pp. $1.00.

The Korean People's Democratic Republic. By Glenn D. Paige. Stanford: Stanford University, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Hoover Institution Studies, No. 11, April 1966. 60 pp. $2.00.

The Mongolian People's Republic. By Robert A. Rupen. Stanford: Stanford University, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Hoover Institution Studies, No. 12, May 1966. 74 pp. $2.00.

New Error-Compensated Measures for Comparing Nations: Some Correlates of Civil Violence. By Ted Gurr. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 25, May 1966. 126 pp. $2.00.

The Nuclear Blackmail of Communist China. By Kun-hou Lih. Taipei, Taiwan: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, September 1965. 46 pp. 50 cents.

Soviet Local and Republic Elections. By Max E. Mote. Stanford: Stanford University, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Study No. 10, 1965. 123 pp. $2.50.

Strengthening the Free World Through Steps Toward Atlantic Unification. By the NPA Board of Trustees and Standing Committees. Washington: The National Planning Association, Special Report No. 63, May 1966. 16 pp. $1.00.

Synopses of United Nations Cases. Compiled by Catherine G. Teng and Kay L. Hancock. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 1966. $1.00.

United States-Western European Travel and Trade Relations. A Study by the European Airlines Research Bureau. Paris: European Airlines Research Bureau, February 1966. 27 pp. n.p.

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Contributors to this Issue

Edward Teller, nuclear physicist, University of California.

Edmond Combaux, Ingénieur Militaire Général des Télécommunications, French Army (Ret.); Vice-Chairman of the *Revue de Défense Nationale* (Paris).

Robert C. Hill, Member, New Hampshire House of Representatives; formerly, U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, El Salvador and Mexico.

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Associate Editor, ORBIS; Staff Member, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.

Bernard K. Gordon, Research Professor of Political Science, The George Washington University; currently on leave of absence as director of a research project on Southeast Asia for the Research Analysis Corporation; author of *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Prentice-Hall, 1966).

Justus M. van der Kroef, Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Bridgeport; author of *The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program and Tactics* (University of British Columbia Press, 1965).

Willard Range, Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia.

Victor Basiuk, Associate Professor of Political Science, Graduate Program on Science, Technology, and Public Policy, Case Institute of Technology; Research Associate, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University; Consultant, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy.

Raymond L. Garthoff, Special Assistant for Soviet Bloc Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; Lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University.

Benjamin Rivlin, Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

Werner Feld, Professor and Chairman, Department of Government, Louisiana State University in New Orleans; author of *The Court of the European Communities: New Dimension in International Adjudication.*

Edward G. Janosik, Staff Consultant to the East European Project, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; author of forthcoming book on Constituency Labour Parties in Britain.

Fredrick B. Pike, Professor of Latin American History, University of Pennsylvania; author of forthcoming book, *A History of Republican Peru* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).

Bryce F. Denno, Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.); Director of Instruction and Research, The Military Assistance Institute, Arlington, Virginia; formerly, Senior Advisor, I Vietnamese Corps.

Dorothea S. Michelman, free-lance writer on historical, political and cultural subjects; graduate of lyceum, Mainz, 1946.

Kurt L. London, Director, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, and Professor of International Affairs, The George Washington University.

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